

BRAHMA SUTRAS

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY ŚHRĪ SWĀMĪ ŚHIVĀNANDA

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To: Śhrī Vyāsa Bhagavan, Śhrī Jagadguru Śhaṅkarāchārya and Śhrīmad Appayya Dikshitar.

Notes on the symb-ol.org soft copy:

Any translations or comments added by us are in italics. Sanskrit transliteration has been changed to the usual symb-ol.org style (explained in the ‘Sanskrit Pronunciation Guide’ on the Home Page).

*A **Glossary** of Sanskrit terms used in the book is added at the end. However Swāmī Śhivānanda uses a lot of Sanskrit terms and it is not possible to explain them all.*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Chh. Up	Chhandogya Upaniṣhad
Tait. Up	Taittiriya Upaniṣhad
Kau. Up	Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad
Ait. Up	Aitareya Upaniṣhad
Mun. Up	Mundaka Upaniṣhad
Bri. Up	Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad
Katha Up	Katha Upaniṣhad
Kena Up .	Kena Upaniṣhad
Prasna Up	Prasna Upaniṣhad
Svet. Up	Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad
Sat. Br	Satapatha Brāhmaṇa

SHRI SWAMI SHIVANANDA

Born on the 8th September, 1887, in the illustrious family of Sage Appayya Dikshitar and several other renowned saints and savants, Śhrī Swāmī Śhivānanda had a natural flair for a life devoted to the study and practice of Vedānta. Added to this was an inborn eagerness to serve all and an innate feeling of unity with all mankind.

His passion for service drew him to the medical career; and soon he gravitated to where he thought that his service was most needed. Malaya claimed him. He had earlier been editing a health journal and wrote extensively on health problems. He discovered that people needed right knowledge most of all; dissemination of that knowledge he espoused as his own mission.

It was divine dispensation and the blessing of God upon mankind that the doctor of body and mind renounced his career and took to a life of renunciation to qualify for ministering to the soul of man. He settled down at Rishikesh in 1924, practised intense austerities and shone as a great Yogi, saint, sage and Jīvan-mukta – *‘liberated while alive’*.

In 1932 Swāmī Śhivānanda started the Śhivānand’āshram.

In 1936 was born The Divine Life Society. In 1948 the Yoga-Vedānta Forest Academy was organised. Dissemination of spiritual knowledge and training of people in Yoga and Vedānta were their aim and object. In 1950 Swāmījī undertook a lightning tour of India and Ceylon. In 1953 Swāmījī convened a ‘World Parliament of Religions’. Swāmījī is the author of over 300 volumes and has disciples all over the world, belonging to all nationalities, religions and creeds. To read Swāmījī's works is to drink at the Fountain of Wisdom Supreme. On 14th July, 1963 Swāmījī entered Mahāsamādhi – *‘final absorption’*. (7)

PREFACE

It need not be over-emphasised that the Brahma Sūtras, or the Nyāya-Prasthāna –‘*expositions of doctrine*’ of the triad* of Indian Philosophical treatises hold supreme sway over the later rationalistic and scholastic developments. Right from the mighty brain of Śhaṅkara down to the master-intellecets like Śhrīharsha, Chitsukha and Madhusudana, the main polemics have been occupied with the task of establishing the doctrine of absolute Monism and refuting the views contrary to it, by appeal to logic as well as authority alike, which find their seeds already sown in the Brahma Sūtras. The founder of a new religious and philosophical school had simply to write a new commentary on the Brahma Sūtras so that his view may be accepted by the mass of people. Such is the authority of the Brahma Sūtras, the work of Bādarāyaṇa.

Commentaries there have been many on the Brahma Sūtras, but either they are too short and insufficient to be useful for a comprehensive study of the Sūtras, or are extremely tough and abstruse to be utilized by men of ordinary understanding. This work of Swāmī Śhivānanda is of a unique type in itself, unrivalled by any other. This commentary is neither too short to be useless, nor too verbose to be unintelligible, but follows a via media course, useful to one and all, mainly the spiritual aspirants, who want thought, not mere word.

Swāmījī has got his own inimitable way of writing, which is a boon to the inquisitive student on the spiritual path. All real aspirants after Truth should possess this book, for it is a guide-light that is capable of steering them across the sea of ignorance and doubt.

* *The three are the Upanishads, the Brahma Sūtra and the Bhagavad Gītā.*

Swāmījī has left nothing unsaid that may be useful to the student of the Brahma Sūtras, and in addition has given useful information which will not be found in other notes and commentaries. The division of each Pada –‘section’ into the relevant Adhikaraṇas –‘subjects’ marking at the same time the number of Sūtras they contain, the subject matter they treat of, and the accompaniment of each Sūtra by the serial number from the very beginning is for the use and guidance of the student. An elaborate introduction precedes the work in addition to a short introduction and a summary of the different Adhikaraṇas preceding each Pada.

These are all a boon to the student of the Brahma Sūtras for which the incomparable Swāmījī has to be eulogised.

More need not be said than that the production is a marvellous one. Swāmījī has completed his annotations on the Prasthāna-traya with his Brahma Sūtras. His writings are too famous to necessitate further introduction.

-THE DIVINE LIFE SOCIETY

(8)

Note: *The Sanskrit text of the Brahma Sūtras has not been included in this soft copy (although present in Shivānanda’s original work) on the grounds of its being a less interesting encumbrance to the western student.*

Dhyāna Śhlokas –‘Meditation Verses’

I prostrate myself before that Guru, the Existence, devoid of the three Guṇas –‘*attributes*’, beyond comprehension, the witness of all mental functions, changeless and pure, one and eternal, transcending the pairs of opposites, expansive like the sky, reachable through the sentences like ‘Thou art That’, the Mass of Absolute Wisdom.

He whom the Śhaivas worship as Śhiva; the Vedāntins as the Absolute (Brahman); the Buddhists as Lord Buddha; the logicians, the experts in the theory of knowledge, as the Creator; those following the teachings of Jaina as the Arhat and the ritualists as the Sacrifice; may that Hari, the Lord of the three worlds, give you the desired object.

I worship the great Rishi Vyāsa, who is called Kṛṣṇa-dvaipayana – ‘*dark-skinned, born on an island*’, who is worshipped by gods, men and Asuras –‘*demons*’ alike, who is the form of Viṣṇu, who is like the light of the rising sun to the darkness of the impurities of the age of Kali, who belongs to the family of Vasishtha, who divided the Vedas into different sections, who is the seed of Dharma, who wrote the Puranas, the Brahma Sūtras, the Mahābhārata and the Smṛiti.

I contemplate on Śhaṅkarāchārya, who is seated in Padmāsana –‘*Lotus posture*’, who is tranquil, who is established in self-restraint, whose glory is like that of the enemy of Cupid (*Lord Shiva*), who wears the sacred ashes shining on his forehead, whose smiling face resembles the blossomed lotus, who has lotus-like eyes, whose neck is conch-like, holding book in one hand and indicating Jñāna-mudra –‘*hand posture of knowledge*’ (with another hand), who is adored by the foremost of gods, who gives boons to those who prostrate to him. (10)

Śhrī Śhaṅkara-desik'aṣṭakam -'eight verses in praise of Shrī Ādi Śhaṅkāchārya' (by Hastamalaka)

1. O ocean of the nectar of illumined knowledge of the whole Śhastras! Thou hast revealed the treasure of the meaning of the great Upaniṣhads. I meditate on Thy pure Lotus Feet in my heart, O Śhaṅkara Desika (Āchārya), be Thou my refuge.
2. O ocean of mercy! Protect me who am afflicted sorely by the pains of Samsāra; Thou hast expounded the truth of the various schools of philosophy, O Śhaṅkara Desika, be Thou my refuge.
3. By Thee the humanity has attained happiness. Thou art endowed with a fine intellect reflecting Self-knowledge. I meditate on Thee who expounded the identity of Jīva –'soul' and Īśhwara –'God', O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge.
4. "Thou art my God"- thus thinking my mind became full of joy. Remove the great ocean of delusion in me, O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge.
5. It is through various meritorious actions done by me for a long time that I have got in me a love for the vision of Thy Lotus Feet. Protect this humble self, O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge.
6. For the redemption of mankind great souls like Thy Self move about from place to place. Thou seems to me like the pure and resplendent sun, O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge.
7. O best of Gurus, O Lord Śhiva! It is impossible for anyone to gauge Thy mental poise. O Protector of the refuges! O Repository of Knowledge! O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge.
8. I have not been able to find any treasure worthy of possession except Thee, O Preceptor! Have mercy on me which is Thy natural quality, O Śhaṅkara, be Thou my refuge. (12)

(3) INTRODUCTION

Hari Om! Salutations to Śhrī Vyāsa, the Avatāra of Viṣṇu, the wise Bādarāyana and Śhrī Kṛiṣṇa Dvaipayana.

Vedas consist of three portions viz. the Karma Kāṇḍa – ‘*Action Section*’ which deals with sacrifices or ceremonial rites, the Upāsana Kāṇḍa – ‘*Worship Section*’ which treats of worship and the Jñāna Kāṇḍa – ‘*Knowledge Section*’ which deals with knowledge of Brahman. Karma Kāṇḍa represents the feet of a man, Upāsana Kāṇḍa the heart, and the Jñāna Kāṇḍa the head. Just as the head is the most important portion of a man, so also the Upaniṣhads which treat of the knowledge portion of the Vedas is the head of the Vedas. Hence it is said to be the Śhiras (head) of Vedas.

Mīmāṃsā means the investigation or enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts. Of this Mīmāṃsā two branches have been recognised, the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā (earlier) and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā (the later). The former systematises the Karma Kāṇḍa- the portion of the Veda which pertains to action and sacrifices and which comprises Samhitas and the Brāhmaṇas; the latter systematises the Jñāna Kāṇḍa i.e. that part of the Vedas which includes the Aranyaka portion of the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣhads.

Jaimini is the author of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. Śhrī Vyāsa (Bādarāyaṇa or Kṛiṣṇa Dvaipayana) the Guru of Jaimini is the author of the Brahma Sūtras otherwise known as Vedānta Sūtras. The study of Brahma Sūtras is a synthetic study of the Upaniṣhads. It treats of the Vedānta philosophy.

The Vedas are eternal. They were not written by any individual.

They came out from the breath of Hiranya-garbha –‘*Golden Egg*’ (Lord Brahmā).

Vedānta is the end or gist of the Vedas. It deals with the knowledge portion. Vedānta is not mere speculation. It is the authentic record of transcendental experiences or direct and actual realisation of the great Hindu Rishis or seers. Brahma Sūtras is the Science of the Soul.

Sūtras –‘*strings, threads*’ are concise aphorisms. They give the essence of the arguments on a topic. Maximum of thought is compressed or condensed into these Sūtras in as few words as possible. It is easy to remember them. Great intellectual people only, with realisation, can compose Sūtras. They are clues or aids to memory. They cannot be understood without a lucid commentary (Bhāṣhya). The commentary also is in need of further elaborate explanation. Thus the interpretations of the Sūtras gave rise to various kinds of literary writings such as Vrittis (gloss) and Karikas. The different Āchāryas (founders of different schools of thought) have given their own interpretations of the Sūtras to establish their own doctrines. The Bhāṣhya of Śhrī Śhaṅkara on Brahma Sūtras is known as Śharīraka Bhāṣhya. His school of thought is Kevala Advaita –‘*absolute non-duality*’. The Bhāṣhya of Śhrī Rāmānuja who founded the Visisht’ādvaita School is called Śhrī Bhāṣhya. The commentary of Śhrī Nimbark’āchārya is known as Vedānta-parijata-saurabha. Śhrī Vallabh’āchārya expounded his system of philosophy of Suddh’ādvaita (pure monism) and his commentary on the Brahma Sūtras is known as Anu Bhāṣhya.

Sanskrit is very elastic. It is like Kāmadhenu or Kalpataru. You can milk out of it various kinds of Rasas according to your intellectual calibre

and spiritual experiences. Therefore different Āchāryas have built different systems of thought or cults by interpreting the Sūtras in their own ways and became founders of sects. Madhva founded his own system of Dvaita. The cults of Viṣṇu known as Bhagavata or Pancharatra and those of Śhiva, Pasupata or Mahesvara have interpreted Brahma Sūtras in accordance with their own tenets.

Nimbarkāchārya interpreted the Vedānta system from the standpoint of Bhedabheda-Dvaitadvaita. He was largely influenced by the teachings of Bhaskara who flourished in the first half of the ninth century.

The theory held by Bhaskara and Nimbarka was held by the ancient teacher Audulomi. Bādarāyaṇa himself refers to this theory in his Brahma Sūtras.

There are more than fourteen commentaries on the Brahma Sūtras. Śhrī Appaya Dikshita rendered the commentary of Śhrī Śhaṅkara more clear by his Parimala, Śhrī Vachaspati Misra by his work Bhamati and Śhrī Amalānanda Sarasvati by his Kalpataru.

The erroneous identification of the body with the pure Ātman is the root cause for human sufferings and miseries and for births and deaths. You identify yourself with the body and say, 'I am fair, dark, stout or thin. I am a Brahmin, I am a Kshatriya, I am a doctor'. You identify yourself with the senses and say, 'I am blind, I am dumb'. You identify yourself with the mind and say, 'I know nothing. I know everything. I became angry. I enjoyed a good meal. I am suffering from this disease'. The entire object of the Brahma Sūtras is to remove this erroneous identification of the Soul with the body which is the root cause of your

sufferings and miseries. which is the product of Avidyā (ignorance) and help you in the attainment of the final emancipation through knowledge of Brahman.

The Upaniṣhads seem to be full of contradictions at first. They do not contain consistent system of thought. Śhrī Vyāsa systematised the thoughts or philosophy of the Upaniṣhads in his Brahma Sūtras.

The Sūtras reconcile the conflicting statements of the Upaniṣhads. In reality there are no conflicts for the thinker. Audulomi and Asmarathya also did this work in their own way and founded their own schools of thought.

Those who wish to study the philosophy of Vedānta should study the Ten Classical Upaniṣhads and the Brahma Sūtras. All Āchāryas have commented on Brahma Sūtras. This is a great authority for every philosophical school in India. If any Āchārya wishes to establish his own cult or sect or school of thought he will have to write a commentary of his own on Brahma Sūtras. Then only it will be recognised.

The five great Āchāryas: Śhrī Śhaṅkara the exponent of Kevala Advaita or uncompromising monism, Śhrī Rāmānuja the exponent of Visishtadvaita or qualified monism, Śhrī Nimbarka the exponent of Bhedabheda-vada, Śhrī Madhva the exponent of strict Dvaitism or Dvaita-vada and Śhrī Vallabha the exponent of Suddhadvaita-vada or pure monism agree that Brahman is the cause of this world and that knowledge of Brahman leads to Moksha or the final emancipation, which is the goal of life. They also emphatically declared that Brahman can be known only through the scriptures and not through mere reasoning. But they differ amongst themselves as to the nature of this

Brahman, the relation of the individual soul to Brahman, the state of the soul in the state of final emancipation, the means of attaining It and its causality with reference to this universe.

According to Śhrī Śhaṅkara, there is one Absolute Brahman who is Sat-chit-ānanda, who is of an absolutely homogeneous nature. The appearance of this world is due to Māyā - the illusory power of Brahman which is neither Sat –‘*reality*’ nor Asat –‘*non-reality*’. This world is unreal. This world is a Vivarta or apparent modification through Māyā. Brahman appears as this universe through Māyā. Brahman is the only reality. The individual soul has limited himself through Avidyā and identification with the body and other vehicles. Through his selfish actions he enjoys the fruits of his actions. He becomes the actor and enjoyer. He regards himself as atomic and as an agent on account of Avidyā or the limiting Antaḥkaraṇa. The individual soul becomes identical with Brahman when his Avidyā is destroyed. In reality Jīva is all-pervading and identical with Brahman. Īśhwara or Saguna Brahman is a product of Māyā.

Worship of Īśhwara leads to Krama Mukti –‘*liberation from the material*’. The pious devotees (the knowers of Saguna Brahman) go to Brahmaloḥa and attain final release through highest knowledge. They do not return to this world.

They attain the Nirguna Brahman at the end of the cycle. Knowledge of Nirguna Brahman is the only means of liberation. The knowers of Nirguna Brahman attain immediate final release or Sadyo-mukti. They need not go by the path of gods or the path of Devayana. They merge themselves in Para Brahman. They do not go to any Loka or world. Śhrī

Śhaṅkara's Brahman is Nirviśheṣha Brahman (impersonal Absolute) without attributes.

According to Śhrī Rāmānuja, Brahman is with attributes (Saviśheṣha). He is endowed with all auspicious qualities. He is not intelligence itself. Intelligence is his chief attribute. He contains within Himself whatever exists. World and individual souls are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter (Achit) and soul (Chit) form the body of the Lord, Lord Nārāyana – '*Shri Vishnu*' who is the Inner Ruler (Antaryāmin). Matter and souls are called modes of Him (Prakara).

The individual souls will never be entirely resolved in Brahman. According to Rāmānuja, Brahman is not absolutely one and homogeneous. The individual souls undergo a state of Śhaṅkocha (contraction) during Pralaya. They expand (Vikasa) during creation.

Śhrī Rāmānuja's Brahman is a Personal God with attributes. The individual soul of Rāmānuja is really individual. It will remain a personality for ever. The soul remains in Vaikuntha for ever in a state of bliss and enjoys the divine Aiśhvarya of Lord Nārāyana. Bhakti is the chief means to final emancipation and not Jñāna. Śhrī Rāmānuja follows in his Bhāṣhya the authority of Bodhāyana.

According to Śhrī Nimbark'āchārya, Brahman is considered as both the efficient and material cause of the world. Brahman is both Nirguna and Saguna. The universe is not unreal or illusory but is a true manifestation or Parinama of Brahman. (Śhrī Rāmānuja also holds this view. He says "Just as milk is transformed into curd, so also Brahman has transformed Himself as this universe"). This world is identical with

and at the same time different from Brahman just as the wave or bubble is the same and at the same time different from water.

The individual souls are parts of the Supreme Self. They are controlled by the Supreme Being. The final salvation lies in realising the true nature of one's own soul. This can be achieved by Bhakti (devotion). The individuality of the finite self (Jīvatman) is not dissolved even in the state of final emancipation. Śhrī Rāmānuja also holds that the Jīva assumes the divine body of Śhrī Narayana with four hands and enjoys in Vaikuntha the divine Aisvarya of the Lord.

You may ask why do such great realised souls hold different views, why have they started different cults or systems. The highest philosophy of Śhrī Śhaṅkara which bespeaks of the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul cannot be understood by the vast majority of persons. Therefore Śhrī Madhva and Śhrī Rāmānuja started their Bhakti cult. The different schools are different rungs in the ladder of Yoga. The student must place his foot step by step and finally reach the highest peak of perfection - the Kevaladvaita realisation of Śhrī Śhaṅkara. As temperaments are different, different schools are also necessary to suit the taste, capacity, and stage of evolution of the aspirant. Therefore all schools and cults are necessary. They have got their own place and scope.

The views of various Āchāryas are all true in respect of the particular aspect of Brahman dealt with by them each in his own way.

Śhaṅkara has taken Brahman in His transcendental aspect, while Śhrī Rāmānuja has taken Him chiefly in His immanent aspect. People were following blindly the rituals during the time of Śhrī Śhaṅkara. When he

was preparing his commentary he had in view the purpose of combating the baneful effects which blind ritualism produced. He never condemned selfless service or Nishkāma Karma Yoga. He condemned the performance of rituals with selfish motives.

Śhaṅkara Bhāṣhya is the oldest of all commentaries. It upholds Suddha-Para-Brahman or the Supreme Self of the Upaniṣhads as something superior to other divine beings. It propounds a very bold philosophy and declares emphatically that the individual soul is identical with the Supreme Self. Śhaṅkara's philosophical view accurately represents the meaning of Bādarāyaṇa. His explanations only faithfully render the intended meaning of Śhrī Vyāsa. This is beyond doubt and dispute.

Students of Kevaladvaita School of Philosophy should study the Śharīraka Bhāṣhya of Śhrī Śhaṅkara which is profound, subtle and unique. It is an authority which leads to the right understanding of the Brahma Sūtras. The best thinkers of India, Germany, America and England belong to this school. It occupies a high rank in books on philosophy. Advaita philosophy is the most sublime and the grandest philosophy of the Hindus.

You can understand the Brahma Sūtras if you have a knowledge of the twelve classical Upaniṣhads. You can understand the second chapter if you have a knowledge of Saṅkhya, Nyāya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vaiseshika Darśhana and Buddhistic school, too. All these schools are refuted here by Śhrī Śhaṅkara. Śhrī Śhaṅkara's commentary is the best commentary. Dr. Thibaut has translated this commentary into English. "Brahma Sūtras" is one of the books of Prasthāna-traya –*'three expositions'*. This is an authoritative book on Hindu Philosophy.

The work consists of 4 Adhyāyas (chapters), 16 Padas (sections), 223 Adhikaraṇas (topics) and 555 Sūtras (aphorisms). The first chapter (Samanvay'ādhyāya) unifies Brahman, the second (Avirodh'ādhyāya) refutes other philosophies, the third (Sadhan'ādhyāya) deals with practice (Sadhana) to attain Brahman and the fourth (Phal'ādhyāya) treats of fruits of Self-realisation. Each chapter contains four Padas. Each Pada contains Adhikaraṇas. Each Adhikaraṇa has separate question to discuss. The first five Adhikaraṇas of the first chapter are very, very important.

Glory to Śhrī Vyāsa Bhagavan, son of Parasara, the mighty sage, a Chiranjivi who has written all Puranas and also divided the Vedas.

May his blessings be upon you all! Salutations to Śhrī Ganesha, Śhrī Sarasvati Devi, Śhrī Śhaṅkarāchārya and all Brahma-Vidyā-Gurus.

(9) CHAPTER I, SAMANVAY'ĀDHYĀYA –'mutual connection chapter', SECTION 1, INTRODUCTION.

The Vedānta Sūtras are called "Śharīraka Mīmāṃsā" because they deal with Para Brahman, the Śharīra (the embodied).

In the first chapter the author shows that all the Vedic texts uniformly refer to Brahman and find their Samanvaya (reconciliation) in Him. In the second chapter, it has been proved that there is no conflict between Vedānta and other Śhastras. In the third chapter the means of attaining Brahman are described. In the fourth chapter is described the result of attaining Brahman.

The Adhikārin (one who is competent to understand and study the Śhastra) is one who is of tranquil mind and has the attributes of Sama (quietude), Dama (self-control), etc., is full of faith, is constantly engaged in good thoughts and associates with the knowers of Truth, whose heart is purified by the due discharge of all duties, religious and secular. and without any idea of reward. The Sambandha is the description of Brahman by this Śhastra. The Vishaya or the subject matter of this Śhastra is the Supreme Brahman who is all pure. The Prayojana (necessity) of this Śhastra is to obtain realisation of the Supreme Brahman, by the removal of all false notions that prevent that realisation.

This Śhastra consists of several Adhikaraṇas or topics or propositions. Every proposition consists of five parts:-(1) Thesis or Vishaya, (2) Doubt or Samsaya, (3) Anti-thesis or Pūrva-paksha -'Objection', (4) Synthesis or right conclusion or Siddhanta and (5) Sangati or agreement of the proposition with the other parts of the Śhastra.

In the whole book of the Vedānta Sūtras Brahman is the main theme or the subject matter of discussion. An interpretation of any passage must not go away from the subject matter of Brahman. Each chapter has a particular topic of its own. A passage must be interpreted consistently with the topic of that chapter. There is a certain relation between Adhikaraṇas or topics themselves. One Adhikaraṇa leads to another through some particular association of ideas. In a Pada or section there are many Adhikaraṇas and they are not put together in a haphazard manner.

SYNOPSIS

This section gives a bird's-eye view of the subject dealt with in the Brahma Sūtras namely the nature of the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self, of the individual soul and the universe and their inter-relations and gives hints on meditation on Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa I: Sūtra 1 gives a hint that the book is meant for those who are endowed with a real desire for attaining the knowledge of Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa II: Sūtra 2 defines Brahman as that whence the world originates etc.

Adhikaraṇa III: Sūtra 3 declares that Brahman is the source of the Vedas and that Brahman is known only by the study of Śhruti and by no other means of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa IV: Sūtra 4 proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedānta texts.

Adhikaraṇa V: Sūtras 5 to 11 show that none but Brahman is admitted by Śhruti to be the cause of the world. They prove by various cogent and convincing arguments that the Brahman which the Vedāntic texts proclaim as the cause of the universe is an intelligent principle, and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent or insentient Pradhāna from which the world originates, as declared by the Saṅkhyas.

Adhikaraṇa VI: Sūtras 12 to 19 raise the question whether the 'Ānandamaya' in Taittiriya Upaniṣhad II-5 is merely the individual soul or the Supreme Self. The Sūtras show that Brahman is All-Bliss and that by the term 'Ānandamaya' in Śhruti is meant neither the individual soul, nor the Pradhāna of Saṅkhyas. The Sūtras prove that they all describe none but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VII." Sūtras 20 and 21, show that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye mentioned in Chh. Up. I-6 are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the highest Brahman or the Supreme Self.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: Sūtra 22 shows that the ether (Ākāśha) from which according to Chh. Up. I-9 all beings originate, is not the elemental ether but the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa IX: Sūtra 23 shows that Prāṇa, also mentioned in Chh. Up. I-11-15 is the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa X: Sūtras 24 to 27 teach that the light spoken of in Chh. Up. III-13-7 is not the ordinary physical light but the Supreme Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XI: Sūtras 28 to 31 decide that the Prāṇa mentioned in Kau. Up. III-2 is Brahman.

(12) CHAPTER I, SAMANVAY'ĀDHYĀYA, SECTION 1

Topic 1: The enquiry into Brahman and its pre-requisites.

I.1.(1) Now, therefore, the enquiry into Brahman.

Sūtra literally means a string. It serves the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedānta passages.

The word Atha is not used to introduce a new subject that is going to be taken up. It is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution.

The enquiry of Brahman specially depends upon some antecedent conditions. The enquirer should be endowed with certain spiritual requisites or qualifications. Then only the enquiry is possible.

Atha i.e. after the attainment of certain preliminary qualifications such as the four means of salvation viz.

(1) Nitya-anitya-vastuviveka (discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal);

(2) Ihamutrarthaphalabhogaviraga (indifference to the enjoyment in this life or in heaven, and of the fruits of one's actions);

(3) Shatsampat (sixfold virtues viz. Sama - control of mind, Dama - control of the external senses, Uparati - cessation from worldly enjoyments or not thinking of objects of senses or discontinuance of religious ceremonies, Titiksha - endurance of pleasure and pain, heat and cold, Śhraddhā - faith in the words of the preceptor and of the Upaniṣhads and Samadhana - deep concentration);

(4) Mumukshutva (desire for liberation).

Those who have got an earnest desire for the knowledge of Brahman only are fit for the study of Vedānta Philosophy or Brahma Sūtras. Even without possessing the knowledge of Karma Kāṇḍa which deals with religious ceremonies or sacrifices, a desire for attaining the knowledge of Brahman will arise direct from the study of the Śhrutis. The enquiry of Brahman does not depend on the performance of any acts.

(13)

You must know and realise the eternal Brahman. Then only you will attain eternal bliss, freedom, perfection and immortality. You must have certain preliminary qualifications for your search. Why should you enquire about Brahman? Because the fruits obtained by sacrifices etc., are ephemeral, whereas the knowledge of Brahman is eternal. Life in this earth and the life in heaven which you will attain on account of your virtuous deeds is transient. If you know Brahman, you will enjoy everlasting bliss and immortality. That is the reason why you must start the quest of Brahman or the Truth or the Ultimate Reality.

A time comes when a person becomes indifferent to Karmas.

He knows that Karmas cannot give him everlasting, unalloyed happiness which is not mixed with pain, sorrow and fear. Therefore, naturally, a desire arises in him for the knowledge of Brahman or the all-pervading, eternal Soul which is above Karmas, which is the source of eternal happiness.

Charvakas or Lokayatikas think that the body is the soul. Some think that the senses are the soul. Some others think that the mind is the soul. Some think that the intellect is the soul. Some think that the soul is a mere momentary idea.

Some think that nothing exists in reality. Some think that there is a soul which is different from the body which is both agent and enjoyer of the fruits of action. Others hold that he is not a doer but is only an enjoyer. Some think that the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul. Vedāntins maintain that the individual soul is identical with the Supreme Soul. Different schools of philosophy hold different views.

Therefore it is necessary to examine the truth of things very carefully.

Knowledge of Brahman destroys Avidyā or ignorance which is the root of all evil, or the seed of this formidable Samsāra or worldly life. Hence you must entertain the desire of knowing Brahman.

Knowledge of Brahman leads to the attainment of the final emancipation. Hence an enquiry about Brahman through the study of the Śhrutis which treats of Brahman is worthwhile and should be undertaken.

The question now arises: What are the characteristics of that Brahman? The nature of the Brahman is described in the following Sūtra or aphorism.

(14)

Topic 2: Definition of Brahman

I.1. (2) (Brahman is that) from which the origin etc., (i.e. the origin, sustenance and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

Answer to the enquiry of Brahman is briefly given in this Sūtra. It is stated that Brahman who is eternally pure, wise and free (Nitya, Buddha, Mukta Svabhava) is the only cause, stay and final resort of this

world. Brahman who is the originator, preserver and absorber of this vast world must have unlimited powers and characteristics.

Hence He is Omnipotent and Omniscient. Who but the Omnipotent and Omniscient Brahman could create, rule and destroy it? Certainly mere atoms or chance cannot do this work. Existence cannot come out of non-existence (Ex nihilo nihil fit). The origin of the world cannot proceed from a non-intelligent Pradhāna –‘*primary cause*’ or Prakṛiti – ‘*Nature*’. It cannot proceed from its own nature or Svabhava spontaneously without a cause, because special places, times and causes are needed for the production of effects.

Brahman must have some characteristics. You can attain knowledge of Brahman through reflection on its attributes. Otherwise it is not possible to have such knowledge. Inference or reasoning is an instrument of right knowledge if it does not contradict the Vedānta texts.

In the ascertainment of Truth or the Ultimate Reality or the first cause the scriptures alone are authoritative because they are infallible, they contain the direct intuitive experiences of Rishis or Seers who attained Brahma Sākshāt-kāra or Self-realisation. You cannot depend on intellect or reason because a man of strong intellect can overthrow a man of weak intellect. Brahman is not an object of the senses. It is beyond the reach of the senses and the intellect.

The second Sūtra does not propound here that inference serves as the means of knowing Brahman. It points to a Vedāntic text which gives a description of the characteristics of Brahman. What then, is that Vedānta text? It is the passage of Taittiriya Upaniṣhad III-i: Bhrigu

Varuni went to his father Varuna –‘*Lord of the Ocean*’ saying - “Sir, teach me Brahman." Varuna said “That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know That. That is Brahman." You will attain Self-realisation through meditation on Brahman or the truths declared by Vedāntic texts and not through mere reasoning. Pure reason (Suddha Buddhi) is a help in Self-realisation. It investigates and reveals the truths of the Scriptures. It has a place also in the means of Self-realisation. But perverted intellect (Viparita Buddhi) is a great hindrance. It keeps one far away from the Truth.

(15)

That which is the cause of the world is Brahman. This is Tatastha Lakshana. The origin, sustenance and dissolution of the world are characteristics of the world. They do not pertain to the eternal unchanging Brahman. Yet these indicate Brahman which is the cause for this universe. Śhrutis give another definition of Brahman.

This is a description of its true, essential nature "Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma -Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman." This is Svarūpa Lakshana.

The knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man but only on the thing itself. The knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself. Action depends entirely on your will but perception is not an effect of volition.

It depends on the object perceived. You cannot convert a tree into a man by an act of will. A tree will remain a tree always. Similarly Realisation of Brahman is Vastu Tantra. It depends on the reality of the

object. It is not Puruṣha Tantra. It does not depend on volition. It is not something to be accomplished by action. Brahman is not an object of the senses. It has no connection with other means of knowledge. The senses are finite and dependent. They have only external things for their objects, not Brahman. They are characterised by outgoing tendencies on account of the force of Rajas. They are in their nature so constituted that they run towards external objects. They cannot cognise Brahman.

Knowledge of Brahman cannot come through mere reasoning.

You can attain this knowledge through intuition or revelation. Intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman. The object of enquiry is an existing substance. You will have to know this only through intuition or direct cognition (Aparakosha-anubhuti or Anubhava-experience). Sravana (hearing of the Śhrutis), Manana (reflection on what you have heard), Nididhyasana (profound meditation) on Brahman leads to intuition. The Brahmakara Vritti is generated from the Sattvic Antahkarana which is equipped with the four means of salvation, and the instructions of the Guru, who has understood the real significance of 'Tat Tvam Asi' Mahāvākya. This Brahmakara Vritti destroys the Mula-Avidyā or primitive ignorance, the root cause of all bondage, births and deaths. When the ignorance or veil is removed, Brahman which is self-effulgent reveals Itself or shines by Itself in its pristine glory and ineffable splendour. In ordinary perception of objects the mind assumes the form of the object. The Vritti or ray of the mind removes the veil (Avarana-bhanga) that envelops the object and Vritti-sahita-chaitanya or intelligence reflected in the modification of the mind

reveals the object. Then only you cognise the object. There is Vritti-vyapti and there is Phala-vyapti also in the perception of an object. You want a Vritti and intelligence (Chaitanya) associated with the Vritti. But in the case of cognition of Brahman there is no Phala-vyapti. There is only Vritti-vyapti as Brahman is self-luminous.

If there is a cup in a pot, you want a lamp and the eyes to see the cup in the dark, when the pot is broken; but if there is a lamp within the pot, you want the eyes only to see the lamp when the pot is broken. You do not want a lamp.

(16)

Topic 3: Brahman is realisable only through the scriptures.

I.1. (3) The scripture being the source of right knowledge.

The Omniscience of Brahman follows from His being the source of scripture. The aphorism clearly points out that the Śhrutis alone are proof about Brahman.

As Brahman is the cause of the world we have to infer that Brahman or the Absolute is Omniscient. As the scripture alone is the means of right knowledge with reference to Brahman the proposition laid in Sūtra 2 becomes confirmed. Brahman is not merely the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of the world, He is the source or womb of scriptures and is revealed by scriptures. As Brahman is beyond the reach of the senses and the intellect, He can be apprehended only on the authority of the Śhrutis which are infallible and contain the spiritual experiences of realised seers or sages. The Śhrutis declare that Brahman Himself breathed forth the Vedas. Therefore He who has brought forth the

Śhrutis or the Vedas which contain such wonderful divine knowledge must be all-knowledge and all-powerful.

The scriptures illumine all things like a search light. Scripture is the source or the means of right knowledge through which you have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of Brahman. Śhrutis furnish information about what is not known from other sources. It cannot be known by other means of knowledge independently of the Śhrutis. Brahman is formless, colourless, attributeless. Hence it cannot be grasped by the senses by direct perception. You can infer the existence of fire by its accompanying smoke but Brahman cannot be established by inference or analogy, because it is attributeless and there cannot be a second thing which is similar to Brahman. Brahman is Infinite and secondless. He who is ignorant of the Śhrutis cannot know that Supreme Being. There are other means of knowledge also which have got a place but they are not independent. They supplement after Brahman is established by the Śhrutis.

(17)

Topic 4: Brahman the main purport of all Vedāntic texts

I.1. (4) But that (Brahman is to be known only from the Scriptures and not independently by any other means is established), because it is the main purpose (of all Vedāntic texts).

The argument in support of Sūtra 2 is continued. Brahman or the Absolute can be known only from the scriptures because all the scriptural passages can be harmonised only by such a doctrine. The Vedāntic texts refer to Brahman only, because they have Brahman for

their main topic. The proposition that Brahman is the only cause of the world is established: because this is the authoritative saying of the scriptures. All the Vedāntic texts agree in this respect.

The word 'tu' (but) is employed to rebut the above Pūrva-paksha - 'Objection' or the prima facie view as urged above. It is proper to say that Brahman is the uniform topic taught in all the Vedāntic texts. Why? Samanvayat. Anvaya means construing a passage according to the six characteristics or Shad Llingas viz. (1) Upakrama-Upasamhara Ekavakyata - agreement in beginning and conclusion; (2) Abhyasa - repetition; (3) Apurvata - Uniqueness of subject matter; (4) Phala - fruit; (5) Arthavada - praise and (6) Yukti - reasoning.

These six marks help to arrive at the real purport of any work. In chapter six of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad Brahman is the main purport of all passages. In the beginning you will find "This world, my child, was but the Real (Sat) in the beginning." It concludes, "In it all that exists has its Self. It is true. It is the Self." There is agreement in the opening and concluding passages. This is Upakrama-Upasamhara. Uddalaka the preceptor, repeats 'Tat Tvam Asi' nine times to his disciple Svetaketu. This is repetition (Abhyasa). Brahman is doubtless unique, as He is Infinite and secondless. When you attain knowledge of Brahman everything else is known. This is Phala or fruit.

There is reasoning in the scriptures. Just as pots are nothing but clay, ornaments are nothing but gold, so also this world of names and forms is nothing but Brahman. If you know the nature of clay, you will know all that is made out of clay. Even so if you know Brahman, everything else will be known to you. Brahman is the source of the creation,

preservation and dissolution of the universe. This is Artha-vada or Stuti-vada by way of praise. All these six marks or Shad Lingas denote that the chief topic or main purport of the Vedāntic texts is Brahman.

(18)

All the Vedānta-texts have for their purport Brahman, for example, “Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second” (Chh. Up. VI-2-1) “In the beginning all this was Ātman or Self only” (Ait. Ara. II-4-I-1) “This is Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside; this self is Brahman perceiving everything” (Bri. Up. II-5-19) “That Immortal Brahman is before” (Mun. Up. II-2-11) and similar passages. It is not right to think that these passages have a different sense. The passages cannot refer to agents, divinities connected with acts of religious duty. You will find in Bri. Up. II-4-14, “Then by what should he see and whom?” This clearly shows that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.

Brahman cannot become an object of perception and other means of knowledge, because It is extremely subtle, abstract, infinite and all-pervading. How can a finite insentient instrument know the Infinite? The senses and the mind derive their power and light from Brahman the source. Brahman is Self-luminous, Self-existent, Self-knowledge, Self-delight, and Self-contained. Brahman cannot be realised without the aid of Vedāntic passage “Tat Tvam Asi - Thou art That” (Chh. Up. VI-8-7).

When one realises Brahman, he is totally freed from all sorts of miseries and pains. He attains the goal of life or the summum bonum.

The conception of duality as agent, action and the like is destroyed.

Self-realisation is not a fruit of action. It is not a result of your willing or doing. It is the result of realising one's identity with Brahman. Scripture aims only at removing the veil of ignorance or Avidyā. Then the self-effulgent Brahman shines by Itself in Its pristine glory. The state of Moksha or the final emancipation is eternal. It is not transient like the fruits attained through action. Action depends upon the will and is independent of the object. Knowledge depends on the nature of the object and is independent of the will of the knower.

A proper understanding of the Vedāntic texts leads to the final emancipation of man. It is not necessary for him to exert or do any superhuman feat or action. It is only mere understanding that it is a rope and not a snake that helps to destroy one's fear. Scripture does not speak only of ethical and ceremonial duties. It reveals the soul and helps one to attain Self-realisation. The sage who has learnt by the help of Vedāntic texts to remove the erroneous identification with the body will not experience pain. It is only the ignorant worldly-minded man who experiences pain on account of his identification with the body.

(19)

The attainment of heaven, procuring a son, getting rain, etc., are taught in the Vedas as incitement to the acquirement of knowledge of Brahman by baby souls and to produce faith in man. When he finds that the Vedic Mantras have the power to produce rain he gets faith in them and has an inclination to study them. He gradually gets disgust for the mundane objects and develops discrimination between the real and the transitory and burning yearning for liberation. He develops love for Brahman. Therefore all Vedas teach Brahman. Sacrifices give

mundane fruits only when they are done with selfish motives, only when Kāma or strong desire is at the back of the Mantras. When they are performed with Nishkāmya Bhava without selfish motives they purify the heart and help to attain knowledge of the Self. Hence Karma Kāṇḍa itself, by teaching the worship of various deities, becomes part of Brahma Jñāna. It is really the worship of Brahman, when the element of desire or selfishness is removed. Such a worship purifies the heart and produces a taste for enquiry of Brahman. It does not produce any other earthly desire.

The object of enquiry in the Karma Kāṇḍa is something to be accomplished viz. duty. The object of enquiry in Vedānta texts is the already existent, absolutely accomplished Brahman. The fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be different from the fruit of knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of action.

You will find in the Upaniṣhads “Verily the Self (Ātman) is to be seen” Bri. Up. II-4-5. “The Ātman which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand” Chh. Up VIII-7-1. “Let a man worship him as Ātman or the Self” - Bri. Up I-4-7; ‘Let a man worship the Ātman only as his true state’ - Bri. Up. I-4-15; ‘He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman’ -Mun. Up. III-2-9". These texts rouse in you a desire to know what that Brahman is. The Vedāntic texts give a beautiful description of the nature of Brahman. They teach that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss, self-luminous and indivisible. One attains final emancipation as the fruit of meditation on Brahman.

The Vedāntic texts declare, “The wise who knows the Ātman as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve” (Katha Up. II-22). “He is without breath, without mind, pure” (Mun. Up. II-1-2). “That person is not attached to anything” (Bri. Up. IV-3-15). All these texts establish the fact that the final emancipation differs from all the fruits of action and is an eternally and essentially bodiless state. Moksha is Kutastha Nitya, i.e. eternal, without undergoing any change. Brahman is omnipresent like ether (Ākāśhavat Sarvagata) free from all modifications (Nirvikara), absolutely Self-sufficient, Self-contained (Nirapeksha), indivisible (Akhandā). He is not composed of parts (Nishkala). He is Self-luminous (Svayam Prakāśha, Svayam Jyoti).

(20)

You will find in Katha Upaniṣhad, “Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future is that Brahman” (I-2-14). Moksha is the same as Brahman. Moksha or Brahman cannot be the effect of actions. It cannot be supplementary to actions. If it is so it would be non-eternal.

To know Brahman is to become Brahman. Mundaka Upaniṣhad says, “He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman.” As Brahman is an already existing entity, knowing Brahman does not involve an act like a ritualistic act. When Avidyā or nescience is destroyed through knowledge of the Self, Brahman manifests Itself, just as the rope manifests itself when the illusion of snake is removed. As Brahman is your Inner Self you cannot attain It by any action. It is realised as one’s own Ātman when the ignorance is annihilated. Texts like “The Ātman is

to be realised" etc., is not an injunction. It is intended to withdraw the mind of the aspirant from external objects and turn it inwards.

Brahman is not an object of the action of knowing. "It is different from the Known and again it is beyond the Unknown (Kena Up. I-3) "How should he know him by whom He knows all this" (Bri. Up. II-4-14). Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of an act of devout worship (Upāsana). "Know that alone to be Brahman, not that which people adore here" (Kena Up. I-5).

The scripture never describes Brahman as this or that. Its purpose is to show that Brahman as the eternal subject, Pratyag-ātman, the inner Self is never an object. It cannot be maintained that Moksha or Brahman is something to be ceremonially purified. There is no room for a purificatory ceremony in the eternally pure Brahman.

Brahman is the Self or Ātman of all. It can neither be striven nor avoided. All objects perish because they are mere modifications of the five elements. But the Soul or Brahman is immortal and unchanging. It is in its essence eternally pure and free.

He who identifies himself with his body experiences pain. A sage who has removed Deh'ādhyasa or identification of the body by identifying himself with the pure, all-pervading Brahman will not experience pain. A rich man who is puffed up by the conceit of his wealth is affected with grief when he loses his wealth. But he is not affected by the loss of wealth after he has once retired from the world and has become an ascetic. A sage who has attained knowledge of Brahman cannot be a merely worldly doer as before. He does not belong to this world as he did before. A worldly man also can become a sage of Self-realisation

with the Bhava of non-doer (Akarta), non-agent (Abhokta). The Śhrutis declare “When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him” (Chh. Up. VIII-12-1). The objector may say “The state of being free from the body follows only when a man dies.” This is entirely wrong because the cause of man being joined to the body is erroneous knowledge. The sage who has attained knowledge of Brahman, and who identifies himself with Brahman is free from his body even while still alive. The Śhruti also declares “Just as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, so also lies this body. That bodiless immortal Soul is Brahman only, is only light” (Bri. Up. IV-4-7). With eyes, He is without eyes as it were; with ears, without ears as it were; with speech, without speech as it were; with a mind, without mind as it were; with Prāṇa, without Prāṇa as it were; The sage is no longer connected with action of any kind.

(21)

The Sāṅkhyas say that the Vedāntic texts about creation do not refer to Brahman but to the Pradhāna which is made up of the three Guṇas - Sattva, Rajas and Tamas - as the First Cause. They maintain that all the Vedānta texts which treat of the creation of the world clearly point out that the cause of the world has to be concluded from the effect by inference and the cause which is to be inferred is the connection of the Pradhāna or Prakṛiti with the Souls or Puruṣhas.

The followers of Kanada (the School of Vaiseshika philosophy) infer from the very same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe and the atoms are its material cause.

The Saṅkhyas say “Omnipotence can be attributed to the Pradhāna as it has all its effects for its objects. Omniscience also can be ascribed to it. Knowledge is really an attribute of Sattva Guṇa.

Sattva is one of the components of Pradhāna. Therefore Pradhāna can be said to be omniscient. You cannot ascribe Omniscience or limited knowledge to the Soul or Puruṣha which is isolated and pure intelligence itself. Therefore the Vedānta texts ascribe Omniscience to the Pradhāna although it is in itself non-intelligent".

“Brahman is without any instruments of action. As Pradhāna has three components it seems reasonable that it alone is capable of undergoing modifications like clay into various objects and may act as a material cause, while the uncompounded, homogeneous and unchangeable Brahman is unable to do so. Therefore the Vedāntic texts which treat of creation clearly refer to Pradhāna only and therefore it is the First Cause referred to by the scriptures.” To these conclusions Śhrī Vyāsa gives an answer in the following Sūtra.

(22)

Topic 5: (Sūtras 5-11) Brahman (the intelligent principle) is the First Cause

I.1. (5) On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upaniṣhads to the First Cause, the Pradhāna) is not (the first cause indicated by the Upaniṣhads; for] it (Pradhāna) is not based on the scriptures.

Sūtras 5 to 11 refute the arguments of the Saṅkhyas and establish Brahman alone as the First Cause.

It is not possible to find room in the Vedānta texts for the non-intelligent Pradhāna, because it is not based on scripture. Why? Because seeing or thinking is ascribed to the cause in the scripture. In the scripture it is said that the First Cause willed or thought before creation. You will find in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VI-2, "Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only without a second. It thought 'May I be many, may I grow forth.' It projected fire." Aitareya Upaniṣhad says, "The Ātman willed: 'Let me project worlds'. So it projected these worlds" (I-1-1.2). In Prasna Upaniṣhad VI-3 it is said of the person of sixteen parts. "He thought. He sent forth Prāṇa..." There cannot be any thinking or willing in the insentient Pradhāna. It is possible only if the First Cause is an intelligent being like Brahman.

If it is said that such a quality can be attributed to Prakṛiti in a secondary sense, just as red-hot iron can be called fire because it can burn, we reply, why should we ascribe creative power and Omniscience to such Prakṛiti which we invest with will and Omniscience in a secondary sense when we can ascribe creative power and Omniscience to Brahman Himself to whom will and Omniscience can be ascribed in a primary sense.

Brahman's knowledge is permanent. He is not in need of any instruments of knowledge. He is not in need of a body. His knowledge is without any obstructions. Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad says, "He grasps without hands, moves without feet, sees without eyes, hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows Him. They call Him the first, the Great person" (VI-8, III-19).

You cannot attribute sentiency (Chetanatva) to Pradhāna even in a figurative sense, because it is said that the Creator became the soul and entered the body. How can the insentient matter (Achetana) become the sentient soul (Chetana)? Vedāntic texts emphatically declare that by knowing Brahman everything else can be known. How can we know the souls by knowing matter? Pradhāna or matter cannot be the Sat which is described as the cause of the world, because that would be opposed to the scripture which uses the word "Ikshateh". You will find in Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad, "He, the God of all souls, is the Creator of the world".

Therefore it is quite clear that Brahman and not Pradhāna is the cause of this world.

(23)

In all Vedāntic texts there is a uniform declaration that Chetana (consciousness) is the cause of the world. Pradhāna potentially contains all forms in a seed state. The whole world exists in it in a subtle seed state in Pralaya and yet it cannot be regarded as the Creator because it is non-sentient. Vedānta texts emphatically declare that an Intelligent Being willed and created this universe. You will find in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, "The Sat existed in the beginning. It was one without a second. It willed to become many. It created fire".

The argument of the Saṅkhyas that the Pradhāna is all-knowing because of its Sattva is inadmissible, because Sattva is not preponderant in the Pradhāna as the three Guṇas are in a state of equipoise. If the Pradhāna is all-knowing even in the condition of equilibrium (Guṇasamyavastha) on account of the power of knowledge

residing in Sattva, it must be little-knowing also on account of the power of retarding knowledge which resides in Rajas and Tamas.

Therefore while Sattva will make it all-knowing, Rajas and Tamas will make it little-knowing. This is actually a contradiction. Further a modification of Sattva which is not connected with a witnessing principle or silent Sakshi is not called knowledge. The non-intelligent Pradhāna is devoid of such a principle. Hence all-knowingness cannot be ascribed to Pradhāna.

The case of the Yogin does not apply to the point under consideration here. He attains Omniscience on account of excess of Sattva in him. There is an intelligent principle (Sakshi) in him independent of Sattva. When a Yogi attains knowledge of the past and the future on account of the grace of the Lord, you cannot deny the Eternity and Infinity of Brahman's knowledge.

Brahman is pure Intelligence itself. Unchangeable. All-knowingness and creation are not possible for Brahman. To this objection it can be replied that Brahman can be All-knowing and creative through His illusory power, Māyā.

Just as in the case of ether we talk of ether inside a jar and ether in the sky but it is all really one ether, so also the differentiation of Jīva and Īśhwara is only an apparent differentiation on account of limiting adjuncts or Upadhis, viz. body and mind.

The Sāṅkhyas raise another objection. They say that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings. "The fire thought 'May I be many, May I grow' and it projected water. Water thought 'May I be many, May I grow,' it projected earth" Chh. Up. 6-2-3-4. Here water

and fire are insentient objects, and yet thinking is attributed to them. Even so the thinking by the Sat in the text originally quoted can also be taken figuratively in the case of Pradhāna also.

Hence, though Pradhāna is insentient, it can yet be the First Cause.

The following Sūtra refutes this argument.

(24)

I.1. (6) If it be said that (the word ‘seeing’ or thinking) is used in a secondary sense, (we say) not so, because of the word Ātman being applied to the cause of the world.

You say that the term ‘Sat’ denotes the non-intelligent Pradhāna or Prakṛiti and that ‘thinking’ is attributed to it in a secondary or figurative sense only as it is to fire and water. You may argue that inert things are sometimes described as living beings. Therefore Pradhāna can well be accepted as the efficient cause of the world.

This cannot stand. This is certainly untenable. Why so? Because of the terms ‘Ātman’ (soul) being applied subsequently in the Śhruti to that which is the cause of the world vide the Śhruti “All this universe is in essence That; That is the Truth. That is Ātman (Soul). That thou art O Svetaketu” Chh. Up. VI-8-7. (Instruction by Uddalaka to his son, Svetaketu).

The passage in Chh. Up. VI-2 begins, “Being (Sat) only, my dear, this was in the beginning”. After creating fire, water, earth, It thought ‘let me now enter into these three as this living self (Jīva) and evolve names and forms’ Chh. Up. VI-3-2. The Sat, the First Cause, refers to the intelligent principle, the Jīva as its Self. By the term Jīva we must

understand the intelligent principle which rules over the body and supports the Prāṇa. How could such a principle be the self of the non-intelligent Pradhāna? By Self or Ātman we understand a being's own nature. Therefore it is quite obvious that the intelligent Jīva cannot form the nature of the non-intelligent Pradhāna. The thinking on the part of the fire and water is to be understood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. Hence it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking'.

Now the Sāṅkhya comes with a new objection. He says that the word 'Ātman' (Self) may be applied to the Pradhāna, although it is non-intelligent, on account of its being figuratively used in the sense of 'that which serves all purposes of another', as for example, a king uses the word 'self' to some servant who carries out his wishes 'Govinda is my (other) self'. Similarly it applies to Pradhāna also because the Pradhāna works for the enjoyment and the final salvation of the soul and serves the soul just in the same manner as the minister serves his king. Or else the word Ātman (Self) may refer to non-intelligent things, as well as to intelligent beings, as for instance, in expressions like Bhūt'ātma (the Self of the elements), Indriyātma (the Self of the senses) just as the one word 'light' (Jyoti) denotes a certain sacrifice (the Jyotistoma) as well as a flame. Therefore the word Self (Ātman) can be used with reference to the Pradhāna also. How then does it follow from the word 'Self' that the 'thinking' attributed to the cause of the universe is not to be taken in a figurative sense?

The next Sūtra refutes the argument.

(25)

I.1. (7) (The Pradhāna cannot be designated by the term Self] because Salvation is declared to one who is devoted to that Sat.

Further reason is given in this Sūtra to prove that Pradhāna is not the cause of this world.

The non-intelligent Pradhāna cannot be denoted by the term 'Self' because Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares: "O Svetaketu! That (the subtle Sat) is the Self. 'Thou art That'." An intelligent man like Svetaketu cannot be identified with the non-intelligent Pradhāna. If the non-intelligent Pradhāna were denoted by the term 'Sat', the meaning of the Mahāvākya "Tat Tvam Asi" would be 'Thou art non-intelligent'. The teaching will come to this. You are an Achetana or non-intelligence and emancipation is attaining such a state of insentiency. Then the Śhrutis would be a source of evil. The scriptures would make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man and would thus not become a means of right knowledge. It is not right to destroy the authority of the faultless Śhrutis. If you assume that the infallible Śhruti is not the means of right knowledge this will be certainly quite unreasonable.

The final emancipation is declared in the Śhrutis to him who is devoted to the Sat, who has his being in Sat. It cannot be attained by meditation on the non-intelligent Pradhāna vide Śhruti: 'He waits only till he is released and therefrom unites with Brahman' (Chh. Up. VI-14-2).

If the scripture which is regarded as a means of right knowledge should point out a man who is desirous of emancipation but who is ignorant of the way to it, an insentient self as the true Self he would, like the blind

man who had caught hold of the ox's tail to reach his village, never be able to attain the final release or the true Self.

Therefore the word 'Self' is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. It refers to what is intelligent only in its primary meaning. The 'Sat', the first cause, does not refer to the Pradhāna but to an intelligent principle. It is declared in the Śhruti that he, who is absolutely devoted to the Creator or cause of the world, attains the final emancipation. It is not reasonable to say that one attains his release by devotion to blind matter, Pradhāna. Hence Pradhāna cannot be the Creator of the world.

(26)

I.1. (8) And (the Pradhāna cannot be denoted by the word 'Self'), because it is not stated (by the scriptures) that It (Sat) has to be discarded.

Another reason is given in this Sūtra to prove that Pradhāna is not the Creator of the universe.

If you want to point out to a man the small star Arundhati, you direct his attention at first to a big neighbouring star and say 'That is Arundhati' although it is really not so. Then you point out to him the real Arundhati. Even so if the preceptor intended to make his disciple understand the Self step by step from grosser to subtler truths through the non-self he would definitely state in the end that the Self is not of the nature of the Pradhāna and that the Pradhāna must be discarded. But no such statement is made. The whole chapter of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad deals with the Self as nothing but that Sat.

An aspirant has been taught to fix his mind on the cause and meditate on it. Certainly he cannot attain the final emancipation by meditating on the inert Pradhāna. If the Śhruti here meant the Pradhāna to be the cause of the world, it would have surely asked the aspirant to abandon such a cause and find out something higher for his final emancipation. Hence Pradhāna cannot be the end and aim of spiritual quest.

The word 'and' signifies that the contradiction of a previous statement is an additional reason for the rejection.

Further this chapter begins with the question, "What is that which being known everything is known? Have you ever asked, my child, for that instruction by which you hear what cannot be heard, by which you perceive what cannot be perceived, by which you know what cannot be known." Now if the term 'Sat' denoted the Pradhāna, if the Pradhāna were the first cause, then by knowing Pradhāna everything must be known, which is not a fact. The enjoyer (soul) which is different from Pradhāna, which is not an effect of the Pradhāna cannot be known by knowing the Pradhāna. If 'that' or Sat means Pradhāna (matter) the Śhrutis should teach us to turn away from it. But it is not the case. It gives a definite assurance that by knowing that everything can be known. How can we know the soul by knowing matter? How can we know the enjoyer by knowing the enjoyed? Hence the Pradhāna is not denoted by the term 'Sat'. It is not the first cause, knowing which everything is known, according to the Śhruti.

For this the Sūtra-kāra –*'author of the Sutras'* gives another reason.

(27)

I.1. (9) On account of (the individual) merging in its own Self (the Self cannot be the Pradhāna).

The argument to prove that Pradhāna is not the cause of the universe or the Self is continued.

The waking state is that where the mind, the senses and the body act in concert to know the objects. The individual soul identifies himself with the gross body. In the dreaming state the body and the senses are at rest and the mind plays with the impressions which the external objects have left. The mind weaves its web of Vasanas. In deep sleep the individual soul is free from the limitation of mind. He rests in his own Self though in a state of ignorance.

With reference to the cause denoted by the word 'Sat' the Śhruti says, "When a man sleeps here, then my child, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own self. Therefore they say of him 'he sleeps' (Svapiti) because he is gone to his own (Svam Apita) Chh. Up. VI-8-1. From the fact that the individual soul merges in the universal soul in deep sleep, it is understood that the Self, which is described in the Śhruti as the ultimate Reality, the cause of the world is not Pradhāna.

In the Chhandogya text it is clearly said that the individual soul merges or resolves in the Sat. The intelligent Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent Pradhāna. Hence, the Pradhāna cannot be the First Cause denoted by the term 'Sat' in the text. That into which all intelligent souls are merged in an intelligent cause of the universe is denoted by the term Sat and not the Pradhāna.

A further reason for the Pradhāna not being the cause is given in the next Sūtra.

(28)

I.1. (10) On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedānta texts, Brahman is to be taken as that cause).

The argument to prove that Pradhāna is not the cause of the universe is continued.

All the Vedānta texts uniformly refer to an intelligent principle as the First Cause. Therefore Brahman is to be considered as the cause.

All the Vedānta texts uniformly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. The Śhrutis declare thus, "As from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the Prāṇas proceed each towards its place, from the Prāṇas the gods, from the gods the worlds" (Kau. Up. III-3). "From that Brahman sprang ether" (Tait. Up. II-1). "All this springs from the Self" (Chh. Up. VII-2-6). "This Prāṇa is born from the Self" (Pra. Up. III-3). All these passages declare the Self to be the cause. The term 'Self' denotes an intelligent being. Therefore the all-knowing Brahman is to be taken as the cause of the world because of the uniformity of view of the Vedānta texts.

A further reason for this conclusion is given in the following Sūtra.

I.1. (11) And because it is directly stated in the Śhruti (therefore the all-knowing Brahman alone is the cause of the universe).

The argument that Pradhāna is not the cause of the world is continued.

The All-knowing Lord is the cause of the universe. This is stated in a passage of the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad VI-9, "He is the cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs. He has neither parent nor lord".

‘He’ refers to the all-knowing Lord described in the chapter. Therefore it is finally established that the All-knowing, All-powerful Brahman is the First Cause and not the insentient or non-intelligent Pradhāna or anybody else.

Thus the Vedānta texts contained in Sūtra I-1-11 have clearly shown that the Omniscient, Omnipotent Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. It is already shown on account of the uniformity of view (I-1 -1 0) that all Vedānta texts hold an intelligent cause.

From Sūtra 12 onwards till the end of the first chapter a new topic is taken up for discussion. The Upaniṣhads speak of two types of Brahman, viz. the Nirguna or Brahman without attributes and the Saguna or Brahman with attributes.

The Upaniṣhads declare, “For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?” Bri. Up. IV-5-15. “Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest (Infinite, Bhūma). Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the little (finite). The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal” Chh. Up. VII-24-1. “The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names” Tait. Ar. III-12-7.

(29)

“Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel” Svet. Up. VI-19. “Not so, not so” Bri. Up. II-3-6. “It is

neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long; defective in one place, perfect in the other" Bri. Up. III-1-8.

All these texts declare Brahman to possess a double nature, according as it is the object either of nescience or knowledge. Brahman with attributes (Saguna) is within the domain of nescience. It is the object of Upāsana which is of different kinds giving different results, some to exaltations, some to gradual emancipation (Krama-Mukti), some to success in works. When it is the object of nescience, categories of devotee, object of devotion, worship are applied to it. The kinds of Upāsana are distinct owing to the distinction of the different qualities and limiting adjuncts. The fruits of devotion are distinct according as the worship refers to different qualities. The Śhrutis say "According as man worships him, that he becomes." "According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has left this life" Chh. Up. III-14-1. Meditation on the Saguna Brahman cannot lead to immediate emancipation (Sadyo-Mukti). It can only help one to attain gradual emancipation (Krama-Mukti).

Nirguna Brahman of Vedāntins or Jñānis is free from all attributes and limiting adjuncts. It is Nirūpadhika, i.e.. free from Upadhi or Māyā. It is the object of knowledge. The Knowledge of the Nirguna Brahman alone leads to immediate emancipation.

The Vedāntic passages have a doubtful import. You will have to find out the true significance of the texts through reasoning. You will have to make a proper enquiry into the meaning of the texts in order to arrive at a settled conclusion regarding the knowledge of the Self which leads to instantaneous emancipation. A doubt may arise whether the

knowledge has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object as in the case of Sūtra I-1-2.

You will find in many places in the Upaniṣhads that Brahman is described apparently with qualifying adjuncts. The Śrutis say that the knowledge of that Brahman leads to instantaneous release (Sadyo-Mukti). Worship of Brahman as limited by those adjuncts cannot lead to immediate emancipation. But if these qualifying adjuncts are considered as not being ultimately arrived at by the passages but used merely as indicative of Brahman then these passages would refer to the Nirguna Brahman and the final emancipation would result from knowing that Brahman. Therefore you will have to find out the true significance of the passages through careful enquiry and reasoning.

In some places you will have to find out whether the text refers to Saguna Brahman or the individual soul. You will have to arrive at a proper conclusion as to the true significance of these passages which evidently have a doubtful import through careful enquiry and reasoning. There will be no difficulty in understanding for the intelligent aspirant who is endowed with a sharp, subtle and pure intellect. The help of the teacher is always necessary.

Here ends the commentary of the eleven Sūtras which form a subsection by itself.

(30)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 12-19) Ānandamaya is Para Brahman.

I.1. (12) Ānandamaya means Para Brahman on account of the repetition [of the word 'bliss' as denoting the Highest Self].

Ānanda-mayah: full of bliss.

Now the author Bādarāyaṇa takes up the topic of Samanvaya.

He clearly shows that several words of the Śhrutis which are apparently ambiguous really apply to Brahman. He begins with the word 'Ānandamaya' and takes up other words one after another till the end of the chapter.

Taittiriya Upaniṣhad says, "Different from this Vijñāna-maya (*kośha* – '*sheath of understanding*') is another inner Self which consists of bliss (Ānandamaya). The former is filled by this. Joy (Priya) is its head. Satisfaction (Moda) is its right wing or arm. Great satisfaction (Pramoda) is its left wing or arm. Bliss (Ānanda) is its trunk. Brahman is the tail, the support." II-5. Now a doubt arises as to whether this Ānandamaya is Jīva (human soul) or Para Brahman. The Pūrva-pakshī or Opponent holds that the Self consisting of bliss (Ānandamaya) is a secondary self and not the principal Self, which is something different from Brahman, as it forms a link in a series of selves beginning with the self consisting of food (Anna-maya), all of which are not the principal Self. Even though the blissful Self, Ānanda-maya Puruṣha, is stated to be the innermost of all it cannot be the primary Self, because it is stated to have joy, etc., for its limits and to be embodied. "It also has the shape of man. Like the human shape of the former is the human shape of the latter".

If it were identical with the primary Self, joy, satisfaction, etc., would not affect it; but the text clearly says, 'Joy is its head'. The text also says, 'Of that former one this one is the embodied Self' - Tait. Up. II-6.

Of that former Self of bliss (Ānandamaya) is the embodied Self. That which has a body will be certainly affected by joy and pain. The term Ānandamaya signifies a modification. Therefore it cannot refer to Brahman which is changeless. Further five different parts such as head, right arm, left arm, trunk and tail are mentioned of this Ānandamaya Self. But Brahman is without parts. Therefore the Ānandamaya Self is only Jīva or the individual soul.

(31)

Here is the answer of the Siddhantin. This Sūtra shows that Brahman is Bliss. By the Ānandamaya Self we have to understand the Highest Self, 'on account of repetition'. Abhyasa or repetition means uttering a word again without any qualifications. It is one of the Shad Lingas or six characteristics or marks by which the subject matter of a passage is ascertained.

The word 'Bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest Self.

Taittiriya Upaniṣhad says: 'He the Highest Self is Bliss in itself. The individual soul becomes blissful after attaining that Bliss'. II-7. 'Who could breathe forth if that Bliss did not exist in the ether of the heart? Because He alone causes Bliss. He attains that Self consisting of Bliss'. II-7. "He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing". II-9. And again "He (Bhrigu, having taken recourse to meditation), realised or understood that Bliss is Brahman - Ānandam Brahmeti vyajanat" III-6.

Varuna teaches his son Bhrigu what is Brahman. He first defines Brahman as the cause of the creation, etc., of the universe and then teaches him that all material objects are Brahman. Such as, food is

Brahman, Prāṇa is Brahman, mind is Brahman, etc. He says this in order to teach that they are the materials of which the world is made.

Finally he concludes his teaching with 'Ānanda' declaring that 'Ānanda is Brahman'. Here he stops and concludes that 'the doctrine taught by me is based on Brahman, the Supreme' Taitt. Up. III-6-1.

"Knowledge and Bliss is Brahman" Bri. Up. III-9-27. As the word 'Bliss' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also.

It is objected that the blissful Self denotes the individual soul as it forms a link in a series of secondary selves beginning with the Annamaya Self. This cannot stand because the Ānandamaya Self is the innermost of all. The Śhruti teaches step by step, from the grosser to the subtler, and more and more interior and finer for the sake of easy comprehension by men of small intellect. The first refers to the physical body as the Self, because worldly minded people take this body as the Self. It then proceeds from the body to another self, the Prāṇamaya self, then again to another one. It represents the non-self as the Self for the purpose of easy understanding. It finally teaches that the innermost Self which consists of bliss is the real Self, just as a man points out at first to another man several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati and finally points out in the end the real Arundhati. Therefore here also the Ānandamaya Self is the real Self as it is the innermost or the last.

'Tail' does not mean the limb. It means that Brahman is the support of the individual soul as He is the substratum of the Jīva.

(32)

The possession of a body having parts and joy and so on as head, etc., are also attributed to It, on account of the preceding limiting condition viz. the self consisting of understanding, the so-called Vijñāna-maya Kośha. They do not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a body is ascribed to the Self of Bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the self consisting of food. It is not attributed to it in the same sense in which it is predicated of the individual soul or the secondary self (the Samsārin). Therefore the Self consisting of Bliss is the highest Brahman.

Thus, the Sūtra establishes that Ānandamaya is Brahman. But the commentator Śhaṅkara has a new orientation of outlook in this regard. The Āchārya says that Ānandamaya cannot be Brahman because Ānandamaya is one of the five sheaths or Kośhas of the individual, the other four being Anna-maya (physical body), Prāṇa-maya (vital body), Mano-maya (emotional/mental body), and Vijñāna-maya (intellectual body). The Ānandamaya is actually the causal body which determines the functions of the other sheaths. The individual enters into the Ānandamaya sheath in deep sleep and enjoys bliss there, which is the reason why this sheath is called Ānandamaya (bliss-filled). A coverage of individuality cannot be regarded as Brahman. Further, if Ānandamaya had been Brahman itself, the individual in deep sleep will be united with Brahman in that condition. But this does not happen since one who goes to sleep returns to ordinary waking experience. Hence the Ānandamaya is not Brahman.

(33)

l.1. (13) If (it be objected that the term Ānandamaya consisting of bliss can) not (denote the Supreme Self) because of its being a word denoting a modification or transformation or product (we say that the objection is] not (valid) on account of abundance, (which is denoted by the suffix ‘maya’).

An objection against Sūtra 12 is refuted in this Sūtra.

If the objector says that ‘maya’ means modification, it cannot be.

We cannot predicate such a modification with regard to Brahman who is changeless. We reply that ‘maya’ means fullness or abundance and Ānandamaya means not a derivative from Ānanda or Bliss but fullness or abundance of bliss.

The word ‘Ānandamaya’ has been certainly applied to denote the Supreme Soul or the Highest Self and not the individual soul. In the Tait. Up. II-8 the Bliss of Brahman is finally declared to be absolutely Supreme. “Māyā” therefore denotes abundance or “fullness”.

Ānandamaya does not mean absence of pain or sorrow. It is a positive attribute of Brahman and not a mere negation of pain.

Ānandamaya means ‘He whose essential nature or Svarūpa is Ānanda or Bliss’. When we say: ‘the sun has abundance of light’, it really means, the sun, whose essential nature is light is called Jyotirmaya. Therefore Ānandamaya is not Jīva but Brahman.

‘Ānandamaya’, is equal to ‘Ānanda-svarūpa’-He whose essential nature is bliss. ‘Māyā’ has not the force of Vikara or modification here.

The word 'Ānanda' or Bliss is used repeatedly in the Śhrutis only with reference to Brahman. 'Māyā' does not mean that Brahman is a modification or effect of Bliss. 'Māyā' means pervasion.

The phrase 'The sacrifice is Annamaya' means 'the sacrifice is abounding in food', not 'is some modification or product of food'! Therefore here also Brahman, as abounding in Bliss, is called Ānandamaya.

I.1. (14) And because he is declared to be the cause of it (i.e. of bliss; therefore 'maya' denotes abundance or fullness).

Another argument in support of Sūtra 12 is given.

The Śhrutis declare that "it is Brahman who is the cause of bliss of all." "Esha hyevānandayati-For he alone causes bliss" Tait. Up. II-7. He who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss, just as a man who enriches others must himself be in possession of abundant wealth. The giver of bliss to all is Bliss itself. As 'Māyā' may be understood to denote abundance, the Self consisting of bliss, Ānandamaya, is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

The Śhruti declares that Brahman is the source of bliss to the individual soul. The donor and the donee cannot be one and the same.

Therefore it is understood that 'Ānandamaya' as stated in Sūtra 12 is Brahman.

(34)

I.1. (15) Moreover that very Brahman which has been re-referred to in the Mantra portion is sung (as proclaimed in the Brāhmaṇa passage as the Ānandamaya).

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is continued. The previous proofs were founded on Lingas. The argument which is now given is based on Prakarana.

The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman for the following reason also. The second chapter of the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad begins, "He who knows Brahman attains the Highest - Brahma vidapnoti Param. Brahman is Truth, Knowledge and Infinity (Satyam, Jñānam, Anantam Brahma)" (Tait. Up. II-1). Then it is said that from Brahman sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non-moving things. The Brahman entering into the beings stays in the recess, inmost of all. Then the series of the different selfare enumerated. Then for easy understanding it is said that different from this is the inner Self. Finally the same Brahman which the Mantra had proclaimed is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, "different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss". The Brāhmaṇas only explain what the Mantras declare. There cannot be a contradiction between the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa portions.

A further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss is not mentioned. On the same i.e. the Self consisting of bliss is founded. "This same knowledge of Bhrigu and Varuna, he understood that bliss is Brahman" Tait. Up. III-6. Therefore the Self consisting of Bliss is the Supreme Self.

"Brahma vidapnoti Param"-The knower of Brahman obtains the Highest. This shows that the worshipper Jīva obtains the worshipped Brahman. Therefore Brahman who is the object attained must be considered as different from the Jīva who obtains, because the

obtained and the obtainer cannot be one and the same. Hence the Ānandamaya is not Jīva. The Brahman which is described in the Mantras (Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma) is described later on in the Brāhmaṇas as Ānandamaya. It is our duty to realise the identity of the teaching in the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas which form the Vedas.

(35)

I.1. (16) (Brahman and) not the other (i.e. the individual soul is meant here) on account of the impossibility (of the latter assumption).

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is continued.

The Jīva is not the being referred to in the Mantra “Satyam Jñānam Anantam Brahma” because of the impossibility of such a construction.

The individual soul cannot be denoted by the term “the one consisting of bliss.” Why? On account of the impossibility. Because the scripture says with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, “He wished ‘May I be many, may I grow forth.’ He reflected. After he had thus reflected, he sent forth whatever there is”.

He who is referred to in the passage, “The Self consisting of bliss etc.” is said to be creator of everything. “He projected all this whatever is” Tait. Up. II-6. The Jīva or the individual soul cannot certainly do this. Therefore he is not referred to in the passage “The Self consisting of bliss” etc.

I.1. (17) And on account of the declaration of the difference (between the two i.e. the one referred to in the passage The Self

consisting of bliss' etc. and the individual soul, the latter cannot be the one referred to in the passage).

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is continued.

The Śhruti makes a distinction between the two. It describes that one is the giver of bliss and the other as the receiver of bliss. The Jīva or the individual soul, who is the receiver, cannot be the Ānandamaya, who is the giver of bliss.

"The Self consisting of bliss is of the essence of flavour attaining which the individual soul is blissful: Raso vai sah (Brahma) Rasam hyeva')lam (Jīva) labdhva'nandi bhavati." Tait. Up. II-7.

That which is attained and the attainer cannot be the same.

Hence the individual soul is not referred to in the passage which is under discussion.

(36)

I.1. (18) Because of wishing or willing in the scriptural passage we cannot say even inferentially that Ānandamaya means Pradhāna.

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is continued.

The word 'Akāmyata' (willed) in the scriptural text shows that the Ānandamaya cannot be Pradhāna (primordial matter), because will cannot be ascribed to non-sentient (Jada) matter. Prakṛiti is non-sentient and can have no Kāmana or wish. Therefore the Ānandamaya with regard to which the word Kāma is used cannot be Prakṛiti or Pradhāna. That which is inferred i.e. the non-intelligent Pradhāna

assumed by the Saṅkhyas cannot be regarded as being the Self of bliss (Ānandamaya) and the cause of the world.

I.1. (19) And moreover it, ie., the scripture, teaches the joining of this, i.e. the individual soul, with that, i.e. consisting of bliss (Ānandamaya) when knowledge is attained.

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is concluded in this Sūtra.

Scripture teaches that the Jīva or the individual soul obtains the final emancipation when he attains knowledge, when he is joined or identified with the Self of bliss under discussion. The Śhruti declares, "When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which is invisible, bodiless, indefinable and supportless, then he has attained the fearless (Brahman). If he has the smallest distinction in it there is fear (of Samsāra) for him" Tait. Up. 11-7.

Perfect rest is possible only when we understand by the Self consisting of bliss, the Supreme Self and not either the Pradhāna or the individual soul. Therefore it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss (Ānandamaya) is the Supreme Self or Para Brahman.

(37)

Topic 7: (Sūtras 20-21) The being or person in the Sun and the eye is Brahman.

I.1. (20) The being within (the Sun and the eye) is Brahman, because His attributes are taught therein.

The wonderful Puruṣha of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad described in chapters 1, 6 and 7 is Brahman.

From the description in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad of the essential qualities belonging to the indwelling Spirit residing in the Sun and in the human eye, it is to be understood that he is Brahman and not the individual soul. You will find in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad I-6-6, "Now that person bright as gold who is seen within the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus. His name is 'Ut' because he has risen (Udita) above all evil. He transcends all limitations. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with reference to the Devas." With reference to the body, "Now the person who is seen in the eye is Rik. He is Sama. He is Uktha. He is Yajus. He is Brahman. His form is the same as that of the former i.e. of the Being in the Sun. The joints of the one are the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of the other" Chh. Up. I-7-5.

Do these texts refer to some special individual soul who by means of knowledge and pious deeds has raised himself to an exalted state; or do they refer to the eternally perfect supreme Brahman? The Opponent says that the reference is to an individual soul only, as the scripture speaks of a definite shape, particular abode. Special features are attributed to the person in the Sun, such as the possession of beard as bright as gold and so on. The same characteristics belong to the being in the eye also.

On the contrary no shape can be attributed to the Supreme Lord, "That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay" Kau. Up. I-3-15.

Further a definite abode is stated, "He who is in the Sun. He who is in the eye". This shows that an individual soul is meant. As regards the Supreme Lord, he has no special abode, "Where does he rest? In his own glory" Chh. Up. VII-24-1. "Like the ether he is Omnipresent, Eternal".

The power of the being in question is said to be limited. "He is the Lord of the worlds beyond that and of the wishes of the Devas," shows that the power of the being in the Sun is limited. "He is the Lord of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men," shows that the power of the person in the eye is limited. Whereas the power of the Supreme Lord is unlimited. "He is the Lord of all, the King of all things, the Protector of all things." This indicates that the Lord is free from all limitations. Therefore the being in the Sun and in the eye cannot be the Supreme Lord.

(38)

This Sūtra refutes the above objection of the Opponent. The being within the Sun and within the eye is not the individual soul, but the Supreme Lord only. Why? Because His essential attributes are declared. At first the name of the being within the Sun is stated, "His name is 'Ut'." Then it is declared, "He has risen above all evil". The same name is then transferred to the being in the eye, "the name of the one is the name of the other". Perfect freedom from sins is ascribed to the Supreme Self only, the Self which is free from sin, etc., Chh. Up. VIII-7. There is the passage, "He is Rik. He is Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman," which declares the being in the eye to be the Self, Saman and so on.

This is possible only if the being is the Lord, who as being the cause of all, is to be regarded as the Self of all.

Further it is declared, “Rik and Saman are his joints” with reference to the Devas, and “the joints of the one are the joints of the other with reference to the body”. This statement can be made only with reference to that which is the Self of all.

The mention of a particular abode, viz. the Sun and the eye, of form with a beard bright as gold and of a limitation of powers is only for the purpose of meditation or Upāsana. The Supreme Lord may assume through Māyā any form He likes in order to please thereby his devout worshippers to save and bless them. Smṛiti also says, “That thou seest me, O Nārada, is the Māyā emitted by me. Do not then look on me endowed with the qualities of all beings.” The limitation of Brahman's powers which is due to the distinction of what belongs to the Devas and what to the body has reference to devout meditation only.

It is for the convenience of meditation that these limitations are imagined in Brahman. In His essential or true nature He is beyond them. It follows, therefore, that the Being which scripture states to be within the eye and the Sun is the Supreme Lord.

I.1. (21) And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the Sun etc.) on account of the declaration of distinction.

An argument in support of Sūtra 20 is adduced.

Moreover there is one who is distinct from the individual souls which animate the Sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within. The distinction between the Lord and the individual souls is declared in the

following passage of the Śhrutis, “He who dwells in the Sun and is within the Sun, whom the Sun does not know, whose body the Sun is and who rules the Sun from within, is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal (Bri. Up. III-7-9). Here the expression “He within the Sun whom the Sun does not know” clearly shows that the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. The text clearly indicates that the Supreme Lord is within the Sun and yet different from the individual soul identifying itself with the Sun. This confirms the view expressed in the previous Sūtra. It is an established conclusion that the passage under discussion gives a description of the Supreme Lord only but not of any exalted Jīva.

(39)

Topic 8: The word Ākāśha must be understood as Brahman

I.1. (22) The word Ākāśha i.e. ether here is Brahman on account of characteristic marks (of that i.e. Brahman being mentioned).

Brahman is shown to be Ākāśha in this Sūtra. The Ākāśha of Chh. Up. I-9 is Brahman.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad I-9 the following passage comes in. “What is the origin of this world? ‘Ether’ he replied”. Because all these beings take their origin from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their ultimate resort (Dialogue between Silak and Prabahana). Here the doubt arises-Does the word ‘ether’ denote the Highest Brahman or the Supreme Self or the elemental ether? Here Ākāśha refers to the Highest Brahman and not to the elemental ether, because the characteristics of Brahman, namely the origin of the entire creation from it and its return to it at dissolution

are mentioned. These marks may also refer to Ākāśha as the scriptures say “from the Ākāśha sprang air, from air fire, and so on and they return to the Ākāśha at the end of a cycle”. But the sentence “All these beings take their origin from the Ākāśha only” clearly indicates the highest Brahman, as all Vedānta-texts agree in proclaiming definitely that all beings take their origin from the Highest Brahman.

But the Opponent may say that the elemental Ākāśha also may be taken as the cause viz. of air, fire and the other elements. But then the force of the words “all these” and “only” in the text quoted would be lost. To keep it, the text should be taken to refer to the fundamental cause of all, including Ākāśha also, which is Brahman alone.

The word “Ākāśha” is also used for Brahman in other texts: “That which is called Ākāśha is the revealer of all forms and names; that within which forms and names are, that is Brahman” Chh. Up. VIII-14-1. The clause “They return into the ether” again points to Brahman and so also the phrase ‘Ākāśha is greater than these, Ākāśha is their final resort’, because the scripture ascribes to the Supreme Self only absolute superiority. Chh. Up. III-14-3.

(40)

Brahman alone can be “greater than all” and their “ultimate goal” as mentioned in the text. The qualities of being greater and the ultimate goal of everything are mentioned in the following texts: “He is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds” Chh. Up. III-14-3. “Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss. He is the Ultimate Goal of him who makes gifts” Bri. Up. III-9-28.

The text says that all things have been born from Ākāśha. Such a causation can apply only to Brahman. The text says that Ākāśha is greater than everything else, that Ākāśha is the Supreme Goal and that it is infinite. These indications show that Ākāśha means Brahman only.

Various synonyms of Ākāśha are used to denote Brahman. "In which the Vedas are in the imperishable One (Brahman) the Highest, the ether (Vyoman)" Tait. Up. III-6. Again "OM, Ka is Brahman, ether (Kha) is Brahman" Chh. Up. IV-10-5 and "the old ether" (Bri. Up. V-1.) Therefore we are justified in deciding that the word Ākāśha, though it occurs in the beginning of the passage refers to Brahman, it is similar to that of the phrase "Agni (the fire) studies a chapter", where the word Agni, though it occurs in the beginning denotes a boy.

Therefore it is settled that the word Ākāśha denotes Brahman only.

(41)

Topic 9: The word 'Prāṇa' must be understood as Brahman.

I.1. (23) For the same reason the breath also refers to Brahman.

As Prāṇa is described as the cause of the world, such a description can apply to Brahman alone.

"Which then is that deity?" 'Prāṇa' he said. Regarding the Udgītha – 'Om' it is said (Chh. Up. I-10-9), 'Prastotri' that deity which belongs to the Prastava – '*chanting, hymn, Om*' etc.

"For all the beings merge in Prāṇa alone and from Prāṇa they arise. This is the deity belonging to the Prastava" Chh. Up. I-11-4.

Now the doubt arises whether Prāṇa is vital force or Brahman. The Opponent says that the word Prāṇa denotes the fivefold breath. The

Siddhantin says: No. Just as in the case of the preceding Sūtra, so here also Brahman is meant on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for here also a complementary passage makes us to understand that all beings spring from and merge into Prāṇa. This can occur only in connection with the Supreme Lord.

The Opponent says "The scripture makes the following statement: when man sleeps, then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye, into breath the ear, into breath the mind; when he wakes up then they spring again from breath alone." What the Veda here states is a matter of daily observation, because during sleep when the breathing goes on uninterruptedly the functioning of the sense organs ceases and again becomes manifest when the man wakes up only. Hence the sense organs are the essence of all beings.

The complementary passage which speaks of the merging and emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the chief vital air also.

This cannot be. Prāṇa is used in the sense of Brahman in passages like 'the Prāṇa of Prāṇa' (Bri. Up. IV-4-18) and 'Prāṇa indeed is Brahman' Kau. Up. III-3. The Śhruti declares "All these beings merge in Prāṇa and from Prāṇa they arise" Chh. Up. I-11-5. This is possible only if Prāṇa is Brahman and not the vital force in which the senses only get merged in deep sleep.

Topic 10: (Sūtras 24-27) The light is Brahman.

I.1. (24) The 'light' is Brahman, on account of the mention of feet in a passage which is connected with the passage about the light.

The expression 'Jyotiḥ' (light) is next taken up for discussion.

The Jyotis of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad III-13-7 refers to Brahman and not to material light; because it is described as having four feet.

Śhruti declares, "Now that light which shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds-that is the same light which is within man." Here the doubt arises whether the word "light" denotes the physical light of the sun and the like or the Supreme Self? The Opponent holds that the word 'light' denotes the light of the sun and the like as it is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term. Moreover the word 'shines' ordinarily refers to the sun and similar sources of light. Brahman is colourless. It cannot be said in the primary sense of the word that it 'shines'. Further the word 'Jyotis' denotes light for it is said to be bounded by the sky ('that light which shines above this heaven'); the sky cannot become the boundary of Brahman which is the Self of all, which is all-pervading and infinite, and is the source of all things movable or immovable.

The sky can form the boundary of light which is mere product and which is therefore united.

The word Jyoti does not mean physical light of the sun which helps vision. It denotes Brahman. Why? On account of the feet (quarters) being mentioned in a preceding text: "Such is its greatness, greater than this is the Puruṣha. One foot of It is all beings, while its remaining three feet are the Immortal in heaven" Chh. Up. III-12-6.

(42)

That which in this text forms the three quarter part, immortal and connected with heaven of Brahman which altogether constitutes four

quarters, this very same entity is again referred to in the passage under discussion, for there also it is said to be connected with heaven.

Brahman is the subject matter of not only the previous texts, but also of the subsequent section, Sandilya Vidyā (Chh. Up. III-14). If we interpret 'light' as ordinary light, we will commit the error of dropping the topic started and introduce a new subject. Brahman is the main topic in the section immediately following that which contains the passage under discussion (Chh. Up. III-14). Therefore it is quite reasonable to say that the intervening section also (Chh. Up. III-13) treats of Brahman only. Hence we conclude that in the passage the word 'light' must denote Brahman only.

The word 'Jyoti' here does not at all denote that light on which the function of the eye depends. It has different meaning, for instance "With speech only as light man sits" (Bri. Up. IV-3-5); whatever illumines something else may be considered as 'light'. Therefore the term 'light' may be applied to Brahman also whose nature is intelligence because it gives light to the whole universe. The Śhrutis declare "Him the shining one, everything shines after; by His light all this is illumined" (Kau. Up. II-5-15) and "Him the gods worship as the Light of lights, as the Immortal" (Bri. Up. IV-4-16).

The mention of limiting adjuncts with respect to Brahman, denoted by the word 'light' 'bounded by heaven' and the assignment of a special locality serves the purpose of devout meditation. The Śhrutis speak of different kinds of meditation on Brahman as specially connected with certain localities such as the sun, the eye, the heart.

Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the word 'light' here denotes Brahman.

(43)

I.1. (25) If it be said that Brahman is not denoted on account of the metre Gāyatrī being denoted, we reply not so, because thus i.e. by means of the metre the application of the mind on Brahman is declared; because thus it is seen (in other passages also).

An objection raised against Sūtra 24 is refuted in this Sūtra.

The Opponent says "In the passage, 'One foot of It is all beings'," Brahman is not referred to but the metre Gāyatrī, because the first paragraph of the preceding section of the same Upaniṣhad begins with "Gāyatrī is everything, whatsoever here exists". Hence the feet referred to in the text mentioned in the previous Sūtra refer to this metre and not to Brahman.

In reply we say, not so; because the Brāhmaṇa passage "Gāyatrī indeed is all this" teaches that one should meditate on the Brahman which is connected with this metre, for Brahman being the cause of everything is connected with that Gāyatrī also and it is that Brahman which is to be meditated upon.

Brahman is meditated upon as Gāyatrī. By this explanation all become consistent. If Gāyatrī meant metre then it would be impossible to say of it that "Gāyatrī is everything whatsoever here exists" because certainly the metre is not everything. Therefore the Sūtra says "Tatha hi darsanam"-So we see. By such an explanation only the above passage gives a consistent meaning. Otherwise we will have to hold a metre to

be everything which is absurd. Therefore through Gāyatrī the meditation on Brahman is shown.

The direction of the mind is declared in the text 'Gāyatrī is all this'. The passage instructs that by means of the metre Gāyatrī the mind is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that metre.

This interpretation is in accordance with the other texts in the same section e.g. "All this indeed is Brahman" Chh. Up. III-14-1 where Brahman is the chief topic.

Devout meditation on Brahman through its modifications or effects is mentioned in other passages also; for instance, Ait. Ar. III-2-3.12 "it is the Supreme Being under the name of Gāyatrī, whom the Bahvrchas worship as Mahat-Uktha i.e. Mahā Prāṇa, the Adhvaryu priests as Agni (fire), and the Chandoga priests as Maha Vrata (the greatest rite)." Therefore Brahman is meant here and not the metre Gāyatrī.

(44)

I.1. (26) And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject or topic of the previous passage, where Gāyatrī occurs) because (thus only) the declaration as to the beings etc. being the feet is possible.

An argument in support of Sūtra 24 is adduced.

The beings, earth, body and heart can be felt only of Brahman and not of Gāyatrī, the metre, a mere collection of syllables. The previous passage has only Brahman for its topic or subject, because the text designates the beings and so on as the feet of Gāyatrī. The text at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body and the heart and then goes

on describing “that Gāyatrī has four feet and is sixfold”. If Brahman were not meant, there would be no room for the verse “such is the greatness” etc.

Hence by Gāyatrī is here meant Brahman as connected with the metre Gāyatrī. It is this Brahman particularised by Gāyatrī that is said to be the Self of everything in the passage “Gāyatrī is everything” etc.

Therefore Brahman is to be regarded as the subject matter of the previous passage also. This same Brahman is again recognised as light in Chh. Up. III-12-7.

The elements, the earth, the body and the heart cannot be represented as the four verses of Gāyatrī. They can be understood only to mean the fourfold manifestations of the Supreme Being. The word “heaven” is a significant word. Its use in connection with ‘light’ reminds us of its use in connection with the ‘Gāyatrī’ also. Therefore the ‘light’ shining above heaven is the same as the ‘Gāyatrī’ that has three of its feet in heaven.

I.1. (27) If it be said (that Brahman of the Gāyatrī passage cannot be recognised in the passage treating of ‘light’) on account of the difference of designation or the specification (we reply) no, because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition).

Another objection against Sūtra 24 is raised and refuted. If it be argued that there is a difference of expression consisting in case-ending in the Gāyatrī-Śhruti and in the Jyoti Śhruti regarding the word ‘Div’ (heaven) then the reply is ‘No’; the argument is not tenable, as there is no material contradiction between the two expressions.

In the Gāyatrī passage “three feet of it are what is immortal in heaven”, heaven is designated as the abode of Brahman; while in the latter passage “that light which shines above this heaven”, Brahman is described as existing above heaven. One may object that the subject matter of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter.

(45)

The objector may say “how then can one and the same Brahman be referred to in both the texts?” It can; there can be no contradiction here. Just as in ordinary language a bird, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree, but also above the tree, so Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to as being beyond heaven as well.

The locative “Divi” in heaven and the ablative ‘Divah’ above heaven are not contrary. The difference in the case-ending of the word “Div” is no contradiction as the locative case (the seventh case-ending) is often used in the scriptural texts to express secondarily the meaning of the ablative (the fifth case-ending).

Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the former passage can be recognised in the latter also. It is a settled conclusion that the word “light” denotes Brahman.

Though the grammatical cases used in the scriptural passage are not identical, the object of the reference is clearly recognised as being identical.

Topic 11: (Sūtras 28-31) Prāṇa is Brahman.

I.1. (28) Prāṇa is Brahman, that being so understood from a connected consideration (of the passage referring to Prāṇa).

Prāṇah: the breath or life-energy;

The expression 'Prāṇa' is again taken up for discussion.

In the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad there occurs the conversation between Indra and Pratardana. Pratardana, the son of Divodasa, came by means of fighting and strength to the abode of Indra. Pratardana said to Indra, "You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most beneficial to man". Indra replied, "Know me only. This is what I think most beneficial to man. I am Prāṇa, the intelligent Self (Prajñātman). Meditate on me as life, as immortality" III-2. "That Prāṇa is indeed the intelligent Self, bliss, undecaying, immortal" III-8.

Here the doubt arises whether the word Prāṇa denotes merely breath, the modification of air or the God Indra, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.

The word 'Prāṇa' in the passage refers to Brahman, because it is described as the most conducive to human welfare. Nothing is more conducive to human welfare than the knowledge of Brahman.

Moreover Prāṇa is described as Prajñātma. The air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self.

(46)

Those characteristic marks which are mentioned in the concluding passage, viz. 'bliss' (Ānanda), undecaying (Ajara), immortal (Amrita) can be true only of Brahman. Further knowledge of Prāṇa absolves one

from all sins. "He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, neither by matricide nor by patricide" Kau. Up. III-1.

All this can be properly understood only if the Supreme Self or the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject matter of the passages, and not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word 'Prāṇa' denotes Brahman only.

I.1. (29) If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted or referred in these passages on account of) the speaker's instruction about himself, we reply not so, because there is abundance of reference to the Inner Self in this (chapter or Upaniṣhad).

An objection to Sūtra 28 is refuted.

An objection is raised against the assertion that Prāṇa denotes Brahman. The Opponent says, "The word Prāṇa does not denote the Supreme Brahman, because the speaker Indra designates himself." Indra speaks to Pratardana, "Know me only. I am Prāṇa, the intelligent Self." How can the Prāṇa which refers to a personality be Brahman to which the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed. The Śhruti declares, "Brahman is without speech, without mind" Bri. Up. III-8-8.

Further on, also Indra, the speaker glorifies himself, "I slew the three-headed son of Tvashtri. I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees to the wolves (Salavrika). I killed the people of Prahlada" and so on. Indra may be called Prāṇa owing to his strength. Hence Prāṇa does not denote Brahman.

This objection is not valid because there are found abundant references to Brahman or the Inner Self in that chapter. They are "Prāṇa, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it

rise up". For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave; thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the Prāṇa. And that Prāṇa indeed is the Self of Prajñā, blessed (Ānanda), undecaying (Ajara) and immortal (Amrita). "He is my Self, thus let it be known". "This Self is Brahman, Omniscient" Bri. Up. II-5-19.

(47)

Indra said to Pratardana, "Worship me as Prāṇa". This can only refer to Brahman. For the worship of Brahman alone can give Mukti or the final emancipation which is most beneficial to man (Hitatma). It is said of this Prāṇa, "For he (Prāṇa) makes him, whom he wishes to lead out from these worlds, do a good deed." This shows that the Prāṇa is the great cause that makes every activity possible. This also is consistent with Brahman and not with breath or Indra. Hence 'Prāṇa' here denotes Brahman only.

The chapter contains information regarding Brahman only owing to plenty of references to the Inner Self, not regarding the self of some deity.

But if Indra really meant to teach the worship of Brahman, why does he say "worship me"? It is really misleading. To this the following Sūtra gives the proper answer.

I.1. (30) The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is and with Brahman) is possible through intuition as attested by Śhruti, as in the case of Vamadeva.

The objection raised in Sūtra 29 is further refuted.

The word 'tu' (but) removes the doubt. Indra's describing himself as Prāṇa is quite suitable as he identifies himself with Brahman in that instruction to Pratardana like the sage Vamadeva.

Sage Vamadeva realised Brahman and said "I was Manu and Surya" which is in accordance with the passage "Whatever Deva knew Brahman became That" (Bri. Up. I-4-10). Indra's instruction also is like that. Having realised Brahman by means of Rishi-like intuition, Indra identifies himself in the instruction with the Supreme Brahman and instructs Pratardana about the Highest Brahman by means of the words 'Know me only'.

Indra praises the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore it is not his own glorification when he says 'I killed Tvashtṛ's son' etc. The meaning of the passage is 'Although I do such cruel actions, yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman. Therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his. Indra says in a subsequent passage 'I am Prāṇa, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the whole chapter refers to Brahman only.

(48)

I.1. (31) If it be said that (Brahman is) not (meant) on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); We say no, because (such an interpretation) would enjoin threefold meditation (Upāsana), because Prāṇa has been accepted (elsewhere in the Śhruti in the sense of Brahman) and because here also (words denoting Brahman) are mentioned with reference to Prāṇa.

But another objection is raised. What is the necessity of this Adhikaraṇa again, “meditation of Prāṇa” and identifying Prāṇa with Brahman, when in the preceding Sūtra, I-1-23 it has been shown that Prāṇa means Brahman? To this we answer: this Adhikaraṇa is not a redundancy. In the Sūtra I-1-23, the doubt was only with regard to the meaning of the single word Prāṇa. In this Adhikaraṇa the doubt was not about the meaning of the word Prāṇa, but about the whole passage, in which there are words, and marks or indications that would have led a person meditating to think that there also Jīva and breath meant to be meditated upon. To remove this doubt, it is declared that Brahman alone is the topic of discussion in this Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad and not Jīva or vital breath.

Therefore this Adhikaraṇa has been separately stated by the author.

The Opponent holds that Prāṇa does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both. He says that the chapter mentions the characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand.

(49)

The passage ‘One should know the speaker and not enquire into speech’ (Kau. Up. III-4) mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul. The passage “Prāṇa, laying hold of his body, makes it rise up” Kau. Up. III. 3 points to the chief vital air because the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Then there is another passage, ‘Then Prāṇa said to the organs: be not deceived. I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it’ Prasna Up. II-3.

Then again you will find ‘What is Prāṇa, that is Prajñā; what is Prajñā, that is Prāṇa.’ This Sūtra refutes such a view and says, that Brahman alone is referred to by ‘Prāṇa’, because the above interpretation would involve a threefold Upāsana, viz. of the individual soul, of the chief vital air, and of Brahman. Which is certainly against the accepted rules of interpretation of the scriptures. It is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence enjoins three kinds of worship or meditation.

Further in the beginning we have “know me only” followed by “I am Prāṇa, intelligent Self, meditate on me as life, as immortality”; and in the end again we read “And that Prāṇa indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed (Ānanda), undecaying (Ajara) and immortal (Amrita).” The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar. Therefore we must conclude that they refer to one and the same subject and that the same subject-matter is kept up throughout.

Therefore ‘Prāṇa’ must denote Brahman only. In the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word ‘Prāṇa’ is taken in the sense of Brahman. It is a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic or subject matter of the whole chapter.

Thus ends the first Pada (Section 1) of the first Adhyāya (Chapter I) of the Brahma Sūtras; or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(50) CHAPTER I, SECTION 2, INTRODUCTION

In the First Section Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the whole universe.

It has been taught that the Supreme Brahman should be enquired into. Certain attributes such as Eternity, Omniscience, All-pervadingness, the Self of all and so on have been declared of the Brahman.

In the latter part of Section I certain terms in the Śhruti such as Ānandamaya, Jyoti, Prāṇa, Ākāśha, etc., used in a different sense have been shown through reasoning to refer to Brahman. Certain passages of the scriptures about whose sense doubts are entertained and which contain clear characteristics of Brahman (Spashta-Brahma-linga) have been shown to refer to Brahman.

Now in this and the next Section some more passages of doubtful import wherein the characteristic marks of Brahman are not so apparent (Aspashta-Brahma-linga) are taken up for discussion. Doubts may arise as to the exact meaning of certain expressions of Śhruti, whether they indicate Brahman or something else. Those expressions are taken up for discussion in this and the next Sections.

In the Second and Third Padas will be shown that certain other words and sentences in which there is only obscure or indistinct indication of Brahman apply also to Brahman as in those of the First Pada.

SYNOPSIS

Doubts may arise as to the exact meaning of certain expressions of Śhruti, whether they indicate Brahman or something else.

These expressions are taken up for discussion in this and the next sections.

It is proved in this section that the different expressions used in different Śhrutis for Divine contemplation indicate the same Infinite Brahman.

In the Sandilya Vidyā of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad it is said that as the form and the character of a person in his next life are determined by his desires and thoughts of the present one, he should constantly desire for and meditate upon Brahman who is perfect, who is Sat-Chit-Ānanda, who is immortal, who is Self-luminous, who is eternal, pure, birthless, deathless, Infinite etc., so that he may become identical with Him.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1 to 8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath etc., mentioned in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad III-14 is not the individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 9 and 10) decides that he to whom the Brāhmaṇas and Kshatriyas are but food (Katha Up. I-2-25) is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 11 and 12) shows that the two which entered into the cave (Katha Up. I-3-1) are Brahman and the individual soul.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 13 to 17) states that the person within the eye mentioned in Chh. Up. IV-15-1 indicates neither a reflected image nor any individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 18 to 20) shows that the Inner Ruler within (Antaryamin) described in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad III-7-3 as

pervading and guiding the five elements (earth, water, fire, air, ether) and also heaven, sun, moon, stars etc., is no other than Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VI." (Sūtras 21 to 23) proves that which cannot be seen, etc., mentioned in Mundaka Upaniṣhad I-1-6 is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 24 to 32) shows that the Ātman, the Vaiśhvānara of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad V-11-6 is Brahman.

The opinions of different sages namely Jaimini, Asmarathya and Badari have also been given here to show that the Infinite Brahman is sometimes conceived as finite and as possessing head, trunk, feet and other limbs and organs in order to facilitate divine contemplation according to the capacity of the meditator.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-8) The Manomaya is Brahman.

I.2.1 (32) (That which consists of the mind ‘Manomaya’ is Brahman) because there is taught (in this text) (that Brahman which is) well-known (as the cause of the world) in the Upaniṣhads.

Śhruti declares, “All this indeed is Brahman, emanating from Him, living and moving in Him, and ultimately dissolving in Him; thus knowing let a man meditate with a calm mind.” A man in his present life is the outcome of his previous thoughts and desires. He becomes that in after-life what he now resolves to be. Therefore he should meditate on Brahman who is ideally perfect, who functions through his very life-energy and who is all-light. “He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prāṇa (the subtle body) etc.” Chh. Up. III-14.

Now a doubt arises whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, etc., is the individual soul or the Supreme Brahman.

The Opponent says: the passage refers to the individual soul only. Why? Because the embodied self only is connected with the mind. This is a well-known fact, while the Supreme Brahman is not. It is said in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad II-1-2 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.' The passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman.

It aims only at enjoining calmness of mind. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text "He to whom all works, all desires belong" refer to the individual soul.

The Śhrutis declare "He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley." This refers to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the infinite or unlimited Brahman.

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We reply: The Supreme Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on. Because the text begins with "All this indeed is Brahman." That Brahman which is considered as the cause of the world in all scriptural passages is taught here also in the formula "Tajjalan". As the beginning refers to Brahman, the latter passage where "He who consists of the mind" (Manomaya) occurs, should also refer to Brahman as distinguished by certain qualities. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and unnecessarily introducing a fresh topic. Further the text speaks of Upāsana, meditation. Therefore

it is but proper that Brahman which is described in all other passages as an object of meditation is also taught here and not the individual soul. The individual soul is not spoken of anywhere as an object of meditation or Upāsana.

Moreover you can attain serenity by meditating on Brahman which is an embodiment of peace. Manomaya refers to Brahman in Mun. Up. II-2-7, Tait. Up. I-6-1 and Katha Up. VII-9. The well-known Manomaya, applied in all the above passages to Brahman, is referred to here in the Chhandogya also. Therefore Manomaya refers to the Supreme Brahman only.

1.2.2 (33) Moreover the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

An argument in support of Sūtral is adduced. And because the attributes, sought to be applied by the Śhruti quoted above, justly belong to Brahman, it must be admitted that the passage refers to Brahman.

“He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prāṇa (the subtle body), whose form is light, resolve is true, whose nature is like that of ether (Omnipresent and invisible), from whom proceed all actions, all desires, all scents, all tastes; who is All-embracing, who is voiceless and unattached” Chh. Up. III-14-2. These attributes mentioned in this text as topics of meditation are possible in Brahman only.

The qualities of having true desires (Sat Kāma) and true purposes (Sat Śhaṅkalpa) are attributed to the Supreme Self in another passage viz. ‘The Self which is free from sin etc.’ Chh. Up. VIII-7-1, “He whose Self is

the ether"; this is possible as Brahman which as the cause of the entire universe is the Self of everything and is also the Self of the ether. Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman.

Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the Supreme Brahman alone is represented as the object of meditation.

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I.2.3 (34) On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it) the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by Manomaya etc.).

Such qualities cannot apply to the individual soul. The argument in support of the Sūtra is continued. The preceding Sūtra has stated that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman. The present Sūtra declares that they are not possible in the Jīva or the embodied Soul. Brahman only is endowed with the qualities of 'consisting of mind or Manomaya, and so on' but not the embodied Self.

Because the qualities such as 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who is speechless, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth' cannot be ascribed to the individual soul.

The term 'Śhārīra' or embodied means 'dwelling in a body.' If the Opponent says 'The Lord also dwells in the body', we reply: true, He does abide in the body, but not in the body alone; because Śhruti declares 'The Lord is greater than the earth, greater than the heaven, Omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' On the contrary the individual soul resides in the body only.

The Jīva is like a glow-worm before the effulgence of the Brahman who is like a Sun when compared with it. The superior qualities described in the text are not certainly possible in Jīva.

The All-pervading is not the embodied self or the individual soul, as it is quite impossible to predicate Omnipresence of Him. It is impossible and against fact and reason also that one and the same individual could be in all the bodies at the same time.

I.2.4 (35) Because of the declaration of the attainer and the object attained. He who consists of the mind (Manomaya) refers to Brahman and not to the individual soul.

An argument in support of Sūtra 3 is adduced.

A separate distinction is drawn between the object of activity and of the agent. Therefore the attributes of 'consisting of mind' (Manomaya) cannot belong to the embodied self. The text says "When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him" Chh. Up. III-14-4. Here the word 'Him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion. "Who consists of the mind, the object of meditation" viz. as something to be obtained; while the words 'I shall obtain' represent the meditating individual soul as the agent i.e. the obtainer.

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We must not assume that one and the same thing is spoken of as the attainer (agent) and the object attained at the same time. The attainer and the attained cannot be the same. The object meditated upon is different from the person who meditates, the individual soul referred to in the above text by the pronoun 'I'.

Thus for the above reason also, that which is characterised by the attributes consisting of mind ‘Manomaya’ and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

1.2.5 (36) Because of the difference of words.

The argument in favour of Sūtra 1 is continued. That which possesses the attributes of “consisting of mind” and so on cannot be the individual soul, because there is a difference of words.

In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa the same idea is expressed in similar words “As is a grain of rice, or a grain of barley, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed”, so is that golden person in the Self (.x6-3-2).

Here one word i.e. the locative “in the Self” denotes the individual soul or the embodied self, and a different word, viz. the nominative ‘person’ denotes the self distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind etc.

We, therefore, conclude that the two are different and that the individual self is not referred to in the text under discussion.

1.2.6 (37) From the Smṛiti also (we know the embodied self or the individual soul is different from the one referred to in the text under discussion).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

It is so declared also in the Smṛiti (Bhagavad Gītā). From the Smṛiti also it is evident that the individual soul is markedly different from the subject matter of the text under discussion.

Smṛiti also declares the difference of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul “The Lord dwelleth in the hearts of all beings, O Arjuna,

by His illusive power, causing all beings to revolve, as though mounted on a potter's wheel" (Gītā: XVIII-61).

The difference is only imaginary and not real. The difference exists only so long as Avidyā or ignorance lasts and the significance of the Mahāvākya or Great Sentence of the Upaniṣhads 'Tat Tvam Asi' (Thou art That) has not been realised. As soon as you grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to Samsāra or phenomenal life with its distinction of bondage, final emancipation and the like.

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I.2.7 (38) If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned i.e. the heart) and also on account of the denotation of that (i.e. of minuteness) we say, No; because (Brahman) has thus to be nieditated and because the case is similar to that of ether.

An objection to Sūtra 1 is raised and refuted.

Now an objection is raised, that the Manomaya of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad cannot be Brahman, but is Jīva, because the description there is more applicable to an individual soul than to Brahman. The text says "He is my self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a mustard seed" Chh. Up. III-14-3. This shows that the Manomaya occupies very little space, in fact it is atomic and so cannot be Brahman.

This Sūtra refutes it. Though a man is the king of the whole earth, he could at the same time be called the king of Ayodhya as well.

The Infinite is called the atomic because He can be realised in the minute space of the chamber of the heart, just as Lord Viṣṇu can be realised in the sacred stone called Saligrama.

Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as abiding in the heart. The case is similar to that of the eye of the needle. The ether, though all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, with reference to its connection with the eye of the needle. So it is said of Brahman also.

The attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness are ascribed to Brahman only for the convenience of conception and meditation, because it is difficult to meditate on the all-pervading, infinite Brahman. This will certainly not go against His Omnipresence. These limitations are simply imagined in Brahman. They are not at all real.

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In the very passage Brahman is declared to be infinite like space, and all-pervading like ether, 'Greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.' Though Brahman is all-pervading, yet He becomes atomic through His mysterious inconceivable power to please His devotees. He appears simultaneously everywhere, wherever His devotees are. This simultaneous appearance of the atomic Brahman everywhere establishes His all-pervadingness even in His manifested form. Gopis saw Lord Kṛiṣṇa everywhere.

The Opponent says: If Brahman has His abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow, that He is attended by all the imperfections which attach to beings having

different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages viz. want of unity being made up of parts, non-permanency, etc. He would be subject to experiences originating from connection with bodies. To this the author gives a suitable reply in the following Sūtra.

1.2.8 (39) If it be said that (being connected with the hearts of all individual souls to) Its (Brahman's) Omnipresence, it would also have experience (of pleasure and pain) (we say) not so, on account of the difference in the nature (of the two).

Another objection is raised and refuted here.

The word 'Sambhoga' denotes mutual experience or common experience. The force of 'Sam' in 'Sambhoga' is that of 'Saha'. The mere dwelling within a body is not a cause always of experiencing the pleasures or pains connected with that body. The experience is subject to the influence of the good and evil actions. Brahman has no such Karma. He is actionless (Nishkriya, Akarta). In the Gītā the Lord says, "The Karmas do not touch Me and I have no attachment to the fruit of Karmas-Na mam karmani limpanti na me karmaphale spriha".

There is no equality in experience between Brahman and the individual soul, because Brahman is all-pervading, of absolute power; the individual soul is of little power and absolutely dependent.

Though Brahman is all-pervading and connected with hearts of all individual souls and is also intelligent like them, He is not subject to pleasure and pain. Because the individual soul is an agent, he is the doer of good and bad actions. Therefore he experiences pleasure and pain. Brahman is not the doer. He is the eternal Satchidānanda.

He is free from all evil.

The Opponent says: The individual soul is in essence identical with Brahman. Therefore Brahman is also subject to the pleasure and pain experienced by the Jīva or the individual soul. This is a foolish argument. This is a fallacy. In reality there is neither the individual soul nor pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are mental creations only.

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When the individual soul is under the influence of ignorance or Avidyā, he foolishly thinks that he is subject to pleasure and pain.

Proximity will not cause the clinging of pain and pleasure to Brahman. When something in space is affected by fire, the space itself cannot be affected by fire. Is ether blue because boys call it so? Not even the slightest trace of experience of pleasure and pain can be attributed to Brahman.

Śhruti declares “Two birds are living together as friends on the same tree i.e. body. One of them, i.e. the individual soul, eats the tasteful fruit i.e. enjoys the fruit of his actions: and the other i.e. the Supreme Soul witnesses without eating anything, i.e. without partaking of fruit” Mun. Up. III-1-1.

Sūtras 1 to 8 have established that the subject of discussion in the quoted portion of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad Chapter III-14 is Brahman and not the individual soul.

Topic 2: (Sūtras 9-10) The eater is Brahman.

I.2.9 (40) The Eater (is Brahman), because both the movable and immovable (i.e. the whole world) is taken (as His food).

A passage from the Kathopanishad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Kathopanishad I.2.25 “Who then knows where He is, to whom the Brāhmaṇas and Kshatriyas are (as it were) but food, and death itself a condiment?” This text shows by means of the words ‘food’ and ‘condiment’ that there is some eater.

Who is this eater? Is it the fire referred to in as eater: “Soma indeed is food, and fire eater” Bri. Up. I-4-6, or is it individual soul referred to as eater “One of them eats the sweet fruit” Mun. Up. III-I-I, or the Supreme Self? We reply that the eater must be the Supreme Self because it is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable. The entire universe is re-absorbed in Brahman. All things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food of Brahman while Death itself is the condiment. The eater of the whole world, the consumer of all these things in their totality can be Brahman alone and none else.

The Brāhmaṇas and the Kshatriyas are mentioned as mere examples as they are foremost of created beings and as they hold a pre-eminent position. The words are merely illustrative.

The whole universe sprinkled over by Death is referred to here as the food. Condiment is a thing which renders other things more palatable and causes other things to be eaten with great relish.

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Therefore the Death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were, it makes other things palatable. Therefore the Eater of the entire world made palatable by Death, can mean only Brahman in His aspect of Destroyer. He withdraws the whole universe within Himself at the time

of Pralaya or dissolution. Therefore the Supreme Self must be taken here as the Eater.

The Opponent says: Brahman cannot be an eater. The Śhruti declares "The other looks on without eating". We say that this has no validity. The passage aims at denying the fruition of the results of works.

It is not meant to deny the re-absorption of the world into Brahman; because it is well-established by all the Vedānta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, sustenance and re-absorption of the world.

Therefore the Eater can here be Brahman only.

I.2.10 (41) And on account of the context also the (eater is Brahman).

An argument in support of Sūtra 9 is given.

Brahman is the subject of the discussion. In the beginning Nachiketas asks Yama, "Tell me of that which is above good and evil, which is beyond cause and effect and which is other than the past and future" Katha Up. I-2-14. Yama replies, "I will tell you in brief. It is OM" Katha Up. I-2-15. This Ātman is neither born nor does it die" Katha Up. I-2-18. He finally includes "of whom the Brāhmaṇa and the Kshatriya classes are, as it were, food and Death itself a condiment or pickle, how can one thus know where that Ātman is?" All this obviously shows that Brahman is the general topic. To adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Hence the Eater is Brahman. Further the clause "Who then knows where he is", shows that realisation is very difficult. This again points to the Supreme Self.

The force of the word 'Cha' (and) in the Sūtra is to indicate that the Smṛiti is also to the same effect, as says the Gītā.

"Thou art the Eater of the worlds, of all that moves and stands; worthier of reverence than the Gurus self, there is none like Thee".

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Topic 3: (Sūtras 11-12) The dwellers in the cave of the heart are the individual soul and Brahman.

I.2.11 (42) The two who have entered into the cavity (of the heart) are indeed the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, because it is so seen.

Another passage of the Kathopanishad is taken up for discussion. In the same Kathopanishad I-3-1 we read, "Having entered the cavity of the heart, the two enjoy the reward of their works in the body.

Those who know Brahman call them shade and light: likewise those householders who perform the Trinachiketa sacrifice".

The doubt arises here whether the couple referred to are the individual soul and Buddhi (intellect).

In the passage under discussion, the couple referred to are the individual soul and the Supreme Self, for these two, being both intelligent selves, are of the same nature. We see that in ordinary life also whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant. When a bull is brought to us, we say 'bring another, look out for a second'. It means another bull, not a horse or a man. So, if with an intelligent self, the individual soul, another is said to enter the cavity of the heart, it must refer to another of the same class

i.e. to another intelligent being and not to the intellect (Buddhi) which is insentient.

Śhruti and Smṛiti speak of the Supreme Self as placed in the cave. We read in Kathopanishad I-2-12 "The ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss". We also find in Taittiriya Upaniṣhad II-1 "He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether" and "search for the self who entered into the cave". A special abode for the all-pervading Brahman is given for the purpose of conception and meditation. This is not contrary to reason.

Sometimes the characteristics of one in a group are indirectly applied to the whole group as when we say "The men with an umbrella" where only one has an umbrella and not the whole group. Similarly here also, though it is only one who is enjoying the fruits of actions both are spoken of as eating the fruits.

The word 'pibantau' is in the dual number meaning 'the two drink' while as a matter of fact, the Jīva only drinks the fruit of his works and not the Supreme Self. We may explain the passage by saying that while the individual soul drinks, the Supreme Self also is said to drink because he makes the soul to drink. The individual soul is the direct agent, the Supreme Self is the causal agent that is to say the individual self directly drinks while the Supreme Self causes the individual soul to drink.

The phrases 'shade' and 'light' show the difference between the Infinite Knowledge of the Supreme Self and the finite knowledge of the Jīva, or that the Jīva is bound down to the chain of Samsāra, while the Supreme Self is above Samsāra.

We, therefore, understand by the 'two entered into the cave', the individual soul and the Supreme Self.

Another reason for this interpretation is given in the following Sūtra.

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I.2.12 (43) And on account of the distinctive qualities (of the two mentioned in subsequent texts).

An argument in support of Sūtra 11 is given.

This is clear also from the description in other portions of the same scripture viz. Kathopanishad.

Further the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Because in a subsequent passage (I-3-3) the characteristics of the two that have entered the cavity of the heart are given. They indicate that the two are the individual soul and Brahman. "Know that the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot." The individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through the transmigratory existence and final emancipation. Further it is said "He attains the end of his journey, that highest place of Viṣṇu" Katha Up. I-3-9. Here it is represented that the Supreme Self is the goal of the driver's course. The two are mentioned here as the attainer and the goal attained i.e. the individual soul or Jīva and the Supreme Soul or Brahman.

In the preceding passage (I-2-12) also it is said "The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave of the heart, who abides in the abyss as God, he indeed leaves joy and

sorrow far behind". Here the two are spoken of as the meditator and the object of meditation.

Moreover the Supreme Self is the general topic. It is therefore obvious that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the Supreme Self.

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Topic 4: (Sūtras 13-17) The person within the eye is Brahman.

I.2.13 (44) The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of (the attributes mentioned therein) being appropriate (only to Brahman).

The being within the eye is Brahman, because it is reasonable to construe the passage as applying to the Supreme Self than to anything else.

The form of worship in another part of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (IV-15-1), taking the being within the eyes as the Supreme Self, is taken up as the subject for discussion.

In Chhandogya Upaniṣhad IV-15-1 we read, "This person that is seen in the eye is the Self. This is Immortal and fearless, this is Brahman". The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected self which resides in the eye, or to the individual soul or to the self of some deity which presides over the organ of sight or to the Supreme Self.

The Sūtra says that the person in the eye is Brahman only, because the attributes 'Immortal', 'fearless', etc., mentioned here accord with the nature of the Supreme Self only.

The attributes 'being untouched by sin', being 'Samyadvama' etc., are applicable to the Supreme Self only. The attributes of being 'Vamani' or the leader of all and 'Bhamani', the All-effulgent, applied to the person in the eye are appropriate in the case of Brahman also.

Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the Supreme Self or Brahman only.

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I.2.14 (46) And on account of the statement of place and so on.

An argument in support of Sūtra 13 is given.

In other Śhrutis location etc., i.e. abode, name and form are attributed to Brahman Himself to facilitate meditation. But how can the all-pervading Brahman be in a limited space like the eye? Definite abode like the cavity of the heart, the eye, the earth, disc of the sun etc., is given to the all-pervading Brahman for the purpose of meditation (Upāsana), just as Saligrama is prescribed for meditation on Viṣṇu. This is not contrary to reason.

The phrase 'and so on' which forms part of the Sūtra shows that not only abode is assigned to Brahman but also such things as name and form not appropriate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are ascribed to It for the sake of meditation, as Brahman without qualities cannot be an object of meditation. Vide Chh. Up. 1.6.6-7.

"His name is 'Ut'. He with the golden beard."

I.2.15 (46) And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by bliss (i.e. Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 13 is continued.

Because the text refers to the Supreme Self only and not to Jīva who is miserable.

The same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by bliss in the beginning of the chapter in the clauses “Breath is Brahman,” “Ka is Brahman” “Kha is Brahman” we must suppose It to be referred to in the present passage also, as it is proper to stick to the subject matter under discussion.

The fires taught to Upakosala about Brahman “Breath is Brahman, bliss is Brahman, the ether is Brahman” Chh. Up. IV-10-5. This same Brahman is further elucidated by his teacher as “the being in the eye”.

On hearing the speech of the fires viz. “Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman”, Upakosala says “I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman”. Therefore the fires reply “What is Ka is Kha. What is Kha is Ka”.

The word Ka in ordinary language denotes sensual pleasure. If the word Kha were not used to qualify the sense of Ka one would think that ordinary worldly pleasure was meant. But as the two words Ka and Kha occur together and qualify each other, they indicate Brahman whose Self is Bliss. Therefore the reference is to Supreme Bliss and such a description can apply only to Brahman.

If the word Brahman in the clause “Ka is Brahman” were not added and if the sentence would run “Ka, Kha is Brahman”, the word Ka would be only an adjective and thus pleasure being a mere quality cannot be a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words Ka as well as Kha are joined with the word Brahman. “Ka is Brahman. Kha is Brahman”.

Qualities as well as persons having those qualities could be objects of meditation.

(64)

I.2.16 (47) And on account of the statement of the way of him who has known the Truth of the Upaniṣhads.

The argument in support of Sūtra 13 is continued.

The person in the eye is the Supreme Self for the following reason also. From Śhruti we know of the way of the knower of Brahman.

He travels after death through the Devayana path or the path of the Gods. That way is described in Prasna Up. 1-10. "Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith and knowledge attain the Sun by the Northern Path or the path of Devayana. From thence they do not return. This is the immortal abode, free from fear, and the highest." The knower of the "person in the eye" also goes by this path after death. From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman it is quite clear that the person within the eye is Brahman.

The following Sūtra shows that it is not possible for the above text to mean either the reflected Self or the Jīva or the deity in the Sun.

I.2.17 (48) (The person within the eye is the Supreme Self) and not any other (i.e. the individual soul etc.) as these do not exist always; and on account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the being ascribed to any of these).

The argument in support of Sūtra 13 is continued.

The reflected self does not permanently abide in the eye. When some person comes near the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye. When he moves away the reflection disappears.

Surely you do not propose to have some one near the eye at the time of meditation so that you may meditate on the image in the eye.

Such a fleeting image cannot be the object of meditation. The individual soul is not meant by the passage, because he is subject to ignorance, desire and action, he has no perfection. Hence he cannot be the object of meditation. The qualities like immortality, fearlessness, immanence, eternity, perfection etc., cannot be appropriately attributed to the reflected self or the individual soul or the deity in the sun.

Therefore no other self save the Supreme Self is here spoken of as the person in the eye. The person in the eye (Akshi Puruṣha) must be viewed as the Supreme Self only.

(65)

Topic 5: (Sūtras 18-20) The internal ruler is Brahman.

I.2.18 (49) The internal ruler over the gods and so on (is Brahman) because the attributes of that (Brahman) are mentioned.

A passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion. In Bri. Up. III-7-1 we read “He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings” and later on “He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose

body the earth is, who rules the earth from within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal" etc., III-7-3.

Here a doubt arises whether the Inner Ruler (Antaryamin) denotes the individual soul or some Yogin endowed with extraordinary powers such as for instance, the power of making his body subtle or the presiding deity or Pradhāna or Brahman (the Highest Self).

The Opponent says: Some god presiding over the earth and so on must be the Antaryamin. He only is capable of ruling the earth as he is endowed with the organs of action. Rulership can rightly be ascribed to him only. Or else the ruler may be some Yogin who is able to enter within all things on account of his extraordinary Yogic powers. Certainly the Supreme Self cannot be meant as He does not possess the organs of actions which are needed for ruling.

We give the following reply. The internal Ruler must be Brahman or the Supreme Self. Why so'? Because His qualities are mentioned in the passage under discussion. Brahman is the cause of all created things. The universal rulership is an appropriate attribute of the Supreme Self only. Omnipotence, Selfhood, Immortality, etc., can be ascribed to Brahman only.

The passage "He whom the earth does not know," shows that the Inner Ruler is not known by the earth-deity. Therefore it is obvious that the Inner Ruler is different from that deity. The attributes 'unseen', 'unheard', also refer to the Supreme Self only which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.

He is also described in the section as being all-pervading, as He is inside and the Ruler within of everything viz. the earth, the sun, water, fire,

sky, the ether, the senses, etc. This also can be true only of the Highest Self or Brahman. For all these reasons, the Inner Ruler is no other but the Supreme Self or Brahman.

(66)

I.2.19 (50) And (the Internal Ruler is) not that which is taught in the Saṅkhya Smṛiti (viz. Pradhāna] because qualities contrary to its nature are mentioned (here).

An argument in support of Sūtra 18 is given.

The word Antaryamin (Inner Ruler) cannot relate to Pradhāna as it has not got Chaitanya (sentiency) and cannot be called Ātman.

The Pradhāna is not this 'Internal Ruler' as the attributes "He is the immortal, unseen Seer, unheard Hearer" etc., "There is no other seer but He, there is no other thinker but He, there is no other Knower but He. This is the Self, the Ruler within, the Immortal. Everything else is of evil" (Bri. Up. III-7-23), cannot be ascribed to the non-intelligent blind Pradhāna.

The Opponent says: Well then, if the term 'Internal Ruler' cannot denote the Pradhāna as it is neither a Self nor seer it can certainly denote the individual soul or Jīva who is intelligent and therefore sees, hears, thinks and knows, who is internal and therefore of the nature of Self. Further the individual soul is capable of ruling over the organs, as he is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the individual soul or Jīva.

The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer to this.

(67)

I.2.20 (51) And the individual soul (is not the Internal Ruler) for both also (i.e. both recensions viz. the Kanva and Madhyandina Sakhas of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad) speak of it as different (from the Internal Ruler.)

The argument in support of Sūtra 18 is continued. The word 'not' is to be supplied from the preceding Sūtra.

The followers of both Sakhas speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler. The Kanvas read "He who dwells in Knowledge-Yo vijnane tishthan" Bri. Up. III-7-22. Here 'knowledge' stands for the individual soul. The Madhyandinas read "He who dwells in the Self-ya atmani tishthan". Here 'Self' stands for the individual soul. In either reading the individual soul is spoken of as different from the 'Internal Ruler', for the Internal Ruler is the Ruler of the individual soul also.

The difference between the Jīva and Brahman is one of Upadhi (limitation). The difference between the Internal Ruler and the individual soul is merely the product of ignorance or Avidyā. It has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by ignorance. The difference is not absolutely true. Because the Self within is one only; two internal Selves are not possible. But on account of limiting adjuncts the one Self is practically treated as if it were two, just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether.

The scriptural text "where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another" intimates that the world exists only in the sphere of ignorance, while the subsequent text "But when the Self only is all this

how should one see another" declares that the world disappears in the sphere of true knowledge.

(68)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 21-23) That which cannot be seen is Brahman.

I.2.21 (52) The possessor of qualities like indivisibility etc., (is Brahman) on account of the declaration of Its attributes.

Some expressions from the Mundaka Upaniṣhad are now taken up as the subject for discussion.

We read in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad (I-1-5 & 6) "The higher knowledge is this by which the indestructible is known or realised.

Tat which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise consider as the source of all beings." Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility etc., is Pradhāna, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Self or the Highest Lord.

That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings (Bhūtayoni) characterised by such attributes as invisibility and so on, can be the Supreme Self or Brahman only, nothing else, because qualities like "He is all-knowing (Sarvajña), all-perceiving (Sarvavit) Mun. Up. I-1-9 are true only of Brahman and not Pradhāna which is non-intelligent. Certainly it cannot refer to the Jīva or the embodied soul as he is narrowed by his limiting conditions. The section also, in which these

passages occur relates to the Highest Knowledge or Para Vidyā. Therefore it must refer to Brahman and not to Pradhāna or Jīva.

I.2.22 (53) The other two (viz. the individual soul and the Pradhāna] are not (the source of all beings) for distinctive attributes and differences are stated.

An argument in support of Sūtra 21 is given.

The source of all beings is Brahman or the Supreme Self but not either of the two others viz. the individual soul for the following reason also.

We read in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad II.1, 2 “That the heavenly person is without a body. He is both without and within, is birthless, without breath, and without mind, pure, higher than the high, Imperishable.” The distinctive attributes mentioned here such as “being of a heavenly nature” (Divya), ‘Birthless’, ‘Pure’, etc., can in no way belong to the individual soul who erroneously regards himself to be limited by name and form as presented by Avidyā or ignorance and erroneously considers himself limited, impure, corporeal, etc. Therefore the passage obviously refers to the Supreme Self or Brahman who is the subject of all the Upaniṣhads.

“Higher than the high, Imperishable (Pradhāna)” intimates that the source of all beings spoken of in the last Sūtra is not the Pradhāna but something different from it. Here the term Imperishable means the Avyaktam or Avyakrita (the unmanifested or the undifferentiated) which represents the potentiality or the seed of all names and forms, contains the subtle parts of the material elements and abides in the Lord. As it is no effect of anything, it is high when compared to all effects. Intellect, mind, egoism, the Tanmatras, the organs are all born

from it. "Aksharat paratah parah-Higher than the high, Imperishable", which expresses a difference clearly indicates that the Supreme Self or Brahman is meant here. Beyond Pradhāna or Avyaktam is Para Brahman. It is a settled conclusion therefore that the source of all beings must mean the highest Self or Brahman only.

A further argument in favour of the same conclusion is given in the following Sūtra.

(69)

I.2.23 (54) And on account of its form being mentioned (the passage under discussion refers to Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 21 is continued.

Further His form is described in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad II-1-4 "Fire is His head, His eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters His ears, His speech the Vedas, the wind His breath, His heart the universe; from His feet came the earth, He is indeed the inner Self of all beings." This statement of form can refer only to the Supreme Lord or Brahman. Such a description is appropriate only in the case of Brahman, because the Jīva is of limited power and because Pradhāna (matter) cannot be the Soul or inner Self of living beings.

As the "source of all beings" forms the general topic, the whole passage from "From Him is born breath" upto "He is the inner Self of all beings" refers to that same source.

"The Person indeed is all this, sacrifice, knowledge etc." Mun. Up. II-1-10, intimates that the source of all beings referred to in the passage

under discussion is none other than the Supreme Self or Brahman, for He is the inner Self of all beings.

(70)

1.2.24 (55) Vaiśhvānara (is Brahman) on account of the distinction qualifying the common terms (“Vaiśhvānara” and “Self”).

This Sūtra proves that the word "Vaiśhvānara" used in Śruti for worship indicates Brahman.

We read in Chh. Up. V.18.1-2 “He who meditates on the Vaiśhvānara Self, extending from heaven to earth as identical with his own Self, eats food in all beings, in all selves. Of that Vaiśhvānara Self Sutejas (heaven) is the head, the sun the eye, the feet the earth, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.” Here the doubt arises whether by the term “Vaiśhvānara” we have to understand the gastric fire or the elemental fire, or the god presiding over the elemental fire, or the individual soul or the Supreme Self (Brahman).

The Opponent says that Vaiśhvānara is the gastric fire because it is said in Bri. Up. V-9 “Agni Vaiśhvānara is the fire within man by which the food that is eaten is digested. Or it may denote fire in general or the deity which presides over the elemental fire or the individual soul who being an enjoyer is in close vicinity to Vaiśhvānara fire.” The Siddhantin says, here that the Supreme Self or Brahman only is referred to on account of the qualifying adjuncts to these words. The adjuncts are “Heaven is the head of this Vaiśhvānara Self, the Sun its eyes, etc.” This is possible only in the case of the Supreme Self.

Further in the passage “He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all selfs.” This is possible only if we take the term Vaiśhvānara to denote the Highest Self.

The fruit of meditation on this Vaiśhvānara Self is the attainment of all desires and destruction of all sins (Chh. Up. V.24.3). This can only be true if the Supreme Self is meant. Moreover the chapter begins with the enquiry “What is our Self? What is Brahman?” The words ‘Self’ and ‘Brahman’ are marks of Brahman and indicate the Supreme Self only. The word ‘Brahman’ is used in its primary sense.

Therefore it is proper to think that the whole chapter treats of Brahman only. Moreover, etymologically also the word Vaiśhvānara means Brahman; because it is composed of two words “Viśhva” meaning “all” and “Nara” meaning “men” namely “He who contains all men within himself.” Such a being is Brahman only.

It is a settled conclusion, therefore, that only Brahman can be meant by the term “Vaiśhvānara”.

(71)

l.2.25 (56) Because that (cosmic form of the Supreme Lord) which is described in the Smṛiti is an indicatory mark or inference (from which we infer the meaning of this Śhruti text under discussion).

An argument in support of Sūtra 24 is given. The word ‘Iti’ denotes a reason. It points to a corroborative statement which expresses the same thing as the Śhruti. The Smṛitis interpret the passages of the Śhruti. Therefore where a doubt arises as to the significance of a passage in the Śhruti, the Smṛiti may be consulted in order to get more

light on the subject matter. The Smṛiti gives a description of the cosmic form of the Highest Lord as “He whose mouth is fire, whose head is heaven, whose navel the ether, whose eyes the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to Him, whose body is the world.” This is in agreement with the description in the text under discussion.

The same Lord who is spoken of in the Śhruti is described in the Smṛiti also.

In the Bhagavad Gītā XV-14 the word Vaiśhvānara is expressly applied to the Lord - “I having become the fire of life, take possession of the bodies of breathing beings and united with the life-breaths, I digest the four kinds of food.” Here a truth about the Lord is declared in a Smṛiti passage and from it we may infer that the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā taught in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad also refers to this mystery of the Lord. Hence Vaiśhvānara is the Highest Lord. Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the Supreme Lord is referred to in the text.

In the following Sūtra the author removes the doubt that the Vaiśhvānara may denote the gastric fire.

(72)

l.2.26 (57) If it be said that (Vaiśhvānara is) not (Brahman) or the Highest Lord on account of the term (viz. Vaiśhvānara which has a different settled meaning viz. gastric fire) etc., and on account of his abiding within (which is a characteristic of the gastric fire) (we say) no, because there is the instruction to conceive (Brahman) as such (as the gastric fire, because it is impossible for the gastric fire to have the heaven etc, for its head and other limbs) and also because they (the

Vajasaneyins) describe him (viz. the Vaiśhvānara) as man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

The Opponent raises the following objection. The ordinary meaning of “Vaiśhvānara” is fire. Moreover scripture speaks of the Vaiśhvānara as abiding within. “He knows him abiding within man” Sat. Br. 10-6-1-11 which applies to the gastric fire only. Therefore the gastric fire alone and not Brahman is referred to in the text under discussion.

This Sūtra refutes this objection. The Siddhantin gives the following reply. The Śhruti here teaches the worship of Brahman in the gastric fire by way of meditation (Upāsana) analogously to such passages as “Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman” Chh. Up. III-18-1.

Moreover the gastric fire cannot have heaven for its head, and so on. Further the Vajasaneyins consider Vaiśhvānara as a man (Puruṣha). “This Agni Vaiśhvānara is a man” Sat. Br. 10.6.1-11.

Therefore “Vaiśhvānara” here refers to Brahman only. In the following Sūtra the author sets aside the view that Vaiśhvānara of this passage means the Devata called Agni or the elemental fire.

I.2.27 (58) For the same reasons (the Vaiśhvānara) cannot be the deity (fire) or the element (fire).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

The Opponent says: the presiding deity of fire is a mighty being. He is endowed with great lordliness and power. Therefore heaven, etc., may very appropriately be its head and other members.

Therefore the passage may very well apply to him.

For the same reasons stated in Sūtra 26 Vaiśhvānara is neither the divinity of fire nor the element of fire. The elemental fire is mere heat and light. The heaven and so on cannot properly be ascribed as its head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect. Again the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, etc., to the god of fire, because it is not the Supreme Cause but a mere effect and its power or glory depends on the Supreme Lord. To them the word “Ātman” could not appropriately be applicable at all.

I.2.28 (59) Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even (if by Vaiśhvānara) (Brahman is) directly (taken as the object of worship).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

Jaimini says that it is not necessary to state that what is meant by Vaiśhvānara is fire as a symbol of God and that the view that it means Brahman directly and in a primary sense is quite consistent and appropriate. The very word ‘Vaiśhvānara’ means the totality of life and applies to Brahman as he is the Soul of all (Sarv’ātmatvat).

This Sūtra declares that ‘Vaiśhvānara can be taken directly to mean Brahman as an object of meditation, because Vaiśhvānara also means the universal man i.e. the all-pervading Brahman Himself. As the word Vaiśhvānara literally means “He to whom belong all men” or “who is the leader (Nara) of all (Viśhva)” so the word Vaiśhvānara denotes etymologically the Supreme Brahman.

I.2.29 (60) On account of the manifestation, so says Āsmarathya.

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad under discussion Vaiśhvānara is described as having the size of a span. How can the Infinite Brahman be limited by the measure of a Pradesa or a span? To this objection the author gives his answer in the following Sūtra.

The sage Āsmarathya says that for the benefit of the worshipper the Infinite Brahman manifests Himself in the finite individually being localised in limited places such as the body or the heart of the human being. Therefore there is no incongruity in using the word “Vaiśhvānara” (even standing for the gastric fire) to signify Brahman.

Even though Brahman is all-pervading, yet He specially manifests Himself as extending from heaven to earth or in the heart for the sake of His devotees.

Asmarathya says that the Infinite is realised through His grace in the limited space of mental image in the mind or a physical image without. The devotees who meditate on Brahman in their heart as having the size of a span, see Him of that size. because He manifests Himself to them in that form.

This is the opinion of Āsmarathya.

Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher Āsmarathya the scriptural text which speaks of Him who is measured by a span may refer to the Supreme Self or the Highest Lord.

(74)

**I.2.30 (61) For the sake of meditation or constant remembrance-
so says the sage Badari.**

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

The sage Bādari is of opinion that this measure of a span is a mental device to facilitate meditation.

He says that the size of the thumb refers to a mental image and not to the actual size.

The Supreme Lord may be called ‘measured by a span’ because He is remembered or meditated, by means of the mind, which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span. The size of the heart is that of a span. As Brahman is meditated as abiding in the lotus of the heart, the aspirant involuntarily associates him with the size of a span. This mental association or Anusmriti is the cause why Brahman is called Pradesamatra, the measure of a span.

Therefore Vaiśhvānara may well stand for Brahman.

I.2.31 (62) Because of imaginary identity the Supreme Lord may be called Pradesamatra (span long). So says Jaimini because so (the Śhruti) declares.

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

Jaimini says that the description refers to a state of realisation of form between the crown of the head and the chin in your body. The cosmic being is worshipped through the identification of different parts of His with the different parts of the worshippers body from the top of head to the chin. The head of the meditator or worshipper is heaven, the eyes the sun and the moon, and so on. In this meditation the cosmic being is limited to the size of a span, the distance from the crown of the head to the chin. Hence Jaimini says that the Highest Lord in the passage under discussion is considered as of the size of a span.

The Śhruti also declares "The teacher said, pointing to his own head. 'This is the Highest Vaiśhvānara' i.e. the head of the Vaiśhvānara"-Vajasaneyi Brāhmaṇa.

(75)

I.2.32 (63) Moreover they (the Jabalas) teach that this (Supreme Lord is to be meditated upon) in this (the space between the head and the chin).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is concluded.

Moreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the Supreme Lord in the intermediate space between the top of the head and the chin.

Jabala Śhruti also says so. It says that He is to be realised Avimukta (full liberation) between Varana (sin preventor) and Nasi (sin destroyer).

Jabala Upaniṣhad says "What is the place? The place where the eye-brows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the heavenly world represented by the upper part of the head and of the other i.e. the earthly world represented by the chin." Sūtras 27 to 32 declare that the reference to the Supreme Lord by the term "Pradesamatra as extending from heaven to the earth or as measured by a span" is quite appropriate.

By all this it is proved that Vaiśhvānara is the Supreme Lord. See Jabala Upaniṣhad-1.

Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the First Adhyāya (Chapter I) of the Brahma-Sūtras of the Vedānta Philosophy.

(76) CHAPTER I, SECTION 3, INTRODUCTION

In the last Section texts of doubtful import were interpreted to refer to Brahman. Some other expressions prescribed for divine contemplation in different Śhrutis, not already discussed in Section 2 are now taken up for discussion to prove that they all indicate the same Infinite Brahman.

In the First Section of the First Chapter the author (Sūtra-kāra) took up the terms which referred to the manifested world such as Ākāśha (ether), Prāṇa (energy), Jyoti (light) and showed that they really refer to Brahman. In the Second Section the author took up the terms which referred to the human body and showed that they refer to Brahman. The Section referred to the Saguna aspect of Brahman.

The Third Section refers to the Nirguna aspect of Brahman. Here the subject of discussion is to Para Brahman or the Supreme Nirguna Brahman.

SYNOPSIS

Some other passages prescribed for meditation in different Śhrutis, not already discussed in Section-2 are now taken up for discussion to prove that they all indicate the same Infinite, Satchidānanda, all-pervading, eternal, Immortal Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth etc., are woven (Mun. Up. II-2-5) is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 8-9) shows that the Bhūma referred to in Chh. Up. VII-23 is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 10-12) teaches that the Akshara (the Imperishable one) of Bri. Up. III-8-8 in which the ether is woven is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa IV.' (Sūtra 13) decides that the Highest Person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable OM according to Prasna Up. V-5 is not the lower but the higher Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 14-21) shows that the small ether (Daharakasa) within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Chh. Up. VIII-1 is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 22-23) proves that he after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted-Katha Up. II-2-15-is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 24-25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Katha Up. II-1-12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 26-33) The next two Adhikaraṇas are of the nature of a digression. They raise a side issue and decide that deities are equally entitled to practise Brahma Vidyā as prescribed in the Vedas. Sūtras 29 and 30 establish the conclusion that the Vedas are eternal.

Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtras 34-38) explains that Śhūdras are altogether not entitled for Brahma Vidyā.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtra 39) proves that the Prāṇa in which everything trembles according to Katha Up. II-3-2 is Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtra 40) proves that the 'light' (Jyoti) mentioned in Chh. Up. VIII-12-3 is the Highest Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtra 41) decides that the ether which reveals names and forms (Chh. Up. VIII-14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XIII: (Sūtras 42-43) teaches that the Vijñānamaya-he who consists of knowledge of Bri. Up. IV-3-7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

(78)

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-7) The abode of heaven, earth etc. is Brahman.

I.3.1 (64) The abode of heaven, earth, etc., (is Brahman) on account of the term, 'own' i.e. 'Self'.

An expression from the Mundaka Upaniṣhad is taken up for discussion.

Para Brahman is the basis or resting place of heaven, earth etc., as the term Ātman indicative of Him is found in the passage. We read in Mundaka Upaniṣhad II-2-5 "He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven, as also the mind with all the senses, know Him alone as the Self, and leave off other talk! He is the bridge of immortality." Here the doubt arises whether the abode is the Supreme Brahman or something else.

The Pūrva-pakshī or the Opponent holds that the abode is something else on account of the expression "He is the bridge of immortality". He says: it is known from daily experience that a bridge takes one to some further bank. It is impossible to assume something beyond the Supreme Brahman, because the Śhrutis declare, "Brahman is endless without a shore" Bri. Up. II-4-12. As the Pradhāna is the general cause, it may be called the general abode. Or the Sūtratman may be the abode. The Śhrutis say "Air is that thread, O Gautama! By air as by a thread O Gautama! this world and the other world and all beings are strung together" Bri. Up. III-7-2. So the air supports all things. Or else

the Jīva may be the abode with reference to the objects of enjoyment as he is the enjoyer.

He who is spoken of as the abode, in whom the earth, heaven etc., are woven is Brahman only, on account of the term 'Own' or 'Self' which is appropriate only if Brahman is referred to in the text and not Pradhāna or Sūtratman. (We meet with the word 'Self' in the passage - "Know him alone as the Self").

Brahman is spoken of in the Śhruti as the general abode by its own terms i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman as, for instance, "All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the being" (Chh. Up. VI-8-4).

(79)

In the texts preceding and following this one, i.e. In Mun. Up. II-1-10 and II-2-11 Brahman is spoken of. Therefore it is only proper to infer that Brahman only is referred to in the intervening texts which is under discussion. In the texts cited above mention is made of an abode and that which abides. In Mundaka Upaniṣhad II-2-11 we read: "Brahman indeed is all this." From this a doubt may arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of leaves, branches, stem, root etc. In order to remove this doubt the text declares in the passage under discussion "Know Him alone as the Self" i.e. know the Self alone and not that which is merely a product of Avidyā (ignorance) and is false or illusory/. Another scriptural text reproves the man who thinks that this world is real. "From death to death goes he who beholds any difference here" (Katha Up. II-4-11).

The statement "All is Brahman" aims at dissolving the wrong conception of the reality of the world. It does not intimate that Brahman is of manifold, variegated nature. The homogeneous nature of Brahman is clearly stated in the Śhrutis. "As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self (Brahman) neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge" (Bri. Up. IV-5-13). For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth etc., is the Supreme Brahman.

The word Setu (bridge) in the words 'Amritasyaisa Setuh' (He is the bridge of immortality) merely refers to His being the basis of every created object and the means of immortality. The word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that which is called a bridge that supports, not that it has a further bank. You should not think that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of wood or stone. Because the word 'Setu' is derived from the root 'Si' which means to bind. The word conveys the idea of holding together or supporting.

I.3.2 (65) Because of the declaration (in the scriptures) that that is to be attained by the liberated.

An argument in support of Sūtra I is given.

The above word "Dyubhvadyayatanam" refers to Para Brahman, also because He is described as attained by the emancipated soul.

A further reason is given to intimate that Brahman is meant in the passage under discussion. Brahman is the goal of the emancipated. That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the liberated is known from other scriptural passages such as "The fetter of the heart is

broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He who is the higher and the lower has been beheld" Mun. Up. II-2-8.

"The wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great" (Mun. Up. III.2-8). "When all desires which once entered his heart are destroyed then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman" (Bri. Up. IV-4-7).

Nowhere will you find that the Pradhāna and similar entities are to be resorted to by the emancipated.

We read in the Bri. Up. IV-4-21, "Let a wise Brāhmaṇa after he has discovered Him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, because that is mere weariness of the tongue." For this reason also the abode of heaven, earth, etc., is the Supreme Brahman.

(80)

I.3.3 (66) (The abode of heaven etc.) is not that which is inferred i.e.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The abode referred to in Sūtra 1 does not indicate Pradhāna because there is no such expression in the said Mundaka Upaniṣhad as can be construed to indicate Pradhāna or matter. On the contrary such terms as "He who knows all (Sarvajña) understands all (Sarvavit)" (Mun. Up. I-1-9) intimate an intelligent being opposed to Pradhāna in nature. For the same reason the air (Sūtratman) cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc.

I.3.4 (67) (Nor) also the individual soul.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The word 'not' is understood here from the preceding Sūtra.

Although the individual soul is an intelligent being and can therefore be denoted by the word 'Self' yet omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to him, as his knowledge is limited by the adjuncts. He cannot become the resting place or abode of the entire world as he is limited and therefore not omnipresent.

The individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc., for the following reason also.

1.3.5 (68) (Also) on account of the declaration of difference (between) individual soul and the abode of heaven etc.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

In the text under discussion viz. "Know him alone as the Self (Ātman)" (Mun. Up. II-2-5), there is a declaration of difference. The individual soul who is desirous of emancipation is the Knower and abode of heaven is the thing to be known. Brahman which is denoted by the word 'Self' and represented as the object of knowledge is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth and so on.

For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth etc.

1.3.6 (69) On account of the subject matter.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The Supreme Brahman is the subject matter of the entire chapter. You can understand this from the passage "Sir, what is that through which when it is known, everything else becomes known?" Mun. Up. I-1-3.

Here the knowledge of everything is said to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. Because all this i.e. the whole universe becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, but not if only the individual soul is known.

The Mundaka Upaniṣhad begins with 'what is that through which' and concludes by saying "The knower of the Brahman becomes Brahman" III-2-9. This clearly intimates that the subject matter of the whole Upaniṣhad from the beginning to the end is Brahman only. Hence it is the same Brahman which is spoken of as the resting place of heaven, earth and so on.

Another reason against the individual soul is given in the following Sūtra.

(82)

I.3.7 (70) And on account of the two conditions of remaining unattached and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the Supreme Self, the latter of the individual soul).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is concluded.

We read in Mundakopanishad III-1-1. "Two birds, inseparable friends cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on (remains as a witness)." The passage refers to Brahman as Self-poised bliss and to the individual soul as eating the sweet and bitter fruits of actions. Here Brahman is described as the silent witness. The passage describes the condition of mere inactive presence of Brahman. The individual soul eats the fruits of his works viz. pleasure and pain and therefore he is different from Brahman. The two states viz. mere presence and the enjoyment indicate that Brahman and the

individual soul are referred to. This description which distinguishes the two can be apt only if the abode of heaven etc. is Brahman. Otherwise there will be no continuity of topic.

It cannot be said that the passage merely describes the nature of the individual soul, because it is nowhere the purpose of the scripture to describe the individual soul. The individual soul is known to everyone as agent and enjoyer. Ordinary experience tells us nothing of Brahman. Brahman is the special topic of all scriptural texts. The purpose of the scriptures is always to describe and establish Brahman which is not well known.

Topic 2: (Sūtras 8-9) Bhūma is Brahman.

I.3.8 (71) Bhūma (is Brahman) because it is taught after the state of deep sleep (i.e. after Prāṇa or the vital air which remains awake even in that state).

Bhūma: the vast, the Infinite, the full;

The term 'Bhūma' does not denote numerical largeness but pervasion in the shape of fullness. Samprasada means the undisturbed place or bliss hence the state of deep sleep, when that bliss is enjoyed. 'Adhi' means above, beyond.

Bhūma denotes Brahman, because it is described in Śhruti to be above Prāṇa, which is here represented by the bliss enjoyed during deep sleep. Bhūma refers to Brahman as the passage teaches an entity higher than Samprasada i.e. Prāṇa or vital air which is awake and active even in deep sleep.

An expression from the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion. In the seventh chapter of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad Sanatkumāra gives instructions to Nārada. He begins with 'name' and takes the student step by step. He goes higher and higher and ultimately teaches the highest truth which is Bhūma or the Infinite. Sanatkumāra says to Nārada "Bhūma is Bliss. You should desire to understand where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is Bhūma." VIII-22-24.

Here the doubt arises whether Bhūma is the vital air or Brahman (the Supreme Self).

(83)

The Opponent maintains that the vital air is Bhūma. He says: Nārada approaches Sanatkumāra for initiation into the mysteries of Ātman. We meet with a series of questions and answers such as "Is there anything greater than a name? Speech is greater than name. Is there anything greater than speech? Mind is greater than speech which extends from name up to vital air". Then Nārada does not ask whether there is any higher truth. But still Sanatkumāra gives an exposition on Bhūma. This intimates that Bhūma is not different from the vital air taught already.

Further he calls the knower of the vital air an Ativādin i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing preceding statements. This clearly shows that the vital air is the highest Truth.

This Sūtra refutes the argument and says that Bhūma is Brahman. Sanatkumāra distinctly says to Nārada - "But verily he is an Ativādin who declares the highest Being to be the True (Satya)" Chh. Up. VII-16-1. This clearly indicates that it refers to something higher than Prāṇa or

the vital air. One can become truly an Ativādin by knowing this Supreme Truth only.

Though Nārada does not ask Sanatkumāra "Is there anything greater than the vital air?", a new topic about Brahman (Bhūma) which is the Supreme Truth is begun. Nārada said to Sanatkumāra "Sir, may I become an Ativādin through the Truth." Sanatkumāra leads Nārada step by step, stage by stage to the knowledge of Brahman or Bhūma and instructs him that this Bhūma is Brahman.

Nārada at first listens to the instruction given by Sanatkumāra on various matters, the last of which is Prāṇa and then becomes silent. Thereupon the wise Sanatkumāra explains to him spontaneously without being asked that he only is an Ativādin who has knowledge of the Highest Truth, and that the knowledge of vital air which is an unreal product is destitute of substance. By the term "The True" is meant the Supreme Brahman, because Brahman is the only Reality. Sanatkumāra thereupon leads Nārada by a series of steps beginning with understanding up to the knowledge of Bhūma. We, therefore, conclude that the Bhūma is the Supreme Brahman, and that it is different from Prāṇa or the vital air.

If Prāṇa or the vital air were the Bhūma then Sanatkumāra would not have continued his instructions. He would have stopped his instructions after saying "Prāṇa is greater than hope" (VII-15-1). But he gives a clear description of the nature of Bhūma in Sections 23, 24, 25 of the same chapter. Therefore Bhūma alone is Brahman or the Highest Truth.

Selfhood does not belong to Prāṇa. Moreover one can free himself from grief only by knowledge of the Supreme Brahman. Brahman only is All Full. Bhūma means also fullness. The quality of the Bhūma agrees best with the Supreme Brahman which is the cause, source, support and substratum for everything. Bhūma is taught as the last of the series. It is infinite Bliss. Therefore it is the highest of all.

(84)

The meditation on Prāṇa is higher than meditation on Name up to hope. Therefore he who thus meditates on Prāṇa is called an Ativādin. He is an Ativādin compared with those below him. But the meditation on the Supreme Brahman is superior even to that on Prāṇa. Hence he who meditates on Brahman or the Bhūma is the real Ativādin.

Nārada thought that the instruction about the Ātman is now completed. Therefore he did not ask any further question.

Sanatkumāra knew that the knowledge of Prāṇa is not the highest knowledge. Therefore he spontaneously continues his teaching to Nārada and tells him that the knowledge of Brahman or the Bhūma is the highest knowledge. The Śrūtis say that Prāṇa springs from Brahman. Therefore Prāṇa is inferior to Brahman. Brahman alone is the Bhūma of the passage of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad under discussion.

I.3.9 (72) And because the attributes (declared in the scriptural passage to Bhūma) apply appropriately only to Para Brahman.

An argument in support of Sūtra 8 is given.

The attributes which the scripture attributes to the Bhūma agree well with Brahman. In the Bhūman the ordinary activities of seeing etc. are

absent. The Śhruti declares “where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Bhūma”. We know from another text that this is the characteristic of the Supreme Self. “But when the Ātman only is all this, how could he see another?” Bri. Up. IV-5-15.

The qualities of being the True, resting on its own greatness, non-duality, bliss. Infiniteness, the self of everything, Omnipresence, Immortality etc., mentioned in the text under discussion can belong to the Supreme only, not to Prāṇa which is an effect and as such cannot possess any of these attributes.

By all this it is proved that the Bhūma is the Supreme Self or Brahman.

(85)

Topic 3: (Sūtras 10-12) Akshara is Brahman

I.3.10 (73) The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting everything up to Ākāśha (ether).

An expression from the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Bri. Up. III-8-7, “In what then is the ether woven like warp and woof?” Gargi put this question to sage Yajnavalkya. He replied: “O Gargi, the Brāhmaṇas call this Akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long etc.” Bri. Up. III-8-8. Here the doubt arises whether the word ‘Akshara’ means syllable ‘OM’ or Brahman. The Opponent maintains that ‘Akshara’ etymologically means a syllable and therefore generally represents the syllable OM, which is also an object of meditation. We have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word.

This Sūtra refutes the above view and says that 'Akshara here stands for Brahman only'. Why? Because the Akshara is said to support everything from earth up to ether. The text says "In that Akshara, Gargi! is the ether woven like warp and woof" Bri. UP. III-8-11. Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman.

Moreover "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long" etc, indicates that relative qualities are absent in it. Therefore the 'Akshara' is Brahman. The objector says: But even Pradhāna supports everything up to ether, because it is the cause of all the modified objects in the universe and so the Akshara or the Imperishable may be Pradhāna. To this doubt the following Sūtra gives an answer.

I.3.11 (74) This (supporting) on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, can be the work of the Supreme Self only and not of the Pradhāna).

An argument in support of Sūtra 10 is given.

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the Highest Self only. Why? On account of the command. The text speaks of a command "By the command of that Akshara O Gargi! the sun and the moon stand apart" Bri. Up. III-8-9.

This command or rulership can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent Pradhāna. Because non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like cannot command their effects such as jars and the like. Therefore the Pradhāna cannot be the 'Akshara' which supports everything up to Ākāśha or ether.

(86)

1.3.12 (75) And on account of (the Śhruti) separating (the Akshara) from that nature is different (from Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 10 is concluded.

The Imperishable (Akshara) is not Pradhāna or Jīva, because in the same text we find description of attributes which would exclude another nature than Brahman. In a supplementary passage in the same Upaniṣhad we find description of this Akshara which excludes Pradhāna and Jīva, because they do not possess that nature.

The qualities referred to in the text namely, seeing, hearing, thinking, knowing etc., “That Akshara, O Gargi! is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing. There is no other seer but He, no other hearer but He, no other thinker but He, no other knower but He. In that Imperishable O Gargi! the ether is woven warp and woof’ (Bri. Up. III-8-1 1), point to an intelligent being and therefore negate the Pradhāna which is non-intelligent.

The word ‘Akshara’ cannot denote the individual soul as he is not free from limiting adjuncts, from which Akshara is free. The Śhrutis say “Akshara is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind etc.” (Bri. Up. III-8-8).

Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the Akshara or the imperishable is the Supreme Brahman only.

(87)

Topic 4: The Highest person to be meditated upon is the Highest Brahman.

I.3.13 (76) Because of His being mentioned as the object of sight, He (who is to be meditated upon is Brahman).

An expression from the Prasnopanishad is taken up now for discussion.

The Highest Brahman is described as He is stated to be the object of Ikshana (realisation by vision). The reference is clearly to the Supreme Self as the object of Ikshana.

We read in Prasna Upaniṣhad V-2 “O Satyakāma, the syllable OM is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two”. The text then goes on “Again he who meditates with the syllable Om of three Matras (A-U-M) on the Highest Person” Prasna Up. V-5. A doubt arises whether the object of meditation is the Highest Brahman or the lower Brahman, because in V-2 both are mentioned, and also because Brahmaloaka is described as the fruit by the worship of this Highest Person.

The Sūtra says: What is here taught as the object of meditation is the Highest Brahman and not Hiranyagarbha (the lower Brahman).

Why? On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight - “He sees the Highest Person”. This intimates that he actually realises or gets himself identified with the Highest Person. Hiranyagarbha also is unreal from the highest or transcendental view point. He is within the realm of Māyā. He is associated with Māyā. Therefore the Highest Person means the Highest Brahman only which is the only Reality.

This very Brahman is taught at the beginning of the passage as the object of meditation.

The Śhruti declares that the release from evil is the fruit of meditation "As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil". This clearly indicates that the Supreme constitutes the object of meditation.

The attainment of Brahmaloka by the worshipper should not be considered as an inappropriate or insignificant fruit of the worship of the Highest Person, because it is a step in gradual liberation or emancipation by degrees (Krama Mukti). He who meditates on the Supreme Self by means of the syllable OM as consisting of the Matras, obtains for his first reward Brahmaloka and after that Kaivalya Moksha or oneness with Supreme Brahman.

In Prasna Upaniṣhad we read "He arrives at this by means of the Omkara; the wise arrives at that which is at rest, free from decay, from death, from fear, the Highest". Free from decay, free from death, free from fear, the Highest can apply only to the Supreme Brahman and not to the lower Brahman.

The word Brahmaloka does not mean the Loka of Brahman but the Loka or condition which is Brahman Himself, just as we explain the compound word Nishadasthapati, not as the headman of the Nishadas but a headman who at the same time is a Nishada. It is a Karmadharaya compound which does not mean the "world of Brahman, but that world which is Brahman."

(88)

Topic 5: (Sūtras 14-21) The Dahara or the 'Small Ākāśha' is Brahman.

I.3.14 (77) The small (ether, Ākāśha, is Brahman) on account of the subsequent arguments or expression).

Another expression from the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is taken up for discussion.

‘Dahara’ refers to Brahman, because the reason stated in the later portions of the passage show this clearly.

We read in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII-1-1 “Now there is this city of Brahman (the body), and in it the place, the small lotus (the heart) and in it that small ether (Ākāśha)". Now what exists within that small ether is to be sought, that is to be understood.

Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart, which the Śhruti speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul.

The Opponent says: By the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether which is the ordinary meaning of the word. It is here called small with reference to its small abode, the heart. Or else the ‘small one’ may be taken to mean the individual soul on account of the term the city of Brahman (Brahmapuri). The body is here called the city of Brahman because the individual soul has his abode in the body, and has acquired this by his deeds. The individual soul is here called Brahman in a metaphorical sense. The Supreme Brahman cannot be meant, because He is not linked with the body as its Lord. The Lord of the city i.e. the individual soul resides in one spot of the city viz. the heart, just as a King dwells in one spot of his Kingdom. Further the mind, the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, abides in the heart. Only the individual soul is compared in the Śhruti in size to the point of a goad.

Here the 'small Ākāśha' is Brahman and does not mean elemental ether, although there is the qualification 'small' which may indicate that he is a limited something. Why? Because the nature of Brahman is described later on in the text "As large as this (external) ether is, so large is that Ākāśha within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it." Chh. Up. VIII 1-3. This clearly intimates that it is not actually small.

Ākāśha cannot be compared with itself. The finite individual soul also with its limiting adjuncts cannot be compared with the all-pervading Ākāśha or ether. The Śhruti declares "Both the earth and heaven are contained in it". This indicates that this Ākāśha is the support of the whole world. From this it is manifest that the ether is the Supreme Self.

We read in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII-1-5 "The Self or Ātman is sinless, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from old age, hunger, thirst, with true desire (Satkāma), true thought (Satsankalpa) that ever comes true". This cannot apply to mere physical ether. These are all distinct qualities of the Supreme Brahman. The description cannot refer to the individual soul, because the comparison to the infinite ether and the statement that heaven and earth are contained in it cannot apply to the finite individual soul.

(89)

The word 'Brahma' in Brahmapuri shows the reference to Brahman only. Even if you take the word as referring to Jīva the teaching relates to Brahman who is realised in the heart which is the Brahmapuri (the city of soul or Brahman). Moreover the promise of Infinite Bliss to the

knower of Dahara Ākāśha intimates that the reference is only to the Supreme Brahman.

For all the reasons explained, that ether is the Highest Self or Supreme Brahman.

I.3.15 (78) The small Ākāśha (ether) is Brahman on account of the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (Brahmaloka); because thus it is seen (i.e. the individual souls go into Brahman) is seen elsewhere in other Śhruti texts; and this daily going of the souls into Brahman (during deep sleep) is an inferential sign by means of which we may properly interpret the word Brahmaloka’).

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is given.

It has been said in the preceding Sūtra that the small ether is Brahman on account of the reasons given in the subsequent passages. These subsequent passages are now described.

The mention of ‘going’ and a ‘word’ refers to Brahman. We read in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII-3-2 “All these creatures day after day go into this Brahmaloka (i.e. they are merged in Brahman during deep sleep) and yet do not discover it” etc. This passage shows that all Jīvas or individual souls go daily into the ‘small Ākāśha’ called here Brahmaloka. This intimates that the ‘small Ākāśha’ is Brahman.

This going of the individual souls into Brahman which occurs daily in the deep sleep is mentioned in the other Śhruti text: “He becomes united with the true (Sat), he is merged in his own Self’ Chh. Up. VI-8-1.

In common parlance or ordinary life also we say of a man who is in deep sleep "He has become Brahman". "He is gone into the state of Brahman".

(90)

The word 'Brahmaloka' is to be interpreted as Brahman Himself, and not as the world of Brahman (Satya Loka) because there is the indicatory sign in the passage. What is that indicatory sign or Lingam? It is said in the text that the soul goes to this world daily. It is certainly impossible for the Jīva to go to the world of Brahman daily. Hence the term 'Brahmaloka' means here Brahman Himself.

1.3.16 (79) Moreover on account of the supporting also (attributed to it) the small ether must be Brahman, because this greatness is observed in this (Brahman only according to other scriptural passages).

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is continued.

Daharakasa or the small ether referred to in Sūtra 14 indicates Brahman, as the glory of supporting all the worlds can be reasonably true only in respect of Brahman. And also on account of the 'supporting' the small ether can be the Supreme Brahman only. How? To begin with the text introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage "In it is that small ether". Then the small ether is to be compared with the universal ether. Everything is contained in it. Then the term Self is applied to it. Then it is stated that it is free from sin etc. Finally it is said "That Self is a bank. a limiting support (Vidhriti) so that these worlds may not be confounded" (Chh. Up. VIII-4-1). In this

passage the glow of small ether by way of supporting the worlds is seen.

Just as a dam stores the water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so also that Self serves like a dam in order that the world and all the different castes and Āśhramas may not be confounded.

Other texts declare that this greatness of supporting belongs to Brahman alone. "By the command of that Imperishable (Akshara) O Gargi, the sun and moon are held in their positions" Bri. Up. III-8-9.

"He is the lord of all, the king of all kings, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limiting support, so that these worlds may not be confounded" Bri. Up. IV-4-22. This also shows that to be a boundary and support of the worlds is the distinctive attribute of Brahman only.

Therefore, on account of the 'supporting' also, the small (ether) is nothing else but Brahman.

(91)

I.3.17 (80) Also because of the well-known meaning (of Ākāśha as Brahman, the small Ākāśha is Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is continued.

Ākāśha has the settled meaning of Brahman. It is a well-known fact in Śhruti that Brahman is indicated by the term Ākāśha. Therefore 'Daharakasa' also stands for Brahman.

We read in Chh. Up. VIII-14-1 "Ākāśha is the revealer of all names and forms". "All these beings take their origin from Ākāśha alone" Chh. Up.

I-9-1. "For who could breathe if that Ākāśha (ether) were not bliss"
Tait. Up. II-7. In all these texts 'Ākāśha' stands for Brahman.

I.3.18 (81) If it is said that the other one (i.e. the individual soul) is meant on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage) (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is continued. We read in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad - "Now that serene being, the individual soul (Jīva) indeed which having risen above this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is the Self: thus he spoke." The Opponent says: As in the complementary passage the individual soul is referred to, the small Ākāśha of Chh. Up. VIII-1-1 is also the individual soul. "The word 'serenity' (Samprasada) which denotes the state of deep sleep conveys the idea of the individual soul only. The 'rising from the body' also can be spoken of the individual soul only whose abode is therefore 'the small Ākāśha'; this denotes in the passage under discussion only the individual soul, on account of reference to the ether." This cannot be. In the first place the individual soul which is limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, cannot be compared with the all-pervading ether.

In the second place, the attributes like 'freedom from evil' and the likes of this Ākāśha, referred to in the passage under discussion, cannot be true of the individual soul. Hence Brahman is meant in that passage.

(92)

I.3.19 (82) If it be said that for subsequent texts (it appears that the individual soul is meant, we say that what is there referred

to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its real nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is continued.

An objection is again raised by the Opponent to justify that the 'small Ākāśha' (Dahara) refers to the individual soul. Prajāpati at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like is that which we must try to understand Chh. Up. VIII-7-1. After that he points out that the seer within the eye i.e. 'the individual soul is the Self', Chh. Up. VIII-7-3. He again explains the nature of the same individual soul in its different states. "He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self' Chh. Up. VIII-10-1. "When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self' Chh. Up. VIII-11-1. The qualifying terms 'Immortal, fearless' used in each of these descriptions of the self show that the individual soul is free from sin or evil and the like. Obviously the individual soul is meant here because Brahman is free from the three states viz. waking, dream and deep sleep. It is also said to be free from evil. Therefore 'small Ākāśha' refers to the individual soul or Jīva and not to Brahman.

The Sūtra refutes this. The Sūtra uses the expression "He whose nature has become manifest". Prajāpati finally explains the individual soul in its true nature as identical with Brahman. The reference is to the individual soul in its true nature as identical with Brahman or, in other words, who has realised his oneness with Brahman and not to the individual soul as such. "As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in its own form. Then It is the Highest Puruṣha" Chh. Up. VIII-12-3. The individual soul is free from evil etc., when it becomes

identical with Brahman and not when it is enveloped by limiting adjuncts and remains as the finite Jīva or embodied soul. Agency (Kartritva), enjoying (Bhoktritva), like and dislike (Raga-dvesha) indicate Jīvahood. If these are removed the individual soul shines as Brahman.

As long as the individual soul does not free itself from Avidyā (ignorance) in the form of duality and does not rise to the knowledge of the Self or Brahman, whose nature is unchangeable and Satchidānanda which expresses itself in the form 'I am Brahman', so long it remains as an individual soul. The ignorance of the Jīva may be compared to the mistake of a man who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man, a rope for a serpent.

(93)

When it gives up the identification with the body, sense organs and mind, when it realises its identity with the Supreme Brahman it becomes Brahman itself whose nature is unchangeable and Satchidānanda, as is declared in Mun. Up. III-2-9 "He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman". This is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own real form.

Why a reference has at all been made to Jīva in this Section treating of Dahara, you will find an answer in the following Sūtra.

I.3.20 (83) And the reference (to the individual soul) is for a different purpose.

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is continued.

The reference to the individual soul has a different meaning.

The reference to the individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the Supreme Brahman. The reference to the three states of the individual soul is meant not to establish the nature of Jīva as such, but to show finally its real nature (Svarūpa) which is not different from Brahman.

Another objection is raised. The text describes this 'Dahara' as occupying a very small space in the heart, and because 'Dahara' is so small and Jīva is also small, therefore, 'Dahara' must be Jīva mentioned subsequently. The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer.

I.3.21 (84) If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Brahman cannot be meant) (we say that) that has already been explained.

The argument in support of Sūtra 14 is concluded.

The Opponent has stated that the smallness of the ether stated by the Śhruti "In it is that small ether" does not agree with Brahman, that it may however refer to the Jīva or the individual soul which is compared to the point of a goad. This has already been refuted. It has already been shown under I.2.7 that smallness may be attributed to Brahman for the purpose of meditation (Upāsana). The same refutation is to be applied here also. That smallness is contradicted by that Śhruti text which compares the etherwithin the heart with the universal ether "As large as is this ether so large is the etherwithin the heart".

(94)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 22-23) Everything shines after Brahman.

I.3.22 (85) On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after) (that after which sun, moon, etc. are said to shine is the Supreme Self) and (because by the light) of Him (everything else is lighted).

A passage from the Mundaka Upaniṣhad is taken now for discussion.

We read in Mundaka Upaniṣhad II-2-10 and Kathopanishad II-ii-15 "The Sun does not shine there nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less the fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted." Now a doubt arises whether "he after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted" is some effulgent substance, or the Supreme Self.

The 'shining after' mentioned in the text "After him when he shines everything shines" is possible only if the Supreme Self or Brahman is understood. Another Śhruti declares of that Supreme Self, "His form is light, his thoughts are true" Chh. Up. III-14-2. "Him the gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time" Bri. Up. IV-4-16.

The clause "On account of the acting after" points to the 'shining after' mentioned in the text under discussion.

That the light of the Sun etc., should shine by some other material light is not known. It is absurd to say that one light is lighted by another. We do not know of any physical light, except the sun, that can light Brahman.

The manifestation of this whole universe has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman, just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colours. Brahman is self-

luminous. It remains in Its own glory. It illumines the sun, the moon, the stars, the lightning, the fire, the senses, the mind and the intellect and all objects. It does not need any other light to illumine it. Śhruti texts like "Brahman is the light of lights (Jyotisham Jyotih)" clearly intimate that Brahman is Self-effulgent. It is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon etc., with reference to Brahman, because whatever is seen is seen by the light of Brahman only. As Brahman is Self-effulgent, it is not seen by means of any other light.

(95)

Brahman manifests everything else but is not manifested by anything else. We read in Bri. Up. "By the Self alone as his light man sits" IV»3-6. The word 'Sarvam' denotes that the entire world of names and forms is dependent on the glory of Brahman. The word 'anu' intimates that the reference is to Brahman because it is from Him that all effulgence is derived.

I.3.23 (86) Moreover the Smṛiti also speaks of him i.e. Brahman to be the universal light.

An argument in support of Sūtra 22 is given.

The Smṛiti or Gītā also says so. In Gītā, Chapter XV-6 we read "Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that, having gone into which men do not return, that is My highest seat." And "The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be Mine" XV-12.

Topic 7: (Sūtras 24-25) The person of the size of a thumb is Brahman.

I.3.24 (87) From the very word (viz. the term Lord applied to it) the (person) measured (by the size of the thumb) (is Brahman).

An expression from the Kathopanishad is taken up for discussion.

We read in Kathopanishad II-4-12, "The person of the size of a thumb resides in the middle or centre of the body etc." and in II-4-13 "That person, of the size of a thumb is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same today and tomorrow.

Knowing Him one does not seek to hide oneself any more. This is That." A doubt arises now whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the individual soul or the Supreme Self (Brahman).

The Opponent holds that on account of the statement of the person's size of thumb the individual soul is meant, because to the Supreme Self which is Infinite the Śhruti text would not ascribe the measure of a thumb.

(96)

To this we reply that the person of the size of a thumb can only be Brahman. Why? On account of the term 'Isana', 'Lord of the past and of the future.' The highest Lord only is the absolute ruler of the past and the future. Further the clause "This is that" connects the passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. What had been enquired about by Nachiketas is Brahman. Nachiketas asks Lord Yama, "That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that" (Katha Up. I-2-14). Yama refers to this person of the size of a thumb thus "That which you wanted to know is this." Brahman is said

to be of the size of a thumb, though He is all-pervading, because He is realisable in the limited chamber of the heart of a man.

The epithet 'The Lord of the past and the future', cannot be applied to Jīva at all, whose past and the future is bound by his Karmas and who is not free to possess so much glory.

But how the all-pervading Lord can be said to be limited by the measure of a thumb? The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer.

I.3.25 (88) But with reference to the heart (the highest Brahman is said to be of the size of a thumb) as man alone is entitled (to the study of the Vedas, to practise meditation and attain Self-realisation).

A qualifying explanation of Sūtra 24 is given, and the privilege for Upāsana or meditation is discussed.

The measure of a thumb is ascribed to Brahman, although all-pervading, which with reference to his residing within the heart which is generally as big as the thumb. Brahman dwells within the heart of all living beings. The hearts differ according to the animals, some have larger hearts, some have smaller, some are more than a thumb, some are less than a thumb. Why is the 'thumb' used as a standard? Why a man's heart only and not that of any other animal, also? The second half of the Sūtra gives an answer-'on account of man only being entitled'. Man only is entitled to the study of the Vedas and practice of meditation and different Upāsanas of Brahman prescribed in them. Therefore the thumb is used as the standard of measurement with reference to him alone.

The aim here is to show the identity of individual soul with Brahman which is inside the body and is of the size of a thumb. The Vedānta passages have two-fold purport. Some of them aim in giving a description of the nature of Brahman, some in teaching the unity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul or Brahman, not the size of anything. This point is rendered quite clear further on in the Upaniṣhad. "The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, always abides in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as 'Bright as the Immortal'." Katha Up. II-6-17.

(97)

Topic 8: (Sūtras 26-33) The Devas also are entitled to the study of Vedas and to meditate on Brahman.

I.3.26 (89) Also (beings) above them (viz. men) (are entitled for the study and practice of the Vedas) on account of the possibility (of it) according to Bādarāyaṇa.

The description of the privilege of study of Vedas and meditation is continued.

There is a digression from the main topic in this Section in Sūtras 26 to 38. The Opponent holds that such meditation is not possible in the case of the Devas, because they are not endowed with the sense organs. Hence they have got no capability to meditate. The Devas like Indra and the rest are mere thought forms created by the chanting of Mantras. They have no desire for the possession of Vairagya (dispassion), Viveka (discrimination) etc. To this the author gives a reply

in this Sūtra. A doubt may arise from the previous Sūtra that as it is stated that men alone have the privilege to the study of the Vedas, the gods are thereby debarred. This Sūtra removes this doubt.

The teacher Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the Sūtra entitles gods also who are above men for the study of Vedas, practice of meditation and attainment of knowledge of Brahman. How? Because it is possible for them also as they too are corporeal beings. The Upaniṣhads, the Mantra portion of the Vedas, the Itihāsas and the Puranas all unanimously describe that the Devas have bodies. They may have the desire of final release caused by the reflection that all effects, objects and power are non-permanent. They may have the desire to possess the fourfold qualification which is necessary for attaining the knowledge of Brahman. The gods undergo discipleship in order to attain knowledge. We read in Chh. Up. VIII-7-11 "Indra lived as a disciple with Prajāpati for one hundred and one years"; "Bhrigu Varuni went to his father Varuna, saying, sir, teach me Brahman" Tait. Up. III-1. The god Varuna possessed the knowledge of Brahman which he teaches to his son Bhrigu.

(98)

The gods also possess all the requisites for practising meditation. Therefore they are also entitled for the study of the Vedas and attaining Self-realisation. Even without Upanayana and study the Veda is manifest of itself to the gods.

The passage about that which is of the size of a thumb is equally valid when the right of the gods is accepted. In their case the Śruti

describing the Lord of the size of a thumb refers to the size of their thumbs.

The Opponent says if we admit that Devas have bodies, then there would arise difficulties with regard to sacrifices, because it is not possible for one finite corporeal being like Indra to be simultaneously present at many places of sacrifices, when he is invoked simultaneously by all his worshippers. Therefore sacrifices will become useless. To this objection the author gives a suitable reply in the following Sūtra.

I.3.27 (90) If it be said that (the corporeality of the gods involves) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no, because we find (in the scriptures) the assumption (by the gods) of many (forms at one and the same time).

An objection against Sūtra 26 is raised and refuted.

It is possible for a Devata to assume several forms at the same time. He can appear in sacrifices performed simultaneously at different places. Smṛiti also states “A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may by his power multiply his self in many thousand forms and in them walk about on earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and finally he may again withdraw them all, just as the sun withdraws its many rays”. If such Smṛiti passage declares that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body and the like may assume several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. Agod may divide himself into many forms and present himself in many sacrifices at the same time.

He can remain all the while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to make himself invisible.

Moreover, why cannot the same god be the object of many sacrifices, just as the same man can be the object of salutation of many persons?

(99)

l.3.28 (91) If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word (we say) no, because (the world) originates from the word, as is known from direct perception (Śhruti) and inference (Smṛiti).

Another objection against Sūtra 26 (with respect to the corporeality of the gods) is raised and refuted.

The Opponent maintains: The Vedic words have been proved in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā philosophy to be permanent, i.e. without beginning or end. Now if gods are said to have bodies they must have births and deaths, which all embodied beings are subject to.

Therefore the Vedic words for individual deities cannot exist before their birth, nor can those words signify any deities, when they have ceased to exist during dissolution. Hence the permanency of Vedic words fails.

To this objection the answer is that there cannot be any such incongruity with regard to Vedic words, because both Śhruti and Smṛiti maintain that individual gods owe their origin to Vedic words.

The Vedic words exist from eternity. They have got their settled meaning. The Vedic names for gods signify their types and not the

individuals. Therefore the births or deaths of individual gods cannot affect the types, much less the permanent character of Vedic words.

Cows are innumerable but it is with the type that the word 'cow' is inseparably connected. The word 'cow' is eternal. It does not depend on the birth and death of individuals belonging to that type.

Words representing the gods have for their counterpart objects that are types and not individuals. Indra refers to a divine function like the office of the Viceroy and whoever is called to that function is called Indra. Therefore here is no non-eternality with reference to the Vedas.

The word, including even the gods, is created from scriptural words. The scriptural words are the source for the world and the gods.

If you object to this and say that this conflicts with the Sūtra I-1-2, which says that Brahman is the cause of the world, we reply: Brahman is the Upadanakarana (material cause). The Veda is not such material cause. The creator utters the Vedic words and creates. He says earth and creates the earth and so on.

(100)

The creation of every embodied being, whether Indra or a cow, proceeds from remembrance of the form and its characteristics by Lord Brahma. When he utters these words, which by association always suggest the particular form and the characteristics of that form.

When a special individual of the class called Indra has perished, the creator, knowing from the Vedic word 'Indra' which is present in his mind as the class characteristics of the being denoted by the word, creates another Indra possessing those very same characteristics, just

as the potter fashions a new jar on the basis of the word 'jar' which is revolving in his mind.

Every Vedic word always expresses a particular type form and does not express any individual. Brahman creates the world by remembering the particular type forms denoted by those words. Forms (Akritis) are eternal and exist in the archetypal plane from eternity before they become concrete in any individual form. Brahma, the creator created the Devas by reflecting on the word 'Ete' (these). He created the men by the word 'Asrigram'; the Pitris by the word 'Indavah' (drops); the planets by the word 'Tiras pavitram'; the songs by the word 'Asuva'; the Mantras by the word 'Viśhvani' and he created all other creatures by the word 'Abhisaubhaga'.

The word 'etad' (this) reminds Brahma the creator of the Devas presiding over the senses; the word 'Asrigra' meaning blood, reminds him of those creatures in which blood is the chief life-element, namely men; the word 'Indu' denoting moon, reminds him of the fathers, who live in the Chandraloka; the word 'Tiras pavitram' meaning 'holding of the pure ambrosia' reminds of the planets where the Soma fluid exists; the word 'Asuva' (flowing) reminds him of the sweet flow of music; the word 'Viśhva' reminds him of the hymns sacred to the Visvedevas; the word 'Abhisubhaga', meaning 'great prosperity', reminds him of all creatures. We read in Bri. Up. "He with his mind united himself with speech" i.e. the word of the Veda.

Every word has for its counterpart a form or an object which it denotes. Name and form are inseparable. Whenever you think of a form its name comes before your mind at once. Whenever you utter a name

the object comes before your mind. The relation between a name or word and form (the object) is eternal.

The Veda is not the material cause of the universe. If you say that the Veda refers to Vasus, Rudras, Adityas and other gods who are born and are therefore non-eternal and, hence, the Vedas also must be non-eternal, we reply that what are born are the individual manifestations of Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality) and Karma (actions) but not the Akritis, species. The origination of the universe from the 'word' is not to be understood in the sense that the word constitutes the material cause of the world as Brahman does.

(101)

"The several names, actions, and conditions of all things He shaped in the beginning from the words of the Vedas" Manu I-21.

Thought first manifests as a word and then as the more concrete form. You cannot separate the thought from name and form. If you wish to do a thing you first remember the word denoting the thing and then you start the work. The Vedic words manifested in the mind of Prajāpati, the creator before the creation. After that he created the things corresponding to those words. "Uttering 'Bhur' he created the earth" etc. Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa II-2-4-2.

The Opponent maintains that the universe cannot be born of letters which are perishable, that there is an eternal Sphota (causal form of sound) of which uttered sounds are manifestations and that such Sphota is the cause of the universe. Sphota is that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (Arthadhiketu).

Sphota is a super-sensuous entity which is manifested by the letters of the word and if comprehended by the mind itself manifests the sense of the word.

This statement of the Opponent is really untenable. This is certainly not our actual experience. The uttered sounds do not perish, for at the end of their utterance we realise their identity when we utter them again. It is said that there might be a difference of intonation when uttering the same word twice; this does not negate the identity, for the difference is only a difference of the instrument of manifestation. Albeit the letters are many, their group can be the subject of a conception (e.g. ten, hundred etc). The Sphota theory is therefore quite unnecessary.

It is therefore quite clear that the Vedic sounds are eternal and that there is no logical fallacy in the doctrine that through them has been created the entire universe including the gods.

(102)

I.3.29 (92) From this very reason also there follows the eternity of the Vedas.

A side issue is deduced from Sūtra 28.

The eternal nature of Vedic words is also established from the same reasons adduced in Sūtra 28 i.e. because those words signify permanent types.

This Sūtra now confirms the already established eternity of the Vedas. The universe with its definite eternal types or spheres such as gods and so on originates from the word of the Veda. For this very reason the

eternity of the word of the Veda must be accepted. As gods etc., as types are eternal, the Vedic words are also eternal.

The Vedas were not written by anybody. They are the very breath of the Lord. They are eternal. The Rishis were not the authors of the Vedas. They only discovered them. "By means of their past good deeds the priests were able to understand the Vedas. They found them dwelling in the Rishis." The Mantra "By means of sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the Rishis" in Rigveda Samhita X-71-3 shows that the speech found by the Rishis was permanent. Veda Vyāsa also says "Formerly the great Rishis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, obtained through their penance the Vedas together with the Itihāsas, which had been hidden at the end of the Yuga."

I.3.30 (93) And on account of the sameness of names and forms in every fresh cycle there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the words of the Vedas) even in the revolving of the world cycles, as is seen from the Śhruti and Smṛiti.

An argument in favour of Sūtra 29 is given in this Sūtra.

The Opponent says: At the end of a cycle everything is totally annihilated. There is new creation at the beginning of the next cycle. There is a break in the continuity of existence.

Hence even as types, the gods are not eternal and the eternal relation of Vedic words and the objects they denote does not remain. Consequently there is contradiction to the eternity and the authority of the Vedas.

We say it is not so. Just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep, so also the world is a latent or potential state (in seed form) in Pralaya or dissolution; it is again projected with all the previous variety of names and forms at the beginning of the next cycle. Therefore the eternity of the relation between Vedic words and their objects is not at all contradicted. Consequently the authoritativeness of the Vedas remains. This is supported by Śhruti and Smṛiti. We read in Rigveda X-190-3 "As formerly the Lord ordered the sun and the moon, heaven, earth, the sky etc." We read in the Smṛiti "As the same signs of seasons appear again and again in their due course, so do beings appear and reappear in successive cycles".

(103)

Even after a great Pralaya there is no contradiction with regard to the eternity of Vedic words, because the new creation proceeds on the sameness of names and forms etc., in the preceding creation. In a Mahāpralaya the Vedas and the types denoted by the words of the Vedas merge in the Lord and become one with Him. They remain in Him in a state of latency. When the Lord desires to create they come out from Him again and become manifest. The creation of individuals is always preceded by a reflection on the words of the Vedas and the types denoted by them.

After the Mahāpralaya the Lord creates the Vedas in exactly the same order and arrangements as they had been before. He reflects on the words and types and projects the whole universe. A subsequent creation is similar to the past creation. The Lord creates the world just

as a potter who makes a pot by remembering the word 'pot' and the form which the word calls up in his mind.

After a Mahāpralaya the Lord Himself creates all elements from Mahat downwards up to Brahmanda. He projects Brahma from His body and teaches him the Vedas mentally (not orally) and entrusts him with the work of further creation. In minor Pralaya Brahma does not cease to exist, nor do the elements. Brahma himself creates the world after every minor Pralaya.

It may be objected that when we sleep and then wake up we can recall the already experienced external universe and that such a thing is not possible in the case of the dissolution of the world. But our answer is that by the grace of the Supreme Lord, Hiranyagarbha or Brahma can recollect the state of the world as it was before the dissolution. We read in the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad "During Pralaya all forms vanish but Sakti remains. The next creation takes place through it alone". Otherwise you would have to postulate a creation out of nothing.

(104)

I.3.31 (94) On account of the impossibility (of the gods being qualified) for Madhu Vidyā etc., Jainini (is of opinion that the gods) are not qualified (either for Upāsana or for the Brahma Vidyā or the knowledge of the Self).

Another objection to Sūtra 26 is raised.

For Madhu Vidyā vide Chh. Up. III-1-11, the sage Jaimini, the author of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā , says that as the sun and the other gods are the deities to be worshipped in Madhu Vidyā and the like, it is impossible that they should also be the worshippers. Hence they are not entitled

for the Upāsana prescribed in Śhruti, because obviously they cannot worship themselves. In Madhu Vidyā one is to meditate on the Sun as honey (beneficial). Such a meditation is not possible for Surya or the Sun-god because one and the same person cannot be both the object of meditation as well as the person meditating.

Further the Devas like Vasu etc., already belong to the class of Vasus etc. Therefore in their case the meditation is useless as the fruit is already accomplished. The Devas have nothing to gain by such meditation. So they have no desire for this meditation, because they already are in possession of that which is the fruit of such meditation.

l.3.32 (95) And (the gods are not qualified for Vidyās) because (the words ‘sun, moon’ etc., spoken of as gods) are used in the sense of mere spheres of light.

An argument in support of the objection raised in Sūtra 31 is given.

The Opponent raises another objection: The luminous orbs cannot possibly do acts of meditation. Such and other luminary objects as Agni etc., cannot have a bodily form with hands, heart or intelligence. They are material inert objects. They cannot have wishes.

We cannot place faith on Itihāsas and Puranas, as they are of human origin and as they themselves stand in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The Mantras do not form an independent means of authoritative knowledge. The Arthavada passages cannot be regarded to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality of the gods. Consequently the gods are not qualified for any kind of Vidyā or knowledge of Brahman.

(105)

I.3.33 (96) But Bādarāyaṇa, on the other hand (maintains) the existence (of qualification on the part of the gods for Brahma Vidyā); for there are (passages indicative of that; body, desires etc., which qualify one for such knowledge do exist in the case of the gods).

This Sūtra refutes the arguments in the previous two Sūtras and concludes the discussion.

But Bādarāyaṇa holds that the gods too have the right to practise Upāsana as meditation and Brahma Vidyā, because there are indications in Śhruti to that effect. He maintains that each luminary orb has a presiding deity with body, intelligence, desires etc. The gods can assume any form at will. Indra assumed the form of a ram and carried off Medhatithi. Surya assumed the form of a man and came to Kunti. We read in Chh. Up. VIII-12-6 “The gods indeed do worship the Ātman.” The sun-god may be disqualified for a particular form of meditation-Madhu Vidyā, as he cannot meditate on the sun himself, but that is no reason why he should be disqualified for other meditations or for Brahma Vidyā or the knowledge of Brahman. Similar is the case with other gods.

The expression ‘Tu’ (but, on the other hand) is meant to rebut the Opponent.

Scripture declares that the Devas are qualified. “Whatever Deva was awakened so to know Brahman he indeed became that” Bri. Up. 1-4-10. Indra went to Prajāpati saying “well, let us search for that Self by which if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained” Chh. Up. VIII-7.

The description of the forms of gods is real. How can unreal forms of gods be conceived by our minds for our offering sacrifices to them? Ordinary people are not able to behold their forms. But sages like Vyāsa have seen them. They spoke to the gods. The Yoga Sūtras say "By Svadhyaya one can be in communion with the deity which we worship." How can you deny the powers of Yoga? Rishis had marvellous powers.

Therefore gods have forms and are eligible for Brahma Vidyā.

(106)

I.3.34 (97) (King Janasruti) was in grief on hearing some contemptuous words used about him by the sage in the form of a swan; owing to his approaching Raikva, overwhelming with that grief, Raikva called him Sucra; for it (the grief) is pointed at by Raikva.

The discussion on the privilege of divine meditation begun in Sūtra 25 is continued.

The whole of this Adhikaraṇa about Śhūdras together with the preceding one about the Devas appears to be an interpolation of some later author.

In the previous Sūtra it has been shown that the gods are entitled to the study of Vedas and Brahma Vidyā. This Sūtra discusses whether the Śhūdras are entitled to them or not.

The Opponent says: The Śhūdras also have got bodies and desires. Hence they are also entitled. Raikva refers to Janasruti who wishes to learn from him by the name of Śhūdra. "Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O Śhūdra, together with the cows" Chh. Up. IV-2 & 3.

But when he appears a second time, Raikva accepts his presents and teaches him. Smṛiti speaks of Vidura and others who were born from Śhūdra mothers as possessing highest knowledge. Therefore the Śhūdra has a claim to Brahma Vidyā or knowledge of Brahman.

This Sūtra refutes the view and denies the right to the study of the Vedas for Śhūdra. The word 'Śhūdra' does not denote a Śhūdra by birth which is its conventional meaning, because Janasruti was a Kshatriya king. Here we will have to take the etymological meaning of the word which is, "He rushed into grief (Sukam abhi dudrava) or as "grief rushed on him" or as "he in his grief rushed to Raikva". The following Sūtra also intimates that he was a Kshatriya.

l.3.35 (98) And because the Kshatriya-hood (of Janasruti) is known from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with Chaitraratha (who was a Kshatriya himself).

An argument in support of Sūtra 34 is given.

Janasruti is mentioned with the Kshatriya Chaitraratha Abhipratarin in connection with the same Vidyā. Hence we can infer that Janasruti also was a Kshatriya because, as a rule, equals are mentioned together with equals. Hence the Śhūdras are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

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l.3.36 (99) Because purificatory ceremonies are mentioned (in the case of the twice-born) and their absence is declared (in the case of the Śhūdra).

The discussion on the privilege of Brahma Vidyā on the part of Śhūdras is continued.

In different places of the Vidyās the Upanayana ceremony is referred to. The Upanayana ceremony is declared by the scriptures to be a necessary condition for the study of all kinds of knowledge or Vidyā. We read in Prasna Up. I-1 "Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach them all that." Upanayana ceremony is meant for the higher castes. With reference to the Śhūdras on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned in the scriptures. "In the Śhūdra there is not any sin by eating prohibited food, and he is not fit for any ceremony" Manu X-12-6. A Śhūdra by birth cannot have Upanayana and other Samskaras without which the Vedas cannot be studied.

Hence the Śhūdras are not entitled to the study of the Vedas.

The next Sūtra further strengthens the view that a Śhūdra can have no Samskara.

I.3.37 (100) And because the inclination (on the part of Gautama to impart knowledge is seen only) on the ascertainment of the absence of Śhūdrahood (in Jabala Satyakarna).

The same discussion on the Śhūdras' right is continued.

Gautama, having ascertained Jabala not to be a Śhūdra from his speaking the truth proceeded to initiate and instruct him. "None who is not a Brāhmaṇa would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth" Chh. Up. IV-4-5.

This scriptural text furnishes an inferential sign of the Śhūdras not being capable of initiation.

(108)

I.3.38 (101) And on account of the prohibition in Smṛiti of (the Śhūdras) hearing, studying and understanding (the Veda) and performing Vedic rites (they are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman)

The same discussion on the Śhūdras' right is concluded here.

The Smṛiti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying and understanding the Veda and their performing Vedic rites. "The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with molten lead and lac." For a Śhūdra is like a cemetery. Therefore the Veda is not to be read in the vicinity of a Śhūdra. "His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it." Śhūdras like Vidura and the religious hunter Dharma Vyadha acquired knowledge owing to the after effects of former deeds in past births. It is possible for the Śhūdras to attain that knowledge through the Puranas, Gītā and the epics, Ramayana and Mahābhārata which contain the quintessence of the Vedas.

It is a settled point that the Śhūdras do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.

The digression begun from Sūtra 26 ends here and the general topic is again taken up.

Topic 10: The Prāṇa in which everything trembles is Brahman

1.3.39 (102) (Prāṇa is Brahman) on account of the vibration or trembling (spoken of the whole world).

After discussing the side issues in Sūtra 25-38 the Sūtra-kāra or the author of the Sūtras resumes the examination of the main issue.

An argument in support of Sūtra 24 is given here.

The discussion of qualification for Brahma Vidyā or knowledge of Brahman is over. We return to our chief topic i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedānta texts.

We read in Kathopanishad II-3-2 “Whatever there is in the whole world has come out of Prāṇa and trembles in the Prāṇa. The Prāṇa is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal.” The Opponent maintains that the term Prāṇa denotes the air or the vital force with its five modifications. The Siddhantin says: Here Prāṇa is Brahman and not the vital force, because Brahman only is spoken of in the preceding as well as in the subsequent part of the chapter. How then can it be supposed that all at once the vital force should be referred to in the intermediate part?

(109)

“The whole world trembles in Prāṇa.” We find here a quality of Brahman viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word ‘Prāṇa’ denotes the highest Self appears from such passages as ‘the Prāṇa of Prāṇa’ Bri. Up. IV-4-18. The scripture declares “No mortal lives by the Prāṇa and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose” (Katha Up. II-5-5). In the passage subsequent to the one under discussion “From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun shines, from terror Indra and Vayu and Death as the fifth run

away." Brahman and not the vital force is spoken of as the subject of that passage, which is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the entire universe inclusive of the Prāṇa itself. Brahman only is the cause of the life of the entire universe including the vital force.

Brahman is compared to a thunderbolt because he inspires fear in fire, air, sun, Indra and Yama. Further Immortality is declared to him who knows this Prāṇa. "A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go." (Svet. Up. VI-15). Prāṇa is also often used to denote Brahman in the Śhruti.

Topic 11: The 'light' is Brahman.

I.3.40 (103) The light (is Brahman) on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is continued.

We read in the Śhruti "Thus does that serene being arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the Highest Light" (Chh. Up. VIII-12-3).

Here the doubt arises whether the word 'light' denotes the physical light which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the Highest Brahman.

The Opponent says: The word light denotes the well-known physical light because that is the conventional sense of the word.

To this we have the following reply. The word 'light' can denote the Highest Brahman only. Why? Because in the whole chapter Brahman is the topic of discussion. The Highest Light is also called the 'Highest Person' in that text itself later on. Freedom from body is said to belong

to that being which is one with this light. Śhruti declares "When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him" (Chh. Up. VIII-12.1). Freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman. One can attain freedom or the bodiless state when he identifies himself with Brahman.

(110)

Topic 12: The Ākāśha is Brahman.

I.3.41 (104) Ākāśha (is Brahman) because it is declared to be something different etc., (from names and forms).

Another expression from the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion. We read in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII-14-1 "That which is called Ākāśha is the revealer of all names and forms.

That within which these names and forms are contained is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self." Here a doubt arises whether that which here is called Ākāśha is the Highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether.

The Opponent says that Ākāśha means here the elemental ether, because this is the conventional meaning of the word.

To this the Siddhantin gives the following reply. Here 'Ākāśha' is Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing etc.

Names and forms are said to be within this Ākāśha, which is therefore different from these.

The term Ākāśha signifies Brahman because it is stated to be the source of all names and forms, also because it is qualified by such epithets as 'Infinite' 'Immortal' 'Self'. The word Ākāśha, refers to Brahman because the description "beyond name and form" applies only to Brahman.

(111)

Topic 13: (Sūtras 42-43) The Self consisting of knowledge is Brahman.

I.3.42 (105) Because of the Highest Self being shown as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and death.

An expression from the sixth chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion.

In the sixth Prapathaka or chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad, in reply to the question - “Who is that Self?” (IV-3-7), a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self is given. “He who is within the heart, among the Prāṇas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge”.

Here a doubt arises whether the Self is the Highest Self or the individual soul.

The Sūtra declares that it is the Highest Self. Why? Because it is shown to be different from the individual soul in the state of deep sleep and at the time of death. “This person embraced by the Highest intelligent Self knows nothing that is without or within” Bri. Up. IV-3-21. This clearly indicates that in deep sleep the ‘person’ or the individual soul is different from the Highest intelligent Self or Brahman.

Here the term “the person” must mean the Jīva or the embodied soul, because the absence of the knowledge of what is within and without in deep sleep can be predicated only of the individual soul.

The Supreme intelligent Self is Brahman because such intelligence can be predicated of Brahman only. Brahman is never dissociated from all-embracing knowledge. Similarly the passage that treats of departure i.e. death (this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent self moves along

groaning) refers to the Supreme Lord as different from the individual soul. The Jīva who casts off this mortal body is different from Supreme Self or Brahman. The Jīva alone passes through the stages of sound-sleep and death. Brahman has neither sleep nor death. He is wide awake always.

Therefore Brahman is the chief topic in this Section. The Chapter exclusively aims at describing the nature of Brahman. The lengthy discourse on the individual soul in this Section is to show that he is in essence identical with Brahman.

I.3.43 (106) (The Being referred to in Sūtra 42 is Brahman) because of the words ‘Lord’ etc., being applied to Him. “He is the controller, the Ruler, the Lord of all.” Bri. Up. IV-4-22.

The argument in support of Sūtra 42 is given.

These epithets are apt only in the case of Brahman, because these epithets intimate that the thing spoken of is absolutely free.

Hence the word Self denotes the Highest Self or Brahman and not the Jīva or the embodied soul, from all of which we conclude that the Chapter refers to the Supreme Brahman.

Here ends the Third Pada of the First Adhyāya of the Brahma Sūtras and of Śharīraka Bhāṣhya of Śhrī Śhaṅkarāchārya.

(112) CHAPTER I, SECTION 4 - INTRODUCTION

In Topic 5, Section 1, it has been shown that as the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas is not based on the authority of the scriptures and that as all

the Śhruti texts refer to an intelligent principle as the first cause, Brahman is the first cause.

The nature of Brahman has been defined in I.1.2. It has been shown that the purport of all Vedānta texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman and not the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world.

The Saṅkhyas say that it has not been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the Pradhāna, because some Sakhas contain expression which seem to convey the idea of the Pradhāna.

This Pada or Section proceeds to deal with the consideration of other Vedic texts which are asserted by the Saṅkhyas to declare that the Pradhāna is the cause of the universe.

The whole of Section 4 gives suitable and cogent answers to all objections raised by the Saṅkhyas.

SYNOPSIS

The fourth Pada or Section of the first Chapter is specially directed against the Saṅkhyas. This Section examines some passages from the Upaniṣhads where terms occur which may be mistaken for the names of the insentient matter of Saṅkhyas. It declares authoritatively that the Vedānta texts lend no support whatsoever to the Saṅkhya theory of creation or the doctrine of Pradhāna. This Section proves that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-7) discusses the passage in Katha Upaniṣhad I-3-10, 11 where mention is made of the great (Mahat) and the undeveloped (Avyaktam). Avyakta is a synonym for Pradhāna in the Saṅkhya Śhastra. 'Mahat' means intellect in Saṅkhya philosophy.

Śhrī Śhaṅkarachaiya shows that the term Avyakta denotes the subtle body or Sukshma Śharīra as well as the gross body also and the term Mahat Brahman or the Supreme Self.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 8-10) shows that according to Śhaṅkara the tri-coloured 'Aja' spoken of in the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad IV.5 is not the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas but either that power of the Lord from which the world takes its origin or the primary causal matter first produced by that power.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 11-13) shows that the 'Pancha-pancha-janah' mentioned in Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad IV-4-17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 14-15) shows that although there is conflict as regards the order of creation, scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman i.e. a Being whose essence is intelligence, which is the cause of this universe.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 16-18) proves that "He who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work" mentioned in Kau. Up. IV-1-19 is not either the Prāṇa (the vital air) or the individual soul, but Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 19-22) decides that the "Self to be seen, to be heard" etc. (Bri. Up. II-4-5) is the Supreme Self, but not the individual soul. The views of Jaimini, Asmarathya, Audulomi and Kasakritsna are expressed.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (Nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (Parinama Sūtra 26).

Adhikaraṇa VIII.' (Sūtra 28) shows that the refutation of the Saṅkhya views is applicable to other theories also such as the atomic theory which says that the world has originated from atoms, etc.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-7) The Mahat and Avyakta of the Kathopanishad do not refer to the Saṅkhya Tattvas.

I.4.1 (107) If it be said that in some (recensions of the Vedas) that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhāna) (is) also (mentioned), (we say) no, because (the word 'Avyakta' occurring in the Katha Upaniṣhad) is mentioned in a simile referred to the body (and means the body itself and not the Pradhāna of the (Saṅkhyas); (the Śhruti) also explains (it).

The Saṅkhyas again raise an objection. They say that the Pradhāna is also based on scriptural authority, because some Sakhas like the Katha Sakha (school) contain expressions wherein the Pradhāna seems to be referred to "Beyond the Mahat there is the Avyakta (the unmanifested or the undeveloped), beyond the Avyakta is the Puruṣha (Being or Person)" Katha Up. 1-3-11.

The Saṅkhyas say that the word 'Avyakta' here refers to the Pradhāna because the words 'Mahat', 'Avyakta' and 'Puruṣha' which occur in the same order in the Saṅkhya philosophy, occur in the Śhruti text. Hence they are recognised to be the same categories of the Saṅkhyas. The Pradhāna is called 'undeveloped' because it is destitute of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be said that there is no scriptural authority for the Pradhāna. We declare that this Pradhāna is the cause of the world on the strength of Śhruti, Smṛiti and ratiocination.

This Sūtra refutes it thus. The word 'Avyakta' does not refer to the Pradhāna. It is used in connection with a simile referring to the body. The immediately preceding part of the Chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the Lord of a chariot, a charioteer etc. "Know the soul to be the Lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When the Self is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer" Katha Up. I.3.3-4.

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All these things that are referred to in these verses are found in the following: "Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self (Mahat) is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great (Mahat) is the Avyakta (the undeveloped), beyond the Avyakta there is the Puruṣha.

Beyond the Puruṣha there is nothing-this is the goal, the highest path" Katha Up. I.3.10-11.

Now compare these two quotations. In this passage we recognise the senses etc. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on. The senses, the intellect and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects in the second passage are the objects which are in the former passage designated as the roads of the senses. The Mahat of the later text means the cosmic intellect. In the earlier passage intellect is the charioteer. It includes the individual and cosmic intellect. The Ātman of the earlier text corresponds to the Puruṣha of the later text and body of the earlier

text corresponds to Avyakta in the later text. Therefore Avyakta means the body here and not the Pradhāna. There remains now the body only which had before been compared to the chariot in the earlier text.

Now an objection is raised. How can the body which is manifest, gross and visible (Vyakta) be said to be unmanifest and unevolved? The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer.

I.4.2 (108) But the subtle (body is meant by the term Avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

An objection to Sūtra 1 is refuted.

The Sūtra replies that what the term 'Avyakta' denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as 'undeveloped' or 'unmanifested'. The subtle parts of the elements, the causal substance, i.e. the five uncompound elements out of which the body is formed may be called so. As they are subtle and not manifest, and as they also transcend sense perception, they can be properly designated by the term 'Avyakta'.

It is also a matter of common occurrence to denote the effect by the cause. Therefore the gross body is referred to here indirectly.

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Compare for instance the phrase "Mix the Soma with the cow (i.e. milk)" Rigveda IX.40.4. Another scriptural passage also declares "Now all this, i.e. this developed world with names and forms is capable of being designated 'undeveloped in so far as in a previous state it was in a merely seminal or potential state destitute of names and forms'".

In Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad I-4-7, the Karana Śharīra is called by the term unevolved or Avyakta. Before the world came into manifestation it was in the form of a seed or causal body.

An objection is raised. If the Avyakta is taken to be matter in its subtle state consisting of the causal body, what objection is there to interpret it as the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhya system, because there also Avyakta means matter in subtle state. The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer to this objection.

I.4.3 (109) On account of its dependence (on the Lord, such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted, because such an admission is) reasonable.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The Opponent says. If a suitable causal state of the gross world is admitted it is as good as accepting the Pradhāna, for we Sāṅkhyas understand by the term Pradhāna, nothing but the antecedent condition of the universe.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. The Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas is an independent entity. The subtle causal state admitted here is dependent on the Highest Lord. A previous subtle stage of the universe must necessarily be admitted. It is quite reasonable. For without it the Lord cannot create. It is the potential power of Brahman.

The whole Lila is kept up through this power. He could not become active if he were destitute of this potential power. It is the causal potentiality inherent in Brahman. That causal potentiality is of the nature of nescience.

The existence of such a causal potentiality renders it possible that the Jīvanmuktas or liberated souls do not take further birth as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. It is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped' (Avyakta). It has the Supreme Lord for its substratum. It is of the nature of an illusion. It is Anirvachaniya or indescribable. You can neither say that it is nor that it is not.

This undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term 'Ākāśha', ether. "in that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether is woven like warp and woof" Bri. Up. III-8-11. Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term Akshara, the Imperishable. "Higher than the high, Imperishable" Mun. Up. II-1-2.

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Just as the illusion of a snake in a rope is not possible merely through ignorance without the substratum-rope, so also the world cannot be created merely by ignorance without the substratum, the Lord. Therefore the subtle causal condition is dependent on the Lord, and yet the Lord is not in the least affected by this ignorance, just as the snake is not affected by the poison. "Know that the Prakṛiti is Māyā and the great Lord the ruler of Māyā" Svet. Up. IV-10.

So the Avyakta is a helper (Sahakari) to the Lord in His creation.

The Lord creates the universe using it as a means. It is dependent on the Lord. It is not like the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas which is an independent entity.

The Lord looks on Māyā and energises her. Then she has the power of producing the world. In her own nature she is Jada or insentient.

In the next Sūtra the author gives another reason for holding that the 'Avyakta' of the Katha Upaniṣhad is not to be interpreted as Pradhāna.

I.4.4 (110) And because it is not mentioned (that the Avyakta) is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

According to the Saṅkhyas, emancipation results when the difference between the Puruṣha and the Avyakta (Prakṛiti) is known. For without a knowledge of the nature of the constitutive elements of Pradhāna it is impossible to recognise the difference of the soul from them. Hence the Avyakta is to be known according to the Saṅkhyas.

But here there is no question of knowing the Avyakta. Hence it cannot be the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas.

It is impossible to hold that knowledge of things which is not taught in the text is of any use to man. For this reason also we hold that the word 'Avyakta' cannot denote the Pradhāna.

The Saṅkhyas call Avyakta or Pradhāna the first cause. But the first cause has been stated in the Śhruti as the object to be known. In the Śhruti 'Avyakta' is not stated to be an object of pursuit. Hence it is not the first cause and consequently, cannot be mistaken for the matter of Saṅkhyas.

According to the Saṅkhyas, liberation is attained by knowing that Puruṣha is different from Prakṛiti. The knowledge of Prakṛiti is thus an essential of release. But the Katha Upaniṣhad nowhere mentions that the knowledge of 'Avyakta' is necessary for the final emancipation.

Therefore the Avyakta of the Katha Upaniṣhad is not the Prakṛiti of the Saṅkhyas.

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Nowhere does the scripture declare that Pradhāna (Matter) is Jneya (to be known) or Upasya (to be worshipped). What is aimed at as the object of knowledge of adoration in the Śhrutis is the Supreme seat of Viṣṇu (Tad Vishnoh paramam padam).

I.4.5 (111) And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the Pradhāna as an object of knowledge) we deny that; because the intelligent (supreme) Self is meant on account of the general subject matter.

An objection to Sūtra 4 is raised and refuted.

The Śhruti says, "He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great (Mahat) and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death" Katha Up. II-3-15.

The Saṅkhyas says that the Pradhāna has to be known to attain the final release, because the description given of the entity to be known agrees with the Pradhāna, which is also beyond the Mahat (great). Hence we conclude that the Pradhāna is denoted by the term 'Avyaktam'.

This Sūtra refutes this. It says that by Avyakta, the one beyond Mahat (great) etc., the intelligent Supreme Self is meant, as that is the subject-matter of that Section.

Further the highest Self is spoken of in all Vedāntic texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above viz. absence of sound etc.

Hence it follows that the Pradhāna in the text is neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term 'Avyaktam'.

Even the propounders of the Sāṅkhya philosophy do not state that liberation or release from death is the result of the knowledge of Pradhāna. They state that it is due to the knowledge of the sentient Puruṣha.

The author gives another reason for holding that Pradhāna is not meant in the passage of the Katha Upaniṣhad.

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I.4.6 (112) And there is question and explanation relating to three things only (not to the Pradhāna).

The objection raised in Sūtra 5 is further refuted.

In the Katha Upaniṣhad Nachiketas asks Yama three questions only viz. about the fire sacrifice, the individual soul and the Supreme Self. These three things only Yama explains and to them only the questions of Nachiketas refer. Pradhāna is not mentioned. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired about. There is no question relative to the Pradhāna and hence no scope for any remarks on it. We cannot expect Yama to speak of the Pradhāna which has not been enquired into. So Pradhāna has no place in the discourse.

I.4.7 (113) And (the case of the term Avyakta) is like that of the term Mahat.

An argument in support of Sūtral is given. Just as in the case of Mahat, Avyakta also is used in the Vedas in a sense different from that attached to it in the Saṅkhya.

The Saṅkhyas use the term 'Mahat' (the great one) to denote the first born entity, the intellect. The term has a different meaning in the Vedic texts. In the Vedic texts it is connected with the word Self.

Thus we see in such passages as the following - "The great Self is beyond the intellect" (Katha Up. I-3-10), "The great Omnipresent Self" (Katha Up. I-2-22), "I know the great person" (Svet. Up. III-8). We therefore, conclude that the term 'Avyakta' also where it occurs in the Śhrutis, cannot denote the Pradhāna. Though the Avyakta may mean the Pradhāna or Prakṛiti in the Saṅkhya philosophy, it means something different in the Śhruti texts. So the Pradhāna is not based on scriptural authority, but is a mere conclusion of inference.

Mahat is the Buddhi of the Saṅkhyas. But in the Katha Upaniṣhad the Mahat is said to be higher than Buddhi. "Buddheratma mahan parah." So the Mahat of the Kathopanishad is different from the Mahat of the Saṅkhyas.

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Topic 2: (Sūtras 8-10) The Aja of Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad does not mean Pradhāna.

I.4.8 (114) (It cannot be maintained that 'Aja' means the Pradhāna) because no special characteristic is stated, as in the case of the cup.

An expression from the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion in support of Sūtra 1.

The author next refutes another wrong interpretation given by the Saṅkhyas of a verse from the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad.

We find in the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad IV-5, "There is one 'Aja' red, white and black in colour, producing manifold offspring of the same nature." Here a doubt arises whether this 'Aja' refers to the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas or to the subtle elements fire, water, earth. The Saṅkhyas maintain that 'Aja' here means the Pradhāna, the unborn.

The words red, white and black refer to its three constituents, the Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. She is called 'unborn'. She is not an effect. She is said to produce manifold offspring by her own unaided effort.

This Sūtra refutes this. The Mantra taken by itself is not able to give assertion what the Saṅkhya doctrine is meant. There is no basis for such a special assertion in the absence of special characteristics.

The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the Mantra, "There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above" Bri. Up. II-2-3. It is impossible to decide from the text itself what kind of cup is meant. Similarly it is not possible to fix the meaning of 'Aja' from the text alone.

But in connection with the Mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant.

“What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is the skull.” Similarly, here we have to refer this passage to supplementary texts to fix the meaning of Aja. We should not assert that it means the Pradhāna.

Where can we learn what special being is meant by the word ‘Aja’ of the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad? To this question the following Sūtra gives a suitable answer.

(123)

I.4.9 (115) But (the elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term Aja), because some read so in their text.

This is explanatory to Sūtra 8.

By the term ‘Aja’ we have to understand the causal matter from which fire, water and earth have sprung. The matter begins with light i.e. comprises fire, water and earth. The word ‘tu’ (but) gives emphasis to the assertion. One Sakha assigns to them red colour etc. “The red colour is the colour of fire, white colour is the colour of water, black colour is the colour of earth” Chh. Up. VI-2-4, 4-1.

This passage fixes the meaning of the word ‘Aja’. It refers to fire, earth and water from which the world has been created. It is not the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas which consists of the three Guṇas. The words red, white, black primarily denote special colours. They can be applied to the three Guṇas of the Saṅkhyas in a secondary sense only. When doubtful passages have to be interpreted, the passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used. This is generally a recognised rule.

In the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad in Chapter I we find that Aja is used along with the word “Devatma Sakti-the divine power.” Therefore Aja does not mean Pradhāna.

The creative power is Brahman’s inherent energy, which emanates from Him during the period of creation. Prakṛiti herself is born of Brahman. Therefore Aja in its literal sense of ‘unborn’ cannot apply to Prakṛiti or Pradhāna. Lord Kṛiṣṇa says, “Mama yonir mahad Brahma-My womb is the great Brahman, in that I place the germ thence cometh forth the birth of all beings, O Bharata.” This shows that Prakṛiti herself is produced from the Lord.

l.4.10 (116) And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in Aja denoting the causal matter) as in the case of honey (denoting the sun in Madhu Vidyā for the sake of meditation) and similar cases.

The argument in support of Sūtra 8 is continued.

The Opponent says, “The term Aja denotes something unborn. How can it refer to the three causal elements of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, which are something created? This is contrary to reason.” The Sūtra says: There is no incongruity. The source of all beings viz. fire, water and earth is compared to a she-goat by way of metaphor. Some she-goat might be partly red, partly white and partly black. She might have many young goats resembling her in colour.

Some he-goat might love her and lie by her side, while some other he-goat might abandon her after having enjoyed her. Similarly the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured on account of its comprising fire,

water and earth produces many inanimate and animate beings like unto itself and is enjoyed by the souls who are bound by Avidyā or ignorance, while it is renounced by those souls who have attained true knowledge of the Brahman.

(124)

The words 'like honey' in the Sūtra mean that just as the sun although not being honey is represented as honey (Chh. Up. III.1), and speech as cow (Brl. Up. V-8), and the heavenly world etc., as the fires (Bri. Up. VI-2.9). So here the causal matter though not being a tri-coloured she-goat, is metaphorically or figuratively represented as one.

Hence there is nothing incongruous in using the term 'Aja' to denote the aggregate of fire, water and earth. 'Aja' does not mean 'unborn'.

The description of Nature as an Aja is an imaginative way of teaching a Truth. The sun is the honey of the gods, though the sun is not mere honey.

Topic 3: The five-fold-five (Pancha-panchajanah) does not refer to the twenty-five Sāṅkhyan categories.

I.4.11 (117) Even from the statement of the number (five-fold-five i.e. twenty-five categories by the Śhruti it is) not (to be understood that the Śhruti refers to the Pradhāna) on account of the differences (in the categories and the excess over the number of the Sāṅkhyan categories).

This Sūtra discusses whether the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyan philosophy are admitted by the Śhruti.

The Sāṅkhya or Opponent failed in his attempt to base his doctrine on the text which speaks of the 'Aja'. He again comes forward and points to another text. "He in whom the five groups of five and the ether rest, Him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe Him to be Brahman" (Brl. Up. IV-4-17). Now five-times-five makes twenty-five. This is exactly the number of the Sāṅkhya Tattvas or principles. The doctrine of Pradhāna rests on a scriptural basis.

Here is the scriptural authority for our philosophy.

This Sūtra refutes such an assumption. Panchapanchajanah, five-five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhyas. The Sāṅkhya categories have each their individual difference. There are no attributes in common to each pentad. The Sāṅkhya categories cannot be divided into groups of five of any basis of similarity, because all the twenty-five principles or Tattvas differ from each other.

(125)

This is further not possible 'on account of the excess'. The ether is mentioned as a separate category. This will make the number twenty-six in all. This is not in accordance with the theory of the Sāṅkhyas.

From the mere enumeration of the number 25 we cannot say that the reference is to the twenty-five Sāṅkhya categories and that hence the Sāṅkhya doctrine has the sanction of the Vedas.

The passage refers to Ātman also. Then the total number will be twenty-seven. Ātman is described as the basis of the others. Therefore it cannot be one of the twenty-five principles.

The principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy are propounded as independent of Puruṣha. But here the categories are known to be entirely dependent on Brahman or Ātman who is said to be the mainstay of them all. So they cannot be accepted as the independent principles of Sāṅkhya.

The word Panchajanah is a group denoting term. It is the special name belonging to all the members of that group. The group consists of five members, each of whom is called a Panchajanah. Therefore the phrase 'Pancha-panchajanah' does not mean five times five beings but five beings. Every one of whom is called a Panchajanah. It is just like the phrase Saptarshi, which denotes the constellation Ursa Major, consisting of seven stars. The word Saptarshi is a special name of everyone of these stars. When we say seven Saptarshis we do not mean seven times-seven stars but seven stars each one of whom is called a Saptarshi. Therefore 'Pancha-panchajanah' does not mean five times five products, but five people every one of whom is called a Panchajanah. The twenty-five Tattvas of the Sāṅkhyas are these: 1, Prakṛiti; 2-8, seven modifications of Prakṛiti viz. Mahat etc., which are causal substances, as well as effects; 9-24 sixteen effects; the 25 is the soul which is neither a causal substance nor an effect.

Who then are these beings called Panchajanah'? The following Sūtra gives the reply.

(126)

I.4.12 (118) (The Panchajanah or the five people referred to are) the vital force etc., (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

The Sūtra is explanatory to Sūtra 11.

The text in which the Panchajanya are mentioned is followed by another one in which the vital force and four other things are mentioned in order to describe the nature of Brahman. "They who know the Prāṇa of Prāṇa (the breath of breath), the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mind of mind etc." (Bri. Madhya. IV-4-21).

The five people refer to the Prāṇa and the other four of the text and are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman.

The Sāṅkhya asks how can the word 'people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear and so on? How we ask in return, can it be applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the term 'people' is applied to the Prāṇas in the text, "These are the five persons of Brahman" (Chh. Up. III-13-6). "Breath is father, breath is mother" (Chh. Up. VII-15-1).

The objector says. This is possible only in the recension of the Madhyandinas, who read the additional word 'Annasya Annam'. But in Kanva recension that phrase 'annasya annam' is omitted. We have only four. This objection is answered by the author in the following Sūtra.

I.4.13 (119) In the text of some (the Kanva recension) where food is not mentioned (the number five is made up) by 'light' (mentioned in the previous verse).

The argument in support of Sūtra 11 is continued.

"The immortal light of lights the gods worship as longevity" Bri. Up. IV-4-10. Although food is not mentioned in the text cited in the last Sūtra,

according to the Kanva recension of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, yet the four of that verse, together with 'light' mentioned in the text quoted above, would make the five people.

We have proved herewith that scriptures offer no basis for the doctrine of the Pradhāna. It will be shown later on that this doctrine cannot be proved either by Smṛiti or by ratiocination.

(127)

Topic 4: (Sūtras 14-15) Brahman is the First cause.

I.4.14 (120) Although there is a conflict of the Vedānta texts as regards the things created such as ether and so on, there is no such conflict with respect to Brahman as the First Cause, on account of His being represented in one text as described in other texts.

The doubt that may arise from Sūtra 13 that different Śhrutis may draw different conclusions as to the cause of the universe is removed by this Sūtra.

In the preceding part of the work the proper definition of Brahman has been given. It has been shown that all the Vedānta texts have Brahman for their common topic. It has been proved also that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the Pradhāna. But now the Sāṅkhya raises a new objection.

He says: it is not possible to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin etc., of the universe or that all the Vedānta texts refer to Brahman; because the Vedānta passages contradict one another. All the Vedānta texts speak of the successive steps of the creation in different order. In reality they speak of different creations.

Thus in Tait. Up. II-1-1 we find that creation proceeds from Self or Brahman "From the Self sprang Ākāśha, from Ākāśha air" etc. This passage shows that the cause of creation is Ātman. In another place it is said that the creation began with fire (Chh. Up. VI-2-3). In another place, again, it is said "The person created breath and from breath faith" (Pras. Up. IV-4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water above the heaven, light, the mortal (earth) and the water below the earth (Aitareya Aranyaka II-4-1-2, 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere it is said that the creation originated from the non-existent (Asat). "In the beginning there was the non-existent (Asat); from it was born what exists" (Tait. Up. II-7). "in the beginning there was the non-existent; it became existent; it grew" (Chh. Up. III-19-1). In another place it is said "Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is to be born of that which is not" (Chh. Up. VI-2-1, 2).

In another place Sat is said to be the cause of the universe "Sat alone was in the beginning" Chh. Up. VI-2-1. In another place, again, the creation of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously. Again we find that Avyakta is said to be the cause of the world "Now all this was then Avyakrita (undeveloped). It became developed by name and form" Bri. Up. 1-4-7. Thus the Upaniṣhads are not consistent, as regards the cause of the universe. Thus it is not possible to ascertain that Brahman alone is taught in the Upaniṣhads as the cause of the world. As many discrepancies are observed, the Vedānta texts cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the universe.

We must accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Śhruti and reasoning.

(128)

It is possible to say that Pradhāna alone is taught to be the cause of the world as we find from the passage of the Bri. Up. already quoted above. Further the words Sat, Asat, Prāṇa, Ākāśha and Avyakrita can very well be applied to Pradhāna, because some of them such as Ākāśha, Prāṇa are the effects of Pradhāna, while others are the names of Pradhāna itself. All these terms cannot be applied to Brahman.

In some passages we find that Ātman and Brahman are also said to be the cause of the world; but these two terms can be applied to Pradhāna also. The literal meaning of the word 'Ātman' is all-pervading. Pradhāna is all-pervading. Brahman literally means that which is pre-eminently great (Brihat). Pradhāna may be called Brahman also. Pradhāna is called Asat in its aspect of modified things and it is called Sat or being in its causal or eternal aspect. Pradhāna is called Prāṇa as it is an element produced from it. Thinking etc., may also apply to Pradhāna in a metaphorical sense, meaning the commencement of action. So when the Upaniṣhad says "It thought, let me become many", it means, that Pradhāna started the action of multiplication. Therefore all the Upaniṣhad passages relating to creation harmonise better with the theory of Pradhāna being the creator than of Brahman.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. Although the Vedānta texts may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created such as ether and so on, yet they uniformly declare that Brahman is the First Cause. The Vedāntic passages which are concerned with setting forth

the cause of the world are in harmony throughout. It cannot be said that the conflict of statements regarding the universe affects the statements regarding the cause i.e. Brahman. It is not the main object of the Vedānta texts to teach about creation. Therefore it would not even matter greatly. The chief purpose of the Śhrutis is to teach that Brahman is the First Cause. There is no conflict regarding this.

The teacher will reconcile later on these conflicting passages also which refer to the universe.

(129)

I.4.15 (121) On account of the connection (with passages treating of Brahman, non-existence does not mean absolute Non-existence) Samakarshat: from its connection with a distant expression.

Some texts from the Taittiriya, the Chhandogya and Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhads are taken up for discussion.

The Sāṅkhyas raise another objection. They say: There is a conflict with reference to the first cause, because some texts declare that the Self created these worlds (Ait. Ar. II-4-1-2-3). Some Vedānta passages declare that creation originated from non-existence (Tait. II-7). Again in some passages existence is taught as the First Cause (Chh. Up. VI-1-2). Some Śhrutis speak of spontaneous creation. It cannot be said that the Śhrutis refer to Brahman uniformly as the First Cause owing to the conflicting statements of the Vedānta texts.

The Siddhantin gives the following reply. We read in the Tait. Up. II-7 “This was indeed non-existence in the beginning.” Non-existence here does not mean absolute non-existence. It means undifferentiated

existence. In the beginning existence was undifferentiated into name and form. Taittiriya Upaniṣhad says "He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing" Tait. Up. II-6. It is further elaborated by means of the series of sheaths viz. the sheath of food etc. represented as the inner self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause. He wished 'May I be many'. This clearly intimates that Brahman created the whole universe.

The term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms. The term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation. Brahman is called 'Non-being' previously to the origination of the world in a secondary sense.

We read in Chh. Up. VI-2-2 "How can that which is created from non-existence be?" This clearly denies such a possibility.

"Now this was then undeveloped" (Bri. Up. I-4-7) does not by any means assert that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler, because it is connected with another passage where it is said, "He has entered here to the very tips of the finger-nails" (Bri. Up. I-4-7). 'He' refers to the Ruler. Therefore we have to take that the Lord, the Ruler, developed what was undeveloped.

Another scriptural text also describes that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a Ruler. "Let me now enter these beings with this loving Self, and let me then evolve names and forms" Chh. Up. VI-3-2.

Although there is a reaper it is said "The corn-field reaps itself." It is said also "The village is being approached." Here we have to supply "by

Devadatta or somebody else." Brahman is described in one place as existence. In another place it is described as the Self of all. Therefore it is a settled conclusion that all Vedānta texts uniformly point to Brahman as the First Cause. Certainly there is no conflict on this point.

Even in the passage that declares Asat i.e. non-being to be the cause there is a reference to Sat i.e. Being. Even the text that describes Asat as the Causal force ends by referring to Sat.

(130)

The doubt about the meaning of a word or passage can be removed by reference to its connection with a distant passage in the same text, for such connection is found to exist in the different passages of Śhruti. The exact meaning of such words as 'Asat' which means non-entity, apparently, 'Avyakrita' which means apparently non-manifest Pradhāna of Sāṅkhya, is thus ascertained to be Brahman. Compare the Śhrutis: "He desired, I will be many I will manifest myself' Tait. Up. II-6-2. "This was at first Asat"-apparently a non-entity. Tait. II-7-1. The meaning of the word Asat of the second passage is ascertained to be Brahman by reference to the first passage where the same question namely the state of the universe before creation is answered in a clearer way.

The meaning of the word Avyakrita in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad I-4-7 in the passage (thus therefore, that was the undifferentiated) is ascertained to be the Brahman as still undeveloped by a reference to the passage (the same is pervading all through and through down to the tips of the nails of the fingers and toes). Avyakta is recognised in the last passage more clearly by the words 'Sa esha' (the self-same

one). The Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas does not find a place anywhere in the passages which treat about the cause of the world. The words 'Asat' 'Avyakrita' also denote Brahman only.

The word 'Asat' refers to Brahman which is the subject under discussion in the previous verse. Before the creation, the distinction of names and forms did not exist. Brahman also then did not exist in the sense that He was not connected with names and forms. As he has then no name and form, he is said to be Asat or non-existent. The word 'Asat' cannot mean matter or non-being, because in this very passage we find that the description given of it can apply only to Brahman.

Brahman is not 'Asat' in the literal meaning of that word. The seer of the Upaniṣhad uses it in a sense totally distinct from its ordinary denotation.

(131)

Topic 5: (Sūtras 16-18) He who is the maker of the Sun, Moon, etc. is Brahman and not Prāṇa or the individual soul.

I.4.16 (122) (He, whose work is this, is Brahman) because (the 'work') denotes the world.

A passage from the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion.

In the Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇa the sage Balaki promises to teach Brahman by saying "I shall tell you Brahman", and he goes on to describe sixteen things as Brahman, beginning with the Sun. All these are set aside by the King Ajatasatru who says, none of them is Brahman. When Balaki is silenced, Ajatasatru gives the teaching about Brahman in these words:

“O Balaki! He who is the maker of those persons whom you mentioned and whose work is the visible universe-is alone to be known." We read in the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad in the dialogue between Balaki and Ajatasatru “O Balaki, He who is the maker of those persons whom you mentioned, and whose work is this (visible universe) is alone to be known” (Kau. Up. IV-19).

A doubt arises now whether what is here said as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the Prāṇa or Brahman, the Supreme Self. The Opponent holds that the vital force or Prāṇa is meant, because he says the clause “of whom this is the work" points to the activity of motion and that activity rests on Prāṇa. Secondly, we meet with the term ‘Prāṇa’ in a complementary passage. “Then he becomes one with the Prāṇa alone" Kau. Up. IV-20. The word ‘Prāṇa’ denotes the vital force. This is well known. Thirdly, Prāṇa is the maker of all the persons, the person in the Sun, the person in the moon etc.

We know from another scriptural text that the Sun and other deities are only differentiations of Prāṇa, “Who is that one God in whom all other gods are contained? Prāṇa and he is Brahman, and they call him That" (Bri. Up. III-9-9).

Or the passage refers to the individual soul as the object of knowledge. A subsequent passage contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, “As the master feeds with his people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other selves" Kau. Up. IV-20. As the individual soul is the support of the Prāṇa, it may itself be called Prāṇa. We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief Prāṇa but

not to the Lord of whom it does not contain any inferential marks whatsoever.

The Sūtra refutes all these and says it is Brahman that is referred to the maker in the text; because Brahman is taught here "I shall teach you Brahman." Again 'this' which means the world, is his 'work.' This clearly points out that the 'he' is Brahman only.

The reference in the Kaushitaki Brāhmaṇa passage is to the Supreme Lord because of the reference to the world. The activity referred to is the world of which the Lord is the Creator.

(132)

Therefore the maker is neither Prāṇa nor the individual soul, but the Highest Lord. It is affirmed in all Vedānta texts that the Maker of the world is the Supreme Lord.

I.4.17 (123) If it be said that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief Prāṇa (Brahman is) not (referred to by the word 'matter' in the passage quoted), (we reply) that has already been explained.

An objection to Sūtra 16 is raised and refuted. The objection has already been disposed of under I-1-31.

In the Sūtra I-1-31 which dealt with the topic of the dialogue between Indra and Prataardana, this objection was raised and answered.

All those arguments would apply here also. It was shown there that when a text is interpreted as referring to Brahman on the ground of a comprehensive survey of its initial and concluding clauses, all other inferential marks which point to other topics, such as Jīva or Prāṇa etc.,

must be so interpreted that they may be in harmony with the main topic.

Here also the initial clause refers to Brahman in the sentence "Shall I tell you Brahman?" The concluding clause is "Having overcome all evils, he obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty and supremacy, yea, he who knows this". Thus the initial and concluding clauses here also refer to Brahman. If in the middle of this text we find any mark from which Jīva or any other topic may be inferred, we must so interpret the passage as to refer to Brahman, in order to avoid contradiction.

This topic is not redundant as it is already taught in Sūtra I-1-31, because the chief point discussed here is the word 'Karma' which is liable to misinterpretation. Therefore this Adhikaraṇa certainly teaches something new.

The word Prāṇa occurs in the sense of Brahman in the passage "The mind settles down on Prāṇa" Chh. Up. VI-8-2.

(133)

I.4.18 (124) But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul in the text) has another purpose on account of the question and the reply; moreover, thus some also (the Vajasaneyins) (read in their text or recension).

An argument in support of Sūtra 16 is given.

Even the reference to the individual soul has a different purpose i.e. aims at intimating Brahman.

After Ajatasatru has taught Balaki by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the Prāṇa or the vital air, he asks the following question: "Balaki, where did the person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?" Kau. Up. IV. 19. These questions clearly refer to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the answer (Kau. Up. IV.20) say that the individual soul is merged in Brahman in deep sleep.

When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that Prāṇa alone, and 'from that Self all Prāṇas proceed, each towards its place, from the Prāṇas the gods, from the gods the worlds".

This conversation occurs in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad. It clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term "the person consisting of cognition" (Vijñānamaya) and distinguishes from it the Highest Self. "Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come back?" (Bri. Up. II-1-16) and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart'. We already know that the word 'ether' denotes the supreme seat for instance in the passage above the "small ether within the lotus of the heart" (Chh. Up. VIII-1-1).

Topic 6: (Sūtras 19-22) The Ātman to be seen through hearing etc., of the Bri. Up. II-4-5 is Brahman and not Jīvatma.

I.4.19 (125) (The Self to be seen, to be heard etc., is the Supreme Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

A passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is now taken up for discussion.

From the synthetic study of the context it is clear that the reference is to the Supreme Self.

We read in the Maitreyi-Brāhmaṇa of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad the following passage: “Verily a husband is not dear that you may love the husband etc., but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and to be meditated upon, O Maitreya, when the Self has been seen, heard, reflected and realised or known, then all this is known” Bri. Up. IV-5-6.

(134)

Here a doubt arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be heard and so on is the individual soul or the Supreme Self.

The Opponent says: The Self is by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer. From this it appears that the text refers to the individual soul.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that in this passage the highest Self is referred to, and not the individual soul. In the whole Section Brahman is treated. Maitreyi says to her husband Yajnavalkya: “What should I do with the wealth by which I do not become immortal? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me.” Thereupon Yajnavalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Scripture and Smṛiti declare that immortality can be attained only by the knowledge of the Supreme Self.

Then Yajnavalkya teaches her the knowledge of the Self. Finally the Section concludes with “Thus far goes immortality.” Immortality cannot be attained by the knowledge of the individual soul, but only by the knowledge of the Highest Self or Brahman.

Therefore Brahman alone is the subject matter of the passage under discussion. Brahman alone is to be seen or realised through hearing, reflection and meditation.

Yajnavalkya declares that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge. It follows from all this that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the Supreme Self.

Further it is said in the text that by the knowledge of the Self everything is known. This clearly intimates that the Self is Brahman only because how can the knowledge of finite Jīva or individual soul give us knowledge of everything?

(135)

I.4.20 (126) (The fact that the individual soul is taught as the object of realisation is an) indicatory mark which is proof of the proposition; so Asmarathya thinks.

An argument in support of Sūtra 19 is given. The indication is that the individual soul is not different from Brahman, the Ultimate Cause, of which it is a ray. Hence to know Brahman, the Cause, is to know all that.

If the individual were quite different from Brahman, then by the knowledge of Brahman everything else would not be known. The initial statement aims at representing the individual soul or Jīva and the Supreme Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made. The non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul

establishes the proposition, "When the Self is known all this is known", "All this is that Self".

Asmarathya is of opinion that the passages 'Ātmarii vijnate sarvamidam v/jnatam bhavati" and 'Idam sarvam yadayamatma' prove the aspect of identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Self, because only then can be attained what is promised i.e. that by the knowledge of Brahman everything can be attained. I-4-20.

The sparks that proceed from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire as they are of the nature of the fire. They are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other. Similarly the individual souls also, which are the effects of Brahman, are neither absolutely different from Brahman, because that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other; and because if they were identical with Brahman, and therefore Omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Therefore the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different. This doctrine of Asmarathya is known as "Bheda-abheda-vada". This is the opinion of the sage Asmarathya.

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I.4.21 (127) The initial statement identifies the individual soul with Brahman or the Supreme Self because the soul, when it will depart (from the body), is such (i.e. one with the Supreme Self); thus Audulomi thinks.

The argument in support of Sūtra 19 is continued.

Jīva or the individual soul which is associated with its different limiting adjuncts viz. body, senses and mind, attains freedom through meditation and knowledge. When it rises from the body i.e. when it is free and has no body-consciousness, it realises that it is identical with Brahman. Therefore it is represented as non-different from the Supreme Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Audulomi.

We read in the Śhrutis also “that serene being arising from this body, appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the Highest Light” Chh. Up. VIII-12-3. Mundakopanishad says “As the flowing rivers vanish in the sea, having lost their name and form, so also the sage, freed from name and form, goes to the Divine Person who is greater than the great” Mun. Up. III-2-8.

The individual soul is absolutely different from the Supreme Self. It is conditioned by the different limiting adjuncts viz. body, senses, mind and intellect. But it is spoken of in the Upaniṣhads as non-different from the Supreme Self because it may pass out of the body and become one with the Supreme Self, after having purified itself by means of meditation and knowledge. The text of the Upaniṣhad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. This doctrine advocated by Audulomi-which holds that difference between the individual soul and Brahman in the state of ignorance is a reality-is a Satyabhedavada.

I.4.22 (128) (The initial statement is made) because (the Supreme Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so the Sage Kasakritsna thinks.

The argument in support of Sūtra 19 is continued.

The individual soul or Jīva is quite different in nature from Brahman or the Supreme Self. It is not possible for the individual soul to be one with Brahman in the state of emancipation. Therefore the teacher Kasakritsna thinks that the Highest Self Itself exists as the individual soul. As the Supreme Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, the Sage Kasakritsna is of opinion that the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible.

Brahman or the Supreme Self and the individual soul are absolutely non-different. The apparent difference is due to Upadhis or limiting vehicles or adjuncts which are only products of Avidyā or ignorance. The difference is illusory or unreal from the absolute or transcendental view point. Therefore it follows that everything else is known by the knowledge of the Self or Brahmajnana.

That the Supreme Self only is that which appears as the individual soul is obvious from the Brāhmaṇa-passage “Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms.” Sūtra 20 means that, the affirmation that “by knowing it everything is known”, shows the individual soul and the Supreme Self are non-different. Sūtra 21 means the identity of the soul and the Supreme Self, refers to the state of attainment of the Supreme Self by the purified and perfected soul. Sūtra 22 means that even now the Supreme Self is the individual soul. It is not that the individual soul is dissolved or merged in the Supreme Self. Our erroneous sense of diversity and separateness is lost or dissolved but the soul, which is in reality the Supreme Self (or the one Ātman which alone exists), exists for ever.

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Of these three opinions, the one held by Kasakritsna is in accordance with the Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedānta texts teach.

According to the statement of Asmarathya, the soul is not absolutely different from the Supreme Self. His declaration indicates by the expression “Owing to the fulfilment of the promise”, that there is a certain relation of cause and effect between the Supreme Self and the individual soul. The promise is made in the two passages “when the Self is known, all this is known” and “all this is that Self.” According to Asmarathya the individual soul is a product of the Highest Self. Therefore the knowledge of the cause gives rise to the knowledge of everything. If the Soul and the Supreme Self are non-different, the promise that through the “knowledge of one everything becomes known” can be fulfilled.

According to the view of Audulomi the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition; the individual soul is only a state of the highest Self or Brahman. The view of Asmarathya and Audulomi cannot stand.

Jīvahood is an unreality. It is a creation of Avidyā or nescience.

The individual soul is identical with Brahman in essence. On account of ignorance we feel that we are conditioned or limited by the false, illusory Upadhis and that we are different from Brahman. Really the individual soul is neither created nor destroyed. If the Jīvahood is a reality it can never be destroyed and liberation would be impossible. If the individual soul becomes one with Brahman or the Highest Self when it attains freedom or the final emancipation, then Jīvahood is

illusory. The origin of the souls from the Supreme Self like sparks from the fire is not real creation. It must be viewed only with reference to the limiting adjuncts.

The objector says: the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge', indicates the final annihilation of the soul, but not its oneness with the Supreme Self.

We reply, this is incorrect. The passage means to say only that all sense perception ceases when the soul departs from the body, not that the Self is annihilated. The passage intimates that the eternally unchanging Self which is one mass of knowledge or consciousness cannot certainly perish but by means of true knowledge of the Self, disconnection with the elements and the sense organs, which are the products of ignorance, has taken place.

The individual soul and the Supreme Self differ in name only. It is a settled conclusion that perfect knowledge produces absolute oneness of the two. The Self is called by many different names but it is One only. Perfect knowledge is the door to Moksha or the final emancipation. Moksha is not something effected and non-eternal, It is eternal and is not different from the eternally unchanging, immortal, pure Brahman who is One without a second. Those who state that there is distinction between the individual and the Supreme Self are not in harmony with the true sense of the Vedānta texts.

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Topic 7: (Sūtra 23-27) Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause.

1.4.23 (129) (Brahman is) the material cause also on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the proposition and the illustrations (quoted in the Śhruti).

This Sūtra states that Brahman is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe.

Brahman has been defined as that from which proceed the origin, sustenance and dissolution of this universe. Now a doubt arises whether Brahman is the material cause like clay or gold, or the efficient or operative causality like potter or goldsmith.

The Opponent or the objector holds that Brahman is the only operative or the efficient cause of the world, as in texts like, "He reflected, he created Prāṇa" Pres. Up. VI.3 & 4. Observation and experience intimate that the action of operative causes only such as potters and the like is preceded by thinking or reflection. It is, therefore, quite correct that we should regard the creator also in the same light. The creator is declared as the 'Lord'. Lords such as kings are known only as operative causes. The Supreme Lord must be regarded as an operative cause.

This Sūtra refutes this prima facie view of the Opponent.

Brahman is also the material cause of this universe. The term 'cha' (also) indicates that Brahman is the efficient cause as well. Only if Brahman is the material cause of the universe it is possible to know everything through the knowledge of Brahman. "Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known?" (Chh. Up. IV.1-2), which declare that the effects are not dif

ferent from their material cause, because we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter is different from the house he has built.

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The illustrations referred to here are “My dear, as by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification i.e. the effect being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely” etc. (Chh. Up. VI-1-14). These texts clearly indicate that Brahman is the material cause of the universe, otherwise they would be meaningless.

Promising statements are made in other places also. For instance “What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known,” Mun. Up. I.1.3. “When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived and known then all this is known” (Bri. Up. IV-5-6). All these promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedānta texts prove that Brahman is also the material cause.

There is no other guiding being than Brahman. We have to conclude from this that Brahman is the efficient cause at the same time.

Lumps of clay and pieces of gold are dependent on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative or efficient cause to which the material cause could look, because the scripture says that Brahman was One without a second previous to creation. Who else could be an efficient or operative cause when there was nothing else? If that were admitted that there is a guiding principle different from the material cause, in that case everything cannot be known through one thing.

Consequently the promissow statements and the illustrations would be stultified.

Therefore Brahman is the efficient cause, because there is no other ruling principle. He is the material cause as well because there is no other substance from which the universe can take its origin.

For the sake of harmony between the proposition to be established and illustrations given therein, we conclude that Brahman is the material cause of the world. The text expressly declares Him to be the efficient or operative cause as well.

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I.4.24 (130) On account of the statement of will or reflection (to create on the part of the Supreme Self, It is the material cause).

An argument in support of Sūtra 23 is given “He wished or thought may I be many, may I grow forth”. In this text the desire and reflection indicate that Brahman is the efficient cause.

“May I be many” shows that Brahman Himself became many.

Therefore He is the material cause as well.

He willed to manifest Himself as many i.e. as the universe.

He willed to evolve the universe out of Himself. This intimates that He is at once the material and the efficient cause of creation.

I.4.25 (131) And because the Śhruti states that both (the origin and the dissolution of the universe) have Brahman for their material cause.

The argument in support of Sūtra 23 is continued.

This Sūtra provides a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.

That from which a thing takes its origin and into which it is withdrawn, and absorbed is its material cause. This is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley and the like. "All these things take their origin from the Ākāśha (Brahman) alone and return into the Ākāśha" Chh. Up. I-9-1.

"That from which these things are produced, by which, when produced they live, and into which they enter at their dissolution-try to know that. That is Brahman" Tait. Up. III.1 . These Upaniṣhadic passages indicate clearly that Brahman is the material cause also.

The word 'Sākshāt' (direct) in the Sūtra shows that there is no other material cause, but that all this originated from the Ākāśha (Brahman) only. Observation and experience teach that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material cause.

I.4.26 (132) (Brahman is the material cause of the world) because it created Itself by undergoing modification.

The argument in support of Sūtra 23 is continued. We read in the Tait. Up. II-7 "That Itself manifested Itself." This intimates that Brahman alone created the world out of Itself, which is possible only by undergoing modification. This represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent. So He is the Kartā (creator-agent) and Karma (creation). He becomes the creation by means of Parinama (evolution or modification).

The word 'Itself' intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self. The modification is apparent (Vivarta), according to Śhrī Śhaṅkarāchārya. It is real, according to Śhrī Ramanujāchārya.

The world is unreal in the sense that it is not permanent. It is an illusion in the sense it has only a phenomenal existence, it has no existence separate from Brahman.

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I.4.27 (133) And because (Brahman) is called the source.

The argument in support of Sūtra 23 is continued.

Brahman is the material cause of the universe, also because He is stated in Śhruti to be the source of the universe.

We read in Mundaka Upaniṣhad III-1-3, "The Maker, the Lord, the Person, who has his source in Brahman" and "that which the wise regard as the Source of all beings" Mun. Up. I-1-6.

'Achintyam-avyaktam-ananta rūpam, sivam, prasantam amritam brahmayonim; Tamadirnadhyantavihinam-ekam vibhum chidānandam-arūpam-adbhutam' 'He is incomprehensible, unspeakable, infinite in form, all-good, all-peace, immortal, the parent of the universe, without beginning, middle and end, without rival, all-pervading, all-consciousness, all-bliss, invisible, and inscrutable' (Kaivalya Up. 6) -this indicates that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

The word Yoni or womb always denotes the material cause, as in the sentence "the earth is the Yoni or womb of herbs and trees." It is thus proved or established that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.

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Topic 8: The arguments refuting the Saṅkhyas refute the others also.

I.4.28 (134) By this all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedānta texts) are explained.

The argument is concluded in this Sūtra.

By what has been said in the foregoing Sūtras it is to be understood that the teaching of all the Śhrutis, even those that have not been discussed points to Brahman, the only cause of the world.

By thus disproving the doctrine of Pradhāna being the cause of the world all have been refuted. By overthrowing the chief disputant others are overthrown just as by defeating the commander all the others are also defeated. Thus those who attribute creation to atoms and other theorists are all defeated.

All doctrines that speak of two separate causes are refuted. The atomic theory and other theories are not based on scriptural authority.

They contradict many scriptural texts.

The Saṅkhya doctrine according to which the Pradhāna is the cause of the universe, has in the Sūtras beginning with I.1.5 been again and again brought forward and refuted.

The doctrine of Pradhāna stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine as it admits the non-difference of cause and effect like the Vedānta doctrine. Further, it has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma Sūtras such as Devala and others. Moreover the Vedānta texts contain some passages which to some people who are

endowed with dull intellect may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. For all these reasons the commentator has taken special trouble to refute the Pradhāna doctrine. He has not directed his special attention to the atomic and other theories.

It is proved that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

Thus ends the Fourth Pada (Section 4) of the First Adhyāya (Chapter I) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy. Here ends Chapter I.

(143) CHAPTER 11, AVIRODHAYA ADHYĀYA – 'consistency chapter', SECTION 1, INTRODUCTION

Smṛiti-nyāya-virodha-parihara –*'removing any conflicts in correctness of the Vedas'* forms the topic of the first Pada (section).

The Smṛiti-virodha –*'conflict in the Purānas, etc.'* is dealt with in Sūtras 1-3 and 12 also. The Nyāya-virodha –*'conflicts in doctrine'* is treated in the rest of the Sūtras. Section 2 attacks the various Darśhanas or systems of philosophy on their own grounds. The Third and Fourth Padas aim at establishing a unity of purport in the apparently divergent and inconsistent cosmological and psychological thoughts of the several Vedānta passages. Thus the title Avirodha or absence of contradiction given to the chapter is quite appropriate.

It has been shown in the First Chapter that the Omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of the world just as clay is the material cause of pots etc., and gold of golden ornaments. It has been conclusively proved also in the First Chapter that all the Vedānta texts treat of Brahman as the First Cause and that Brahman is the import of all the Vedānta texts. This was established by the Samanvaya –*'coordination chapter'*.

Just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion, so also Brahman is the cause of the subsistence of this universe by His Rulership. Just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth, so also, projected world is finally reabsorbed into His essence during Pralaya or dissolution.

It has been further proved also that the Lord is the Self of all beings.

The doctrine of Pradhāna being the cause of the world has been refuted in the First Chapter as it is not based on the authority of the scriptures.

In this Section the arguments based on reasoning against the doctrine which speaks of Brahman as the First Cause are refuted.

Further arguments which claim their authoritativeness from the Smṛitis to establish the doctrine of Pradhāna and the theory of the atoms are refuted in this Section.

SYNOPSIS

Previously it has been proved on the authority of Śhruti that the matter or Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. The First Chapter has proved that all the Vedāntic texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the universe, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence. It has also been proved that there is no scriptural text which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedānta, more particularly the Sāṅkhya system.

The first two Padas of the Second Chapter refute any objections which may be raised against the Vedānta doctrine on purely speculative grounds apart from the authority of the Śhrutis. They also show that no system that cannot be reconciled with the Vedānta can be established in a satisfactory manner.

Section 1 of the Second Chapter proves by arguments that Brahman is the cause of the world and removes all objections that may be levelled against such a conclusion.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-2) refutes the objection of the Sāṅkhyas that the accepting of the system of Vedānta involves the rejection of the Sāṅkhya doctrine which constitutes a part of Smṛiti and so has claims or consideration. The Vedānta replies that the acceptance of the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti would force us to reject other Smṛitis such as the Manu Smṛiti which are opposed to the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas. The Veda does not confirm the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti but only those Smṛitis which teach that the universe takes its origin from an intelligent creator or intelligent primary cause (Brahman).

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtra 3) extends the same line of argument to the Yoga-Smṛiti. It discards the theory of the Yoga philosophy of Patanjali regarding the cause of the world.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 4-5) raises an objection that as Brahman and the world are not similar in nature and properties, one being sentient, etc., and the other insentient, etc., Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 6-7) refutes the objection by stating that there are instances in the world of generation of the inanimate from the animate as, for instance, the production of hair from the living body, also of the animate from the inanimate as, for instance, the birth of scorpions and other insects from cow-dung. They prove that it is not necessary that the cause and the caused should be similar in all respects.

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Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 8) raises an objection that at the time of general dissolution, when the effect (world) is merged in the cause (Brahman), the latter must be contaminated by the former.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 9) refutes the objection by showing that there are direct instances to the contrary, just as the products of the earth such as jars etc., at the time of dissolution do not change earth into their own nature; but, on the contrary, they are themselves changed into the substance of earth.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 10-11), Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtra 12), Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtra 29) show that arguments directed against the view that Brahman is the cause of the world may be levelled against the Opponents as well, such as the Saṅkhyas and the Vaiseshikas, because in the Saṅkhya system, the nameless Pradhāna produces all names and forms and in the Vaiseshika system invisible and formless atoms unite and form a visible world. The Sūtras state that arguments may be prolonged without any conclusion being arrived at and that the conclusion of the Vedas only is to be respected. All the views which are antagonistic to the Vedas are ruthlessly refuted.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtra 13) teaches that although the enjoying souls and the objects are in reality nothing but Brahman, yet they may practically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, the ripples and foam of the ocean although they are in essence identical and only sea water.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, a doctrine of the Vedānta which is defended by the

followers of the Vedānta against the Vaiseshikas. According to the Vaiseshikas, the effect is something different from the cause.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 21-22) refutes the objection that Brahman in the form of the individual soul is subject to pleasure and pain by showing that though Brahman assumes the form of the individual soul, yet He transcends the latter and remains untainted by any property of Jīva whom He controls from within. Though the individual soul or Jīva is no other than Brahman Himself, yet Brahman remains the absolute Lord and as such above pleasure and pain. Jīva is a slave of Avidyā. Brahman is the controller of Māyā. When Jīva is freed from Avidyā, he becomes identical with Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 23-25) shows that Brahman, although devoid of material and instruments of action, may yet create the world through His Sat-Śhaṅkalpa or will power, just as gods by their mere power of volition create palaces, animals and the like and milk by itself turns into curds.

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Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtras 26-29) explains that Brahman does not entirely transform Himself into the universe though He is without parts. Although He projects the world from Himself, yet He remains one and undivided. The world is unreal. The change is only apparent like the snake is the rope but not real. Brahman is not exhausted in the creation.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtras 30-31) teaches that Brahman, although devoid of instruments of action, is able to create the universe by means of the diverse powers He possesses.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtras 32-33) explains that Brahman has no motive in creating the world but projects the universe out of mere sporting impulse which is inherent in Him.

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtras 34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which are brought against Him owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various persons and the universal suffering in the world. Brahman acts as a creator and dispenser with reference to the merit and demerit of the individual souls.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.' (Sūtra 37) sums up the preceding arguments and states that all the attributes of Brahman, viz. Omniscience, Omnipotence and the like. are found appropriate in Brahman alone and none else and are such as to capacitate Him for the creation of the universe. Brahman is, therefore, the cause of the world.

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-2) Refutation of Smṛitis not based on Śhrutis.

II.1.1 (135) If it be objected that (from the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) there would result the defect of there being no room for certain Smṛitis (we say) no, because (by the rejection of that doctrine] there would result the defect of want of room for some other Smṛiti.

The conclusion arrived at in Chapter I, Section IV, that Brahman is the cause of the world is corroborated by Smṛitis other than Saṅkhya. The earliest and the most orthodox of these Smṛitis is the Smṛiti written by Manu.

If you say that one set of Smṛitis will be ignored if it is said that Pradhāna is not the cause of the world, will not another set of Smṛitis like Manu Smṛiti which is based on the Śhrutis and therefore more authoritative be ignored if you say that Brahman is not the cause? We have shown that the Śhruti declares Brahman to be the cause. Only such Smṛitis which are in full agreement with the Śhruti are authoritative. What if Kapila and others are Siddhas? Siddhi (perfection) depends on Dharma and Dharma depends on the Vedas. No Siddha is authoritative if his view is contrary to that of the Śhruti. Smṛitis which are opposed to the Vedas should be rejected ruthlessly. Kapila acknowledges a plurality of selfs. He does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. The system of Kapila contradicts the Vedas, not only the assumption of an independent Pradhāna but also by its hypothesis of a plurality of selfs. We cannot explain the Vedānta texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with Kapila Smṛiti. Kapila Smṛiti contradicts the Śhrutis. Hence it should be disregarded.

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The verse V.2 of Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad does not refer to Kapila the founder of Sāṅkhya philosophy. It refers to a different being altogether. The verse really means "He who before the creation of the world produced the golden coloured Brahma (Kapila) in order to maintain the universe". The word Kapila means here 'golden coloured' and is another name for Brahma called Hiranyagarbha.

II.1.2 (136) And there being no mention (in the scriptures) of others (i.e. the effects of the Pradhāna according to the

Saṅkhya system), (the Saṅkhya system cannot be authoritative).

An argument in support of Sūtra 1 is given.

Further such principles as Mahat etc., which are said to be products of Pradhāna are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. On the other hand the elements and the senses are found in the Veda and in the world and hence may be referred to in the Smṛiti. Hence such words as Mahat etc., found in Smṛitis do not refer to products of Pradhāna but to other categories revealed in the Śhruti.

See I.4.1.

There is no mention of the other categories of the Saṅkhyas anywhere in the Vedas. Therefore the Saṅkhya system cannot be authoritative.

Śhaṅkarāchārya has proved that by the word Mahat we have to understand either the cosmic intellect or Hiranyagarbha or the individual soul, but in no case the Mahat of the Saṅkhya philosophy i.e. the first product of the Prakṛiti.

It is not only because Saṅkhya teaches that Pradhāna is the author of creation which makes it unauthoritative, but it teaches other doctrines also which have no foundation in the Vedas. It teaches that souls are pure consciousness and all-pervading, that bondage and freedom is the work of Prakṛiti. It further teaches that there is no Supreme Self, the Lord of all. It also maintains that Prāṇas are merely forms of the functions of the five senses and have no separate existence of their own. All these heterodox doctrines are to be found there. Hence the Saṅkhya system cannot be authoritative.

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Topic 2: Refutation of Yoga.

II.1.3 (137) By this the Yoga philosophy is (also) refuted.

The Yoga philosophy of Patanjali is refuted here. Yoga is called "Sesvara-Saṅkhya".

The Opponent says: The Yoga system is given in the Upaniṣhads also, like the Svetavatara Upaniṣhad etc. "Holding his head, neck, trunk erect" etc. Svet. Up. II-8. "The Self is to be heard, to be thought of, to be meditated upon" Bri. Up. II-4-5. "This the firm holding back of the senses is what is called Yoga" Katha Up. II-3-11.

"Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga" Katha. Up. II-3-18. Yoga is an aid to the concentration of mind. Without concentration one cannot have knowledge of Brahman. Hence Yoga is a means to knowledge. As the Yoga Smṛiti is based on the Śhrutis, it is authoritative. The Yoga Smṛiti acknowledges the Pradhāna which is the First Cause.

For the same reason as adduced against the Saṅkhya system, the Yoga philosophy by Patanjali is also refuted as it also accepts the theory that Prakṛiti is the cause of the universe.

This Sūtra remarks that by the refutation of the Saṅkhya Smṛiti the Yoga Smṛiti also is to be considered as refuted because the Yoga philosophy also recognises, in opposition to scripture, a Pradhāna as the independent cause of the world and the great principle etc., as its effects although the Veda or common experience is not in favour of these views.

Though the Smṛiti is partly authoritative it should be rejected as it contradicts the Śhrutis on other topics.

Although there are many Smṛitis which treat of the soul, we have directed our attention to refute the Saṅkhya and Yoga, because they are widely known as offering the means for attaining the highest end of man. Moreover, they have obtained the appreciation of many great persons. Further their position is strengthened by Śhruti "He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Saṅkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters" Svet. Up. VI-13.

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We say that the highest goal of man cannot be attained by the knowledge of the Saṅkhya Smṛiti, or Yoga practice. Śhruti clearly says that the final emancipation or the supreme beatitude can only be obtained by the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda. "Only the man who knows Brahman crosses over Death, there is no other path to go" Svet. Up. III-8.

The Saṅkhya and Yoga systems maintain duality. They do not discern the unity of the Self. In the text cited "That cause which is to be known by Saṅkhya and Yoga", the terms 'Saṅkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation as these terms are used in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.

We certainly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. The Saṅkhyas say, "The soul is free from all qualities (Asanga)." This is in harmony with the Veda which declares that Puruṣha is essentially pure. "For that person is not attached to anything" Bri. Up. IV-3-16.

The Yoga prescribes retirement from the concerns of life (Nivritti) for the wandering Sannyāsin. This is corroborated by the Śhruti. “Then the Parivrajaka with orange robe, shaven, without any possession” etc. Jabala Upaniṣhad V.

Their reasoning is acceptable to the extent to which it leads to Self-realisation.

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Smṛitis. We hold that the truth can be realised nor known from the Vedānta texts only, “None who does not know the Veda perceives the great one” Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa III-12.9.7. “I now ask thee that Person taught in the Upaniṣhads” Bri. Up. III-9-26.

(150)

Topic 3: (Sūtras 4-11) Brahman can be the cause of the universe, although It is of a contrary nature from the universe.

II.1.4 (138) (The objector says that) Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, because this (the world) is of a different nature (from Brahman) and its being so (different from Brahman) [is known] from the scriptures.

There are eight Sūtras in this Adhikaraṇa. The first and the second express the Pūrva-paksha -‘Objection’ (objection) and the others express the true doctrine (Siddhanta).

The objections founded on Smṛiti against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of the universe have been refuted. We now proceed to refute those founded on reasoning.

Some plausible objections against Brahman being the cause of the world are raised in this Sūtra and the subsequent one.

The objector says: Brahman is intelligence. Brahman is pure.

But the universe is material, insentient and impure. Therefore, it is different from the nature of Brahman. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of this world.

The effect must be of the same nature as the cause. The effect is only cause in another form. The cause and effect cannot be entirely of a different nature. The intelligent and sentient Brahman cannot produce non-intelligent, insentient, material universe. If Brahman is taken to be the cause of the world, the nature of the two must be similar. But they appear to be quite different in essence or nature. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

The difference in nature is also known from the statements of Śhruti, “Brahman became intelligence as well as non-intelligence (world)” (Taittiriya Upaniṣhad, Brahmānanda Valli, Sixth Anuvaka-V/jnanam cha av/jnanam cha abhavat). Therefore, Brahman cannot be the cause of the material universe. Brahman, which is pure spirit, cannot be the cause of this universe, which is impure matter. The world which consists of pain, pleasure and illusion cannot be derived from Brahman.

II.1.5 (139) But the reference is to the presiding deities (of the organs) on account of the special characterisation and also from the fact of a deity so presiding.

This Sūtra meets an objection to Sūtra 4. The word ‘Tu’ (but) discards the doubt raised.

Whenever an inanimate object is described in Smṛiti as behaving like animate beings, we are to understand that it is an indication of a deity presiding over it. In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural texts do not denote the mere material elements and organs but rather the intelligent deities which preside over each organ viz. speech, etc.

(151)

You will find in Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad: "The deities contending with each other for who was the best." "All the deities recognised the pre-eminence in Prāṇa" (Kau. Up. II-14). The Kaushitakins make express use of the word "deities" in order to exclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant. Aitareya Aranyaka (II-2-4) says, "Agni having become speech entered the mouth". This shows that each organ is connected with its own presiding deity.

There is a text in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (VI-I-7) which says, "These organs quarrelled over their respective greatness." The texts of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad also show the existence of such presiding deities. "The fire thought and produced water." This indicates that the inanimate object may be called God having reference to its presiding deity. The thought spoken of is that of the Highest Deity which is connected with the effects as a superintending principle.

All these strengthen the hypothesis that the texts refer to the superintending deities.

From all this, we have to conclude that this universe is different in nature from Brahman. Therefore, the Universe cannot have Brahman for its material cause.

The next Sūtra gives a very suitable reply to the objection raised by the Opponent.

II.1.6 (140) But it (such organisation of life from matter) is also seen.

Objection raised in Sūtras 4 and 5 are now refuted.

The word 'but' discards the Pūrva-paksha -'Objection'. 'But' refutes the Opponent's or objectors views expressed in the last Sūtra, viz. that this universe cannot have originated from Brahman, because it is different in character. For we see that from man who is intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that from non-intelligent matter such as cow-dung, scorpions etc., are produced. SO the objections raised in Sūtras 4 and 5 are not valid. Hence it is quite possible that this material universe could be produced by an intelligent Being, Brahman. Origination of insentient creation from the sentient Creator is not unreasonable.

The Mundaka Upaniṣhad says "Just as the spider stretches forth and gathers together its threads, as herbs grow out of the earth, as from a living man comes out the hair, so also from the Imperishable comes out this universe" (I.1.7).

(152)

The objector may say that the body of a man is the cause of the hair and nails and not the man, and the cow-dung is the cause of the body of the scorpion, etc. Even then, there is difference in character between the cause, the dung and the effect, the body of the scorpion, in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the soul of the scorpion), which the other non-

intelligent matter (the cow-dung) is not. They are not similar in all respects. If they were, then there would be nothing like cause and effect. If you expect to find all the aspects of Brahman in the world, then what is the difference between cause and effect? The cause and its effects are not similar in all respects, but something in the cause is found in the effect also, just as clay in the lump is found in the jar also, though the shape, etc., of the two vary.

The very relationship of cause and effect implies that there is some difference between the two. Some qualities of the cause, Brahman, such as existence and intelligence, are found in Its effect, the universe. All objects in the universe exist. The universe gets this quality from Brahman, which is Existence itself. Further the intelligence of Brahman illumines the entire world. The two qualities of Brahman, viz. existence and intelligence, are found in the universe. Hence it is quite proper to take Brahman as the cause of this universe, though there may be some difference in other respects between them.

II.1.7 (141) If it be said (that the world, the effect, would then be) non-existent (before its origination or creation), (we say) no, because it is a mere negation (without any basis).

An objection to Sūtra 6 is raised and refuted.

The Opponent says that if Brahman which is intelligent, pure and devoid of qualities such as sound and so on, is the cause of the universe which is of an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, etc., it follows that the effect, i.e. the world, was non-existent before its actual origination, because Brahman was then the only existence. This means that something which was non-existing

is brought into existence, which is not accepted by the Vedāntins who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.

The objection raised by the Opponent is no real objection. It has no force on account of its being a mere negation.

This Sūtra refutes the objection raised by the Opponent. It declares that this negation is a mere statement without any objective validity. If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without any object to be negated. The effect certainly exists in the cause before its origination and also after it. The effect can never exist independently, apart from the cause either before or after creation. The Śhruti says, “Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in Brahman is abandoned by everything” (Bri. Up. II-4-6).

(153)

Therefore, the universe exists in Brahman even before creation. It is not absolutely non-existent.

II.1.8 (142) On account of the consequence that at the time of Pralaya or great dissolution (the cause becomes) like that (i.e. like the effect), the doctrine maintained hitherto (that Brahman is the cause of the universe) is absurd.

A plausible objection against Brahman being the cause of the world is raised here.

The Opponent raises further objections.

During dissolution the effect, i.e. the world, is absorbed in the cause, the Brahman. Consequently, it follows that the cause becomes like the effect. The cause is affected by the nature of the effect.

The evils of defects inherent in the effect will taint the cause. Brahman must be affected by the nature of the world, just as water is affected by the salt which is dissolved in it, just as the whole food is scented by the pungent smell of asafoetida when it is mixed with any condiment.

He would become impure and would no more be the Omniscient cause of the universe as the Upaniṣhads hold. He must become insentient, gross, limited, like the world, which is absurd. Brahman, therefore, cannot be the cause of the world.

There is another objection also. During dissolution all things have gone into a state of oneness with Brahman. All distinctions pass at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction. Then there would be no special cause left at the time of a new beginning of the universe. Consequently, the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed, etc. There will be no factor bringing about creation again.

The third objection is, if in spite of this a new creation is possible, then even the liberated souls or the Muktas who have become one with Brahman, will be dragged into rebirth.

(154)

It cannot be said that the universe remains distinct from the Highest Brahman even in the state of reabsorption or dissolution, be cause in that case it would be no dissolution at all. The effect existing separate from the cause is not possible.

Hence the Vedānta doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the universe is objectionable as it leads to all sorts of absurdities.

The next Sūtra gives a suitable reply to this.

II.1.9 (143) But not (so) on account of the existence of illustrations.

The objection raised in Sūtra 8 is refuted.

By the word 'tu' (but) the possibility of the objection is set aside.

The objections have no force. Why should an effect which is resolved into the cause again affect the cause by introducing the defects of the effect? When the effect is involved in the cause, it does not at all taint the cause by its effects. There are innumerable instances. If a good ornament is melted into gold, how can the peculiarities of form of the ornament appear in the gold? When a jar made up of clay is broken and reabsorbed into its original substance, i.e. clay, it does not impart to it its special features or qualities. It does not turn the earth into pots and pitchers but it is itself transformed as earth. The four-fold complex of organic beings which springs from the earth does not impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re-absorption.

Reabsorption cannot occur at all if the effect, when resolving back into its causal substance, continues to subsist there with all its individual properties.

Despite the non-difference of cause and effect, the effect has its self in the cause but not the cause in the effect. The effect is of the nature of the cause and not the cause the nature of the effect. Therefore the qualities of the effect cannot touch the cause.

Instead of Brahman being transformed into the world, the world is transformed into Brahman, being merged in Him at the time of its dissolution. Hence there cannot be any objection to Brahman being accepted as the cause of the world on the ground suggested in Sūtra 8.

Though the world is full of misery, etc., yet Brahman is all pure, etc. He remains always untouched by evil. As youth, childhood and old age belong to the body only and not to the Self, as blindness and deafness etc., belong to the senses and not to the Self, so the defects of the world do not belong to Brahman and do not pervade the pure Brahman.

(155)

If cause and effect are separate as you say, there will be no involution at all. As cause and effect are one and the same, the objection that the defects of the effect will affect the cause is not peculiar to involution alone. If what the Opponent says is correct, the defect will affect the cause even now. That the identity of cause and effect of Brahman and the universe, holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time, not only the time of involution or reabsorption is declared in many scriptural passages, as for instance-This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II.4.6). The Self is all this (Chh. Up. VII.25.2). The Immortal Brahman is this before (Mun. Up. II.2.11). All this is Brahman (Chh. Up. III.14.1).

If it is said that the defects are the effects of superimposition of Avidyā or nescience and cannot affect the cause, this explanation will apply to involution also.

Cobra is not affected by the poison. A magician is not affected by the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal.

Even so Brahman is not affected by Māyā. The world is only an illusion or appearance. Brahman appears as this universe, just as a rope appears as the snake. Therefore Brahman is unaffected by Māyā or the world illusion. No one is affected by his dream-creations or the illusory visions of his dream, because they do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep. Similarly the Eternal Witness of all states of consciousness is not affected by the world or Māyā.

Equally baseless is the second objection. There are parallel instances with reference to this also. In the state of deep sleep, you do not see anything. The soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction. There is no diversity, but as soon as you wake up you behold the world of diversity. The old stage of distinction comes again, as ignorance or Avidyā is not destroyed. Chhandogya Upaniṣhad says, "All these creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar or a worm or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become again" (Chh. Up. VI-9-2 & 3).

A similar phenomenon takes place during Pralaya or dissolution. The power of distinction remains in a potential state as Avidyā or Nescience in the state of dissolution also. So long as the basic Avidyā or ignorance is there, creation or evolution will follow involution just as a man wakes up after sleep.

The liberated souls will not be born again because in their case wrong knowledge or ignorance has been completely destroyed by perfect knowledge of Brahman.

The view held by the Opponent that even at the time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from Brahman is not admitted by the Vedāntins.

In conclusion it can be correctly said that the system founded on the Upaniṣhads is in every way unobjectionable.

(156)

II.1.10 (144) And because the objections (raised by the Saṅkhya against the Vedānta doctrine) apply to his (Saṅkhya) view also.

The objections raised in Sūtras 4 and 8 are levelled against the Opponents.

Now the tables are turned on the objector. The objections raised by him (the Saṅkhya) to the doctrines of Vedānta are applicable to his theory as well. In his doctrine of causation also, the world of forms and sounds takes its origin from Pradhāna and Prakṛiti which has no form or sound. Thus the cause is different from the effect here also. In the state of reabsorption or dissolution, all objects merge into Pradhāna and become one with it.

There is pervasion into the Pradhāna of all the effects of the world. It is admitted by the Saṅkhyas also that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction from the cause, and so the objection raised in Sūtra 8 applies to Pradhāna also. The Saṅkhya will have to admit that before the actual beginning, the effect was non-existent. Whatever objections that are raised against Vedānta in this respect are in fact true of the Saṅkhyas. That Brahman is the cause of the world, which is admitted by Śhruti, cannot be thrown out by this

sort of vain reasoning. Vedānta is based on the Śhrutis. Hence the doctrine of Vedānta is authoritative and infallible.

Therefore it must be admitted. Further, the Vedāntic view is preferable, because the objections have also been answered from the viewpoint of Vedānta. It is not possible to answer them from the viewpoint of the Saṅkhya.

(157)

II.1.11 (145) If it be said that in consequence of the non-finality of reasoning we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.

Objections raised in Sūtras 4 and 8 are further refuted.

Great thinkers like Kapila and Kanada are seen to refute each other. Logic has no fixity or finality. The deductions of one reasoner are overthrown by another. What one man establishes through reason can be refuted by another man more intelligent and ingenious than he. Neither analogy nor syllogism can apply to the soul. Conclusions arrived at by mere argument, however well-reasoned, and not based on any authoritative statement, cannot be accepted as final as there still remains the chance of their being refuted by more expert sophists. Hence, the conclusion of Śhruti alone must be accepted.

Without showing any regard to reasoning we must believe Brahman to be the material cause of the universe, because the Upaniṣhad teaches so.

The conclusions of Vedānta are based on the Śhrutis which are infallible and authoritative. Reasoning which has no sure basis cannot overthrow the conclusions of Vedānta.

Reason has its own province and scope. It is useful in certain secular matters but in matters transcendental such as the existence of Brahman, final release, life beyond, the pronouncements of human intellect can never be perfectly free from doubt, because these are matters which are beyond the scope of intellect. Even if there is to be any finality of reasoning, it will not bring about any finality of doctrine with reference to the soul, because the soul cannot be experienced by the senses. Brahman cannot be an object of perception or of inference based on perception. Brahman is inconceivable and consequently unarguable. Kathopanishad says, "This knowledge is not to be obtained by argument, but it is easy to understand it, O Nachiketas, when taught by a teacher who beholds no difference" (I.2.9).

The Opponent says: You cannot say that no reasoning whatever is well-founded because even the judgment about reasoning is arrived at through reasoning. You yourself can see that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only. Hence the statement that reasoning has never a sure basis is not correct. Further, if all reasoning were unfounded, human life would have to come to an end. You must reason correctly and properly.

We remark against this argument of the Opponent that thus also then results "want of release". Although reasoning is well-founded with respect to certain things, with regard to the matter in hand there will result "want of release".

Those sages who teach about the final emancipation of the soul, declare that it results from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge is always uniform. It depends upon the thing itself. Whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged to be the true thing. Knowledge that pertains to this is perfect or true knowledge. Mutual conflict of men's opinions is not possible in the case of true or perfect knowledge. But the conclusions of reasoning can never be uniform. The Sāṅkhyas maintain through reasoning that Pradhāna is the cause of the universe. The Naiyāyikas arrive through reasoning that the Paramanus or atoms are the cause of the world.

(158)

Which to accept? How, therefore, can knowledge which is based on reasoning, and whose object is not something always uniform, be true of perfect knowledge? We cannot come to a definite, positive conclusion through reasoning independent of the Śruti. The Veda is eternal. It is the source of knowledge. It has for its object firmly established things. Knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be denied at all by any of the logicians of the past, present or future. As the truth cannot be known through reasoning, there will be no liberation.

We have thus established that perfection can be attained through knowledge of Brahman with the aid of Upaniṣads or the Śruti. Perfect knowledge is not possible without the help of the Śruti. Disregard of Śruti will lead to absence of final emancipation.

Reasoning which goes against the scriptures is no proof of knowledge.

Our final position is that the intelligent Brahman must be regarded as the cause and substratum of the universe on the ground of scripture and of reasoning subordinate to scripture.

II.1.12 (146) By this (i.e. by the arguments against the Saṅkhyas) (those other theories) not accepted by the wise or competent persons are explained or refuted.

Other views or theories not accepted by the Vedas are refuted.

Sishtah-the remaining systems like those of the "Atomists" trained, i.e. trained in the Vedas.

Si'shtaparigrahaḥ-all other views or systems of thought not accepted by those who are well instructed in the Vedas; all the different views or systems contrary to the Vedas.

Aparigrahaḥ means those systems which do not acknowledge or accept (Parigraha) the Vedas as authority on these matters, but which rely on reason alone and which are not countenanced by the Veda.

All the different views or systems of thought which are contrary to the Vedas and which are not accepted by the disciplined and the wise are refuted by what is said against Saṅkhya, i.e. by the same arguments.

(159)

Like the theory of those who say that Pradhāna or Prakṛiti is the cause of the world, the theories of those who postulate atoms as the cause are refuted by those who know the truths of scripture, like Manu or Vyāsa, trained in the correct way of knowing them. The doctrine of the Pradhāna deserves to be refuted first as it stands near to the Vedic system, and is supported by somewhat strong and weighty arguments.

Further, it has to a certain extent been adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda. If the most dangerous enemy is conquered, the minor enemies are already conquered. Even so, if the Saṅkhya doctrine is refuted, all other systems are already refuted also.

The Sūtra teaches that by the demolition of the Saṅkhya doctrine given above, the remaining theories not comprised within the Vedas are also refuted, such as the theories of Kanada, Gautama, Akshapada, Buddhists, etc., because they are opposed to the Vedas on these points. The reasons are the same as in the case of Saṅkhya.

As regards the nature of the atom, there is no unanimity of opinion. Kanada and Gautama maintain it to be permanent, while the four schools of Buddhas hold it to be impermanent. The Vaibhashika Bauddhas hold that the atoms are momentary but have an objective existence (Kshanikam artha-bhutam). The Yogachara Bauddhas maintain it to be merely cognitional (Jñānarūpam). The Madhyamikas hold it to be fundamentally void (Sunya-rūpam). The Jains hold it to be real and unreal (Sad-asad-rūpam).

Topic 5: The distinctions of enjoyer and enjoyed do not oppose unity.

(160)

II.1.13 (147) If it be said (that if Brahman be the cause then) on account of (the objects of enjoyment) turning into the enjoyer, non-distinction (between the enjoyer and the objects enjoyed) would result, we reply that such distinction may exist nevertheless as is experienced commonly in the world.

Another objection based on reasoning is raised against Brahman being the cause and refuted.

The distinction between the enjoyer (the Jīva or the individual soul) and the objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience. The enjoyers are intelligent, embodied souls while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Ramakrishna for instance, is an enjoyer while the mango which he eats is an object of enjoyment. If Brahman is the material cause of the universe, then the world, the effect would be non-different from Brahman. The Jīva and Brahman being identical, the difference between the subject and the object would be annihilated, as the one would pass over into the other. Consequently, Brahman cannot be held to be the material cause of the universe, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction between the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment.

If you say that the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world will lead to the enjoyer or spirit becoming one with the object of enjoyment (matter), we reply that such differentiation is appropriate in our case also, as instances are found in the universe in the case of ocean, its waves, foams and bubbles and of the Sun and its light. The ocean waves, foams and bubbles are one and yet diverse in the universe. Similarly, are the Brahman and the world. He created and entered into the creation. He is one with them, just as the ether in the sky and the ether in the pot are one although they appear to be separate.

Therefore it is possible to have difference and non-difference in things at the same time owing to the name and form. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other and yet they are not different from the Supreme Brahman. The enjoyers and objects of

enjoyment are not different from the viewpoint of Brahman but they are different as enjoyers and objects enjoyed. There is not contradiction in this.

The conclusion is that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their Highest Cause, as the instance of the ocean, and its waves, foams and bubbles demonstrates.

Topic 6: (Sūtras 14-20) The world (effect) is non-different from Brahman (the cause).

II.1.14 (148) The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as ‘origin’ and the like.

That the effect is not different from the cause is shown here.

In Sūtra 13, the Sūtra-kāra spoke from the point of view of Parinamavada and refuted the objection raised by the Opponent that Brahman cannot be the material cause as it contradicts perception. In Parinamavada, Brahman actually undergoes transformation or modification. Now the same objection is overthrown from the view point of Vivartavada. In Vivartavada there is only apparent modification. Rope appears as a snake. It is not transformed into an actual snake. This is the doctrine of Advaita of Śhrī Śhaṅkara.

(161)

In the previous Sūtra the simile of the ocean and the waves was stated, accepting the apparent variety of objects. But in reality, cause and effect are one even now. This is clear from the word ‘Arambhana’ (beginning), just as by knowing a lump of clay, all clay will be known.

Name is only a verbal modification. The true being is only clay. Apot is only clay even now. Similarly, the world is only Brahman even now. It is wrong to say that oneness and manifoldness are both true as in the case of ocean and waves, etc. The word 'eva' in 'Mr̥ttiketyeva' shows that all diversity is unreal. The soul is declared to be one with Brahman.

The objector or Opponent says: 'If there is only one Truth viz. Brahman, the diverse objects of perception will be negated. The ethical injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends does not really exist. Moreover, the science of liberation of the soul will have no reality, if the distinction of teacher and the student on which it depends is not real. There would be no bondage and hence no liberation. As the science of the soul itself is unreal, it cannot lead to the Reality. If the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self? But these objects have no force because the whole phenomenal existence is regarded as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman has not arisen, just as the dream creatures are regarded to be true till the waking state arrives. When we wake up after dreams, we know the dream world to be false but the knowledge of dreams is not false. Moreover, even dreams sometimes forebode the imminent reality of death. The reality of realisation of Brahman cannot be said to be illusory because it destroys ignorance and leads to the cessation of illusion.

(162)

II.1.15 (149) And (because) only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is experienced.

The argument begun in Sūtra 14 as to how it follows that the effect (world) is inseparable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.

The effect is perceived only when the cause is present in it; otherwise not. A pot or cloth will exist even if the potter or the weaver is absent, but it will not exist if the clay or thread is absent. This proves that the effect is not different from the cause. The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad says, "All these created things, O my son, originate from Sat, i.e. Brahman, rest in Him and eventually dissolve in Him" (VI-8-4).

The objector says: There is no recognition of fire in the smoke.

The smoke being the effect of fire, ought to show fire in it. To this we reply that smoke is really the effect of damp fuel. The damp fuel comes in contact with fire and throws off its earthly particles in the form of smoke. The smoke and the fuel are identical. We can recognise the fuel in the smoke. This is proved by the fact that the smoke has smell just as the fuel has. The smoke is generally of the same nature as that of the fuel.

The phenomena of the universe manifest only because Brahman exists. They cannot certainly appear without Brahman. Therefore the world (effect) is not different from Brahman, the cause.

II.1.16 (150) And on account of the posterior (i.e. the effect which comes after the cause) existing (as the cause before creation).

The argument begun in Sūtra 14 is continued.

The scripture says that the effect (the world) existed in its causal aspect (Brahman) before the creation.

“In the beginning, my dear, Sadeva somyedamagra asit, this was only existence” (Chh. Up.). “Ātma va idam eka agra asit, verily in the beginning this was Self, one only” (Ait. Ar.2.4.1). “Brahma va idamagra asit. Before creation, this universe existed as Brahman” (Bri. Up. 1.4.10).

The Upaniṣhads declare that the universe had its being in the cause, Brahman, before creation. It was one with Brahman. As the world was non-different from the cause before creation, it continues to be non-different after creation also.

The effect (world) is non-different from the cause (Brahman) because it is existent in the cause, identically even, prior to its manifestation, though in time it is posterior.

(163)

A thing which does not exist in another thing by the self of the latter is not produced from that other thing. For instance, oil is not produced from sand. We can get oil from the groundnut because it exists in the seed, though in latency, but not from sand, because it does not exist in it. The existence is the same both in the world and in Brahman. As everything exists in Brahman, so it can come out of it.

Brahman is in all time neither more nor less than that which is.

So the effect also (the world) is in all time only that which is. That which is, is one only. Hence the effect is non-different from the cause.

II.1.17 (151) If it be said that on account of (the effect) being described as that which is not, (the effect does) not (exist before creation), we reply ‘not so’, because the term ‘that which

is not' denotes another characteristic or attribute (as is seen from the latter part of the text).

The argument that the world had no existence before creation is refuted.

From the word 'Asat', literally meaning non-existence, in the Śhruti, it may be argued that before creation the world had no existence. But that argument cannot stand as the latter part of the same text uses epithets other than "non-existent" to describe the condition of the world before creation. We understand from this that the world was existent before creation. This is established by reasoning also because something cannot come out of nothing and also by clear statements on other texts of Śhruti. "Asad va idam agra asif'-Asat was this verily in the beginning (Tait. Up. II-7-1).

"Asat eva agre asit"-This universe was at first but non-existent. Asat indeed was this in the beginning. From it verily proceeded the Sat (Chh. Up. III.19.1). The latter part of the passage is "Tatsadasit" (That was existent). The word 'non-existent' (Asat) universe does not certainly mean absolute non-existence, but that the universe did not exist in a gross, differentiated state. It existed in an extremely subtle unmanifested state. It was not differentiated. It had not yet developed name and form. The world was projected. Then it became gross, and developed name and form. You can get the meaning if you go through the latter part of the passage 'It became existent.' 'It grew'.

It is absurd to say that non-existence (Asat) existed. Therefore, Sat means manifest, i.e. having name and form, whereas Asat simply means fine, subtle and unmanifested. 'Asat' refers to another attribute

of the effect, namely non-manifestation. The words Sat and Asat refer to two attributes of one and the same object, namely to its gross or manifested condition and subtle or unmanifested condition.

(164)

Asat indeed was this in the beginning. From it verily proceeded the Sat. That made itself its Self. Therefore, it is said to be self-made.

The words "Asat made itself its Self" clears up any doubt as to the real meaning of the word "that". If the word "Asat" meant absolute non-existence, then there will be a contradiction in terms, because non-existence can never make itself the Self of anything. The word "Asit" or "was" becomes absurd when applied to "Asat" because absolute non-existence can never be said to exist and 'was' means 'existed'. An absolute non-existence can have no relation with time past or present. Further, it cannot have any agency also as we find in the passage, "It made itself its Self." Hence the word 'Asat' should be explained as a subtle state of an object.

II.1.18 (152) From reasoning and from another Śhruti text (the same is clear).

This relation between cause and effect is established.

That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause follows from reasoning and also from a further scriptural passage or another text of the Vedas.

The same fact is clear from logic or reasoning also. Otherwise, everything could have been produced from anything. If non-being is the cause, then why should there be an inevitable sequence? Why

should curds be produced from milk and not from mud? It is impossible even within thousands of years to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. Particular causes produce particular effects only. The relation of cause and effect (e.g. the relation of mud and pot) is a relation of identity. The cause of our thinking and saying 'the pot exists' is the fact that the lump of clay assumes a particular form of a neck, hollow belly, etc., while the material remains as clay only. On the contrary we think and say 'the jar does not exist', when the clay pot is broken into piece. Hence existence and non-existence show only their different conditions. Non-existence in this connection does not mean absolute non-existence. This is reasoning or Yukti.

Just as an actor puts on many disguises and is yet the same man, so also the Ultimate Cause (Brahman) appears as these diverse objects and yet is the same.

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Hence the cause exists before the effects and is non-different from the effect.

The effect exists in the cause in an unmanifested state. It is manifested during creation. That is all. An absolutely non-existent thing like the horns of a hare can never come into existence. The cause cannot produce altogether a new thing which was not existing in it already.

Further, we find from the well-known passage of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, "In the beginning, my dear, there was only existence, one without a second" (Chh. Up. VI-2-1), that the effect exists even before creation and is non-different from its cause.

The author now gives some illustrations in order to confirm the doctrine that effect is identical with the cause.

II.1.19 (153) And like a piece of cloth.

An example in support of Sūtra 17 is presented.

Just as a rolled or folded piece of cloth is subsequently unrolled or unfolded, so also the world which rested unmanifested before creation becomes afterwards manifested. The world is like a folded cloth before creation. It is like a cloth that is spread out after creation. A folded cloth is not seen as a cloth till it is spread out. The threads are not seen as a cloth till they are woven. Even so, the effect is in the cause and is identical with the cause. In the folded state you cannot make out whether it is a cloth or anything else. But when it is spread out you can clearly know that it is a cloth. In the state of dissolution (Pralaya) the world exists in a seed state or potential condition in Brahman.

There are no names and forms. The universe is in an undifferentiated or unmanifested state. It takes a gross form after creation. The names and forms are differentiated and manifested.

As a piece of cloth is not different from the threads, so the effect (world) is not different from its cause (Brahman).

The word "Cha" (and) of the Sūtra shows that other illustrations like the seed and the tree may also be given here.

When the cloth is folded, you do not know of what definite length and width it is. But when it is unfolded you know all these particulars.

You also know that the cloth is not different from the folded object. The effect, the piece of cloth, is unmanifested as long as it exists in its cause, i.e. the threads. It becomes manifest and is clearly seen on account of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, etc.

The conclusion is that the effect is not different from the cause.

(166)

II.1.20 (154) And as in the case of the different Prāṇas or Vital airs.

Another illustration in support of Sūtra 17 is presented.

The word 'Cha' (and) in the Sūtra shows that the last illustration of the piece of cloth and the present one of life functions should be read together as one illustration.

When the five different vital airs are controlled by the practice of Prāṇayama, they merge in the chief Prāṇa, the cause which regulates breathing. Mere life only is maintained. All other functions such as bending and stretching of the limbs etc., are stopped. This shows that the various vital airs, the effects, are not different from their cause, the chief Prāṇa. The different vital airs are only modifications of the chief or Mukhyaprana. So is the case with all effects. They are not different from the cause.

Thus it is established that the effect, the world, is identical with its cause, Brahman. Therefore, by knowing Brahman everything is known. As the whole world is an effect of Brahman and non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural text 'what is not heard is heard,

what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Chh. Up. VI.I.3) is fulfilled.

(167)

Topic 7: (Sūtras 21-23) Brahman does not create evil.

II.1.21 (155) On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being stated (as non-different from Brahman) there would arise (in Brahman) the faults of not doing what is beneficial and the like.

The discussions on the relation of the world to Brahman have been finished now. The question of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman is being raised by way of an objection in this Sūtra.

In the previous Adhikaraṇa, the oneness of the effect (world) with its cause (Brahman) has been established.

In this Sūtra, the Opponent raises an objection.

He says, that if Brahman is the cause of the world, there is inappropriateness in that view because the scripture describes Jīva as being Brahman and, therefore, he will not cause harm to himself such as birth, death, old age, disease, by getting into the person of the body. A being which is itself absolutely pure, cannot take this altogether impure body as forming part of its Self.

The scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul to be one with Brahman. "That is the Self". "Thou art That. O Svetaketu" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7.). By stating that the individual soul is one with Brahman, there arises room for finding out a fault in the wisdom of Brahman, that He is not doing good to Himself by creating suffering and pain on account of

repeated births and deaths for Himself. Will any one do what is harmful and unpleasant to himself? Will he not remember that he created the world? Will he not destroy it as the cause of his suffering? Brahman would have created a very beautiful world where everything would have been pleasant for the individual soul without the least pain or suffering. That is not so. Hence, Brahman is not the cause of the world as Vedānta maintains. As we see that what would be beneficial is not done, the hypothesis of the world having come out of an Intelligent Cause (Brahman) is not acceptable.

II.1.22 (156) But (Brahman, the Creator, is) something more (than the individual soul) on account of the statement in the Śhrutis (of difference) between the individual soul (and Brahman).

The objection raised in Sūtra 21 is refuted.

The word 'tu' (but) refutes the objection of the last Sūtra. It discards the Pūrva-paksha - 'Objection'.

The Creator of the world is Omnipotent. He is not the imprisoned, embodied soul. The defects mentioned in the previous Sūtra such as doing what is not beneficial and the like do not attach to that Brahman because as eternal freedom is His characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by Him or non-beneficial to be avoided by Him. Moreover, there is no obstruction to His knowledge and power, because He is Omniscient and Omnipotent. He is a mere witness. He is conscious of the unreality of the world and Jīva.

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He has neither good nor evil. Hence the creation of a universe of good and evil by Him is unobjectionable.

The Jīva is of a different nature. The defects mentioned in the previous Sūtra belong to the Jīva only, so long as he is in a state of ignorance. The Śhrutis clearly point out the difference between the individual soul and the Creator in texts like “Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected and to be meditated upon” (Brl. Up. II.4.5).

All these differences are imaginary or illusory on account of ignorance. When the individual soul attains knowledge of Brahman, he remembers his identity with Brahman. Then the whole phenomenon of plurality which springs from wrong knowledge disappears. There is neither the embodied soul nor the creator.

This Brahman is superior to the individual soul. The individual soul is not the creator of this universe. Hence the objection raised in Sūtra 21 cannot stand. The possibility of faults clinging to Brahman is excluded.

Though Brahman assumes the form of the individual soul, yet He is not exhausted thereby. But He remains as something more, i.e. as the controller of the individual soul. This is obvious from the distinction pointed out in the Śhruti. Hence there is no occasion for the fault spoken of in Sūtra 21.

II.1.23 (157) And because the case is similar to that of stones, etc., (produced from the same earth), the objection raised is untenable.

The objection raised in Sūtra 21 is further refuted.

The objector may say that Brahman which is Knowledge and Bliss and unchangeable cannot be the cause of a universe of diversity, of good and bad. This objection cannot stand, because we see that from the same material earth, stones of different values like diamonds, lapis lazuli, crystals and also ordinary stones are produced.

From the seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring up, such as sandalwood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrance, juice, etc. One and the same food produces various effects such as blood, hair, nail, etc. So also, one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual selves and the highest Self and may produce various effects. So also from Brahman which is Bliss and Knowledge, a world of good and evil can be created.

(169)

Hence the objection imagined by others against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world cannot be maintained.

Moreover, the scripture declares that all effects have their origin in speech only. The dreaming man is one but the dream pictures are many. These are hinted at by the word 'Cha' of the Sūtra.

Topic 8: (Sūtras 24-25) Brahman is the cause of the world.

II.1.24 (158) If you object that Brahman without instruments cannot be the cause of the universe, because an agent is seen to collect materials for any construction, (we say) no, because (it is) like milk (turning into curds).

An objection that materials are necessary for the creation of the world is refuted.

Though Brahman is devoid of materials and instruments, He is yet the cause of the universe. If you object that an efficient cause like a potter is seen to use instruments and therefore Brahman cannot be the material cause as also the efficient cause, we reply that it is like milk turning into curds.

The Opponent says: Workmen are found to collect materials to do their works. Brahman also must have required materials wherewith to create the world, but there was no other thing than Brahman before creation. He is one without a second. He could not have brought out His work of creation as there was no material, just as a potter could not have made his pots, if there had been no materials like earth, water, staffs, wheels, etc., before him.

This objection has no force. Materials are not required in every case. For instance, milk is itself transformed into curd. In milk no external agency is needed to change it into curds. If you say that in the case of milk heat is necessary for curdling the milk, we reply that heat merely accelerates the process of curdling. The curdling occurs through the inherent capacity of the milk. You cannot turn water into curds by the application of heat. The milk's capability of turning into curd is merely completed by the cooperation of auxiliary means.

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Brahman manifests Himself in the form of the universe by His inscrutable power. He simply wills. The whole universe comes into being. Why cannot the Omnipotent Infinite Brahman create the world

by His will-power (Śhaṅkalpa) alone without instruments and extraneous aids? Brahman is Omnipotent and Infinite. Hence no extraneous aid or instrument is necessary for Him to create this world.

Thus Śhruti also declares "There is no effect and no instrument known of Him, no one is seen like unto or better. His high power is revealed as manifold and inherent, acting as force and knowledge" (Svet. Up. VI. 8).

Therefore, Brahman, although one only, is able to transform Himself as this universe of diverse effects without any instrument or extraneous aid, on account of His infinite powers.

II.1.25 (159) (The case of Brahman creating the world is) like that of gods and other beings in the world (in ordinary experience).

The argument in support of Sūtra 24 is brought forward.

The Opponent says: 'The example of milk turning into curds is not appropriate as it is an insentient thing. Intelligent agents like potters begin to do their work after providing themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be said that Brahman, an intelligent Being, can do His work of creation without any auxiliary, without the aid of any constituent materials?' We reply, 'like gods and others.' We see also that in the world gods and sages create particular things such as palaces, chariots, etc., by force of will, without external aid. Why cannot the Omnipotent Creator create the world by His will-power (Sat Śhaṅkalpa) or His infinite power of Māyā? Just as the spider projects out of itself the threads of its web, just as the female crane conceives without a male from hearing the sound of thunder, just as the lotus wanders from one lake to another without any means of conveyance

so also the intelligent Brahman creates the world by itself without external instruments or aid.

The case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. No extraneous means is necessary for Brahman for creation.

There is limitation in the creation of pots. The creation of Brahman cannot be limited by the conditions observed in the creation of pots.

Brahman is Omnipotent.

(171)

Topic 9: (Sūtras 26-29) Brahman is the material cause of the universe, though He is without parts.

II.1.26 (160) Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts (if Brahman is the material cause of the world).

An objection that Brahman is not the material cause of the world, is raised in the Sūtra.

The objector says that if the entire Brahman becomes the world, then no Brahman will remain distinct from the world and that if a part of Brahman becomes the world, the scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be without parts will be violated.

If Brahman is without parts and yet the material cause of the universe, then we have to admit that the entire Brahman becomes modified into the universe. Hence there will be no Brahman left but only the effect, the universe. Further, it will go against the declaration of the Śhruti text that Brahman is unchangeable.

If on the contrary it is said that a portion of Brahman only becomes the universe, then we will have to accept that Brahman is made up of parts, which is denied by the scriptural texts. The passages are, - "He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint" (Svet. Up. VI.19). - "That heavenly person is without body, He is both without and within, not produced" (Mun. Up. II.1 .2). - "That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but Knowledge" (Bri. Up. II.4.12). - "He is to be described by 'Not this, Not this'" (Bri. Up. III.9.26). - "It is neither coarse nor fine" (Bri. Up. III.8-8). All these passages deny the existence of parts or distinctions in Brahman.

Whatever has form is perishable and so Brahman also will become perishable or non-eternal.

(172)

Also if the universe is Brahman, where is the need for any command to see (Drastavya)? The texts which exhort us to strive to see Brahman become purposeless, because the effects of Brahman may be seen without any effort and apart from them no Brahman exists. Finally, the texts which declare Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.

Hence Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe.

This objection is refuted in the next Sūtra.

II.1.27 (161) But (this is not so) on account of scriptural passages and on account of (Brahman) resting on scripture (only).

The objection raised in Sūtra 25 is refuted.

The entire Brahman does not become the world because the scripture declares so, and Brahman can be known only through the source of scripture.

The word 'tu' (but) discards the objection. It refutes the view of the previous Sūtra. These objections have no force because we rely on the Śhruti or scripture.

The entire Brahman does not undergo change, although the scriptures declare that the universe takes its origin from Brahman.

Śhruti says, "one foot (quarter) of Him is all beings, and three feet are what is immortal in heaven." (wlisw first <-gnfi fiwzwwqfi ea I) Moreover, we are one with Brahman in deep sleep as stated by the scripture. How could that happen if the entire Brahman has become the world? Further, the scripture declares that we can realise Brahman in the heart. How could that be if the entire Brahman has become the world? Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived.

The scriptural texts declare Brahman to be without parts. Then how could a part become manifest? We reply that it is only the result of Avidyā.

Are there two moons if on account of a defect of your vision you see two moons? You must rely on scriptures alone but not on logic for knowing what is beyond the mind.

(173)

Brahman rests exclusively on the Śhrutis or scriptures. The sacred scriptures alone, but not the senses, are authoritative regarding Brahman. Hence we will have to accept the declarations of the Śhrutis without the least hesitation.

The scriptural texts declare on the one hand that not the entire Brahman changes into its effects and on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, etc., possess powers which produce diverse opposite effects on account of difference of time, place, occasion and so on.

No one is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, etc., without the help of instruction. When such is the case with ordinary things, how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought? The scripture declares "Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable." Hence the Śhrutis or the scriptures alone are authority in matters supersensuous. We will have to accept that both these opposite views expressed by the scriptures are true, though it does not stand to reason. It must be remembered that the change in Brahman is only apparent and not real. Brahman somehow appears as this universe, just as rope appears as the snake. Brahman becomes the basis of the entire, apparent universe with its changes, but it remains at the same time unchanged in its true and real nature.

II.1.28 (162) And because in the individual soul also (as in gods, magicians, in dreams) various (creation exists). Similarly (with Brahman also).

The objection raised in Sūtra 26 is further refuted by an illustration.

There is no reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self without destroying its character.

In the dream state, we see such diverse and wonderful creation in ourselves. “There are no chariots in that dreaming state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads” (Bri. Up. IV.3.10), and yet the individual character of the self is not affected by it. This does not lessen or affect our integrity of being.

In ordinary life too multiple creations, elephants, horses and the like are seen to exist in gods, magicians, without any change in themselves, without interfering with the unity of their being. Similarly, a multiple creation may exist in Brahman also without divesting it of its character of unity. The diverse creation originates from Brahman through its inscrutable power of Māyā and Brahman Itself remains unchanged.

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The second ‘cha’ (also, and) is in order to indicate that when such wonderful things are believed by us as the dreams, the powers of the gods and the magicians, why should we hesitate to believe in the mysterious powers of Brahman? The word ‘hi’ implies that the facts above mentioned are well known in the scriptures.

II.1.29 (163) And on account of the Opponent’s own view being subject to these very objections.

The objection raised in Sūtra 26 is further refuted.

The argument raised in Sūtra 26 cannot stand, because the same charge can be levelled against the objector's side also.

The objection raised by you will equally apply to your doctrine that the formless (impartite) Infinite Pradhāna or Prakṛiti void of sound and other qualities creates the world. The Sāṅkhyas may say, “We do not mention that our Pradhāna is without parts. Pradhāna is only a state of equipoise of the three Guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

Pradhāna forms a whole containing the three Guṇas as its parts. We reply that such a partiteness does not remove the objection in hand since Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are each of them equally impartite.

Each Guṇa by itself assisted by the two other Guṇas, constitutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature. Hence, the objection lies against the Sāṅkhya view likewise.

As reasoning is always unstable, if you are inclined to believe in the Pradhāna’s being in fact capable of partition, then it follows that the Pradhāna cannot be eternal.

Let it then be said that the various powers of the Pradhāna to which the variety of its effects are pointing are its parts. Well, we reply, those diverse potencies are admitted by us also as we see the cause of the world in Brahman. The same objection applies also to your atomic theory.

The same objections can be levelled against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. The atom is not made up of parts.

When one atom combines with another atom, it must enter into combination with its whole extent with another. It cannot enter into partial contact with another. There will be entire interpenetration. Hence, there could be no further increase in the size. The compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom. The result of

the conjunction would be a mere atom. But if you hold that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, that would go against the assumption of the atoms having no parts.

(175)

If the Pradhāna is taken to be the cause of the universe as the Saṅkhyas maintain, in that case also the view of the Saṅkhyas will be equally subject to the objections raised against the Vedāntic view of Brahman as the cause of the universe, as the Pradhāna, too, is without parts. As for the propounder of the Brahman-theory, he has already refuted the objection directed against his own view.

Topic 10: (Sūtras 30-31) Fully-equipped Brahman.

II.1.30 (164) And (Brahman is) endowed with all (powers), because it is seen (from the scriptures).

The objection in Sūtra 26 is further refuted.

Brahman is Omnipotent as is clear from the scriptures. Hence it is perfectly within His powers to manifest Himself as the world and to be at the same time beyond it.

The Opponent says: We see that men who have a physical body are endowed with powers. But Brahman has no body.

Hence He cannot be in the possession of such powers.

This has no force. This Sūtra gives proof of Brahman being endowed with Māyā Sakti. Various scriptural texts declare that Brahman possesses all powers. "He to whom all actions, desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is never surprised" (Chh. Up. III.14.4). "He who desires what is true and

imagines what is true" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). "He who knows all in its totality and cognises all in its details" (Mun. Up. I.1 .9). "By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart" (Bri. Up. III.8.9). "The great Lord is the Mayin (the Ruler of Māyā)" (Svet. Up. IV.10) and other similar passages.

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II.1.31 (165) If it be said that because (Brahman) is devoid of organs, (it is) not (able to create), (we reply that) this has already been explained.

Another objection to Brahman being the cause of the world is refuted.

The Opponent says: "Brahman is destitute of organs. Hence, though He is all-powerful, He cannot create." Scripture declares, "He is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind" (Bri. Up. III.8.8). Further Srutis say, "Notthis, Not this." This precludes all attributes. We know from Mantras and Arthavadas, etc., that the gods and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are able to create because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action.

The Sūtra consists of an objection and its reply. The objection portion is 'Vikaranatvanneti chet' and the reply portion is 'Taduktamf Even though Brahman has no eyes or ears, or hands or feet, He is Omnipotent. That has been explained above in Sūtras II.1.4 and II.1.25. He assumes different forms through Avidyā or Māyā. With respect to Brahman, the scripture alone is the authority, but not reason.

The scripture declares that Brahman, though destitute of organs, possesses all capacities and powers, "Grasps without hands, moves swiftly without feet, sees without eyes and hears without ears" (Svet.

Up. III.19). Though Brahman is devoid of all attributes, yet He is endowed with all powers through Avidyā or Māyā.

(177)

Topic 11: (Sūtras 32-33) Final end of Creation

II.1.32 (166) (Brahman is) not [the creator of the universe) on account of (every activity) having a motive.

Another objection to Brahman being the cause of the world is raised.

The objector says: "In this world, everybody does a work with some motive. He does any work to satisfy his desire. There is also a scriptural passage that confirms this result of common experience, 'Verity, everything is not dear that you may love everything, but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear' (Bri. Up. II.4.5).

But Brahman is all-full, self-sufficient and self-contained. He has nothing to gain by the creation. Therefore He cannot engage Himself in such a useless creation. Hence, Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe." The undertaking of creating this world with all its details is indeed a weighty one. If Brahman desires creation to fulfil a wish, then He cannot be an eternally happy, perfect being with no unfulfilled desires. If He has no desire, then He will not wish to create and so there will be no creation. It cannot be said that He creates without purpose, like a senseless man in a state of frenzy. That would certainly contradict His Omniscience.

Hence the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent Being (Brahman) is untenable.

II.1.33 (167) But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere sport, such as is seen in the world (or ordinary life).

The objection raised in Sūtra 32 is replied to.

The word 'tu' (but) removes the above objection.

Brahman has created the world not out of any desire or motive.

It is simply His pastime, proceeding from His own nature, which is inherent in and inseparable from Him, as it is seen also in the world that sometimes a rich man or a prince, does some action without any motive or purpose, simply out of a sportive impulse. Just as children play out of mere fun, or just as men breathe without any motive or purpose, because it is their very nature, just as a man full of cheerfulness when awakening from sound sleep, begins to dance about without any objective, but from mere exuberance of spirit, so also Brahman engages Himself in creating this world not out of any purpose or motive, but out of sporting or Lila or play proceeding from His own nature.

Although the creation of this universe appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is infinite or limitless.

If in ordinary life we may possibly by close scrutiny detect some subtle motive even for sportful action (playing at a game of balls is not altogether motiveless, because the prince gets some pleasure by the play), we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord. The scripture declares that all wishes are fulfilled in the Lord and that He is all-full, self-contained and self-sufficient.

It should not be forgotten however that there is no creation from the standpoint of the Absolute, because name and form are due to Avidyā or ignorance and because Brahman and Ātman are really one. The Opponent again raises an objection. The theory that Brahman is the creator is open to the objection that He is either partial or cruel, because some men enjoy happiness and others suffer misery.

Hence this theory is not a congruous one. This objection is removed by the following Sūtra.

(178)

Topic 12: (Sūtras 34-36) Brahman is neither partial nor cruel

II.1.34 (168) Partiality and cruelty cannot (be ascribed to Brahman) on account of His taking into consideration (other reasons in that matter viz. merit and demerit of the souls), for so (scripture) declares.

The accusation that Brahman is partial and cruel in His creation of the world is removed.

Some are created poor, some rich. Therefore Brahman or the Lord is partial to some. He makes people suffer. Therefore He is cruel. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. This objection is untenable. The Lord cannot be accused of inequality and cruelty, because enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul are determined by his own previous good and bad actions.

Śhruti also declares. "A man becomes virtuous by his virtuous deeds and sinful by his sinful acts - Punyo vai punyena karmana bhavati, pāpah pāpena" (Bri. Up. III.2.13).

The grace of the Lord is like rain which brings the potency of each seed to manifest itself according to its nature. The variety of pain and pleasure is due to variety of Karma.

The position of the Lord is to be regarded as similar to that of Parjanya, the giver of rain. Parjanya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other plants. The difference between the various species is due to the diverse potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds. Even so, the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc. The differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls.

Scripture also declares, "The Lord makes him whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good action. The Lord makes Him whom He wishes to lead down do a bad action" (Kau. Up. III.8). "A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work" (Bri. Up. III.2.13). Smṛiti also declares that the Lord metes out rewards and punishments only in consideration of the specific actions of beings. 'I serve men in the way in which they approach Me.' (Bhagavad Gītā IV.11).

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II.1.35 (169) If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is not possible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit before creation), (we say) no, because of (the world) being without a beginning.

An objection against Sūtra 34 is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of two parts, viz. an objection and its reply.

The objective portion is 'Na karmavibhagaditi chet' and the reply portion is 'Na anaditvat'.

An objection is raised now. The Śhruti says, "Being only this was in the beginning, one without a second." There was no distinction of works before creation of the world. There was only the absolutely One Real Being or Brahman. The creation at the beginning of one man as rich and of another as poor and unhappy cannot certainly depend on the respective previous good or bad deeds. The first creation must have been free from inequalities.

This objection cannot stand. The creation of the world is also without a beginning. There was never a time that may be said to be an absolute beginning. The question of first creation cannot arise. Creation and destruction of the world following each other continually by rotation is without any beginning and end. The condition of individual souls in any particular cycle of creation is predetermined by their actions in the previous cycle.

It cannot be said that there could be no Karma prior to creation, which causes the diversity of creation, because Karma is Anādi (beginningless). Creation is only the shoot from a pre-existing seed of Karma.

As the world is without a beginning, merit and inequality are like seed and sprout. There is an unending chain of the relation of cause and effect as in the case of the seed and the sprout. Therefore, there is no contradiction present in the Lord's creative activity.

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II.1.36 (170) And (that the world-and also Karma-is without a beginning) is reasonable and is also seen (from the scriptures).

Karma is Anādi (beginningless). This is logical and is supported by scripture. By reasoning also it can be deduced that the world must be beginningless. Because, if the world did not exist in a potential or seed state, then an absolutely non-existing thing would be produced during creation. There is also the possibility of liberated persons being reborn again. Further, people would be enjoying and suffering without having done anything to deserve it. As there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to submit or assert to the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted without reference to previous virtues and vicious deeds. There will be effect without a cause. This is certainly absurd. When we assume effect without a cause, there could be no law at all with reference to the purpose or regularity of creation. The Śhruti declares that creation is 'Anādi' (beginningless).

Moreover, mere Avidyā (ignorance) which is homogeneous (Ekarūpa), cannot cause the heterogeneity of creation. It is Avidyā diversified by Vasanas due to Karma that can have such a result.

Avidyā needs the diversity of individual past work to produce varied results. Avidyā may be the cause of inequality if it be considered as having regard to demerit accruing from action produced by the mental suppression of wrath, hatred and other afflicting passions.

The scriptures also posit the existence of the universe in former cycles or Kalpas in texts like, "The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as

before" (Rig Veda Samhita, X-190-3). Hence partiality and cruelty cannot be ascribed to the Lord.

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Topic 13: Saguna Brahman necessary for creation

II.1.37 (171) And because all the qualities (required for the creation of the world) are reasonably found (only in Brahman) He must be admitted to be the cause of the universe.

Another reason to prove that Brahman is the cause of the world is brought forward.

The objector says: Material cause undergoes modification as the effect. Such a cause is endowed with the attributes. Brahman cannot be the material cause of the universe as He is attributeless.

This Sūtra gives a suitable answer to this objection.

There is no real change in Brahman but there is an apparent modification in Brahman on account of His inscrutable power of Māyā.

Brahman appears as this universe, just as rope appears as snake. All the attributes needed in the cause for the creation (such as Omnipotence, Omniscience) are possible in Brahman on account of the power of Māyā. Hence, Brahman is the material cause of this universe through apparent change. He is also the efficient cause of this universe.

Therefore it is established that Brahman is the cause of the universe. The Vedāntic system founded upon the Upaniṣhads is not open to any objection. Thus it follows that the whole creation proceeds from Para Brahman.

In the Vedāntic theory as hitherto demonstrated, viz. that Brahman is the material and the efficient cause of the world-the objection alleged by our Opponents such as difference of character and the like have been refuted by the great Teacher. He brings to a conclusion the section principally devoted to strengthen his own theory. The chief aim of the next chapter will be to refute the opinions held by other teachers.

Thus ends the First Pada (Section 1) of the Second Adhyāya (Chapter II) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(182) CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, INTRODUCTION

In the First Section of Chapter II Brahman's creatorship of the world has been established on the authority of the scriptures supported by logic. All arguments against Brahman being the cause of the universe have been refuted.

In this Section the Sūtra-kāra or the framer of the Sūtras examines the theories of creation advanced by other schools of thought in vogue in his time. All the doctrines of the other schools are taken up for refutation through reasoning alone without reference to the authority of the Vedas. Here he refutes by reasoning the Matter theory or the Pradhāna theory of the Saṅkhya philosophy, the Atom theory of the Vaiseshika philosophy, the momentary and the Nihilistic view of the Buddhists, the Jain theory of simultaneous existence and non-existence, the Pasupata theory of coordinate duality and theory of energy unaided by intelligence.

It has been shown in the last Sūtra of the First Section of Chapter II that Brahman is endowed with all the attributes through Māyā, such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc., for qualifying Him to be the cause of the world.

Now in Section 2 the question is taken up whether the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhya philosophy can satisfy all those conditions.

SYNOPSIS

To put all things concisely in a nutshell, Śhrī Vyāsa Bhagavan refutes in this section all the doctrines or theories prevalent in his time and inconsistent with the Vedānta theory; viz. (1) The Saṅkhya theory of

the Pradhāna as the first cause. (2) Refutation of the objection from the Vaiseshika stand-point against the Brahman being the First Cause. (3) Refutation of the Atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas. (4) Refutation of the Bauddha Idealists and Nihilists. (5) Refutation of the Bauddha Realists. (6) Refutation of the Jainas. (7) Refutation of the Pasupata doctrine, that God is only the efficient and not the material cause of the world. (8) Refutation of the Pancharatra or the Bhagavata doctrine that the soul originates from the Lord, etc.

In the First Section of the Second Chapter Brahman's authorship of the world has been established on the authority of the scriptures supported by logic. The task of the Second Pada or Section is to refute by arguments independent of Vedic passages the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the universe which are contrary to the Vedāntic view.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-10) is directed against the Saṅkhyas. It aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause such as the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas is unable to create and dispose.

Adhikaraṇas II and III: (Sūtras 11-17) refute the Vaiseshika doctrine that the world takes its origin from the atoms which are set in motion by the Adṛiṣṭa.

Adhikaraṇas IV and V." are directed against various schools of Buddhistic philosophy.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 18-27) refutes the view of Buddhistic Realists who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 28-32) refutes the view of the Vijñānavadins or Buddhistic Idealists, according to whom Ideas are the only reality. The

last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa refutes the view of the Madhyamikas or Sunyavadins (Nihilists) who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatsoever is real.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 33-36) refutes the doctrine of the Jainas.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 37-41) refutes the Pasupata school which teaches that the Lord is not the material but only the efficient or operative cause of the world.

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Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 42-45) refutes the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pancharatras.

In Sūtras 1 to 10 the principle of Saṅkhya philosophy is further refuted by reasoning. Pradhāna or blind matter is inert. It is insentient or non-intelligent. There is methodical arrangement in the causation of this world. Hence it is not reasonable to suppose that blind matter can have any inclination for the creation of the world without the help of intelligence.

The Saṅkhya says that the inert Pradhāna may become active of its own accord and spontaneously pass into the state of the world and undergo modification into intellect, egoism, mind, Tanmātras –‘*subtle elements*’, etc., just as water flows in rivers spontaneously, rain from the clouds, or milk from the udder to the calf. This argument of the Saṅkhya is untenable, because the flowing of water or milk is directed by the intelligence of the Supreme Lord.

According to the Saṅkhyas, there is no external agent to urge Pradhāna into activity or restraining from activity. Pradhāna can work quite independently. Their Puruṣha is always inactive and indifferent.

He is not an agent. Hence the contention that Pradhāna in presence of Puruṣha or Spirit acquires a tendency towards action or creation cannot stand.

The Saṅkhya argues that Pradhāna is by itself turned into the visible world, just as grass eaten by a cow is itself turned into milk.

This argument is groundless as no such transformation is found on the part of the grass eaten by the bull. Hence, also, it is the will of the Supreme Lord that brings about the change, not because the cow has eaten it. Therefore Pradhāna by itself cannot be said to be the cause of the world.

The Saṅkhya says that Puruṣha can direct the Pradhāna or inspire activity in Pradhāna though He has no activity, just as a lame man can move by sitting on the shoulders of a blind man and direct his movements. The independent and blind Pradhāna, in conjunction with the passive but intelligent Puruṣha, originates the world. This argument also is untenable because the perfect inactivity and indifference of Puruṣha and the absolute independence of Pradhāna cannot be reconciled with each other.

The Pradhāna consists of three Guṇas, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. They are in a state of equipoise before creation. No Guṇa is superior or inferior to the other. The Puruṣha is altogether indifferent.

He has no interest in bringing about the disturbance of equilibrium of the Pradhāna. Creation starts when the equipoise is upset and one

Guṇa becomes more predominant than the other two. As there was in the beginning of creation no cause for the disturbance of the state of equipoise, it was not possible for Pradhāna to be transformed into the world.

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Sūtras 11 to 17 refute the Atomic theory of the Vaiseshika philosophy where the indivisible minute atoms are stated to be the cause of the world. If an atom has any parts of an appreciable magnitude, then it cannot be an atom. Then it can be further divisible. If they are without parts of any appreciable magnitude, as they are so described in Vaiseshika philosophy, it is not possible for such two partless atoms to produce by their union a substance having any magnitude. Hence compound substances can never be formed by the combination of atoms. Therefore the Vaiseshika theory of origination of the world from indivisible atoms is untenable.

The inanimate atoms can have no tendency of themselves to unite together and cohere so as to form compounds. Vaiseshikas hold that the motion which is due to the unseen principle (Adṛiṣṭa), joins the atoms in which it resides to another atom. Adṛiṣṭa is a latent force of the sum total of previous deeds which waits to bear fruit in the future. Thus the whole world originates from atoms.

As Adṛiṣṭa is insentient it cannot act. It cannot reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. If the latent force or Adṛiṣṭa be an inherent property of atoms, the atoms will always remain united. Hence there will be no dissolution and no chance for fresh creation.

If the two atoms unite totally or perfectly the atomic state will continue as there will be no increase in bulk. If in part, then atoms will have parts. This is against the theory of the Vaiseshikas. Hence, the theory of the Vaiseshikas that the world is caused by combination of atoms is untenable.

The atomic theory involves another difficulty. If the atoms are by nature active, then creation would be permanent. No Pralaya or dissolution could take place. If they are by nature inactive. no creation could take place. The dissolution would be permanent. For this reason also, the atomic doctrine is untenable.

According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, the atoms are said to have colour etc. That which has form, colour etc., is gross, and impermanent. Consequently, the atoms must be gross and impermanent.

This contradicts the theory of the Vaiseshikas that they are minute and permanent.

If the respective atoms of the elements also possess the same number of qualities as the gross elements, then the atom of air will have one quality, an atom of earth will have four qualities. Hence an atom of earth which possesses four qualities will be bigger in size. It would not be an atom any longer. Hence the Atom theory of the Vaiseshikas on the causation of the world does not stand to reason in any way. This Atom theory is not accepted by the Vedas.

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Sūtras 18 to 32 refute the Buddhistic theory of momentarism (Kshanikavada) and Nihilism (Śhūnya-vāda). The Vaiseshikas are the Realists (Sarvastitvavadins). They accept the reality of both the outside

world and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and consciousness and feelings. The Sautrantikas are the idealists (Vijñānavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from the ideas. The Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The external objects are unreal like dreamy objects. The Madhymikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam). They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment.

According to the Buddhists, atoms and consciousness are both inanimate. There is no permanent intelligence which can bring about the aggregation or which can guide the atoms to unite into an external thing or to form a continuous mental phenomena. Hence the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable.

Nescience etc., stand in a causal relation to each other merely.

They cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates.

According to the Buddhistic theory, everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment, when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing already vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable.

The Buddhists maintain that existence originates from non-existence because they hold that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed. We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. Hence the Buddhistic view is incorrect, unreasonable and inadmissible.

Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place unless there is a coordinating intelligence. The Buddhists say that everything has only a momentary existence. Their school cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikavada) will vanish.

According to the Buddhistic view, salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.

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The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction), or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like, because the means like every other thing is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation. Annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of salvation will be useless.

The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Ākāśha. They regard Ākāśha as a non-entity. This is unreasonable. Ākāśha has the quality of sound. It is also a distinct entity like earth, water, etc. If Ākāśha be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space. Scriptural passages declare “Ākāśha sprang from Ātman.” Hence Ākāśha is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.

If everything is momentary, the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place in a man who has previously experienced it. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentariness.

A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause. The world which is a reality is stated by the Buddhists to have arisen out of non-entity. This is absurd. A pot is never found to be produced without clay. If existence can come out of non-existence. then anything may come out of anything, because non-entity is one and the same in all cases. A jack tree may come out of a mango seed. If an existing thing can arise out of nothing, then an indifferent and lazy man may also attain salvation without efforts. Emancipation may be attained like a windfall. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field.

The Vijñānavādins say that the external things have no objective reality. Everything is an idea without any reality corresponding to it. This is not correct. The external objects are actually perceived by

senses of perception. The external world cannot be non-existent like the horns of a hare.

The Buddhist Idealists say that perception of the external world is like the dream. This is wrong. The consciousness in dream depends on the previous consciousness in the wakeful state, but the consciousness in the wakeful state does not depend on anything else but on the actual perception by the sense. Further, the dream experiences become false as soon as one wakes up.

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The Buddhist Idealists hold that though an external thing does not actually exist, yet its impressions do exist, and from these impressions diversities of perception and ideas like chair, tree arise. This is not possible, as there can be no perception of an external thing which is itself non-existent. If there be no perception of an external thing, how can it leave an impression? The mental impressions cannot exist because the ego which receives impressions is itself momentary in their view.

The Śhūnya-vāda or Nihilism of the Buddhists which asserts that nothing exists is fallacious, because it goes against every method of proof, viz. perception, inference, testimony or scripture and analogy.

Sūtras 33 to 36 refute the Jaina theory. According to the Jaina theory, everything is at once existing and non-existing. Now this view cannot be accepted, because in one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold at the same time. Simultaneous existence of light and darkness in one place is impossible.

According to the Jaina doctrine heaven and liberation may exist or may not exist. We cannot arrive at any definite knowledge. There is no certainty about anything.

The Jainas hold that the soul is of the size of the body. As the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different sizes, the soul of a man taking the body of an elephant on account of his past deeds will not be able to fill up the body of an elephant. The soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant. The stability of the dimensions of the soul is impaired. The Jaina theory itself falls to the ground.

Sūtras 37 to 41 refute the theory of the followers of the Pasupata system. The followers of this school recognise God as the efficient or the operative cause. They recognise the primordial matter as the material cause of the world. This view is contrary to the view of the Śhruti or Vedānta where Brahman is stated to be both the efficient and the material cause of the world. Hence, the theory of Pasupatas cannot be accepted.

God, in their view, is pure, without attributes, and activity. Hence there can be no connection between Him and the inert primordial matter. He cannot urge and regulate matter to work. To say that God becomes the efficient cause of the world by putting on a body is also fallacious because all bodies are perishable. God is eternal according to the Pasupatas, and so cannot have a perishable body and become dependent on this physical instrument.

If it be said that the Lord rules the Pradhāna. etc., just as the Jīva rules the senses which are also not perceived, this cannot be; because the

Lord also would experience pleasure and pain, hence would forfeit His Godhead. He would be subject to births and deaths, and devoid of Omniscience. He will lose all His supremacy. This sort of God is not admitted by the Pasupatas.

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Sūtras 42 to 45 refute the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or the Pancharatra doctrine. According to this school, the Lord is the efficient as well as the material cause of the universe. This is in quite agreement with the Śhrutis. Another part of the system is open to objection. The doctrine that Śhaṅkarshana or the Jīva is born of Vaasudeva, Pradyumna or mind from Śhaṅkarshana, Aniruddha or Ahamkara from Pradyumna is incorrect. Such creation is not possible. If there is such birth, if the soul be created it would be subject to destruction and hence there could be no liberation.

The Bhagavatas may say that all the Vyuhās or forms are Vaasudeva, the Lord having intelligence, Lordship, strength, power, etc., and are free from faults and imperfections. In this case there will be more than one Īśhwara or Lord. This goes against their own doctrine according to which there is only one real essence, the holy Vaasudeva. Further, there are also inconsistencies or manifold contradictions in the system. There are passages which are contradictory to the Vedas. It contains words of depreciation of the Vedas. Hence, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted.

(190) CHAPTER II, SECTION 2

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-10) Refutation of the Saṅkhyan theory of the Pradhāna as the cause of the world.

II.2.1 (172) That which is inferred (by the Saṅkhyas, viz. the Pradhāna), cannot be the cause (of the world) because (in that case it is) not possible (to account for the) design or orderly arrangement (found in the creation).

An argument is brought forward to the effect that the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas is not the cause of the world.

The main object of the Vedānta Sūtras is to show the purpose of the revelation of truth in the Vedas. They aim also at refuting the wrong doctrines in the other systems of philosophy. In the previous portion the doctrine of the Saṅkhyas has been refuted here and there on the authority of the scriptures. Sūtras 1-10 refute it through logical reasoning.

Pradhāna or blind matter is inert. It is an insentient entity. It does not possess the intelligence that is needed for creating such a multifarious, elaborate, wonderful, orderly, methodical and well-designed universe as this. It cannot bring into being the manifold orderliness of the cosmos. No one has ever seen a beautiful palace constructed by the fortuitous coming together of bricks, mortar, etc., without the active cooperation of intelligent agents like the architects, masons and the rest. Hence, Pradhāna cannot be the cause of this world.

Clay cannot change itself into a pot.

The reasoning that Pradhāna is the cause of the world because it has in it pleasure, pain, dullness, which are found in the world is not valid, because it is not possible for an insentient entity to create the

wonderful, orderly universe. Moreover, how do you say that pleasure and pain and dullness are found in the outside world? The external objects are a factor in pleasure and pain which are internal experiences. Moreover, there can be pleasure and pain even irrespective of the external objects. How can you ascribe them to an insentient entity (Achetana)? Physical objects like flowers, fruits, etc., no doubt have the presence in them of the quality of producing pleasure. But the feeling of pleasure is altogether an internal feeling. We cannot say that flowers and fruits have the nature of pleasure in them, though they excite pleasure in man. Pleasure is altogether an attribute of the soul and not of matter or Pradhāna. Hence, matter or Pradhāna cannot be said to have the quality of pleasure, etc.

II.2.2 (173) And on account of the (impossibility of) activity.

This is an argument in support of Sūtra 1.

Pradhāna (blind matter) cannot be the cause of the world, because it is also impossible for it to have an inclination for creation.

How does Pradhāna in a state of equilibrium of its three Guṇas become dynamic and creative? It cannot disturb its own equipoise.

The desire or tendency to create cannot be ascribed to the inert Pradhāna. The inert chariot cannot move by itself. It is only the intelligent charioteer who moves the chariot by directing the movements of the horse. Mud by itself is never seen to create a jar without the agency of an intelligent potter. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. We proceed from the known to the unknown. How then do you prove that Pradhāna which is insentient is self-moving? Hence the inert Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the

universe, because the activity that is necessary for the creation of the universe would be impossible in that case. There must be a directive intelligent Being or Entity for that purpose.

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The activity must be attributed to the directive intelligence rather than to the inert matter or Pradhāna. That which sets Pradhāna or matter in motion is the real agent. Every activity is seen as the result of an intelligent agent. Inert matter or Pradhāna therefore has no agency. Matter or Pradhāna has no self-initiated activity of its own.

The objector may say "I do not see Chetana (soul) active and that I see only the activity of the body." We reply that there is no activity without the soul.

He may again say that the soul, being pure consciousness, cannot have activity. We reply that the soul can induce activity, though not self-active, just as a lodestone or magnet though unmoving can make iron move. A material object though fixed causes activity in our senses.

The objector may again say that as the soul is one and infinite, there is no possibility of causation of activity. We reply that it causes activity in the names and forms created by Māyā owing to Avidyā.

Hence, motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an intelligent First Cause but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause (Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas).

II.2.3 (174) If it be said (that the Pradhāna moves or spontaneously modifies herself into the various products) like

milk or water (without the guidance of any intelligence), (we reply that) there also (it is due to intelligence).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

If the objector says that there could be self-activity of nature as in milk or water, we reply that even then there is the operation of an intelligent agent.

The Sāṅkhya says that the inert Pradhāna may become active of its own accord and undergo modification into intellect, egoism, mind, Tanmatra, etc., just as water flows in rivers spontaneously, rain from the clouds or milk from the udder to the calf.

This is refuted by the latter part of Sūtra ‘Tatra Api’ –‘even there’.

Even the flowing of water or milk is directed by the intelligence of the Supreme Lord. This we infer from the example of chariot, etc. We may not see the intelligent driver of the chariot, but we infer his existence from the motion of the car.

The scriptures also say, “He who dwells in the water, who rules the water from within” (Bri. Up. III.7.4). “By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi! some rivers flow to the east” (Bri. Up. III.8.9). Everything in this world is directed by the Lord.

Further the cow is an intelligent creature. She loves her calf, and makes her milk flow by her wish. The milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. The flow of water depends on the downward sloping of the earth.

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II.2.4 (175) And because (the Pradhāna) is not dependent (on anything), there being no external agent besides it (it cannot be active).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

According to the Saṅkhyas, there is no external agent to urge Pradhāna into activity, or restrain from activity. Their Puruṣha is indifferent, neither moves to, nor restrains from, action. He is not an agent. He is unresponsive to the first stimulus for starting the process of creation. Hence, there is no agency to disturb the primordial equilibrium. Therefore, the Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas cannot be the First Cause of the world.

The state in which the three Guṇas are in a state of equipoise is called Pradhāna by the Saṅkhyas. According to the Saṅkhyas, no controlling sentient power operates on the Pradhāna. Puruṣha is static and quiescent.

Therefore, Pradhāna may evolve in one way now and in another way afterwards or may not evolve at all, as it is not controlled by any directing and ruling Intelligence. But the Supreme Lord is Omniscient and Omnipotent. He has perfect control over Māyā. He can create or not create as He pleases.

The Pradhāna of the Saṅkhyas is inert, so it cannot of itself start to be active; or when it is set in motion it can hardly stop to be active of itself. Hence, the Saṅkhyas cannot explain creation and dissolution when there is no directing or ruling intelligence. All other principles are only effects of the Pradhāna. Therefore, they cannot exercise any influence on it. Hence, the theory of the Saṅkhyas is self-contradictory.

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II.2.5 (176) And (it can) not (be said that the Pradhāna modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, etc., (which turn into milk), because of its absence elsewhere (than in the female animals).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The objector says that as grass becomes milk, so Pradhāna may evolve into the world. But does grass become milk of its own power? No. If so, try to produce milk from grass. A cow alone converts grass into milk. Does a bull do so? The spontaneous modification of the Pradhāna is not possible.

Grass is not changed into milk spontaneously. It is converted into milk only when eaten by cows but not by the bulls. Here also it is the will of the Supreme Lord that brings about the change, not because the cow has eaten it.

The illustration or analogy is useless. It cannot stand. The argument of the Sāṅkhyas is not sound. Hence, the Pradhāna's undergoing modification of itself cannot be accepted. The spontaneous modification of Pradhāna cannot be proved from the instances of grass and the like.

II.2.6 (177) Even if we admit (the Sāṅkhya position with regard to the spontaneous modification of the Pradhāna, it cannot be the cause of the universe) because of the absence of any purpose.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

Even though we admit for the sake of argument that the Pradhāna is spontaneously active, it will lead to a contradiction in their philosophy. If the Pradhāna is spontaneously active, if it is capable of an inherent tendency for modification, motion or change, its activity cannot have any purpose. This will contradict the view of the Sāṅkhyas that the modification of the Pradhāna is for the experience or enjoyment (Bhoga) and release of the soul (Moksha).

There is no enjoyment to be enjoyed by the ever-perfect Puruṣha (or Soul). If he could enjoy, how could he ever become free from enjoyment? He is already free. He is already in a state of beatitude. As He is perfect, He can have no desire.

The insentient Pradhāna cannot have a desire to evolve. So the satisfaction of a desire cannot be considered as the purpose of activity of the Pradhāna. If you say that evolution must be postulated because creative power would become inoperative otherwise, we reply that in that case creative power will be always operative and there could be no attainment of freedom from it by the attainment of beatitude.

(194)

It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the Pradhāna becomes active for the purpose of the soul. It cannot be the cause of the universe.

II.2.7 (178) If it be said (that the Puruṣha or Soul can direct or move the Pradhāna) as the (lame) man can direct a blind man, or as the magnet (moves the iron), even then (the difficulty cannot be overcome).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The Sāṅkhyas say that Puruṣha can direct the Pradhāna or inspire activity in Pradhāna, though He has no activity, just as a lame man can move by sitting on the shoulders of a blind man and direct his movements or just as a magnet attracts iron. But these illustrations are not apt. A lame man speaks and directs the blind man. The blind man, though incapable of seeing, has the capacity of understanding those instructions given by the lame man and acting upon them. But Puruṣha is perfectly indifferent. He has no kind of activity at all. Hence, He cannot do that with regard to the Pradhāna.

Moreover, the lame and the blind are both conscious entities and the iron and the magnet are both insentient matter. Consequently, the instances given are not to the point. According to the Sāṅkhyas the Pradhāna is independent. Hence, it is not right to say that it depends on the proximity of the Puruṣha for its activity, just as the iron depends on the magnet for its motion. A magnet attracts when the iron is brought near. The proximity of the magnet to the iron is not permanent. It depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position. But no one brings the Puruṣha near Pradhāna. If Puruṣha is always near, then creation will be eternal. There will be no liberation at all.

The Puruṣha and the Pradhāna are altogether separate and independent. Pradhāna is non-intelligent, inert and independent.

Puruṣha is intelligent and indifferent. No one else (a third principle) exists to bring them together. Hence there can be no connection between them.

There could be no creative activity at all according to the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas. If there could be such activity, there could be no final release as the cause of creation could never cease.

In Vedānta, Brahman which is the cause of the universe is indifferent but He is endowed with attributes and activity through Māyā.

He is characterised by non-activity inherent in His own nature and at the same time by moving power inherent in Māyā. So He becomes the Creator. He is indifferent by nature and active by Māyā. Hence, His creative power is well explained. He is superior to the Puruṣha of the Sāṅkhyas.

(195)

II.2.8 (179) And again (the Pradhāna cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three Guṇas).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

The Pradhāna has been defined to be the equilibrium of the three Guṇas. The Pradhāna consists of three Guṇas, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Three Guṇas are independent of each other. They are in a state of equipoise before creation. In the state of Pradhāna no Guṇa is superior or inferior to the other. Every one of them is equal to the other and consequently the relation of subordinate and principal could not exist then. The Puruṣha is altogether indifferent. He has no interest in bringing about the disturbance of equilibrium of the Pradhāna. Creation starts when the equipoise is upset and one Guṇa becomes more predominant than the other two. As there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the Guṇas, the production of the Great Principle and

the other effects which would require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the Guṇas is impossible. Equipoise cannot be disturbed without any external force. The Guṇas are absolutely independent when they are in a state of equilibrium. They cannot take of themselves a subsidiary position to another Guṇa without losing their independence. Hence, creation would be impossible.

This Sūtra says that such preponderance is not possible. The Saṅkhyas cannot explain why should one Guṇa preponderate over the other. Hence, on account of the impossibility of such preponderance of one over the other Guṇas, Pradhāna cannot be accepted to be the cause of the world.

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II.2.9 (180) Even if it be inferred otherwise on account of the Pradhāna being devoid of the power of intelligence (the other objections to the Pradhāna being the cause of the universe remain in force).

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is continued.

Even if the objector postulates such power of modification as being inherent in Pradhāna, the inappropriateness will continue because of the insentiency or non-intelligence of the Pradhāna.

The Saṅkhya says: We do not acknowledge the Guṇas to be characterised by absolute independence, irrelativity and unchangeableness. We infer the characteristics of the Guṇas from those of their effects. We presume that their nature must be such as to make the production of the effects possible. The Guṇas have some characteristics, different attributes and mysterious powers inherent in

them like instability. Consequently the Guṇas themselves are able to enter into a state of inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise. Even in that case we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, etc., remain in force on account of the Pradhāna being devoid of the power of intelligence. As Pradhāna is insentient it has not the power of self-consciousness. Being thus destitute of it, it has not the idea of any plan or design. It cannot say as an intelligent entity would say, “Let me create the world in such and such a way.” A house can never be built by mere bricks and mortar without the supervision and active agency of the architect and masons. Even so, creation never proceeds from dead matter or Pradhāna. Without the directive action of intelligence, the Guṇas, however wonderful in their powers and attributes, cannot of themselves create the universe.

On account of lack of intelligence the objections, founded on design etc., in the universe and that it would lead to continuous creation, come in the way of accepting the Pradhāna as the cause of the universe (Vide Sūtras 1, 4 and 7).

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II.2.10 (181) And moreover (the Sāṅkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

The argument in support of Sūtra 1 is concluded.

Further, the Sāṅkhya doctrine is inconsistent because there are various contradictions in the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Sometimes the senses are said to be eleven and again they are said to be seven. It sometimes says that the Tanmatras come from Mahat and sometimes that they come

from Ahamkara. Sometimes it says that there are three Antahkaranas. Sometimes it says that there is only one Antahkarana.

Moreover, their doctrine contradicts Śhruti which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the universe, and Smṛiti based on Śhruti. For these reasons also the Saṅkhya system is objectionable. It cannot be accepted.

Here the Saṅkhya again brings a counter-charge. He says "You also have got such inappropriateness in your doctrine." He asks whether if Brahman is cause and effect, there could be any liberation from effects and whether scripture affirming liberation will not become useless. He argues "fire cannot become free from heat and light or water free from waves. Only when there is separateness of cause and effect, there can be any meaning in liberation." We reply that even the objector must admit that Puruṣha being by nature pure, cannot be disturbed and that disturbance is due to Avidyā and is not absolutely real. That is our position too. But you give Avidyā a state of permanence. Consequently even if Puruṣha gets free from it, there is no surety that such separation will be permanent.

We postulate only one Being. All effects are only relative and cannot, therefore, affect the absolute reality.

Topic 2: Refutation of the Vaiseshika view.

II.2.11 (182) (The world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.

The atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas that formless, indivisible atoms enter into the composition of the world is now refuted.

The sage Kanada is the founder of the Vaiseshika philosophy.

He holds all objects which have any shape or form as perishable and they are all made of minute, indivisible, formless and immutable particles known as atoms (Anu). These atoms are considered to be the cause of the world. The atoms are of four kinds, viz. the atoms of earth, the atoms of water, the atoms of fire and the atoms of air. These atoms exist distinct from one another without any shape or form. At the beginning of creation, one atom (a monad) unites with another and forms a dyad, an aggregate of two atoms. The dyad (dvyanu) unites with another atom and forms a triad, an aggregate of three atoms, and so on. Thus a visible universe is formed.

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The Vaiseshikas argue thus: The qualities which inhere in the substance which constitutes the cause produces qualities of the same kind in the substance which forms the effect. White cloth is produced from a cloth of a different colour. Consequently, when the intelligent Brahman is taken as the cause of the universe, we should find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the universe. But this is not so. Hence, the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe.

The Sūtra-kāra or the author of the Sūtras shows that this reasoning is fallacious on the ground of the system of Vaiseshikas themselves.

The Saṅkhya philosophy has been refuted in Sūtras 1-10. Now the Vaiseshika system is taken up in Sūtras 11-17 and refuted. The inconsistency in the origination of an aggregate of the three and of four atoms from the union of monads and of dyads of the Vaiseshika is like the inconsistency in the origination of the world from the insentient

Pradhāna of Saṅkhya. If the atom has any parts of an appreciable magnitude, then it cannot be an atom. Then it can be further divisible.

If they are without parts of any appreciable magnitude, as they are so described in Vaiseshika philosophy, it is not possible for such two partless atoms to produce by their union a substance having any magnitude. The same is the case with three atoms and so on. Hence, compound substances can never be formed by the combination of atoms. Therefore, the Vaiseshika theory of origination of the world upon indivisible atoms is untenable.

According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, two ultimate atoms (Parimandalas or Paramanus) become a double atom (Dvyanuka or Hrasva) on account of Adṛiṣṭa, etc. But the atomic nature of the ultimate atom is not found in the Dvyanuka which is small. Two Dvyanukas form a Chaturanuka (quadruple atom) which has not the characteristics of smallness but becomes longer and bigger. If the ultimate atom can create something which is contrary to the atom, what is the inappropriateness in Brahman which is Knowledge and Bliss creating the insentient and non-intelligent world full of misery? Just as the atomic nature of the ultimate atom is not found in the later combinations which have other traits, so also the Chaitanya or intelligence of Brahman is not found in the world.

The ultimate condition of the world is atomic, according to the Vaiseshika system. The atoms are eternal. They are the ultimate cause of the universe. The universe exists in the atomic state in the state of Pralaya or dissolution. An atom is infinitesimal. Adyad is minute and short. Chaturanuka or quadruple atom is great, and long.

If two atoms which are spherical can produce a dyad which is minute and shon but which has not got the spherical nature of the atom, if the dyads which are short and minute can produce a Chaturanuka which is great and long but which has not got the minuteness and shortness of the dyad, it is quite obvious that all the qualities of the cause are not found in the effect. So it is quite possible that the intelligent, blissful Brahman can be the cause of a world which is non-intelligent and full of suffering.

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Topic 3: (Sūtras 12-17) Refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiseshikas The objection against the view of Vedānta has been answered in the previous Sūtra. Now the Vaiseshika system is refuted.

II.2.12 (183) In both cases also (in the cases of the Adṛiṣṭa, the unseen principle inhering either in the atoms or the soul) the activity (of the atoms) is not possible; hence negation of that (viz. creation through the union of the atoms).

The argument against the Vaiseshika system commenced in Sūtra 11 is continued.

What is the cause that first operates on the ultimate atoms? Vaiseshikas hold that the motion which is due to the unseen principle (Adṛiṣṭa) joins the atom in which it resides, to another atom. Thus binary compounds, etc. are produced and finally the element of air.

Similarly fire, water, earth, the body with its organs are produced.

Thus the whole world originates from atoms. The qualities of the binary compounds are produced from the qualities inhering in the atoms, just

as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads. Such is the teaching of the Vaiseshika system of philosophy.

The motion in the atoms cannot be brought about by the Adṛiṣṭa residing in the atoms, because the Adṛiṣṭa which is the resultant of the good and bad actions of the soul cannot reside in the atoms. It must inhere in the soul. The Adṛiṣṭa residing in the soul cannot produce motion in the atom. The motion of the atom is not explained on both these views. As Adṛiṣṭa is insentient it cannot act. As Adṛiṣṭa is in the soul, how can it operate in the atoms? If it can, such operation will go on for ever as there is no agency to control it. When two atoms combine do they unite perfectly or not? If they unite totally, if there is total interpenetration, the atomic state will continue as there will be no increase in bulk. If in part, then atoms will have parts. This is against the theory of the Vaiseshikas. Moreover, if they combine once, there cannot be separation or dissolution. Adṛiṣṭa will be active to bring about creation for the enjoyment of the fruits of actions.

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For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

The Vaiseshikas may argue that the motion originates in the atoms as soon as they come in the proximity of the souls charged with any definite Adṛiṣṭa. This also is untenable. Because there can be no proximity or contact between the souls which are partless and the atoms which also are partless.

An insentient object cannot move another as it is inert. All motion of objects are initiated, guided and directed by intelligence and intelligent beings.

The soul cannot be the cause of the primal motion of the atoms at the beginning of creation. Because in dissolution, according to the Vaiseshikas, the soul itself lies dormant without possessing any intelligence and hence is in no way superior to the atom.

It cannot be said also that the primal motion of the atom is caused by the will of the Lord in conformity with the Adṛiṣṭa of the souls, because the Adṛiṣṭas of the souls do not mature and are not awakened. Hence the will of the Lord is not active.

As there is thus no motion in the atoms in the beginning of the creation, they cannot come together and form an aggregate. Consequently, there can be no creation as the binary compounds cannot be produced.

According to the Vaiseshikas, the universe is created by the union of the atoms. Now what causes this union? If it is a seen cause, it is not possible before the creation of the body. A seen cause can be an endeavour or an impact. There can be no endeavour on the part of the soul if there is no connection of the soul with mind. As there is neither body nor mind before creation, there cannot be any endeavour.

Similar is the case with impact or the like.

What causes the union of the atoms? Adṛiṣṭa or the unseen principle cannot be the cause of the first motion of the atoms because the Adṛiṣṭa is non-intelligent. There is no intelligence to guide the Adṛiṣṭa. Hence it cannot act by itself.

Does the Adṛiṣṭa inhere in the soul or the atoms? If it is inherent in the soul, there is no intelligence to direct the Adṛiṣṭa as the soul is then inert. Moreover, the soul is partless like the atoms. Consequently, there cannot be any connection between the soul and the atoms. Hence, if the Adṛiṣṭa inheres in the soul, it cannot produce motion in the atoms which are not connected with the soul.

If the Adṛiṣṭa is inherent in the atoms, there would be no dissolution because the atoms will ever be active as the Adṛiṣṭa is always present. Therefore there is no possibility for original motion in the atoms and so combination of atoms is not possible.

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Hence the theory of Vaiseshikas that the universe is caused by the combination of atoms is untenable.

II.2.13 (184) And because in consequence of Samavaya being admitted, a regressus ad infinitum results on similar reasoning (hence the Vaiseshika theory is untenable).

The argument against the Vaiseshika philosophy commenced in Sūtra 11 is continued.

Samavaya is inseparable inherence or concomitant cause or combining force. It is one of the seven categories of the Vaiseshika philosophy. It is the affinity which brings about the union of the atoms.

The Vaiseshikas say that two Paramanus become a Dvyanuka on account of the operation of the combining force (Samavaya) and that the Samavaya connects the dyad with its constituents, the two atoms, as the dyad and the atoms are of different qualities. Samavaya is

different from the ultimate atoms and dyads which it connects. Why should it operate unless there be another Samavaya to make it operate? That new Samavaya will require another Samavaya to connect it with the first and so on. Thus their theory is vitiated by the fault of Anavastha Dosha or regressus ad infinitum.

The argument is faulty. Hence the atomic doctrine which admits Samavaya relationship for the union of the atoms is not admissible. It must be rejected as it is useless and as it is an incongruous assumption.

II.2.14 (185) And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity, the atomic theory is not admissible).

The argument against the Vaiseshika commencing in Sūtra 11 is continued.

The atomic theory involves another difficulty. If the atoms are by nature active, then creation would be permanent. No Pralaya or dissolution could take place. If they are by nature inactive, no creation could take place. The dissolution would be permanent. Their nature cannot be both activity and inactivity because they are self-contradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative or efficient cause like Adṛiṣṭa. As the Adṛiṣṭa is in permanent proximity to the atoms, as the Adṛiṣṭa is always connected with the atoms, they will be ever active. Consequently, creation would be permanent. If there is no efficient or operative cause, there will be no activity of the atoms. Consequently, there would be no creation.

For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable and inadmissible.

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II.2.15 (186) And on account of the atoms possessing colour, etc., the opposite (of which the Vaiseshikas hold would take place), because it is seen or observed.

The argument against Vaiseshika commencing in Sūtra 11 is continued.

According to the Vaiseshika philosophy, the atoms are said to have colour, etc. If this is not the case, the effects will not possess these qualities, as the qualities of the cause only are found in the effects. Then the atoms would no longer be atomic and permanent. Because that which has form, colour, etc., is gross, ephemeral and impermanent. Consequently the atoms, etc., which are endowed with colour etc., must be gross and impermanent. This contradicts the theory of the Vaiseshikas that they are minute and permanent.

Hence the atomic theory, being thus self-contradictory, cannot be accepted. The atoms cannot be the ultimate cause of the universe.

There would result from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, etc., the opposite of which the Vaiseshikas mean.

II.2.16 (187) And because of defects in both cases (the atomic theory cannot be accepted).

The argument against Vaiseshikas is continued.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour and is gross. Water has colour, taste and touch and is fine. Fire has colour and touch and is finer still. Air is the finest of all and has the quality of touch only. The four gross elements earth, water, fire and air are produced from atoms.

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If we suppose that the respective atoms of the elements also possess the same number of qualities as the gross elements, then the atom of air will have one quality, an atom of earth will have four qualities. Hence an atom of earth which possesses four qualities will be bigger in size. It would not be an atom any longer. It will not satisfy the definition of an atom.

If we suppose them all to possess the same number of qualities, in that case there cannot be any difference in the qualities of the effects, the gross elements because the attributes of the cause (the atoms) are reproduced in its effects (the gross elements).

If the atom is one and the same and has only one quality, then more than one quality should not be found. Fire should not have form in addition to touch and so on.

Hence, in either case the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas is defective and therefore untenable. It cannot be logically maintained.

II.2.17 (188) And because (the atomic theory) is not accepted (by authoritative sages like Manu and others) it is to be totally rejected.

The argument against Vaiseshika is concluded.

At least the Saṅkhya doctrine of Pradhāna was accepted to some extent by Manu and other knowers of the Veda but the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any person of authority in any of its parts. Therefore, it is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

Further, there are other objections to the Vaiseshika doctrine.

The Vaiseshikas assume six categories or Paclarthas viz. Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karma (action), Samanya (generality), Viśheṣha (particularity) and Samavaya (inherence). They maintain that the six categories are absolutely different from each other and possess different characteristics just as a man, a horse and a hare differ from one another. They say that the categories are independent and yet they hold that on Dravya the other five categories depend.

This contradicts the former one. This is quite inappropriate. Just as animals, grass, trees and the like, being absolutely different from each other, do not depend on each other, so also the qualities etc., also being absolutely different from substance cannot depend on the latter.

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The Vaiseshikas say that Dravya (substance) and Guṇa (quality) are inseparably connected. At the same time they say that each begins its activity. The threads bring the cloth into existence and the whiteness in the threads produces the whiteness in the cloth. "Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality" (Vaiseshika Sūtras I.1.10). If the thread and its quality occupy the same space and are inseparably united, how can this take place? If the substance and the quality are inseparably together with reference to time, the two horns of a cow would have to grow together. If there is inseparability in the nature of the substance and its quality, why can you not say that both are one and identical? Hence the theory that the quality depends upon substance and that the quality and substance are inseparable, is untenable and inadmissible.

Further, the Vaiseshikas make distinction between Samyoga (conjunction) and Samavaya (inherence). They say that Samyoga is the connection of things which exists separately and Samavaya is the connection of things which are incapable of separate existence. This distinction is not tenable as the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. What is the proof of the existence of Samyoga or Samavaya apart from cause and effect? Nor is there any Samyoga or Samavaya apart from the things which become connected. The same man although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relation to others. Thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brāhmaṇa, learned in the Veda, generous boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law, etc. The same digit connotes different numbers, ten or hundred or thousand, according to its place.

Moreover, we have not seen Samyoga except as between things which occupy space. But mind is Anu and does not occupy space according to you. You cannot say that you will imagine some space for it. If you make such a supposition, there is no end to such suppositions. There is no reason why you should not assume a further hundred or thousand things in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vaiseshikas.

Moreover, two Paramanus which have no form cannot be united with a Dvyanuka which has form. There does not exist that kind of intimate connection between ether and earth which exists between wood and varnish.

Nor is the theory of Samavaya necessary to explain which, out of cause and effect, depends on the other. There is mutual dependence. Vedāntins do not accept any difference between cause and effect. Effect is only cause in another form. The Vedāntins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and the thing abiding. According to the Vedānta doctrine, the effect is only a certain state of the cause.

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Moreover, Paramanus are finite and so they will have form.

What has form must be liable to destruction.

Thus it is quite clear that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments. It is opposed to those scriptural texts which declare the Lord to be the general cause. It is not also accepted by sages like Manu and others. Therefore, it should be totally disregarded by wise men.

Topic 4: (Sūtras 18-27) Refutation of the Bauddha Realists.

II.2.18 (189) Even if the [two kinds of] aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would take place non-establishment (of the two aggregates).

After refuting the atomic theory of Vaiseshika, the Buddhist theories are now refuted.

Lord Buddha had four disciples who founded four systems of philosophy, called respectively Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara and Madhyamika. The Vaibhashikas are the Realists (Sarva-stitva-vadins) who accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and thought (also

consciousness, feelings, etc.). The Sautrantikas are the Idealists (Vijñānavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not, the ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhashikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived while the Sautrantikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third class, the Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The outward objects are unreal like dream objects.

The Madhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam).

They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Nothing lasts beyond a moment. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment. One appears and the next moment it is replaced by another. There is no connection between the one and the other. Everything is like a scene in a cinema which is produced by the successive appearance and disappearance of several isolated pictures.

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The Realists recognise two aggregates, viz. the external material world and the internal mental world, which together make up the universe. The external world is made up of the aggregate of atoms, which are of four kinds, viz. atoms of earth which are solid, atoms of water which are viscid, atoms of fire which are hot and atoms of air which are mobile.

The five Skandhas or groups are the cause for the internal world. They are Rupa Skandha, Vijñāna Skandha, Vedana Skandha, Samjna Skandha and Samskara Skandha. The senses and their objects form the Rupa Skandha. Vijñāna Skandha is the stream of consciousness which gives the notion of egoism or 'I'. The Vedana Skandha comprises the feeling of pleasure and pain. The Samjna Skandha consists of names such as Ramakrishna, etc. All words thus constitute the Samjna Skandha. The fifth Skandha called Samskara Skandha consists of the attributes of the mind such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit (Dharma), demerit (Adharma), etc. All internal objects belong to any one of the last four Skandhas. The four last Skandhas form the internal objects. All activities depend upon the internal objects. The internal objects constitute the inner motive of everything. All external objects belong to one Skandha namely the Rupa Skandha. Thus the whole universe consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. The internal aggregate or the mental world is formed by the aggregate of the last four Skandhas. These are the two internal and external aggregates referred to in the Sūtra.

The theory of the Bauddhas which classifies all objects under two heads, one aggregate being called the external, the other internal, is not sufficient to explain the world order; because all aggregates are unintelligent and there is no permanent intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas which can bring about this aggregation. Everything is momentary in its existence according to the Bauddhas. There is no permanent intelligent being who brings about the conjunction of these Skandhas. The continuation is not possible for these external atoms and internal sensations without the intervention of an intelligent guide.

If it be said they come together of their own internal motion, then the world becomes eternal; because the Skandhas will be constantly bringing about creation as they are eternal and as they possess motion of their own. Thus this theory is untenable.

It cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about, because the parts that constitute the material aggregates are destitute of intelligence. The Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being such as enjoying soul or a ruling lord, which could effect the aggregation of atoms.

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How are the aggregates formed? Is there any intelligent principle behind the aggregates as the Cause, the Guide, the Controller or the Director? Or does it take place spontaneously? If you say that there is an intelligent principle, is it permanent or momentary? If it is permanent, then the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness is opposed. If it is momentary, it must come into existence first and then unite the atoms. Then the cause should last more than one moment.

If there is no intelligent principle as director or controller, how can non-intelligent atoms and the Skandhas aggregate in an orderly manner? Further, the creation would continue for ever. There would be no dissolution.

For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be properly explained. Without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of earthly existence which presupposes those aggregates.

Therefore, the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable and inadmissible.

II.2.19 (190) If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (nescience) standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say 'no'; they merely are the efficient cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links and not of the aggregation).

An objection against Sūtra 18 is raised and refuted.

The series beginning with nescience comprise the following members: Nescience, Samskara or impression, Vijñāna (knowledge), name and form, the abode of the six (i.e. the body and the senses, contact, experience of pleasure and pain, desire, activity, merit, demerit, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, mental affliction and the like).

Nescience is the error of considering that what is momentary, impure, etc., to be permanent, pure, etc. Impression, (affection, Samskara) comprises desire, aversion, etc., and the activity caused by them. Knowledge (Vijñāna) is the self-consciousness (Aham it/' alayavijnanasya vrittilabhah) springing up in the embryo. Name and form is the rudimentary flake or bubble-like condition of the embryo.

The abode of the six (Sadayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. Touch (Sparsa) is the sensation of cold, warmth, etc., on the embryo's part.

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Feeling (Vedana) is the sensation of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. Desire (Trishna) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. Activity (Upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. Birth is the passing out from the uterus. Species (Jati) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.

Decay (Jara), death (Marana) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (Mumursha). Grief (Soka) is the frustration of wishes connected therewith. Lament (Parivedana): the lamentations on that account. Pain (Duhkha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. Durmanas is mental affliction. The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

The Buddhistic realist says: Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or of an enjoying soul under whose influence the formation of the aggregates could take place, yet the course of earthly existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality of nescience (ignorance) and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

Nescience, Samskara, etc., constitute an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. In the above series the immediately preceding item is the cause of the next. The wheel of cause and effect revolves unceasingly like the water-wheel and this cannot take place without aggregates. Hence aggregates are a reality.

We reply: Though in the series the preceding one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be the cause of the aggregates. It may be argued that the union of atom and the continuous flow of sensations are proved by the mutual interdependence existing among them. But the argument cannot stand, as this mutual interdependence cannot be the cause of their cohesion. Of two things one may produce the other, but that is no reason why they should unite together.

Even if Avidyā (nescience), Samskara, Vijñāna. Nama, and Rupa, etc., may without a sentient or intelligent agency pass from the stage of cause to the stage of effect, yet how can the totality of all these simultaneously exist without the will of a coordinating mind? If you say that this aggregate or the world is formed by the mutual causation of Avidyā and the rest, we say it is not so, because your link of causation explains only the origin of the subsequent from the previous. It only explains how Vijñāna arises from Samskara, etc. it does not explain how the aggregate is brought about. An aggregate called Sanghata always shows a design and is brought about for the purpose of enjoyment. A Sanghata like a house may be explained to have been produced by putting together of bricks. mortar, etc., but they do not explain the design. You say that there is no permanentĀtman. Your Ātman is momentary only. You are a Kshanikatvavadin.

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There can be no enjoyment or experiencing for such a momentary soul; because the enjoying soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose fruits it has to enjoy. It was produced by another momentary soul. You cannot say that the momentary soul suffers the fruits of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul must be held to be permanent and not momentary. If you hold any soul to be permanent, it will contradict your theory of the momentariness of everything. But if you hold everything to be impermanent, your theory is open to the objection already made. Hence the doctrine of the Sanghatas (Buddhists) is untenable. It is not based on reason.

The atoms cannot combine by themselves even when they are assumed to be permanent and eternal. We have already shown this when examining the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas. Their combination is much more impossible when they are momentary.

The Bauddhas say that a combining principle of the atoms is not necessary if the atoms stand in a relation of causality. The atoms would combine by themselves. This is incorrect. The causality will explain only the production of atoms at different moments. It cannot certainly explain the union of the atom into an aggregate. The combination of an aggregate can take place only if there is an intelligent agent behind. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the union of inert and momentary atoms.

You will say that in the eternal Samsāra the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain and hence also Nescience and so on which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that it may produce either a like or an unlike one without any settled or definite rule. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions as like will go on producing like; in the latter case a man might in an instant become an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.

The individual soul for whose enjoyment this aggregate of body etc., exists is also evanescent or momentary. It cannot therefore be an enjoyer. As the individual soul is momentary, whose is liberation? As

there is no permanent enjoyer, there is no necessity for these aggregates. There may exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, etc., but in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is not possible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates. Hence the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhist school of Realists cannot stand.

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II.2.20 (191) (Nor can there be a causal relation between nescience, etc.) because on the origination of the subsequent thing the preceding one ceases to be.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory, commenced in Sūtra 18, is continued.

We have hitherto argued that nescience and so on stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates. We are now going to prove that they cannot even be regarded as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

According to the Buddhistic theory everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable and inadmissible. It cannot stand to reason.

We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. But the Buddhists hold that existence originates from non-existence because they maintain that the effect cannot

manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed.

Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place, unless there is a coordinating intelligence. You say that everything has only a momentary existence. Your School cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) will vanish.

You may say that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. That also is impossible, because even that will require a successive or second moment for operation. This contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.

The theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) cannot stand. The gold that exists at the time the ornament is made is alone the cause of the ornament and not that which existed before and has ceased to exist then. If it be still held to be the cause, then existence will come out of non-existence. This is not possible. The theory of momentariness will contradict the doctrine that the effect is the cause in a new form. This doctrine indicates that the cause exists in the effect.

This shows that it is not momentary. Further, origination and destruction will be the same owing to momentariness. If it is said that there is difference between origination and destruction, then we will have to say that the thing lasts for more than one moment. Hence we have again to declare the doctrine of momentariness to be untenable.

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II.2.21 (192) If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle or proposition. Otherwise there would result simultaneity (of cause and effect).

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

If the Buddhists say that an effect is produced without a cause then they would contradict their own proposition that every effect has a cause. The proposition admitted by Buddhists that the consciousness of blue, etc., arises when mind, eye, light and object act in union as cause will fail. All sorts of effects can co-exist.

If a cause be assumed then we have to accept that the cause and effect exist simultaneously at the next moment. The cause exists for more than one moment. The cause exists till the state of effect is reached. Then the doctrine of momentariness will fail.

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II.2.22 (193) Conscious and unconscious destruction would be impossible on account of non-interruption.

The argument against the theory of the Buddhists is continued.

The Buddhists hold that universal destruction is ever going on and that this destruction or cessation is of two kinds, viz. conscious and unconscious. Conscious destruction depends upon an act of thought as when a man breaks a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. Unconscious destruction is the natural decay of objects.

The flow of cause and effect goes on without interruption and therefore cannot be subject to either kind of destruction. Nor can any

individual antecedent of a series be said to be totally destroyed, as it is recognised in its immediate consequence.

Both kinds of destruction or cessation are impossible because it must refer either to the series of momentary existences or to the single members constituting the series.

The former alternative is not possible because in all series of momentary existences the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted. The latter alternative is similarly not admissible, because it is not possible to hold that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected with the previous state of existence, as we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence. When an earthen jar is destroyed we find the existence of the clay in the potsherds or fragments into which the jar is broken or in the powder into which the potsherds are ground. We infer that even though what seems to vanish altogether such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continues to exist in some other form, viz. as steam.

The series of momentary existence forming a chain of causes and effect is continuous and can never be stopped, because the last momentary existence before its annihilation must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. If it does, then the series is continued and will not be destroyed. If it does not produce the effect, the last link does not really exist as the Bauddhas define Satta of a thing as its

causal efficiency and the non-existence of the last link would lead backward to the non-existence of the whole series.

We cannot have then two kinds of destruction in the individual members of the series also. Conscious destruction is not possible on account of the momentary existence of each member. There cannot be unconscious destruction as the individual member is not totally annihilated. Destruction of a thing really means only change of condition of the substance.

You cannot say that when a candle is burnt out, it is totally annihilated. When a candle burns out, it is not lost but undergoes a change of condition. We do not certainly perceive the candle when it is burnt out, but the materials of which it consisted continue to exist in a very subtle state and hence they are imperceptible.

For these reasons the two kinds of destruction which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

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II.2.23 (194) And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

There is a fallacy in either view, i.e. that Avidyā or ignorance is destroyed by right knowledge or self-destroyed.

According to the Buddhistic view, emancipation is the annihilation of ignorance. Salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance (Avidyā or nescience) is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.

The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction); or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like; for the mean like every other thing, is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is, therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation; annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of emancipation will be useless.

According to the Buddhistic theory, there can be no voluntary exertion on the part of the aspirant for the breaking asunder of his continued worldly experiences or nescience. There is no hope of their ever coming to an end by mere exhaustion as the causes continue to generate their effects which again continue to generate their own effects and so on and there is no occasion left for practices for attaining release.

Thus in the Buddhistic system release or freedom can never be established. The teaching of the Buddhists cannot stand the test of reasoning.

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II.2.24 (195) The cause of Ākāśha (ether) also not being different (from the two other kinds of destruction it also cannot be a non-entity.)

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

We have shown in Sūtras 22-23 that the two kinds of destruction (cessation) are not totally destitute of all positive characteristics and so cannot be non-entities. We now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, Ākāśha).

The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Ākāśha. They regard Ākāśha as a non-entity. Ākāśha is nothing but the absence of covering or occupying body (Avaranabhava). This is un-reasonable.

Ākāśha has the quality of sound, just as earth has smell, water taste, fire form, air touch. Ākāśha also is a distinct entity like earth, water, etc.

Hence there is no reason why Ākāśha also should be rejected as a non-entity, while earth, water, etc., are recognised as being entities.

Just as earth, air, etc., are regarded as entities on account of their being the substratum of attributes like smell, etc., so also Ākāśha should be considered as an entity on account of its being the substratum of sound. Earth, water, etc., are experienced through their respective qualities, viz. smell, taste, form, touch. The existence of Ākāśha is experienced through its quality, sound. Hence Ākāśha also must be an entity.

Space is inferred from its attribute of sound, just as earth is inferred from smell. Where there is relation of substance and attribute there must be an object. The Buddhists hold that space is mere non-existence of matter (Avaranabhavamatram). If so, a bird may fall down as there is no obstructive matter, but how can it fly up? Non-existence of matter is space which is a positive object and not mere negation or non-entity.

The doctrine that Ākāśha is an absolute non-entity is not tenable.

Why do you say so? Avīśheṣhat, because there is no difference in the case of Ākāśha from any other kind of substance which is an object of perception. We perceive space when we say, "the crow flies in space." The space, therefore, is as much a real substance as the earth, etc. As we know the earth by its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste, and so on, so we know from the quality of being the abode of objects, the existence of space, and that it has the quality of sound. Thus Ākāśha is a real substance and not a non-entity.

If Ākāśha be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space.

Scriptural passages declare "Space sprang from the Ātman" (Ātmana akasassambhutam). So Ākāśha is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.

O Buddhists! You say that air exists in Ākāśha. In the Bauddha scriptures, a series of questions and answers beginning "On which, O revered Sir, is the earth founded?" in which the following question occurs, "On which is the air founded?" to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. If Ākāśha was totally non-existent, what would be the receptacle of air? You cannot say that space is nothing but the absence of any occupying object. This also cannot stand to reason. If you say that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering or occupying body, then when one bird is flying, whereby space is occupied, there would be no room for a second bird which

wishes to fly at the same time. You may give an answer that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body. But we declare that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense and not the mere non-existing of covering bodies.

Moreover, there is a self-contradiction in the statements of Buddhists with reference to the three kinds of negative entities (Nirūpakhya). They say that the negative entities are not positively definable, and also are eternal. It is absurd to talk of a non-being as being eternal or evanescent. The distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution totally rests on real things. Where there is such distinction, there exists the real thing such as pot, etc., which is not a mere undefinable negation or non-entity.

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II.2.25 (196) And on account of memory the things are not momentary.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

The theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is refuted here. If everything is momentary the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary, because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place only in a man who has previously experienced it, because we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. It is not that the experience is that one sees and another remembers.

Our experience is "I saw and I now remember what I saw." He who experiences and remembers is the same. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentariness.

The Buddhists may say that memory is due to similarity. But unless there be one permanent knowing subject, who can perceive the similarity in the past with the present. One cannot say "This is the pot, this is the chair which was in the past." So long there is not the same soul which saw and which now remembers, how can mere similarity bring about such a consciousness as "I saw and I now remember (Pratyabhijna)?" The knowing subject must be permanent and not momentary.

Doubt may arise with reference to an external object. You may not be able to say whether it is identically the same object which was perceived in the past or something similar to it. But with reference to the Self, the cognising subject. there can never arise any such doubt whether I am the same who was in the past, for it is impossible that the memory of a thing perceived by another should exist in one's own Self.

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If you say that this, the thing remembered, is like that, the thing seen, in that case also two things are connected by one agent. If the thing perceived was separate and ceased totally, it cannot be referred at all. Moreover the experience is not that "this is like that" but that "this is that." We admit that sometimes with reference to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; because mistake may occur concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only

similar to itself. It is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and remembers that sensation today. Does any one doubt whether he who remembers is the same as he who saw? For this reason also the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is to be rejected.

We do not perceive objects coming into existence in a moment or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of momentariness of all things is refuted.

II.2.26 (I97) (Existence or entity does) not (spring) from non-existence or non-entity, because it is not seen.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause.

The Bauddhas (Vainasikas) assert that no effect can be produced from anything that is unchanging and eternal, because an unchanging thing cannot produce an effect. So they declare that the cause perishes before the effect is produced. They say from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a pot. So existence comes out of non-existence.

According to the view of the Buddhists, a real thing, i.e. the world has come into existence out of nothing. But experience shows that this theory is false. A pot for instance is never found to be produced without clay. Such a hypothetical production can only exist in the imagination, for example, the child of a barren woman. Hence the view of the Buddhists is untenable and inadmissible.

If existence can come out of non-existence, if being can proceed from non-being, then the assumption of special causes would have no meaning at all. Then anything may come out of anything, because non-entity is one and the same in all cases. There is no difference between the non-entity of a mango seed and that of a jack-seed.

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Hence a jack tree may come out of a mango seed. Sprouts also may originate from the horns of hares. If there are different kinds of non-existence, having special distinctions just as for instance, blueness and the like are the special qualities of lotuses and so on, the non-existence of a mango seed will differ from that of a jack-seed, and then this would turn non-entities into entities.

Moreover if existence springs from non-existence all effects would be affected with non-existence, but they are seen to be positive entities with their various special characteristics.

The horn of a hare is non-existent. What can come out from that horn? We see only being emerging from being, e.g. ornament from gold. etc.

According to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four Skandhas and all material aggregates from the atoms. And yet they say at the same time that entity is born of non-entity. This is certainly quite inconsistent and self-contradictory.

They stultify their own doctrine and needlessly confuse the minds of every one.

II.2.27 (198) And thus (if existence should spring from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal by the indifferent and non-active people also.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

If it were admitted that existence or entity springs from non-existence or non-entity, lazy inactive people also would attain their purpose. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field. Jars will shape themselves even if the potter does not fashion the clay. The weaver too will have finished pieces of cloth without weaving. Nobody will have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for attaining final emancipation. All this is absurd and not maintained by anybody.

Thus the doctrine of the origination of existence or entity from non-existence or non-entity is untenable or inadmissible.

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Topic 5: (Sūtras 28-32) Refutation of the Bauddha Idealist.

II.2.28 (199) The non-existence (of eternal things) cannot be maintained; on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued. From this Sūtra begins the refutation of Buddhistic Idealists.

The doctrine of the Buddhist which affirms the momentary existence of external objects has been refuted. The Sūtra-kāra or the author of the Sūtras now proceeds to refute the doctrine of the Buddhistic school which affirms the momentariness of thought, which declares that only ideas exist and nothing else.

According to the Buddhistic Idealists (Vijñānavadins), the external world is non-existent. They maintain that every phenomenon resolves itself into consciousness and idea without any reality corresponding to it. This is not correct. The external phenomena are not non-existent as they are actually witnessed by our senses of perception. The external world is an object of experience through the senses. It cannot therefore, be non-existent like the horns of a hare.

The Vijñānavadins say: No external object exists apart from consciousness. There is impossibility for the existence of outward things. Because if outward objects are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as chairs, pots, etc. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of chair, etc. It is not possible for cognition to represent things as minute as atoms. There is no recognition of atoms and so the objects could not be atoms. They could not be atomic combinations because we cannot affirm if such combinations are one with atoms or separate therefrom.

According to the Vijñānavadins or the Yogachara system the Vijñāna Skandha or idea alone is real. An object like pot or chair which is perceived outside is nothing more than ideas. The Vijñāna or idea modifies itself into the form of an object. All worldly activities can go on with mere ideas, just as in dream all activities are performed with the thought objects. Ideas only exist. It is useless to assume that the object is something different from the idea. It is possible to have practical thought and intercourse without external objects, just as it is done in dream. All practical purposes are well rendered possible by admitting the reality of ideas only, because no good purpose is served

by additional assumption of external objects corresponding to internal ideas.

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The mind assumes different shapes owing to the different Vasanas or desire-impressions submerged in it. Just as these Vasanas create the dream world, so the external world in the waking state is also the result of Vasanas. The assumption of an external object is unnecessary. We do not see any separation of cognition and object. In dream we cognise without objects. Even so in the waking state there could be cognition without objects. Our manifoldness of Vasanas can account for such cognitions.

Perception in the waking state is like a dream. The ideas that are present during a dream appear in the form of subject and object, although there is no external object. Hence, the ideas of chair, pot, which occur in our waking state are likewise independent of external objects, because they also imply ideas.

This argument is fallacious. When you see a chair or a pot how can you deny it? When you eat, your hunger is appeased. How can you doubt the hunger or the food? You say that there is no object apart from your cognition on account of your capriciousness. Why do you not see a chair as a pot? If an object is a mere mental creation like a dream why should the mind locate it outside? The Buddhist may say "I do not affirm that I have no consciousness of an object. I also feel that the object appears as an external thing, but what I affirm is this that I am always conscious of nothing directly save my own ideas. My idea alone shines as something external. Consequently the appearance of the

external things is the result of my own ideas." We reply that the very fact of your consciousness proves that there is an external object giving rise to the idea of externality. That the external object exists apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. No one when perceiving a chair or a pot is conscious of his perception only, but all are conscious of chair or a pot and the like as objects of perception.

You (Vijñānavādins) say that the internal consciousness or idea appears as something external. This already indicates that the external world is real. If it were not real, your saying like something external would be meaningless. The word 'like' shows that you admit the reality of the external objects. Otherwise you would not have used this word. Because no one makes a comparison with a thing which is an absolute unreality. No one says that Ramakrishna is like the son of a barren woman.

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An idea like a lamp requires an ulterior intellectual principle or illuminer to render it manifest. Vijñāna has a beginning and an end. It also belongs to the category of the known. The knower is as indispensable of cognitions as of objects.

The Buddhist idealist, while contending that there is nothing outside the mind, forgets the fallacy of the argument. If the world, as they argue, were only an outward expression of internal ideas, then the world also would be just mind. But the Buddhists argue that the mind, which is ostensibly in the individual, is also the world outside. Here the question arises: How does the idea of there being nothing outside arise

without the mind itself being outside? The consciousness that nothing exists outside cannot arise if there is really nothing outside.

Hence the Buddhist Vijñānavada doctrine is defective.

When the Buddhists came to know of the illogicality of their concept, they modified their doctrine saying that the mind referred to here is not the individual mind but the cosmic mind, known as Alaya-Vijñāna, which is the repository of all individual minds in a potential form. Here the Buddhist stumbles on the Vedānta doctrine that the world is a manifestation of the Universal Mind.

II.2.29 (200) And on account of the difference in nature (in consciousness between the waking and the dreaming state, the experience of the waking state) is not like dreams, etc., etc.

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

The waking state is not like dream, etc., because of dissimilarity.

The ideas of the waking state are not like those of a dream on account of their difference of nature.

The Buddhists say: The perception of the external world is like the dream. There are no external objects in a dream and yet the ideas manifest as subject and object. Even so the appearance of the external universe is independent of any objective reality.

The analogy of dream phenomena to the phenomena of the waking world is wrong. The consciousness in a dream and that in a wakeful state are dissimilar. The consciousness in a dream depends on the previous consciousness in the wakeful state, but the consciousness in the wakeful state does not depend on anything else, but on the actual

perception by senses. Further the dream experience become false as soon as one wakes up. The dreaming man says as soon as he wakes up, "I wrongly dreamt that I had a meeting with the collector. No such meeting took place. My mind was dulled by sleep and so the false ideas arose." Those things on the contrary, of which we are conscious in our waking state such as post and the like, are never negated in any state. They stand unchallenged and uncontradicted. Even after hundreds of years they will have the same appearance as now.

Moreover dream phenomena are mere memories whereas the phenomena of the waking state are experienced as realities. The distinction between remembrance and experience or immediate consciousness is directly realised by everyone as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly meet him. Simply because there is similarity between dream state and waking state we cannot say that they have the same nature. If a characteristic is not the nature of an object it will not become its inherent nature simply by being similar to an object which has that nature. You cannot say that fire which burns is cold because it has characteristics in common with water.

Hence the dreaming state and the waking state are totally dissimilar in their inherent nature.

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II.2.30 (201) The existence (of Samskaras or mental impressions) is not possible (according to the Bauddhas), on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

According to your doctrine there could be no existence of Vasanas or mental impressions as you deny the existence of objects.

You say that though an external thing does not actually exist, yet its impressions do exist, and from these impressions diversities of perception and ideas like chair, tree arise. This is not possible, as there can be no perception of an external thing which is itself non-existent. If there be no perception of an external thing, how can it leave an impression? If you say that the Vasanas or the mental impressions are Anādi (beginningless, or causeless), this will land you in the logical fallacy of regressus ad infinitum. This would in no way establish your position.

Vasanas are Samskaras or impressions and imply a cause and basis or substratum, but for you there is no cause or basis for Vasanas or mental impressions, as you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

(222)

II.2.31 (202) And on account of the momentariness (of the Alayavijnana or ego-consciousness it cannot be the abode of the Samskaras or mental impressions).

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.

The mental impressions cannot exist without a receptacle or abode. Even the Alayavijnana or ego-consciousness cannot be the abode of mental impressions as it is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view.

Unless there exists one continuous permanent principle equally connected with the past, the present and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable Self which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause. If you say that Alayavijnana is something permanent then that would contradict your doctrine of momentariness.

We have thus refuted the doctrine of the Buddhists which holds the momentary reality of the external world and the doctrine which declares that ideas only exist.

II.2.32 (203) And (as the Bauddha system is) illogical in every way (it cannot be accepted).

The argument against the Buddhistic theory is concluded here.

The Śhūnya-vāda or Nihilism of the Buddhist which asserts that nothing exists is fallacious because it goes against every method of proof, viz. perception, inference, testimony and analogy. It goes against the Śhruti and every means of right knowledge. Hence it has to be totally ignored by those who care for their own happiness and welfare. It need not be discussed in detail as it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has no foundation whatever to rest upon. Any endeavour to use this system as a guide in the practical concerns of life is mere folly.

O Sunyavadins! You must admit yourself to be a being and your reasoning also to be something and not nothing. This contradicts your theory that all is nothing.

Further, the means of knowledge by which Sunyata is to be proved must at least be real and must be acknowledged to be true, because if such means of knowledge and arguments be themselves nothing, then the theory of nothingness cannot be established. If these means and arguments be true, then something certainly is proved. Then also the theory of nothingness is disproved.

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Topic 6: (Sūtras 33-36) Refutation of the Jaina Doctrine.

II.2.33 (204) On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one and the same thing at the same time (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

After the refutation of the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness, Vijñānavada and Nihilism, the Jaina doctrine is taken up for discussion and refutation.

The Jainas acknowledge seven categories or Tattvas, viz. soul(Jīva), non-soul (Ajiva), the issuing outward(Asrava), restraint (Samvara), destruction (Nirjara), bondage (Bandha), and release (Moksha). These categories can be mainly divided into two groups, the soul and the non-soul. The Jainas say also that there are five Astikayas viz. Jīva or soul, Pudgala (body, matter), Dharma (merit), Adharma (demerit) and Ākāśha (space).

Their chief doctrine is the Saptabhanginyāya. They predicate seven different views with reference to the reality of everything, i.e. it may exist, may not exist, may exist and may not exist, may be inexpressible. may exist and may be inexpressible, may not exist and may be

inexpressible and may exist and may not exist and may be inexpressible.

Now this view about things cannot be accepted, because in one substance it is not possible that contradictory qualities should exist simultaneously. No one ever sees the same object to be hot and cold at the same time. Simultaneous existence of light and darkness in one place is impossible.

According to the Jaina doctrine, heaven and liberation may exist or may not exist. This world, heaven and even liberation will become doubtful. We cannot arrive at any definite knowledge. It would be useless to lay down rules of practice for the attainment of heaven, for the avoidance of hell or for emancipation because there is no certainty about anything. The heaven may as well be hell and final freedom not different from these. As everything is ambiguous, there would be nothing to distinguish heaven, hell and final liberation from each other.

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Confusion will arise not only with regard to the object of the world, but of the world also. If things are indefinite, and if everything is "somehow it is, somehow it is not," then a man who wants water will take fire to quench his thirst and so on with everything else, because it may be that fire is hot, it may be that fire is cold.

If there is such doubt how can true knowledge result? How can the Jaina teachers teach anything with certainty if everything is doubtful? How can their followers act at all, learning such teachings? Applying this Saptabhanginyāya to their five Astikayas, the five may become four or even less. If they are inexpressible, why do they talk about it? We

have already refuted the atomic theory on which is based the Jaina doctrine that Pudgala (matter) is due to atomic combination.

Hence the Jaina doctrine is untenable and inadmissible. Their logic is fragile as the thread of a spider and cannot stand the strain of reasoning.

II.2.34 (205) And in the same way (there results from the Jaina doctrine) the non-universality of the soul.

Other defects of the Jaina theory are shown.

We have hitherto spoken about the objection resulting from the Syadvada of the Jainas, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual soul is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.

The Jainas hold that the soul is of the size of the body. In that case it would be limited and with parts. Hence it cannot be eternal and omnipresent.

Moreover, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different sizes, the soul of a man taking the body of an elephant on account of its past deeds will not be able to fill up that body. The soul of an ant also will not be able to fill up the body of an elephant. The soul of an elephant will not have sufficient space in the body of an ant. A large portion of it will have to be outside that body. The soul of a child or a youth being smaller in size will not be able to fill completely the body of a grown-up man.

The stability of the dimensions of the soul is impaired. The Jaina theory itself falls to the ground.

The Jainas may give an answer that a Jīva has infinite limbs and therefore could expand or contract. But could those infinite limbs be in the same place or not? If they could not, how could they be compressed in a small space? If they could, then all the limbs must be in the same place and cannot expand into a big body. Moreover they have no right to assume that a Jīva has infinite limbs. What is there to justify the view that a body of limited size contains an infinite number of soul particles? Well then, the Jainas may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body, some particles accede to it, while some withdraw from it, whenever it enters a small body.

To this hypothesis, the next Sūtra gives a suitable answer.

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II.2.35 (206) Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts according to and departing from the soul to such different bodies) on account of the change, etc., (of the soul).

Further defects of the Jaina doctrine are shown in this Sūtra.

The Jaina may say that the soul is really indefinite in its size.

Therefore when it animates the bodies of an infant or a youth it has that size, and when it occupies the bodies of horses or elephants it expands itself to that size. By successive expansion and dilation like the gas it fully occupies the entire body which animates for the time being.

Then there is no objection to our theory that the soul is of the size of the body.

Even if you say that the limbs of the soul keep out or come in according as the body is small or big, you cannot get over the objection that in such a case the soul will be liable to change and consequently will not be eternal. Then any talk of bondage and emancipation would be meaningless. The futility of the question of release and of the philosophy that deals with it would result.

If the soul's limbs can come and go, how could it be different in nature from the body? So one of these limbs only can be the Ātman.

Who can fix it? Whence do the limbs of the soul come? Where do they take rest? They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements because the soul is immortal. The limbs come and go. The soul will be of an indefinite nature and stature.

The Jaina may say that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent. Just as the stream of water is permanent although the water continually changes.

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Then the same objection as that urged against the Buddhists will arise. If such a continuity is not real but is only apparent, there will be no Ātman at all. We are led back to the doctrine of a general void. If it is something real, the soul will be liable to change and hence not eternal. This will render the view of the Jaina impossible.

II.2.36 (207) And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul on release) and the resulting permanency of the two

(preceding sizes), there is no difference (of size of the soul, at any time).

Discussion on the defects of the Jaina doctrine is concluded.

Further the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul, which it has in the stage of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening size must be permanent. Therefore there is no difference between the three sizes.

What is the speciality of the state of release? There is no peculiarity of difference, according to the Jainas, between the state of release and the mundane state. The different bodies of the soul have one and the same size and the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.

The soul must be regarded as being always of the same size, whether minute or infinite and not of the varying sizes of the bodies.

Therefore the Jaina doctrine that the soul varies according to the size of the body is untenable and inadmissible. It must be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of the Bauddhas.

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Topic 7: (Sūtras 37-41) Refutation of the Pasupata System.

II.2.37 (208) The Lord (cannot be the efficient or the operative cause of the world) on account of the inconsistency (of that doctrine).

The Pasupatas or the Mahesvaras are divided into four classes, viz. Kapala, Kalamukha, Pasupata and Saiva. Their scripture describes five categories, viz. Cause (Karana), Effect (Karya), Union (Yoga by the practice of meditation), Ritual (Vidhi) and the end of pain or sorrow

(Duhkhanta), i.e. the final emancipation. Their categories were revealed by the great Lord Pasupati Himself in order to break the bonds of the soul called herein Pasu or animal.

In this system Pasupati is the operative or the efficient cause (Nimitta Karana). Mahat and the rest are the effects. Union means union with Pasupati, their God. through abstract meditation. Their rituals consist of bathing thrice a day, smearing the forehead with ashes, interturning the fingers in religious worship (Mudra), wearing Rudraksha on the neck and arms, taking food in a human skull, smearing the body with ashes of a burnt human body, worshipping the deity immersed in a wine-vessel. By worshipping the Pasupati the soul attains proximity with the Lord, and there accrues a state of cessation of all desires and all pains which is Moksha.

The followers of this school recognise God as the efficient or the operative cause. They recognise the primordial matter as the material cause of the world. This theory is contrary to the view of the Śhruti where Brahman is stated to be both the efficient and the material cause of the world. Hence the theory of Pasupatas cannot be accepted.

According to Vedānta, the Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. The Naiyayikas, Vaiseshikas, Yogins and Mahesvaras say that the Lord is the efficient cause only and the material cause is either the atoms, according to the Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas, or the Pradhāna, according to the Yogins and Mahesvaras. He is the ruler of the Pradhāna and the souls which are different from Him.

This view is wrong and inconsistent. Because God will be partial to some and prejudiced against others. Because some are prosperous, while others are miserable in this universe. You cannot explain this saying that such difference is due to diversity of Karma, for if the Lord directs Karma, they will become mutually dependent. You cannot explain this on the ground of beginninglessness, for the defect of mutual dependence will persist.

Your doctrine is inappropriate because you hold the Lord to be a special kind of soul. From this it follows that He must be devoid of all activity.

The Sūtra-kāra himself has proved in the previous Section of this book that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world (efficient or the operative cause).

It is impossible that the Lord should be the mere efficient cause of the world, because His connection with the world cannot be established. In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter who is merely the efficient cause of the pot has a certain connection with the clay with which he fashions the pot.

The Śrūtis emphatically declare 'I will become many' (Tait. Up. II.6). This indicates that the Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

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II.2.38 (209) And because relation (between the Lord and the Pradhāna or the souls) is not possible.

The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.

A Lord who is distinct from the Pradhāna and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. It cannot be conjunction (Samyoga), because the Lord, the Pradhāna and the souls are of infinite extent and destitute of parts.

Hence they cannot be ruled by Him.

There could not be Samavaya-sambandha (inherence) which subsists between entities inseparably connected as whole and part, substance and attributes etc., (as in the case of Tantu-pata, thread and cloth), because it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing.

The difficulty does not arise in the case of the Vedāntins. They say that Brahman is Abhinna-Nimitta-Upadana, the efficient cause and the material cause of the world. They affirm Tadatmya-sambandha (relation of identity). Further they depend on the Śhrutis for their authority. They define the nature of the cause and so on, on the basis of Śhruti. They are, therefore, not obliged to render their tenets entirely conformable to observation as the Opponents have to.

The Pasupatas cannot say that they have the support of the Agama (Tantras) for affirming Omniscience about God. Such a statement suffers from the defect of a logical see-saw (petitio principii), because the omniscience of the Lord is established on the doctrine of the scripture and the authority of the scripture is again established on the omniscience of the Lord.

For all these reasons, such doctrines of Saṅkhyayoga about the Lord is devoid of foundation and is incorrect. Other similar doctrines which

likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

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II.2.39 (210) And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).

The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers, such as Naiyayikas, etc., is untenable hypothesis. There is another logical fallacy in the Nyāya conception of Īśhwara. They say that the Lord creates the world with the help of Pradhāna, etc., just as a potter makes pots with the mud.

But this cannot be admitted, because the Pradhāna which is devoid of colour and other qualities and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an entirely different nature from clay and the like. Therefore, it cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action. The Lord cannot direct the Pradhāna.

There is another meaning also for this Sūtra. In this world we see a king with a body and never a king without a body. Therefore, the Lord also must have a body which will serve as the substratum of his organs. How can we ascribe a body to the Lord, because a body is only posterior to creation? The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because he is devoid of a material substratum, because experience teaches us that action needs a material substratum. If we assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body which serves as a substratum for his organs prior to creation, this assumption also will not do, because if the Lord has a body He is subject to the sensations of the ordinary souls and thus no longer is the Lord.

The Lord's putting on a body also cannot be established. So the Lord of animals (Pasupati) cannot be the ruler of matter (Pradhāna).

That by putting on a body the Lord becomes the efficient cause of the world is also fallacious. In the world it is observed that a potter having a bodily form fashions a pot with the clay. If from this analogy the Lord is inferred to be the efficient cause of the world, He is to be admitted to have a bodily form. But all bodies are perishable. Even the Pasupatas admit that the Lord is eternal. It is untenable that the eternal Lord resides in a perishable body and so becomes dependent on another additional cause. Hence it cannot be inferred that the Lord has any bodily form.

There is still another meaning. Further, there is in his case the impossibility (absence) of place. For an agent like the potter etc., stands on the ground and does his work. He has a place to stand upon. Pasupati does not possess that.

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II.2.40 (211) If it be said (that the Lord rules the Pradhāna etc.,) just as (the Jīva rules) the senses (which are also not perceived), (we say) no, because of the enjoyment, etc.

An objection against Sūtra 38 is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of two parts, namely an argument and its reply. The argument is 'Karanavacchef' and the reply is 'Na bhogadibhyah'.

The Opponent says: Just as the individual soul rules the sense organs which are not perceived, so also the Lord rules the Pradhāna, etc.

The analogy is not correct, because the individual soul feels pleasure and pain. If the analogy be true, the Lord also would experience pleasure and pain, caused by the Pradhāna etc., and hence would forfeit His Godhead.

II.2.41 (212) (There would follow from their doctrine the Lord's) being subject to destruction or His non-omniscience.

The argument raised in Sūtra 40 is further refuted and thus the Pasupata doctrine is refuted.

According to these schools (Nyāya, Pasupata, the Mahesvara, etc.), the Lord is Omniscient and eternal. The Lord, the Pradhāna and the souls are infinite and separate. Does the Omniscient Lord know the measure of the Pradhāna, soul and Himself or not? If the Lord knows their measure, they all are limited. Therefore a time will come when they will all cease to exist. If Samsāra ends and thus there is no more Pradhāna, of what can God be the basis or His lordship? Or, over what is His Omniscience to extend? If nature and souls are finite, they must have a beginning. If they have a beginning and end, there will be scope for Śhūnya-vāda, the doctrine of nothingness. If He does not know them, then he would no longer be Omniscient. In either case the doctrine of the Lord's being the mere efficient cause of the world is untenable, inconsistent and unacceptable.

If God be admitted to have organs of senses and so to be subject to pleasure and pain, as stated in Sūtra 40, He is subject to birth and death like an ordinary man. He becomes devoid of Omniscience.

This sort of God is not accepted by the Pasupatas even. Hence the doctrine of the Pasupatas, that God is not the material cause of the world cannot be accepted.

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Topic 8: (Sūtras 42-45) Refutation of the Bhagavata or the Pancharatra school.

II.2.42 (213) On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the Highest Lord), (the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or the Pancharatra doctrine cannot be accepted).

The Pancharatra doctrine or the doctrine of the Bhagavatas is now refuted.

According to this school, the Lord is the efficient cause as well as the material cause of the universe. This is in quite agreement with the scripture or the Śhruti and so it is authoritative. A part of their system agrees with the Vedānta system. We accept this. Another part of the system, however, is open to objection.

The Bhagavatas say that Vaasudeva whose nature is pure knowledge is what really exists. He divides Himself fourfold and appears in four forms (Vyuhās) as Vaasudeva, Śhaṅkarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vaasudeva denotes the Supreme Self, Śhaṅkarshana the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, and Aniruddha the principle of egoism, or Ahamkara. Of these four, Vaasudeva constitutes the Ultimate Cause, of which the three others are the effects.

They say that by devotion for a long period to Vaasudeva through Abhigamana (going to the temple with devotion), Upadana (securing the accessories of worship), Ijya (oblation, worship), Svadhyaya (study of holy scripture and recitation of Mantras) and Yoga (devout meditation) we can pass beyond all afflictions, pains and sorrows, attain Liberation and reach the Supreme Being. We accept this doctrine.

But we controvert the doctrine that Śhaṅkarshana (the Jīva) is born from Vaasudeva and so on. Such creation is not possible. If there is such birth, if the soul be created it would be subject to destruction and hence there could be no Liberation. That the soul is not created will be shown in Sūtra II.3.17.

For this reason the Pancharatra doctrine is not acceptable.

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II.2.43 (214) And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument (is produced) from the agent.

The argument against the Pancharatra doctrine is continued.

An instrument such as a hatchet and the like is not seen to be produced from the agent, the woodcutter. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Śhaṅkarshana, there springs its internal instrument or mind (Pradyumna) and from the mind, the ego or Ahamkara (Aniruddha).

The mind is the instrument of the soul. Nowhere do we see the instrument being born from the doer. Nor can we accept that Ahamkara issues from the mind. This doctrine cannot be accepted.

Such doctrine cannot be settled without observed instances. We do not meet with any scriptural passage in its favour. The scripture declares that everything takes its origin from Brahman.

II.2.44 (215) Or if the [four Vyuhās are said to) possess infinite knowledge, etc., yet there is no denial of that (viz. the objection raised in Sūtra 42).

The argument against the Pancharatra doctrine is continued.

The error of the doctrine will persist even if they say that all the Vyuhās are gods having intelligence, etc.

The Bhagavatas may say, that all the forms are Vaasudeva, the Lord, and that all of them equally possess Knowledge, Lordship, Strength, Power, etc., and are free from faults and imperfections.

In this case there will be more than one Īśhwara. This goes against your own doctrine according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vaasudeva. All the work can be done by only One Lord. Why should there be four Īśhwaras? Moreover, there could be no birth of one from another, because they are equal according to the Bhagavatas, whereas a cause is always greater than the effect. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause, as for instance, in the case of the clay and the pot, where the cause is more extensive than the effect and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. The Bhagavatas do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, etc., between Vaasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they are all forms of Vaasudeva without any special distinction.

Then again, the forms of Vaasudeva cannot be limited to four only, as the whole world from Brahma down to a blade of grass is a form or manifestation of the Supreme Being. The whole world is the Vyuha of Vaasudeva.

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II.2.45 (216) And because of contradictions (the Pancharatra doctrine is untenable).

The argument against the doctrine of the Bhagavatas is concluded here.

There are also other inconsistencies, or manifold contradictions in the Pancharatra doctrine. Jñāna, Aiśhvarya, or ruling capacity, Sakti (creative power), Bala (strength), Virya (valour) and Tejas (glory) are enumerated as qualities and they are again in some other place spoken of as selfs, holy Vāsudevas and so on. It says that Vāsudeva is different from Śhaṅkarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Yet it says that these are the same as Vāsudeva. Sometimes it speaks of the four forms as qualities of the Ātman and sometimes as the Ātman itself.

Further we meet with passages contradictory to the Vedas. It contains words of depreciation of the Vedas. It says that Sandilya got the Pancharatra doctrine after finding that the Vedas did not contain the means of perfection. Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas, Sandiiya studied this Śhastra.

For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted. As this system is opposed to and condemned by all the Śhrutis and abhorred by the wise, it is not worthy of regard.

Thus in this Pada has been shown that the paths of Saṅkhyas, Vaiseshikas and the rest down to the Pancharatra doctrine are strewn with thorns and are full of difficulties, while the path of Vedānta is free from all these defects and should be trodden by everyone who wishes his final beatitude and salvation.

Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the Second Adhyāya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(234) CHAPTER II, SECTION 3, INTRODUCTION

In the previous Section the inconsistency of the doctrines of the various non-Vedāntic schools has been shown. After showing the untenability and unreliability of other systems, Śhrī Vyāsa, the author of Vedānta Sūtras now proceeds to explain the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the Śhruti system because there appear to be diversities of doctrines with reference to the origin of the elements, the senses, etc.

We now clearly understand that other philosophical doctrines are worthless on account of their mutual contradictions. Now a suspicion may arise that the Vedāntic doctrine also is equally worthless on account of its intrinsic contradictions. Therefore a new discussion is begun in order to remove all doubts in the Vedānta passages which refer to creation and thus to remove the suspicion in the minds of the readers. Here we have to consider first the question whether ether (Ākāśha) has an origin or not.

In Sections III and IV the apparent contradictions in Śhruti texts are beautifully harmonised and reconciled. The arguments of the Opponent who attempts to prove the Self-contradiction of the scriptural texts are given first. Then comes the refutation by the Siddhantin.

SYNOPSIS

The Third Section of Chapter II deals with the order of creation as it is taught in Śhruti, of the five primal elements namely Ākāśha, air, fire, water and earth. It discusses the question whether the elements have an origin or not, whether they are co-eternal with Brahman or issue from it and are withdrawn into it at stated intervals. The essential characteristics of the individual is also ascertained.

The first seven Adhikaraṇas deal with the five elementary substances.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman but originates from it as its first effect. Though there is no mention of Ākāśha in the Chhandogya Upanisad, the inclusion of Ākāśha is implied.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtra 8) shows that air originates from ether.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 9) teaches that there is no origin of that which is (i.e. Brahman) on account of the impossibility of there being an origin of Brahman, and as it does not stand to reason.

Adhikaraṇa IV, V, VI: (Sūtras 10, 11, 12) teach that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtra 13) teaches that the origination of one element from another is due not to the latter in itself but to Brahman acting in it.

Brahman who is their Indweller has actually evolved these successive elements.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtra 14) shows that the absorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their creation.

Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtra 15) teaches that the order in which the creation and the re-absorption of the elements takes place is not interfered with by the creation and re-absorption of Prāṇa, mind and the senses, because they also are the creations of Brahman, and are of elemental nature and therefore are created and absorbed together with the elements of which they consist.

The remaining portion of this Section is devoted to the special characteristics of the individual soul by comparing different Śhrutis bearing on this point.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtra 16) shows that expressions such as “Ramakrishna is born” “Ramakrishna has died”, strictly apply to the body only and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtra 17) teaches that the individual soul is according to the Śhrutis permanent, eternal. Therefore it is not like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation. The Jīva is in reality identical with Brahman. What originates is merely the soul’s connection with its limiting adjuncts such as mind, body, senses, etc. This connection is moreover illusory.

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Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtra 18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sūtra declares that intelligence is the very essence of the soul.

Adhikaraṇa XIII: (Sūtras 19-32) deals with the question whether the individual soul is Anu, i.e. of very minute size or omnipresent, all-pervading. The Sūtras 19-28 represent the view of the Opponent according to which the individual soul is Anu, while Sūtra 29 formulates the Siddhanta viz. the individual soul is in reality all-pervading; it is spoken of as Anu in some scriptural passages because the qualities of the internal organ itself are Anu which constitute the essence of the Jīva so long as he is involved in the Samsāra.

Sūtra 30 explains that the soul may be called Anu as it is connected with the Buddhi as long as it is implicated in the Samsāra.

Sūtra 31 intimates that in the state of deep sleep the soul is potentially connected with the Buddhi while in the waking state that connection becomes actually manifest.

Sūtra 32 intimates that if no intellect existed there would result constant perception or constant non-perception.

Adhikaraṇas XIV and XV: (Sūtras 33-39 and 40) refer to the Kartritva of the individual soul, whether the soul is an agent or not.

Sūtras 33-39 declare that the soul is an agent. The soul is an agent when he is connected with the instruments of action, Buddhi, etc. Sūtra 40 intimates that he ceases to be an agent when he is dissociated from them, just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments and rests after having laid them aside.

Adhikaraṇa XVI: (Sūtras 41-42) teaches that the agency of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The Lord always directs the soul according to his good or bad actions done in previous births.

Adhikaraṇa XVII (Sūtras 43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman.

Sūtra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (Amsa) of Brahman. This Sūtra propounds Avacchedavada i.e. the doctrine of limitation i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the Supreme Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.

The following Sūtras intimate that the Supreme Lord is not affected by pleasure and pain like the individual soul, just as light is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections.

According to Śhaṅkara, 'Amsa' must be understood to mean 'Amsa iva', a part as it were. The one universal indivisible Brahman has no real parts but appears to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.

Sūtra 47 teaches that the individual souls are required to follow the different injunctions and prohibitions laid down in the scriptures, when they are connected with bodies, high and low. Fire is one only but the fire of a funeral pyre is rejected and that of the sacrifice is accepted. Similar is the case with the Ātman. When the soul is attached to the body, ethical rules, ideas of purity and impurity have full application.

Sūtra 49 shows that there is no confusion of actions or faults of actions. The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone.

Sūtra 50 propounds the doctrine of reflection (Abhasavada) or Pratibimbavada, the doctrine that the individual soul is a mere reflection of the Supreme Brahman in the Buddhi or intellect.

In the Saṅkhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of the Saṅkhyas is, therefore, an unfair conclusion.

(237)

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-7) Ether is not eternal but created.

II.3.1 (217) (The Opponent says that) ether (Ākāśha) (does) not (originate), as Śhruti does not say so.

The Opponent raises a contention that Ākāśha is uncreated and as such not produced out of Brahman. This prima facie view is set aside in the next Sūtra.

To begin with, the texts which treat of creation are taken up.

Ākāśha (ether) is first dealt with. The Opponent says that Ākāśha is not caused or created because there is no Śhruti to that effect. Ākāśha is eternal and is not caused because the Śhruti does not call it caused, while it refers to the creation of fire. "Tadaikshata bahu syam prajayeyetitattejosrfiata" "It thought 'May I become many, may I grow forth'-It sent forth fire". (Chh. Up. VI.2.3). Here there is no mention of Ākāśha being produced by Brahman. As scriptural sentence is our only authority in the origination of knowledge of supersensuous things, and as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of ether, ether must be considered to have no origin. Therefore Ākāśha has no origin. It is eternal.

In the Vedāntic texts, we come across in different places different statements regarding the origin of various things. Some texts say that

the ether and air originated; some do not. Some other texts again make similar statements regarding the individual soul and the Prāṇas (vital airs). In some places the Śhruti texts contradict one another regarding order of succession and the like.

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II.3.2 (218) But there is (a Śhruti text which states that Ākāśha is created).

The contradiction raised in Sūtra 1 is partially met here.

The word 'but' (tu) is used in this Sūtra in order to remove the doubt raised in the preceding Sūtra.

But there is a Śhruti which expressly says so. Though there is no statement in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad regarding the causation of Ākāśha, yet there is a passage in the Taittiriya Śhruti on its causation: "Tasrnad va etasmadatmana akasah sambhutam" - "FrOm the Self (Brahman) sprang Ākāśha, from Ākāśha the air, from air the fire, from fire the water, from water the earth (Tait. Up. II.1)."

II.3.3 (219) (The Śhruti text concerning the origination of Ākāśha) has a secondary sense, on account of the impossibility (of the origination of the Ākāśha).

Here is an objection against Sūtra 20.

The Opponent says: The Taittiriya text referred to in the previous Sūtra which declares the origination of the Ākāśha should be taken in a secondary sense (figurative), as Ākāśha cannot be created. It has no parts. Therefore it cannot be created.

The Vaiseshikas deny that Ākāśha was caused. They say that causation implies three factors, viz. Samavayikarana (inherent causes-many and similar factors), Asamavayikarana (non-inherent causes, their combination) and Nimittakarana (operative causes, a human agency). To make a cloth, threads and their combination and a weaver are needed. Such causal factors do not exist in the case of Ākāśha.

We cannot predicate of space a spaceless state, just as we can predicate of fire an antecedent state without brightness.

Further unlike earth, etc., Ākāśha is all-pervading and hence could not have been caused or created. It is eternal. It is without origin The word 'Ākāśha' is used in a secondary sense in such phrases as 'make room', 'there is room'. Although space is only one, it is designated as being of different kinds when we speak of the space of a pot, the space of a house. Even in Vedic passages a form of expression such as 'He is to place the wild animals in the spaces (Akaseshu)' is seen. Hence we conclude that those Śhruti texts also which speak of the origination of Ākāśha must be taken to have a secondary sense or figurative meaning.

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II.3.4 (220) Also from the Śhruti texts (we find that Ākāśha is eternal).

Here is an objection against Sūtra 2.

In the previous Sūtra Ākāśha was inferred to be eternal. In this Sūtra the Opponent cites a Śhruti text to show that it is eternal. He points out that Śhruti describes Ākāśha as uncaused and uncreated.

“Vayuschantariksham chaitadamritam” - “The air and the Ākāśha are immortal” (Br. Up. II.3.3). What is immortal cannot have an origin.

Another scriptural passage, “Omnipresent and eternal like ether” - “Ākāśhavat sarvagato nityah”, indicates that those two qualities of Brahman belong to the ether also. Hence an origin cannot be attributed to the Ākāśha.

Other scriptural passages are: “As this Ākāśha is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite.” “Brahman has the ether for its body, the Ākāśha is the Self.” If the Ākāśha had a beginning it could not be predicated of Brahman as we predicate blueness of a lotus (lotus is blue).

Therefore the eternal Brahman is of the same nature as Ākāśha.

(This is the view of the Opponent-Pūrvapakshin).

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II.3.5 (221) It is possible that the one word (‘sprang’-Sambhutam) may be used in a secondary and primary sense like the word Brahman.

An argument in support of the above objection is now advanced by the Opponent.

The Opponent says that the same word ‘sprang’ (Sambhutam) in the Taittiriya text (II.1) - “From that Brahman sprang Ākāśha, from Ākāśha sprang air, from air sprang fire.”-can be used in a secondary sense with respect to Ākāśha and in the primary sense with respect to air, fire, etc. He supports his statement by making reference to other Śhruti texts where the word ‘Brahman’ is so used. “Try to know Brahman by penance, because, penance is Brahman” (Tait. Up. III.2).

Here Brahman is used both in a primary and in a secondary sense in the same text.

The same word Brahman is in the way of figurative identification (Bhakti) applied to penance which is only the means of knowing Brahman and again directly to Brahman as the object of knowledge.

Also "Food is Brahman-Annam Brahma" (Tait. Up. III.2), and "Bliss is Brahman-Ānando Brahma" (Tait. Up. III.6). Here Brahman is used in a secondary and primary sense respectively in two complementary texts.

The Vedāntin says: But how can we uphold now the validity of the statement made in the clause, "Brahman is one only without a second-Ekameva Advit/yam Brahma". Because if Ākāśha is a second entity co-existing with Brahman from eternity, it follows that Brahman has a second. If it is so, how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything is known? (Chh. Up. VI.1.3).

The Opponent replies that the words "Ekameva-one only" are used with reference to the effects. Just as when a man sees in a potter's house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel and so on today and on the following day a number of pots and says that clay alone existed on the previous day, he means only that the effects, i.e. the pots did not exist and does not deny the wheel or the stick of the potter, even so the passage means only that there is no other cause for Brahman which is the material cause of the world. The term 'without a second' does not exclude the existence from eternity of ether but excludes the existence of any other superintending Being but Brahman. There is a superintending potter in addition to the material cause of the vessels,

i.e. the clay. But there is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the material cause of the universe.

The Opponent further adds that the existence of Ākāśha will not bring about the existence of two things, for number comes in only when there are diverse things. Brahman and Ākāśha have no such diverseness before creation as both are all-pervading and infinite and are indistinguishable like milk and water mixed together. Therefore the Śhruti says: “Ākāśhasariram Brahma-Brahman has the ether for its body”. It follows that the two are identical.

Moreover all created things are one with Ākāśha which is one with Brahman. Therefore if Brahman is known with its effects, Ākāśha also is known.

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The case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured into a cup of milk. These drops are taken when the milk is taken. The taking of the drops does not form something additional to the taking of the milk. Similarly the Ākāśha which is non-separate in place and time from Brahman, and its effects, is comprised within Brahman. Therefore, we have to understand the passages about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.

Thus the Opponent tries to establish that Ākāśha is uncreated and is not an effect and that the Śhruti text calls it ‘Sambhuta’ (created) only in a secondary sense.

II.3.6 (222) The non-abandonment of the proposition (viz. by the knowledge of one everything else becomes known, can result only) from the non-difference (of the entire world from

Brahman) according to the words of the Veda or the Śhruti texts (which declare the non-difference of the cause and its effects).

The objection raised in Sūtra 1 and continued in Sūtras 3, 4 and 5 is now replied to.

The Sūtra-kāra refutes the Opponent's view and establishes his position. The scriptural assertion that from the knowledge of One (Brahman) everything else is known can be true only if everything in the world is an effect of Brahman. Because the Śhruti says that the effects are not different from the cause, therefore if the cause (Brahman) is known, the effects also will be known. If Ākāśha does not originate from Brahman, then by knowing Brahman we cannot know Ākāśha. Therefore the above assertion will not come true.

Ākāśha still remains to be known as it is not an effect of Brahman. But if Ākāśha is created then there will be no such difficulty at all. Therefore Ākāśha is an effect. It is created. If it is not created the authoritativeness of the Vedas will disappear.

The Opponent is entirely wrong in imagining that the Taittiriya Śhruti is in conflict with Chhandogya Upaniṣhad. You will have to add in the Chhandogya Śhruti "After creating Ākāśha and Vayu". Then the text would mean that after creating Ākāśha and Vayu "Brahman created fire." Now there will be no conflict at all.

Moreover, the explanation that as Brahman and Ākāśha are one like milk and water and that as Ākāśha is one with all things it will be known by knowing Brahman and its effects is entirely wrong, because the knowledge of milk and water which are one is not a correct knowl

edge. The analogy given in the Śhruti text is not milk and water, but clay and jars to indicate that all effects are not separate from the cause and because the word 'eva' in "Ekameva Advitiyam" excludes two combined things like milk and water and says that only one entity is the cause.

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The knowledge of everything through the knowledge of one thing of which the Śhruti speaks cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed with water, for we understand from the parallel instance of a piece of clay being brought forward, (Chh. Up. VI.1 .4), that the knowledge of everything has to be experienced through the relation of the material cause and the material effect. The knowledge of the cause implies the knowledge of the effect. Further, the knowledge of everything, if taken to be similar to the case of knowledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect knowledge (Samyag-Vijñāna), because the water which is apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk with which it is mixed is not grasped by perfect knowledge, because the water although mixed with the milk, yet is different from it.

That nothing has an independent existence apart from Brahman is corroborated by statements in Śhruti: "Sarvam khalvidam Brahma" - "Idam sarvam yadayamatma". That Self is all that is (Bri. Up. II.4.6).

II.3.7 (223) But wherever there are effects, there are separateness as is seen in the world (as in ordinary life).

The argument begun in Sūtra 6 is concluded here.

The word 'tu' (but) refutes the idea that Ākāśha is not created. It shows that the doubt raised in the last Sūtra is being removed.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad purposely omits Ākāśha and Vayu from the list enumerated, because it keeps in view the process of Trivritkarana, combination of the three visible elements (Murta, i.e. with form), instead of Panchikarana, combination of five elements which is elsewhere developed.

It is to be noted here that though all the elements originate from Brahman, yet Ākāśha and air are not mentioned by name in the Śhruti, Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, whereas fire, water and earth are distinctly stated therein to have originated from Brahman. The specification is like that found in similar cases of ordinary experience in the world, for instance, to mean all the sons of a particular person, Ramakrishna, only a few of them are named.

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This is just like what we find in the ordinary world. If a man says "all these are sons of Narayana" and then he gives certain particulars about the birth of one of them, he implies thereby that it applies to the birth of all the rest. Even so when the Upaniṣhad says that "all this has its self in Brahman" and then it goes on to give the origin of some of them from Brahman such as fire, water and earth, it does not mean that others have not their origin in Him, but it only means that it was not thought necessary to give a detailed account of their origin.

Therefore, though there is no express text in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad as to the origin of Ākāśha, yet we infer from the universal

proposition therein that “everything has its self in Brahman”, that Ākāśha has its self in Brahman, and so is produced from Brahman.

Ākāśha is an element like fire and air. Therefore it must have an origin. It is the substratum of impermanent quality like the sound, and so it must be impermanent. This is the direct argument to prove the origin and destruction of Ākāśha. The indirect argument to prove it is, “whatever has no origin is eternal as Brahman” and whatever has permanent qualities is eternal as the soul, but Ākāśha not being like Brahman in these respects, cannot be eternal.

Ākāśha takes its origin from Brahman, though we cannot conceive how space can have any origin.

We see in this universe that all created things are different from each other. Whatever we observe: effects or modifications of a substance such as jars, pots, bracelets, armlets, and ear-rings, needles, arrows, and swords we observe division or separateness. Whatever is divided or separate is an effect, as jars, pots, etc. Whatever is not an effect is not divided as the Ātman or Brahman. A pot is different from a piece of cloth and so on. Everything that is divided or separate is created. It cannot be eternal. You cannot think of a thing as separate from others and yet eternal.

Ākāśha is separate from earth, etc. Hence Ākāśha also must be an effect. It cannot be eternal. It must be a created thing.

If you say that Ātman also, being apparently separate from Ākāśha etc., must be an effect we reply that it is not so, because Ākāśha itself has originated from Ātman. The Śhruti declares that “Ākāśha sprang from the Ātman” (Tait. Up. II.1). If Ātman also is an effect, Ākāśha etc., will

be without an Ātman i.e. Svarūpa. The result will be Śhūnya-vāda or the doctrine of nothingness. Ātman is Being, therefore it cannot be negated. “Ātmatvacchatmano nirakaranasankanupapattih”. It is self-existent. “Na hyatma-gantukah kasyachit, svayam siddhatvat”. It is self-evident. “Na hyatma atmanah pramanapekshaya siddhyati.” Ākāśha etc., are not stated by anyone to be self-existent. Hence no one can deny the Ātman, because the denier is himself, Ātman. Ātman exists and is eternal.

(244)

The All-pervasiveness and eternity of Ākāśha are only relatively true. Ākāśha is created. It is an effect of Brahman.

In the clauses, “I know at the present moment whatever is present, I knew at former moments, the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know in the future, the nearer and remoter future” the object of knowledge changes according as it is something past or something future or something present. But the knowing agent does not change at all as his nature is eternal presence. As the nature of the Ātman is eternal presence it cannot be annihilated even when the body is burnt to ashes. You cannot even think that it ever should become something different from what it is. Hence the Ātman or Brahman is not an effect. The Ākāśha, on the contrary comes under the category of effects.

Moreover, you say that there must be many and similar causal factors before an effect can be produced. This argument is not correct. Threads are Dravya (substance). Their combination (Samyoga) is a Guṇa (attribute) and yet both are factors in the production of an effect. Even if you say that the need for many and similar causal factors

applies only to Samavayikarana, this sort of explanation is not correct, for a rope or a carpet is spun out of thread, wool, etc.

Moreover, why do you say that many causal factors are needed? In the case of Paramanu or ultimate atom or mind, the initial activity is admittedly not due to many causal factors. Nor can you say that only for a Dravya (substance) many causal factors are necessary. That would be so, if combination causes the effect as in the case of threads and cloth. But in many instances, (e.g. milk becomes curd) the same substance changes into another substance. It is not the Lord's law that only several causes in conjunction should produce an effect. We therefore decide on the authority of the Śhruti that the entire world has sprung from the one Brahman, Ākāśha being produced first and later on the other elements in due succession (Vide II.1.24).

It is not right to say that with reference to the origin of Ākāśha we could not find out any difference between its pre-causal state and its post-causal state (the time before and after the origination of ether).

Brahman is described as not gross and not subtle (Asthulam na anu) in the Śhruti. The Śhruti refers to an Anakasa state, a state devoid of Ākāśha.

Brahman does not participate in the nature of Ākāśha as we understand from the passage. "It is without Ākāśha" (Bri. Up. III.8.8).

Therefore it is a settled conclusion that, before Ākāśha was produced, Brahman existed without Ākāśha.

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Moreover, you (Opponent) are certainly wrong in saying that Ākāśha is different in its nature from earth, etc. The Śhruti is against the uncreatedness of Ākāśha. Hence there is no good in such inference.

The inference drawn by you that Ākāśha has no beginning because it differs in nature from these substances which have a beginning such as earth, etc., is without any value, because it must be considered fallacious as it is contradicted by the Śhruti. We have brought forward cogent, convincing and strong arguments showing that Ākāśha is an originated thing.

Ākāśha has Anitya-guna (non-eternal attribute). Therefore it also is Anitya (non-eternal). Ākāśha is non-eternal because it is the substratum of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other things, which are the substrate of non-eternal qualities are themselves non-eternal. The Vedāntin who takes his stand on the Upaniṣhads does not admit that the Ātman is the substratum of non-eternal qualities.

You cannot say that Ātman also may be Anitya (non-eternal) for Śhruti declares that Ātman is eternal (Nitya).

The Śhruti texts which describe Ākāśha as eternal (Amrita) describe it so in a secondary sense only (Gauna), just as it calls heaven-dwelling gods as eternal (Amrita). The origin and destruction of Ākāśha has been shown to be possible.

Even in the Śhruti text, “Ākāśhavat sarvagatascha nityah” which describes Ātman as similar to Ākāśha in being all-pervading and eternal, these words are used only in a secondary and figurative sense (Gauna).

The words are used only to indicate infiniteness or super-eminent greatness of Ātman and not to say that Ātman and Ākāśha are equal. The use is as “when the sun is said to go like an arrow.” When we say that the sun moves with the speed of an arrow, we simply mean that he moves fast, not that he moves at the same rate as an arrow.

Such passages as “Brahman is greater or vaster than Ākāśha” prove that the extent of Ākāśha is less than that of Brahman. Passages like “There is no image of Him. There is nothing like Brahman - Na tasya pratimasti’ (Svet. Up. IV.19) show that there is nothing to compare Brahman to. Passages like “Everything else is of evil” (Bri. Up. III.4.2) show that everything different from Brahman such as Ākāśha is of evil. All but Brahman is small. Hence Ākāśha is an effect of Brahman.

Śruti and reasoning show that Ākāśha has an origin. Therefore the final settled conclusion is that Ākāśha is an effect of Brahman.

(246)

Topic 2: Air originates from ether.

II.3.8 (224) By this i.e. the foregoing explanation about Ākāśha being a product, (the fact of) air (also being an effect) is explained.

This Sūtra states that air also, like Ākāśha, has been created by and from Brahman.

The present Sūtra extends the reasoning concerning Ākāśha to the air of which the Ākāśha is the abode. The Opponent maintains that the air is not a product, because it is not mentioned in the chapter of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad which treats of the origination of things. The

Opponent says that the birth of air mentioned in the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad is figurative only, because air is said to be one of the immortal along with Ākāśha.

“Vayu (the air) is the deity that never sets” (Bri. Up. I.5.22). The denial of Vayu's never setting refers to the lower knowledge or Aparā Vidyā in which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under the form of Vayu and is merely a relative one.

The glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of worship. The Śhruti says “Vayu never sets.” Some dull type of men may think that Vayu (air) is eternal. To remove this doubt there is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to air also.

Vayu is called deathless or immortal only in a figurative sense.

Vayu (air) also has origin like Ākāśha.

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Topic 3: Brahman (Sat) has no origin.

II.3.9 (225) But there is no origin of that which is [i.e. Brahman], on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).

This Sūtra states that Brahman has no origin as it is, neither proved by reasoning nor directly stated by Śhruti.

The word ‘tu’ (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.

The Opponent says that Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad declares that Brahman is born, “Thou art born with Thy face turned to all directions” (Svet. Up. 4.3).

We cannot, as in the case of Ākāśha and Vayu, attribute origin to Brahman also. Brahman is not an effect like Ākāśha, etc. Origination of Brahman cannot be established by any method of proof.

Brahman is existence itself. It cannot be an effect, as It can have no cause. The Śhruti text expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor. "He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the organs and there is of Him neither progenitor nor Lord" (Svet. Up. VI.9).

Moreover it is not separated from anything else.

Neither can Sat come from Asat, as Asat has no being, for that which is not (Asat) is without a self and cannot therefore constitute a cause, because a cause is the self of its effects. The Śhruti says "How can existence come out of non-existence? (Chh. Up. VI.2.2).

You cannot say that Sat comes from Sat as the relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a certain superiority on the part of the cause. The effect must have some speciality not possessed by the cause. Brahman is mere existence without any destruction.

Brahman cannot spring from that which is something particular, as this would be contrary to experience. Because we observe that particular forms are produced from what is general, as for instance, jars and pots from clay, but not that which is general is produced from particulars. Hence Brahman which is existence in general, cannot be the effect of any particular thing.

If there is no eternal First Cause, the logical fallacy of Anavastha Dosha (regressus ad infinitum) is inevitable. The non-admission of a fundamental cause (substance) would drive us to a retrogressus ad

infinitum. Śhruti says, "That great birthless Self is undecaying" (Bri. Up. IV.4.25).

Brahman is without any origin. According to Śhruti, He alone is the True one, who exists eternally. On the supposition of the origin of Brahman, He cannot be said to be eternal. Hence such a supposition is against Śhruti. It is also against reasoning, because by admitting such an origin the question of source of that origin arises; then again another source of that source and so on. Thus an argument may be continued ad infinitum without coming to a definite conclusion.

That fundamental cause-substance-which is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our Brahman.

Therefore Brahman is not an effect but is eternal.

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Topic 4: Fire originates from air.

II.3.10 (226) Fire (is produced) from this (i.e. air), so verily (declares the Śhruti).

Taittiriya Upaniṣhad declares that fire was born of air "Vayoragnih-From air is produced fire" (Tait. Up. II.1). Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (IV.2.3) declares "That (Brahman) created fire".

The consistency of the two Śhrutis is shown in Sūtra 13.

There is thus a conflict of scriptural passages with regard to the origin of fire. The Opponent maintains that fire has Brahman for its source. Why? Because the text declares in the beginning that there existed only that which is. It sent forth fire. The assertion that everything can be known through Brahman is possible only if everything is produced

from Brahman. The scriptural statement "Tajjalan" (Chh. Up. III.14.1) specifies no difference. The Mundaka text (II.1.3) declares that everything without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriya Upaniṣhad speaks about the entire universe without any exception "After having brooded, sent forth all whatever there is" (Tait. Up. II.6). Therefore, the statement that 'Fire was produced from air' (Tait. Up. II.1) teaches the order of succession only. "Fire was produced subsequently to air." The Pūrvapakshī says: The above two Upaniṣhadic passages can be reconciled by interpreting the Taittiriya text to mean the order of sequence - Brahman after creating air, created fire.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that Fire is produced from Vayu or air. This does not at all contradict the Chhandogya text. It means that Air is a product of Brahman and that fire is produced from Brahman, which has assumed the form of air. Fire sprang from Brahman only through intermediate links, not directly. We may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.

The general assertion that everything springs from Brahman requires that all things should ultimately be traced to that cause, and not that they should be its immediate effects. Thus there is no contradiction. There remains no difficulty.

It is not right to say that Brahman directly created Fire after creating Air, because the Taittiriya expressly says that fire was born of Air. No doubt Brahman is the root cause.

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Topic 5: Water is produced from fire.

II.3.11 (227) Water (is produced from fire).

The same thing may be said of water.

We have to supply from the preceding Sūtra the words “thence” and “for thus the text declares”.

The author of the Sūtras explained the creation of fire in the previous Sūtra. He explains creation of earth in the next Sūtra. He propounds the Sūtra in order to insert water and thus to point out its position in the Śhrīshtikrama or order of creation.

“Agnerapa/v”-From fire sprang water (Tait. Up. II.1). “Tatteja aikshata bahu syam prajaye yeti tadapo’sr/]]’ata-The fire thought ‘May I be many, may I grow forth.’ It created water.” (Chh. Up. VI.2.3). Doubt: Does water come out directly from fire or from Brahman? The Opponent says: Water comes out directly from Brahman as the Chhandyoga text teaches.

Siddhanta: There is no such conflict. From fire is produced water, for thus says the scripture.

Here also it means that as fire is a product of Brahman, it is from Brahman which has assumed the form of fire, that water is produced.

There is no room for interpretation regarding a text which is express and unambiguous.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is given the reason why water comes out of fire. “And, therefore, whenever anybody anywhere is hot and perspires water is produced on him from fire alone. Similarly, when a man suffers grief and is hot with sorrow, he weeps and thus water is

also produced from fire." These explicit statements leave no doubt that water is created from fire.

(250)

Topic 6: Earth is created from water.

II.3.12 (228) The earth (is meant by the word ‘Anna’) because of the subject matter, colour and other Śhruti texts.

The same thing may be said of earth.

"From water sprang earth" (Tait. Up. II.1). "It (water) produced Anna (literally food)" (Chh. Up. VI.2.4). The two Śhruti texts are apparently contradictory, because in one text water is said to produce earth and in another food.

The Sūtra says that ‘Anna’ in the Chhandogya text means not food but earth. Why? On account of the subject matter, on account of the colour, and on account of other passages. The subject matter in the first place is clearly connected with the elements, as we see from the preceding passages. "It sent forth fire; it sent forth water." In describing the creative order we cannot jump from water to cereals without having the earth. The creative order referred to is in regard to the elements. Therefore ‘Anna’ should refer to an element and not food.

Again we find in a complementary passage, "The black colour in fire is the colour of Anna" (Chh. Up. VI.4.1). Here, the reference to colour expressly indicates that the earth is meant by ‘Anna’. Black colour agrees with earth. The predominant colour of earth is black. Eatable things such as cooked dishes, rice, barley and the like are not

necessarily black. The Pauranikas also designate the colour of the earth by the term 'night'. The night is black. We, therefore, conclude that black is the colour of earth, also.

Other Śhruti texts like "What was there as the froth of the water, that was hardened and became the earth" (Bri. Up. I.2.2), clearly indicate that from water earth is produced.

On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like were produced from the earth, "From earth sprang herbs, from herbs food" (Tait. Up. II.1.2).

The complementary passage also, "whenever it rains" etc., pointing out that owing to the earthly nature of food (rice, barley, etc.), earth itself immediately springs from water.

Therefore, for all these reasons the word 'Anna' denotes this earth. There is really no contradiction between the Chhandogya and Taittiriya texts.

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Topic 7: Brahman abiding within the element is the creative principle.

II.3.13 (229) But on account of the indicating mark supplied by their reflecting, i.e. by the reflection attributed to the elements, He (i.e. the Lord is the creative principle abiding within the elements).

The contention raised in Sūtra 10 is now refuted.

The word 'tu' (but) is used in order to remove the doubt.

The Opponent says: The Śhrutis declare that Brahman is the creator of everything. But the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad says "From Ākāśha sprang air"

(Tait. Up. II.1). This indicates that certain elements produce certain effects independently. There is contradiction in the Śhruti passages. This Sūtra refutes this objection.

Creation of Ākāśha, fire, wind, water is done solely to God's will.

One element cannot create another element out of its own power. It is God in the form of one element that creates another element therefrom by His will.

The elements are inert. They have no power to create. Brahman Himself acting from within the elements was the real creator of all those elements. You will find in Brihadaranyka Upaniṣhad "He who dwells within the fire, who is different from fire, whom fire does not know, whose body is fire, who rules the fire from within, is Thy Immortal Ātman, the Inner Ruler within" (Bri. Up. III.7.5).

This Śhruti text indicates that the Supreme Lord is the sole Ruler and denies all independence to the elements.

Though it is stated in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad that the elements have created each one, the other next of it, yet the Supreme Lord is indeed the creator of everything because Śhruti declares that Brahman has created this world by the exercise of His will.

Texts such as "He wished may I become many, may I grow forth" (Tait. Up. II.6) and "It made itself its Self," i.e. the Self of everything which exists (II.7)-indicates that the Supreme Lord is the Self of everything. The passage "There is no other seer (thinker) but He" denies there being any other seer (thinker), that which is (i.e. Brahman) in the character of seer or thinker constitutes the subject matter of the whole

Chapter, as we conclude from the introductory passage "It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth" (Chh. Up. VI.2.3).

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad it is stated "That fire thought. That water thought." Reflection is not possible for the inert elements.

The Supreme Lord, the Inner Ruler of all elements, the Indweller within the elements reflected and produced the effects. This is the real meaning. The elements became causes only through the agency of the Supreme Lord who abides within them and rules them from within. Therefore there is no contradiction at all between the two texts.

For a wise man who reflects and cogitates there is no contradiction. The Śhruti texts are infallible and authoritative. Remember this point well always. The Śhruti texts have come out from the hearts of realised sages who had direct intuitive experience in Nirvikalpa Samādhi. They are neither fictitious novels nor products of the intellect.

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Topic 8: The process of dissolution of the elements is in the reverse order from that of creation.

II.3.14 (230) The order (in which the elements are indeed withdrawn into Brahman during Pralaya or dissolution) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order in which they are created) and this is reasonable.

The process of dissolution of the elements is described in this Sūtra.

The word 'tu' (but) has the force of 'only' here. The question here is whether at the time of cosmic dissolution or Pralaya the elements are

withdrawn into Brahman in an indefinite order, or in the order of creation or in the reverse order.

In creation the order is from above and in dissolution the order is from below. The order of involution is in the inverse of the order of evolution. It alone is quite appropriate and reasonable. Because we see in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has in descending to take the steps in the reverse order.

Further, we observe that things made of clay such as jars, dishes, etc., on being destroyed pass back into clay and that things which have originated from water such as snow and hail-stones again dissolve into water, the cause.

The gross becomes resolved into the subtle, the subtle into the subtler and so on till the whole manifestation attains its final First Cause, viz. Brahman. Each element is withdrawn into its immediate cause, in the reverse order till Ākāśha is reached, which in turn gets merged in Brahman.

Smṛiti also declares “O Divine Rishi! the earth, the basis of the universe is dissolved into water, water into fire, fire into air.” Those which are produced first in creation are more powerful.

Consequently they have longer existence. Therefore, it follows logically that the latest in creation, being of feeble essence, should first become absorbed in those of higher powers. The higher powers should later on take their turn. Vamana Purana declares: “The earlier a thing happens to be in creation, the more it becomes the receptacle of the Lord’s glory. Consequently those that are earlier in creation are more

powerful and are withdrawn only later. And for the same reason undoubtedly their pervasion is also greater."

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Topic 9: The mention of the mind and intellect does not interfere with the order of creation and reabsorption as they are the products of the elements.

II.3.15 (231) If it be said that between (Brahman and the elements) the intellect and the mind (are mentioned, and that therefore their origination and re-absorption are to be placed) somewhere in the series on account of their being inferential signs (whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken), we say, not so on account of the non-difference (of the intellect and the mind from the elements).

A further objection to the causation of the primary elements from Brahman is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of two parts namely an objection and its refutation. The objection is "Antara vijñānamānāsi kramena tallingat iti chet". The refutation portion is "Na aviśheṣhat".

In the Atharvāna (Mundaka Upaniṣhad) in the chapter which treats of the creation occurs the following text: "From this (Brahman) are born Prāṇa, mind, the senses, ether, air, fire, water and earth, the support of all" (II.1 .3).

The Opponent says: The order of creation which is described in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad contradicts the order of creation of elements described in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VI.2.3, and other Śrūtis.

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To this we reply: This is only a serial enumeration of the organs and the elements. It is not certainly a statement as to the order of their origination. The Mundaka text only states that all these are produced from Brahman.

In the Atharva Veda (Mundaka) mind, intellect and the senses are mentioned in the middle of the enumeration of the elements. This does not affect the evolutionary order, because the mind, the intellect and the senses are the effects, of the elements and their involution is included in the involution of the elements.

The intellect, the mind and the senses are products of the elements. Therefore, they can come into being only after the elements are created. The origination and reabsorption of the mind, intellect and the senses are the same as those of the elements as there is no difference between the senses and the elements.

Even if the mind, the intellect and the senses are separate from the elements, the evolutionary order is either the mind and the senses followed by the elements or the elements followed by the mind and the senses. Anyhow they have an orderly evolution.

That the mind, intellect and the organs are modifications of the elements and are of the nature of the elements is proved by Śhruti texts like "For the mind, my child, consists of earth, breath or vital force of water, speech of fire" (Chh. Up. VI.6.5).

Hence the Mundaka text which treats of creation does not contradict the order of creation mentioned in the Chhandogya and Taittiriya

Upaniṣhads. The origination of the organs does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the elements.

The Opponent again says: that as there is mention in Śhruti of the mind and the senses, Ākāśha and the other elements should not be considered to be created out of Brahman and to dissolve in Brahman but to be created out of and to dissolve in the mind and the senses according to the order of succession, as there is indication in the Mundaka to that effect.

This argument is untenable as there is no speciality mentioned in Śhruti about the creation of the elements. The mind, the intellect and the senses have all without exception been stated therein as created out of Brahman.

The word 'Etasmat' of that text is to be read along with every one of these i.e. Prāṇa, mind, etc. Thus "from Him is born Prāṇa, from Him is born mind, from Him are born the senses etc.-Etasmat Prāṇah, Etasmat Manah", etc.

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Topic 10: Births and deaths are not of the soul.

II.3.16 (232) But the mention of that (viz. birth and death of the individual soul) is apt only with reference to the bodies of beings moving and non-moving. It is secondary or metaphorical if applied to the soul, as the existence of those terms depends on the existence of that (i.e. the body).

The essential nature or character of the individual soul is discussed now.

A doubt may arise that the individual soul also has births and deaths because people use such expressions as “Ramakrishna is born”, “Ramakrishna is dead” and because certain ceremonies such as the Jatakarma etc., are prescribed by the scriptures at the birth and death of people.

This Sūtra refutes such a doubt, and declares that the individual soul has neither birth nor death. Birth and death pertain to the body with which the soul is connected but not to the soul. If the individual soul perishes there would be no sense in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant things in another body (another birth).

The connection of the body with the soul is popularly called birth, and the disconnection of the soul from the body is called death in the common parlance. Scripture says, “This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the living soul does not die” (Chh. Up. VI.11.3). Hence birth and death are spoken primarily of the bodies of moving and non-moving beings and only metaphorically of the soul.

That the words ‘birth’ and ‘death’ have reference to the conjunction with and separation from a body merely is also shown by the following Śhruti text, “On being born that person assuming his body, when he passes out of the body and dies” etc. (Bri. Up. IV.3.8).

The Jatakarma ceremony also has reference to the manifestation of the body only because the soul is not manifested.

Hence the birth and death belong to the body only but not to the soul.

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Topic 11: The individual soul is eternal. 'It is not produced'.

II.3.17 (233) The individual soul is not (produced), (because) it is not (so) mentioned by the scriptures, and as it is eternal according to them (the Śhruti texts).

The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is being continued.

Aitareya Upaniṣhad declares: At the beginning of creation there was only "One Brahman without a second" (I.1). Therefore it is not reasonable to say that the individual soul is not born, because then there was nothing but Brahman.

Again the Śhruti says, "As small sparks come forth from fire, thus from that Ātman all Prāṇas, all worlds, all gods emanate" (Bri. Up. II.1.20). "As from a blazing fire sparks, being of the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my friend, and return thither also," (Mun. Up. II.1.1). Therefore the Opponent argues that the individual soul is born at the beginning of the cycle, just as Ākāśha and other elements are born.

This Sūtra refutes it and says that the individual soul is not born.

Why? on account of the absence of scriptural statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation the Śhruti texts expressly deny birth to the individual soul.

We know from scriptural passages that the soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging, that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman, and that the soul has its self rooted in Brahman. A being of such a nature cannot be produced.

The scriptural passages to which we are alluding are the following: "The great unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman" (Bri. Up. IV.4.25). "The knowing self is not born, it dies not" (Katha Up. I.2.18). "The ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting" (Katha Up. I.2.18).

It is the one Brahman without a second that enters the intellect and appears as the individual soul "Having sent forth that entered into it" (Tait. Up. II.6). "Let me now enter those with this living self and let me then evolve names and forms" (Chh. Up. VI.3.2). "He entered thither to the very tips of finger-nails" (Bri. Up. I.4.7).

"Thou art That" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). "I am Brahman" (Bri. Up. I.4.10). "This self is Brahman, knowing all" (Bri. Up. II.5.19). All these texts declare the eternity of the soul and thus contend against the view of its having been produced.

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Therefore there is in reality no difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Jīva is not created. It is not a product. It is not born just as Ākāśha and other elements are born. The fact of the individual soul's being non-created does not contradict the Śhruti passage "At the beginning there was only the Ātman the one without a second" (Ait. Up. I.1).

The mention of creation of souls in the other Śhruti passages cited is only in a secondary sense. It does not therefore contradict the Śhruti passage "Having created it, It entered into it." The doctrine that souls are born from Brahman is not correct.

Those who propound this doctrine declare that if souls are born from Brahman, the scriptural statement that by knowing Brahman everything can become true, because Brahman is the cause and the knowledge of the cause will lead to the knowledge of all the objects.

They say further that Brahman cannot be identified with the individual souls, because He is sinless and pure, whereas they are not so. They further say that all that is separate is an effect and that as the souls are separate they must be effects.

The souls are not separate. The Śhruti declares, "There is one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings" (Svet. Up. VI.11). It only appears divided owing to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just as the ether appears divided by its connection with jars and the like. It is His connection with the intellect that leads to his being called a Jīva, or the individual soul. Ether in a pot is identical with the ether in space. All the above objections cannot stand because of the actual identity of the individual soul and Brahman. Therefore there is no contradiction of the declaration of the Śhruti that by knowing Brahman we can know everything. Origination of souls has reference only to the body.

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Topic 12: The nature of the individual soul is intelligence.

II.3.18 (234) For this very reason (viz, that it is not created), (the individual soul is) intelligence (itself).

The discussion on the essential characteristics of the individual soul is continued.

The Sāṅkhya doctrine is that the soul is always Chaitanya or pure consciousness in its own nature.

The Vaiśeṣikas declare that the individual soul is not intelligent by nature, because it is not found to be intelligent in the state of deep sleep or swoon. It becomes intelligent when the soul comes to the waking state and unites with the mind. The intelligence of the soul is adventitious and is produced by the conjunction of the soul with the mind, just as for instance the quality of redness is produced in an iron rod by the conjunction of the iron rod with fire.

If the soul were eternal, essential intelligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep sleep, swoon etc. Those who wake up from sleep say that they were not conscious of anything. Therefore, as intelligence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the intelligence of the soul is adventitious only.

To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence. Intelligence constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. This we know from Śruti texts such as “Brahman is knowledge and Bliss” (Bri. Up. III.9.28.7). “Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite” (Tait. Up. II.1). “Having neither inside nor outside but being altogether a mass of knowledge” (Bri. Up. IV.5.13). Now if the individual soul is nothing but that Supreme Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul’s essential nature, just as light and heat constitute the nature of fire.

The intelligent Brahman Itself being limited by the Upadhis or limiting adjuncts such as body, mind etc., manifests as the individual soul or Jīva. Therefore, intelligence is the very nature of Jīva and is never altogether destroyed, nor even in the state of deep sleep or swoon.

Śhruti texts directly declare that the individual soul is of the nature of self-luminous intelligence. "He not asleep, himself looks down upon the sleeping senses" (Bri. Up. IV.3.11). "That person is self-illuminated" (Bri. Up. IV.3.14). "For there is no intermission of the knowing of the knower" (Bri. Up. IV.3.30).

That the soul's nature is intelligence follows moreover from the passage (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4) where it is stated as connected with knowledge through all sense organs. "He who knows let me smell this, he is the self." You may ask, what is the use of the senses if the Ātman itself is of the nature of knowledge. The senses are needed to bring about the differentiated sensations and ideas (Vrittijnana).

From the soul's essential nature being intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless; because they serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense, such as smell and so on. Śhruti expressly declares: "Smell (organ of smell) is for the purpose of perceiving odour" (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4).

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The objection that sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in deep sleep, "And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing though he does not see. Because there is no intermission of the seeing of the seer for it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see" (Bri. Up. IV.3.23).

The non-sentiency in deep sleep is not due to absence of Chaitanya but absence of Vishaya (objects). The Jīva does not lose its power of seeing. It does not see, because there is no object to see.

It has not lost its intelligence, for it is impossible. The absence of actual intellectuality is due to the absence of objects, but not to the absence of intelligence, just as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.

If intelligence did not exist in deep sleep, etc., then who would be there to say that it did not exist? How could it be known? The man after waking from deep sleep says, "I slept soundly. I enjoyed perfect rest. I did not know anything." He who says, "I did not know anything. I enjoyed perfect rest" must have been existent at that time. If it is not so how could he remember the condition of that state? Therefore, the intelligence of the individual soul or Jīva is never lost under any condition. The reasoning of the Vaiseshikas and others is merely fallacious. It contradicts the Śhrutis. We therefore conclude and decide that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.

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Topic 13: (Sūtras 19-32) The size of the individual soul.

II.3.19 (235) (On account of the scriptural declarations) of (the soul's) passing out, going, and returning (the soul is not infinite in size; it is of atomic size).

The discussion on the character of the individual soul is continued.

From this up to Sūtra 32 the question of the size of the soul, whether it is atomic, medium-sized or infinite is discussed. The first ten Sūtras (19-28) state the arguments for the view that the individual soul is Anu (atomic). The next four Sūtras give the reply.

Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad declares “He is the one God, all-pervading” (VI.11). Mundaka Śhruti says, “This Ātman is atomic” (III.1.9).

The two texts contradict each other and we have to arrive at a decision on the point.

It has been shown above that the soul is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes its nature. Therefore it follows that it is identical with the Supreme Brahman. The infinity of the Supreme Brahman is expressly declared in the Śhrutis. What need then is there of a discussion of the size of the soul? True, we reply. But Śhruti texts which speak of the soul’s passing out from the body (Utkranti), going (Gati) and returning (Agati), establish the prima facie view that the soul is of limited size. Further, the Śhruti clearly declares in some places that the soul is of atomic size. The present discussion is therefore begun in order to clear this doubt.

The Opponent holds that the soul must be of limited atomic size owing to its being said to pass out, go and return.

Its passing out is mentioned in Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (III.3), “And when he passes out of this body he passes out together with all these.” its going is said in Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (I.2), “All who depart from this world go to the moon.” Its returning is seen in Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (IV.4.6), “From that world he returns again to this world of action.” From these statements as to the soul’s passing out from the body, going to heaven, etc., and returning from there to this world, it follows that it is of limited size. Because motion is not possible in the case of an all-pervading being. If the soul is infinite, how can it rise, or go or come? Therefore the soul is atomic.

II.3.20 (236) And on account of the latter two (i.e. going and returning) being connected with their soul (i.e. agent), (the soul is of atomic size).

An argument in support of Sūtra 19 is given in this Sūtra.

Even if it can be said that 'passing out' means only disconnection with the body, how can they who say that the soul is infinite explain its going to the moon or returning from there? Even if the soul is infinite still it can be spoken of as passing out, out of the body, if by that term is meant ceasing to be the ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its former actions having become exhausted, just as somebody, when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said to 'go out'. The passing away from the body may mean only cessation of the exercise of a definite function just as in the case of a man no longer retained in office.

But the two latter activities viz. going to the moon, returning from there to the world, are impossible for an all-pervading soul.

Hence the soul is atomic in size.

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II.3.21 (237) If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise, (i.e. all-pervading), (we say) not so, because (the one) other than the individual soul (i.e. the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self) is the subject matter (of those passages).

An objection to Sūtra 19 is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of an objection and its answer. The objection-portion is “Nanuratacchruteriti chef’ and the answer-portion is “Na itaradhikarat.” The passages which describe the soul and infinite apply only to Supreme Brahman and not to the individual soul.

Śhruti passages like “He is the one God, who is hidden in all beings, all-pervading, etc.” (Svet. Up. VI.11), “He is that great unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by the Prāṇas, the ether within the heart.” (Bri. Up. IV.4.22), “Like the ether He is Omnipresent, eternal,” “Truth, Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman” (Tait. Up. II.1)-refer not to the Jīva or the individual soul with its limitations, but to the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self, who is other than the individual soul, and forms the chief subject matter of all the Vedānta texts, because Brahman is the one thing that is to be known or realised intuitively and is therefore propounded by all the Vedānta passages.

II.3.22 (238) And on account of direct statements (of the Śhruti texts as to the atomic size) and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic).

The argument in support of Sūtra 19 is continued.

The soul must be atomic because the Śhruti expressly says so and calls him infinitely small.

Mundaka Śhruti declares, “This Ātma is atomic” (III.1.9).

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Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad says, “The individual is of the size of the hundredth part of a part, which itself is one hundredth part of the

point of a hair" (V.9); "That lower one also is seen small even like the point of a goad." Therefore the soul is atomic in size.

But an objection may here be raised. If the soul is of atomic size, it will occupy a point of the body only. Then the sensation which extends over the whole body would appear contrary to reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that those who take bath in the Ganga experience the sensation of cold all over their whole bodies. In summer people feel hot all over the body. The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer to the objection.

II.3.23 (239) There is no contradiction as in the case of sandal paste.

The argument in support of Sūtra 19 is continued.

Just as one drop of sandal-wood paste, smeared on one part of the body makes the whole body thrill with joy, so also the individual soul, though naturally minute, manifests itself throughout the whole body and experiences all the sensations of pleasure and pain.

Though the soul is atomic it may experience pleasure and pain extending over the whole body. Though the soul is atomic still it is possible that it pervades the entire body, just as a drop of sandal paste although in actual contact with one particular spot of the body only pervades, i.e. causes refreshing sensation all over the body.

As the soul is connected with the skin which is the seat of feeling, the assumption that the soul's sensations should extend over the whole body is not contrary to reason because the connection of the soul and the skin abides in the entire skin and the skin extends over the entire body.

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II.3.24 (240) If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul), we deny that, on account of the acknowledgement (by scripture, of a special place of the soul), viz. within the heart.

An objection to Sūtra 23 is raised and refuted by the Opponent.

The Sūtra consists of two parts namely, an objection, and its reply. The objection-portion is: 'Avasthitivaisheshyaditi chet', and the reply portion is: 'Nabhyupagamaddhridi hi'.

The Opponent raises an objection against his own view. The argument relied upon in the last Sūtra is not admissible, because the two cases compared are not parallel. The similarity is not exact. The analogy is faulty or inappropriate. In the case of the sandal paste, it occupies a particular point of the body and refreshes the entire body. But in the case of the soul it does not exist in any particular locality but is percipient of all sensations throughout the entire body. We do not know that it has a particular abode or special seat. When there is no special seat, for the soul, we cannot infer that it must have a particular abode in the body like the sandal paste and therefore be atomic. Because, even an all-pervading soul like ether, or a soul pervading the entire body like the skin may produce the same result.

We cannot reason like this: the soul is atomic because it causes effects extending over the entire body like a drop of sandal ointment, because that reasoning would apply to the sense of touch, the skin also, which

we know not to be of atomic size. Therefore it is not easy to decide the size of the soul when there is no positive proof.

The Opponent refutes the above objection by quoting such Śhruti texts as: "The soul abides within the heart" (Pras. Up. III.6), "The self is in the heart" (Chh. Up. VIII.3.3), "The Self abides in the heart" (Bri. Up. IV.3.7), "Who is that self? He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prāṇas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge," expressly declare that the soul has a special abode or particular seat in the body, viz. the heart. Therefore it is atomic.

The analogy is not faulty. It is quite appropriate. The two cases are parallel. Hence the argument resorted to in Sūtra 23 is not objectionable.

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II.3.25 (241) Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience (such as in the case of a lamp by its light).

The argument in support of Sūtra 23 is continued.

Or it is like a small light which, by its own virtue, illuminates the whole house. The soul, though atomic and occupies a particular portion of the body, may pervade the whole body by its quality of intelligence as the flame pervades the whole room by its rays and thus experiences pleasure and pain throughout the whole body.

A further example is given by way of comparison to show how an atomic soul can have experience throughout the entire body.

II.3.26 (242) The extension (of the quality of intelligence) beyond (the soul in which it inheres) is like the odour (which extends beyond the fragrant object).

Sūtra 23 is further elucidated by this Sūtra.

Just as the sweet fragrance of flowers extends beyond them and diffuses throughout a larger space, so also the intelligence of the soul, which is atomic, extends beyond the soul and pervades the entire body.

If it be said that even the analogy in the above Sūtra is not appropriate, because a quality cannot be apart from the substance, and hence the light of a lamp is only the lamp in its tenuous form, the analogy of perfume will apply. Just as though a flower is far away its scent is felt around, so though the soul is atomic its cognition of the entire body is possible. This analogy cannot be objected on the ground that even the fragrance of a flower is only the subtle particles of the flower, because our experience is that we feel the fragrance and not any particles.

II.3.27 (243) Thus also, (the Śhruti) shows or declares.

The Śhruti also, after having signified the soul's abiding in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such passages as "Upto the hairs, upto the tips of the nails" (Kau. Up. IV.20, Bri. Up. I.4.7), that the soul pervades the whole body by means of intelligence, which is its quality.

(265)

II.3.28 (244) On account of the separate teaching (of the Śhruti) (that the soul pervades the body on account of its quality of intelligence).

This Sūtra is a defence in favour of the preceding Sūtra where intelligence is used as an attribute of the individual soul and so separate from it.

A further argument is given here to establish the proposition of the previous Sūtra. Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad declares "Having by Prajñā, (intelligence, knowledge,) taken possession of the body" (III.6). This indicates that intelligence is different from the soul being related as instrument and agent and the soul pervades the entire body with this quality of intelligence.

Again the text "Thou the intelligent person having through the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence" (Bri. Up. II.1.17) shows intelligence to be different from the agent, i.e. the Jīva or the individual soul and so likewise confirms our views.

Though there is no fundamental difference between the individual soul and his intelligence, they are different in the sense that intelligence is the attribute of the individual soul which is the substance.

The individual soul is the possessor of that attribute, because the Śhruti states a difference between the two.

II.3.29 (245) But that declaration (as to the atomic size of the soul) is on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (viz. the Buddhi), as in the case of the intelligent Lord (Saguna Brahman).

The discussion on the true character of the individual soul, commenced in Sūtra 16 is continued.

The word 'tu' (but), refutes all that has been said in Sūtras 19-28 and decides that the soul is all-pervading.

The next four Sūtras are the Siddhanta Sūtras which lay down the correct doctrine.

The soul is not of atomic size as the Śhruti does not declare it to have had an origin. The scripture declares that the Supreme Brahman entered the universe as the individual soul and that the individual soul is identical with Brahman, and that the individual soul is nothing else but the Supreme Brahman. If the soul is the Supreme Brahman, it must be of the same extent as Brahman. The scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.

(266)

Your argument is that though the soul is Anu, it can cognise all that goes on in the body because of its contact with the skin. But that argument is untenable because when a thorn pricks we feel pain only in the pricked spot. Moreover, your analogy of the lamp and its light and of the flower and its fragrance has no real applicability, because a Guṇa (quality) can never be apart from the substance (Guṇa). The light and the perfume are only subtle portions of the flame and the flower. Further, as Chaitanya is the nature or Svarūpa of the soul, the soul also must be of the size of the body if there is cognition of the whole body. This latter doctrine has been already refuted. Therefore the soul must be infinite.

The Jīva is declared to be atomic by reason of its identification with the Buddhi.

According to the extent of intellect, the size of the individual soul has been fixed. It is imagined that the soul is connected with the Buddhi or intellect and bound. Passing out, going and coming are qualities of the intellect and are superimposed on the Jīva or the individual soul. The soul is considered to be atomic on account of the limitation of the intellect. That the non-transmigrating eternally free Ātman, which neither acts nor enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the Buddhi is due only to its having the qualities of the Buddhi (intellect) for its essence, viz. as long as it is in fictitious connection with the Buddhi. It is similar to imagining the all-pervading Lord as limited for the sake of Upāsana or worship.

Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad (V.9) says, "That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite." This Śhruti text at first states the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite. This is appropriate only if the atomicity of the soul is metaphorical and its infinity is real, because both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at the same time. The infinity certainly cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense, as all the Upaniṣhads aim at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.

The other passage (Svet. Up. V.8) which treats of the measure of the soul "The lower one endowed with the quality of mind and the quality of the body, is seen small even like the point of a goad" teaches the soul's small size to depend on its connection with the qualities of the Buddhi, not upon its own Self.

Mundaka Upaniṣhad declares, “That small (Anu) Self is to be known by thought” (III.1.9). This Upaniṣhad does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, as the subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be fathomed by the eye, etc., but to be realised by the light of knowledge. Further, the soul cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.

Therefore the statement about Anutva (smallness, subtlety) has to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts.

The Buddhi abides in the heart. So it is said that the soul abides in the heart. Really the soul is all-pervading.

As the soul is involved in the Samsāra and as it has for its essence the qualities of its limiting adjunct viz. Buddhi, it is spoken of as minute.

(267)

II.3.30 (246) And there is no defect or fault in what has been said in the previous Sūtra (as the conjunction of the soul with the intellect exists) so long as the soul (in its relative aspect) exists; because it is so seen (in the scriptures).

An additional reason is given in support of Sūtra 29.

The Opponent raises an objection. Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory condition of the soul is due to the qualities of the intellect forming its essence. It will follow from this that, as the conjunction of the intellect and soul which are different entities must necessarily come to an end, the soul when disjoined from the intellect

will either cease to exist altogether or at least cease to be a Samsārin (individual soul).

To this objection this Sūtra gives a reply. There can be no such defect in the argument of the previous Sūtra, because this connection with the Buddhi (intellect) lasts so long as the soul's state of Samsāra is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge. As long as the soul's connection with the Buddhi, its limiting adjunct lasts, so long the individual soul remains individual soul, involved in transmigratory existence.

There is no Jīva or individual soul without identification with intellect. The connection of the soul with the intellect will cease only by right knowledge. The scripture declares "I know that Person of sunlike lustre beyond darkness. A man who knows Him passes over death, there is no other path to go (Svet. Up. III.8).

How is it known that the soul is connected with the Buddhi as long as it exists? We reply, because that is seen, viz. in scripture. It is known from the Śhrutis that this connection is not severed even at death. The scripture declares, "He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, surrounded by Prāṇas, the person of light, he remaining the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving" (Bri. Up. IV.3.7). Here the term "consisting of knowledge" means 'consisting of Buddhi'. The passage "He remaining in the same wanders along the two worlds" declares that the Self, even when going to another world, is not separated from the Buddhi etc. The term "as if thinking," "as if moving" mean that the individual soul does not think and move on its own account, but only through its association with the

Buddhi. The individual soul thinks as it were, and moves as it were, because the intellect to which it is joined really moves and thinks.

The connection of the individual soul with the intellect, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge. Wrong knowledge (Mithyajnana) cannot cease except through perfect knowledge.

Therefore, as long as there does not arise the realisation of Brahman or Brahmajnana, so long the connection of the soul with the intellect and its other limiting adjuncts does not come to an end.

(268)

II.3.31 (247) On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that (connection) which exists (potentially) like virile power, etc.

A proof is now given in support of Sūtra 29 by showing the perpetual connection between the individual soul and the intellect. The word 'tu' (but), is used in order to set aside the objection raised above.

An objection is raised that in Sushupti or deep sleep and Pralaya there can be no connection with the intellect, as the scripture declares, "Then he becomes united with the True; he is gone to his own" (Chh. Up. VI.8.1). How then can it be said that the connection with the intellect lasts so long as the individual soul exists? The Sūtra refutes it and says that this connection exists in a subtle or potential form even in deep sleep. Had it not been for this, it could not have become manifest in the waking state. Such connection is clear from the appropriateness of such connection becoming manifest during creation, after dissolution and during the waking state after sleep, as in the case of virility dormant in boyhood and manifest in manhood.

The connection of the soul with the intellect exists potentially during deep sleep and the period of dissolution and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.

Virile power becomes manifest in manhood only if it exists in a fine or potential state in the body. Hence this connection with the intellect lasts so long as the soul exists in its Samsāra-state.

(269)

II.3.32 (248) Otherwise (if no intellect existed) there would result either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e. of the soul or of the senses).

The internal organ (Antahkarana) which constitutes the limiting adjunct of the soul is called in different places by different names such as Manas (mind), Buddhi (intellect), Vijñāna (knowledge), and Chitta (thought) etc. When it is in a state of doubt it is called Manas; when it is in a state of determination it is called Buddhi. Now we must necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal organ, because otherwise there would result either perpetual perception or perpetual non-perception. There would be perpetual perception whenever there is a conjunction of the soul, and senses and the objects of senses, the three together forming the instruments of perception. Or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect did not follow, there would be perpetual non-perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually observ+ed.

Or else we will have to accept the limitation of the power either of the soul or of the senses. But the limiting of power is not possible, as the

Ātman is changeless. It cannot be said that the power of the senses which is not obstructed either in the previous moment or in the subsequent moment is limited in the middle.

Therefore we have to acknowledge the existence of an internal organ (Antahkarana) through whose connection and disconnection perception and non-perception take place. The scripture declares, "My mind was elsewhere, I did not see, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for a man sees with his mind and hears with the mind" (Bri. Up. I.5.3). The scripture further shows that desire, representation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.

Therefore there exists an internal organ, the Antahkarana, and the connection of the soul with the internal organ causes the Ātman to appear as the individual soul or as the soul its Samsāra state as explained in Sūtra 29. The explanation given in Sūtra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.

(270)

Topic 14: (Sūtras 38-39) The individual soul is an agent.

II.3.33 (249) (The soul is) an agent on account of the scripture having a purport thereby.

Another characteristic of the individual soul is being stated.

The question as regards the size of the soul has been stated.

Now another characteristic of the soul is taken up for discussion. The Jīva is a doer or an agent, for otherwise the scriptural injunctions will be useless. On that assumption scriptural injunctions such as "He is to

sacrifice," "He is to make an oblation into the fire," "He is to give," etc., have a purport, otherwise they would be purportless. The scriptures enjoin certain acts to be done by the agent. If the soul be not an agent these injunctions would become meaningless. On that supposition there is meaning to the following passage also, "For, it is he who sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he is the person whose self is knowledge" (Pras. Up. IV.9). "He who desires to attain heaven, has to perform sacrifices; and he, who desires to attain salvation, has to worship Brahman in meditation."

II.3.34 (250) And on account of (the Śhruti) teaching (its) wandering about.

An argument in support of Sūtra 33 is given.

The Śhruti declares "The immortal one goes wherever he likes" (Bri. Up. IV.3.12), and again "He taking the senses along with him moves about according to his pleasure, within his own body" (Bri. Up. II.1.18). These passages which give a description of the wandering of the soul in the dream indicate clearly that the soul is an agent.

II.3.35 (251) (Also it is a doer) on account of its taking the organs.

Another argument in support of Sūtra 33 is given.

(271)

The text quoted in the last Sūtra also indicates that the soul in dream state takes the organs with it. "Having taken through the intelligence of the senses, intelligence, and having taken the senses" (Bri. Up. II.1.18, 19). This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.

It is a doer or an agent because it is said to use the senses. The individual soul is to be admitted as the agent, because he is described in Śhruti to take the senses along with him as instruments of his work, while roaming within his own body during the dream state. "Thus, he taking the senses along with him, moves about within his own body, just as he pleases." (Bri. Up. II.1.18).

In the Gītā also we find "when the soul acquires a body and when he abandons it, he seizes these and goes with them, as the wind takes fragrance from the flowers" (Gītā. XV.8).

II.3.36 (252) (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not so, there would be a change of designation.

The argument in support of Sūtra 33 is continued.

In the passage "Vijñānam yajnam tanute, Karrnani fanute'p/' cha" - "Intelligence (i.e. the intelligent person, Jīva) performs sacrifices, and it also performs all acts" (Tait. Up.II.5), by 'Intelligence' the soul is meant and not the Buddhi. This clearly shows that the soul is an agent.

Vijñāna refers to Jīva and not to Buddhi, because if Buddhi is referred to, the word would be 'Vijñānena'. The nominative case in 'Vijñānam yajnam tanute', should be instrumental case, 'Vijñānena', 'by intelligence' meaning through its instrumentality.

We see that in another text where the Buddhi is meant the word 'intelligence' is exhibited in the instrumental case "Having through the intelligence of these senses it takes all understanding" (Bri. Up. II.1.17). In the passage under discussion, on the contrary, the word

‘intelligence’ is given in the characteristic of the agent, viz. nominative case and therefore indicates the soul which is distinct from the Buddhi.

(272)

II.3.37 (253) As in the case of perception (there is) no rule (here also).

The argument in support of Sūtra 33 is continued.

An objection is raised that if the soul were a free agent, then why should he do any act productive of harmful effects? He would have done only what is beneficial to him and not both good and evil actions.

This objection is refuted in this Sūtra. Just as the soul, although he is free, perceives both pleasant and unpleasant things, so also he performs both good and evil actions. There is no rule that he should perform only what is beneficial and avoid what is bad or harmful.

In the performance of actions, the soul is not absolutely free as he depends on differences of place, time and efficient causes. But an agent does not cease to be so because he is in need of assistance. A cook remains the agent in action of cooking, although he needs fuel, water, etc. His function as a cook exists at all times.

II.3.38 (254) On account of the reversal of power (of the Buddhi).

The argument in support of Sūtra 33 is continued.

If the Buddhi which is an instrument becomes the agent and ceases to function as an instrument there would take place a reversal of power, i.e. the instrumental power which pertains to the Buddhi would have to be set aside and to be replaced by the power of an agent.

if the Buddhi has the power of an agent, it must be admitted that it is also the object of self-consciousness (Aham-pratyaya), as we see that everywhere activity is preceded by self-consciousness: "I go, I come, I eat, I drink, I do, I enjoy." If the Buddhi is endowed with the power of an agent and affects all things, we have to assume for it another instrument by means of which it affects everything, because every doer needs an instrument.

Hence the whole dispute is about a name only. There is no real difference, since in either case that which is different from the instrument of action is admitted to be the agent. In either case an agent different from the instrument has to be admitted.

(273)

II.3.39 (255) And on account of the impossibility of Samādhi.

The argument in support of Sūtra 33 is continued.

If the soul is not a doer, there will be non-existence of attainment of liberation. If the Jīva or soul is not an agent, then the realisation prescribed by Śhruti texts like "The Ātman is to be realised" (Bri. Up. II.4.5.) through Samādhi would be impossible. The meditation taught in the Vedānta texts is possible only if the soul is the agent. "Verily, the Ātman is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be searched." "The Self we must seek out, we must try to understand" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1.) "Meditate on the Self as OM" (Mun. Up. II.2.6). Therefrom also it follows that the soul is an agent.

"The soul will not be capable of practising hearing, reasoning, reflection, and meditation" which lead to Samādhi and the attainment of Knowledge of the Imperishable. Hence there will be no

emancipation for the soul. Therefore it is established that the soul alone is the agent, but not the Buddhi.

Topic 15: The soul is an agent as long as it is limited by the adjuncts.

II.3.40 (256) And as the carpenter is both.

The argument in support of Sūtra 33 is continued.

That the individual soul is an agent has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sūtras 33 to 39. We now have to consider whether this agency is its real nature or only a superimposition due to its limiting adjuncts. The Nyāya School maintains that it is its very nature.

This Sūtra refutes it and declares that it is superimposed on the soul and not real. Such doership is not the soul's nature, because if it is so, there could be no liberation, just as fire, being hot in its nature, can never be free from heat. Doing is essentially of the nature of pain.

You cannot say that even if there is the power of doing, emancipation can come when there is nothing to do, because the power of doing will result in doing at some time or other. The Śhruti calls the Ātman as having an eternally pure conscious and free nature. How could that be if doership is its nature? Hence, its doership is due to its identification with a limiting function. So there is no soul as doer or enjoyer apart from Para-Brahman. You cannot say that in that case God will become a Samsārin, because doership and enjoyment are due only to Avidyā.

The body of the carpenter is not the cause of his function. His tools are the cause. Even so the soul is a doer only through the mind and the senses. The scriptural injunctions do not command doing but command acts to be done on the basis of such doership which is due to Avidyā.

(274)

The Śhruti declares “This Ātman is non-attached” (Bri. Up. IV.3.15). Just as in ordinary life, a carpenter suffers when he is working with his tools and is happy when he leaves his work, so does the Ātman suffer when he is active in the waking and dream states through his connection with the intellect, etc., and is blissful when he ceases to be an agent as in the state of deep sleep.

The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts refer to the conditioned state of the self. By nature the soul is inactive. It becomes active through connection with its Upadhis or limiting adjuncts, the intellect, etc. Doership really belongs to the intellect. Eternal Upalabdhi or Consciousness is in the soul. Doership implies Ahamkara or ego-consciousness. Hence such doership does not belong to the soul as its nature but belongs to the intellect.

The scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose an agentship established somehow on account of Avidyā or ignorance, but do not themselves aim at establishing the direct agentship of the Self. The agentship of the Self does not constitute its real nature because scripture teaches that its true Self is Brahman. We, therefore, conclude that the Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agentship of the soul which is due to Avidyā.

Nor can you infer doership from the description of Vihara (play or activity) in dreams, because the connection with the mind or intellect continues in dreams. Even in the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not altogether at rest; because scripture declares that even then it is connected with the Buddhi. “Having become a dream,

together with Buddhi, it passes beyond this world." Smṛiti also says, "when the senses being at rest, the mind not being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know to be a dream." It is clearly established that the agency of the soul is due to its limiting adjunct Buddhi only.

(275)

II.3.41 (257) But (even) that (agency of the soul) is from the Supreme Lord, so declares the Śhruti.

A limitation to Sūtra 33 is stated.

We now enter on the discussion whether the agency characterising the individual soul in the state of ignorance on account of its limiting adjuncts is independent of the Lord or dependent on Him.

The Opponent maintains that the soul as far as it is an agent does not depend on the Lord.

The word 'tu' (but), is employed in order to remove the doubt raised by the Opponent. The view that the soul's doership is due to its desires and its possession of the senses as instruments and not to the Lord is wrong, because the Śhruti declares that Lord is the cause.

The agency of the soul is also due to the Supreme Lord. It can be understood from Śhruti that the agency of the individual soul is verily subordinate to and controlled by the Supreme Lord. The soul does good and bad deeds being so directed by the Lord.

Śhruti declares, "He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do good deeds; He makes him, whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds." (Kau. Up. III.8) and, again, "He who

dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within" (Sat. Br. XIV.6.7.30). "The Universal Soul entering within, governs the individual souls" - "Antah pravishtah sasta jivanam" "The Lord is within all, the Ruler of all creatures." You cannot say that that will cause the attribution of partiality (Vaishamya) and cruelty (Nairghrinya) to the Lord, because He acts according to Dharma (merit) and Adharma (demerit). You may reply that these are due to doership and if doership is due to the Lord, how can the Lord act according to Dharma and Adharma? We reply that the Śhruti says that the soul is the doer and declares as cause of doership the Supreme Lord who is the bestower of the fruits of actions, who is immanent in all, who is the witness of all actions, and who is the inspirer and guider of all.

(276)

II.3.42 (258) But (the Lord's making the soul act) depends on the works done (by it), for otherwise there will be uselessness of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.

This Sūtra proceeds to narrow the scope of Sūtra 41 within certain limits.

If causal agency belongs to the Lord, it follows that He must be cruel and unjust and that the soul has to undergo consequences of what it has not done. He must be cruel and whimsical too as He makes some persons do good acts and others evil deeds. This Sūtra refutes this doubt.

The word 'tu' (but), removes the objections. The Lord always directs the soul according to its good or bad actions done in previous births. He bestows good and bad fruits according to the soul's good and bad

actions. He is the rain which always causes each seed to fructify according to its power. Though doership is dependent on the Lord, doing is the soul's act. What the soul does the Lord causes to be done. Such doing is due to deeds done in previous birth and Vasanas which, again, are due to previous Karmas and so on, Samsāra being without beginning (Anādi). As Samsāra is beginningless there will always be previous births with actions performed in those births for the guidance of the Lord. Hence He cannot be accused of being cruel, unjust and whimsical. To give fruits the Lord depends on the soul's actions. If this were not so, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. If Lord does not depend on the soul's actions for giving fruit, effort or exertion (Puruṣhartha) will have no place at all.

The soul will gain nothing by following these injunctions.

Moreover, time, place and causation will be capriciously operative and not according to the law of cause and effect, if our Karma is not the instrumental cause, and the Lord the Supervising Cause.

(277)

Topic 17: (Sūtras 43-53) Relation of the individual soul to Brahman.

II.3.43 (259) (The soul is) a part of the Lord on account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise also (i.e. as non-different from Brahman); because in some (Vedic texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fishermen, knaves, etc.

This Sūtra shows that the individual soul is different from as well as the same with Brahman.

In the last topic it has been shown that the Lord rules the soul.

Now the question of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman is taken up. Is it that of master and servant or as between fire and its sparks? The Opponent holds that the relation is like that of master and servant, because that connection only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and ruled (subject).

To this the Sūtra says that the soul must be considered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of the fire. But then the soul is not actually a part, but a part as it were. It is an imagined part only, because Brahman cannot have any parts. Brahman is Nishkala, without parts.

He is Akhanda (indivisible). He is Niravayava (without limbs).

Why then should it be taken as a part and not identical with the Lord? Because the scriptures declare a difference between them in texts like "That self it is which we must search out, that it is we must try to understand" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). "He who knows Him becomes a Muni" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). "He who dwelling within the self, pulls the self from within" (Bri. Up. III.7.23). "The Ātman is to be seen" (Bri. Up. II.4.5). This difference is spoken of from the relative viewpoint. They are identical from the absolute viewpoint.

The text "Brahman is the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers" etc., indicate that even such low persons are in reality Brahman and that all individual souls, men, women and children are all Brahman.

The same viewpoint is set forth in other passages such as "Thou art woman, Thou art man, Thou art the youth, Thou art the maiden; Thou as an old man totters along on Thy staff, Thou art born with Thy face turned everywhere" (Svet. Up. IV.3). Texts like "There is no other but

He" and similar ones establish the same truth. Non-differentiated intelligence belongs to the soul and the Lord alike, just as heat belongs to the sparks as well as the fire.

From these two views of difference, and non-difference, there results the comprehensive view of the soul being a part of the Lord.

II.3.44 (260) Also from the words of the Mantra (it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).

An argument in support of Sūtra 43, that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is given.

A further reason is given to show that the soul is a part of the Lord. "Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is the Person. One foot of It are all these beings, three feet of It are the immortal in heaven," (Chh. Up. III.12.6) where beings including souls are said to be a foot or part of the Lord. (One foot, i.e. the fourth part of Him are all beings, the whole creation covers only a fraction of Him). Puruṣha Sukta: Rigveda: X.90.3, declares the same thing. "All the beings are but a foot of Him".

The word 'pada' and 'amsa' are identical. Both mean part or a portion.

Hence we conclude that the individual soul is a part of the Lord, and again from the following reason.

(278)

II.3.45 (261) And it is so stated in the Smṛiti.

The argument that the individual soul is a part of Brahman is concluded here.

The Smṛiti also says so- that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. "An eternal portion of Myself becomes the individual soul in the world of life" (Bhagavad Gītā: XV.7).

II.3.46 (262) The Supreme Lord is not (affected by pleasure and pain) like this (individual soul) just as light (is unaffected by the shaking of its reflections).

The speciality of the Supreme Lord is shown in this Sūtra.

Here the Opponent raises another objection. If the soul is a part of the Lord, the Lord also must experience pleasure and pain like the soul. We see in ordinary life that the entire Ramakrishna suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some other limb. Hence attainment of God would mean maximum grief and pain, and the old limited pain of individual soul would be far better.

This Sūtra refutes it. The Lord does not experience pleasure and pain like the individual soul. The individual soul identifies itself with the body, the senses and the mind, on account of ignorance, and therefore experiences pleasure and pain. The Supreme Lord neither identifies himself with a body, nor imagines himself to be afflicted by pain.

The pain of the individual soul also is not real but imaginary only.

It is due to non-discrimination of the Self from the body, senses and mind which are the products of Avidyā or ignorance.

Just as a man feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so also he feels the pain which affects others such as sons or friends, by erroneously identifying himself with them. He enters as it were into them through Moha or

love and imagines "I am the son, I am the friend." This clearly shows that the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagination.

(279)

Some men and women are sitting together and talking. If then somebody calls out "the son has died", grief is produced in the minds of those who have Moha or love for sons on account of erroneous imagination, identification, and connection, but not in the minds of religious ascetics or Sannyāsins who have freed themselves from that imagination. If even a man of right knowledge who has become an ascetic has no pain or grief consequent on death of relations or friends, God who is Supreme and alone, who is pure consciousness, who is eternal pure intelligence, who sees nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects, can have no pain at all.

To illustrate this view the Sūtra introduces a comparison like light etc. Just as the light of the sun which is all-pervading becomes straight or bent by coming in contact with particular objects, but does not really become so, or the ether of a pot seems to move when the pot is moved, but does not really move, or as the sun does not tremble although its image which is reflected in water trembles, so also the Lord is not affected by pleasure, pain or grief although pleasure and pain etc., are felt by that part of Him, which is called the individual soul which is a product of ignorance and is limited by Buddhi, etc.

Just as the sun does not become contaminated by its touch through its parts, the rays with the impurities of the earth, so also the Supreme Lord does not become affected by the enjoyment and suffering of the individual soul, though latter is part and parcel of the former.

When the soul's individual state due to ignorance is sublated, it becomes Brahman, "Thou art That" etc. Thus the Supreme Lord is not affected by the pain of the individual soul.

II.3.47 (263) The Smṛitis also state (that).

"Of the two, the Supreme Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities. It is not touched by the fruits of actions, any more than a lotus leaf by water." The Smṛiti texts like these state that the Supreme Lord does not experience pleasure and pain.

(280)

3.48 (264) Injunctions and prohibitions (are possible) on account of the connection (of the Self) with the body, as in the case of light, etc.

The necessity for observance of mandatory and prohibitory rules is explained.

The Ātman or the Supreme Self is one. There can be no injunctions and prohibitions with regard to the Ātman. But injunctions and prohibitions are possible when it is connected with a body. What are those permissions and injunctions? "He is to approach his wife at the proper time." "He is not to approach the wife of his Guru." "He is to kill the animal devoted to Agnistoma" and "He is not to hurt any being." Fire is one only but the fire of the funeral pyre is rejected and that of a sacrifice is accepted. Some things consisting of earth, like diamonds, are desired; other things consisting of earth, like dead bodies, are shunned. The urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as such; those of other animals are rejected. Water poured from a clean vessel or offered by a clean person is to be accepted; that contained in

an unclean vessel or offered by an unclean man is to be rejected. Similar is the case with the Ātman.

When the soul is in a state of attachment to the body, ethical ideas of purity and impurity have full application.

3.49 (265) And on account of the non-extension (of the soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of results of actions).

The discussion on the special characteristic of the individual soul is continued.

An objection is raised that on account of the unity of the self there would result a confusion of the results of actions, there being only one master, i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of actions. This Sūtra refutes such a possibility.

This is not so, because there is no extension of the acting and enjoying self, i.e. no connection on its part with all bodies. The individual soul depends on its adjuncts, and there is also non-extension of the soul on account of the non-extension of those adjuncts. The individual souls are different from each other. Each soul is connected with a particular body, mind, etc.

The individual soul has no connection with all the bodies at the same time. He is connected with one body only and he is affected by the peculiar properties of that one alone. Therefore the effects of works done by the soul in one body belongs to him in respect of that body only and not of any other body. All the individuals are not affected by the works done by a particular individual.

There will be no possibility for the Ātman, as it is one, to experience all the pleasures and all the pains of all the bodies, because the bodies are disconnected.

Therefore there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions.

(281)

3.50 (266) And (the individual soul is) only a reflection (of Paramatman or the Supreme Lord).

According to Vedānta, the individual soul is only a reflection of Brahman or the Supreme Soul in the mind like the reflection of the sun in the water. Just as the reflections of the sun in different pots of water are different, so also the reflections of the Supreme Soul in different minds are different. Just as, when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also, so also when a particular soul experiences fruits of his actions, viz. pleasure and pain, it is not shared by other souls. When the individual soul in one body is undergoing the effects of his actions, the soul in any other body is not affected on that account.

For those, such as the Saṅkhyas, the Vaiseshikas and the Naiyayikas on the contraw, who maintain that there are many souls and all of them all-pervading, it follows that there must be a confusion of actions and results, because each soul is present everywhere near to those causes which produce pleasure and pain.

According to the opinion of the Saṅkhyas, there exist many all-pervading selfs, whose nature is pure intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable excellence. For the common purpose of all of

them there exists the Pradhāna through which the souls obtain enjoyment and release.

In the Sāṅkhya philosophy the individual soul has been stated to be all-pervading. If this view be accepted there would be confusion of works and their effects. This view of Sāṅkhyas is therefore an unfair conclusion.

Therefore there can be no confusion of the results of action.

(282)

3.51 (267) There being no fixity about the unseen principle (there would result confusion of works and their effects for those who believe in many souls, each all-pervading).

Adṛiṣṭa: the fate, the accumulated stock of previous actions, waiting as a latent force to bring forth fruits in future, merit or demerit acquired by the souls by thoughts, words and actions; Aniyamat: for want of any binding rule, on account of non-determinateness.) The discussion begun in Sūtra 50 is continued.

Sūtras 51 to 53 refute the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas and other schools about the plurality of souls, each of which is all-pervading. It leads to absurdities.

This confusion cannot be avoided by bringing the Adṛiṣṭa or unseen principle, because if all the souls equally are all-pervading, there cannot be any binding rule as to upon which of them the force will act.

According to the Sāṅkhyas, the Adṛiṣṭa does not inhere in the soul but in the Pradhāna which is common to all souls. Hence there is nothing to fix that a particular Adṛiṣṭa operates in a particular soul.

The doctrine of the other two schools is open to the same objection. According to the Nyāya and Vaiseshika schools, the unseen principle is created by the conjunction of the soul with the mind. Here also there is nothing to fix that a particular Adṛiṣṭa belongs to a particular soul, as every soul is all-pervading and therefore equally connected with all minds.

Therefore the confusion of results is unavoidable.

3.52 (268) And this is also the case in resolutions, etc.

The discussion begun in Sūtra 50 is continued.

The same logical defect will apply also to the resolve to do actions. There will be no orderliness of resolves to do actions. That is want of order also in matters of personal determination, etc., if the individual soul be admitted to be all-pervading.

If it be held that the resolution which one makes to get something or to avoid something will allot the Adṛiṣṭa to particular souls, even then there will be this confusion of results of actions, because resolutions are formed by the conjunction of the soul and the mind.

Therefore the same argument applies here also.

If the individual soul is all-pervading, there cannot be any order in motives or matters of personal determination such as "I will do a certain thing" or "I will not do a certain thing" because in such a case, everyone becomes conscious of the determination of every other.

Therefore no order of determination and its putting it into action can be maintained. Moreover collision between wills cannot be avoided.

But order is found in this world everywhere.

Therefore it is established that the soul is not all-pervading.

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3.53 (269) If it be said (that the distinction of pleasure and pain etc., results) from (the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account of the self being in all bodies.

An objection to Sūtra 52 is raised and refuted. This Sūtra consists of two parts, viz. an objection and its reply. The objection portion is 'Pradesaditi chet' and the reply portion is 'Na antarbhavat.' The Naiyayikas and others try to get over the difficulty shown in the previous Sūtra by giving the following argument. Though each soul is all-pervading, yet, confusion of results of actions will not occur if we take its connection with the mind to take place in that part of it which is limited by its body.

Even this cannot stand. This also is not possible on account of its being within all. Because, as being equally infinite all selves are within all bodies. Every soul is all-pervading and therefore permeates all bodies. There is nothing to fix that a particular body belongs to a particular soul.

Moreover, on account of the doctrine of limitation due to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two selves enjoying the same pleasure or pain may effect their fruition by one and the same way, as it may happen that the unseen principle of two selves occupies the same place.

Further, from the doctrine that the unseen principles occupy fixed places it would follow that no enjoyment of heaven can take place, because the Adṛiṣṭa is effected in definite places such as, e.g. the body

of a Brāhmaṇa and the enjoyment of heaven is bound to a definite different place.

There cannot be more than one all-pervading entity. If there were many all-pervading entities they would limit each other and therefore cease to be all-pervading or infinite.

Therefore there is only one Ātman and not many. The Vedānta doctrine of one Ātman is the only faultless doctrine. The only doctrine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity of the self. The plurality of selves in Vedānta is only a product of Avidyā, nescience or ignorance and not a reality.

Thus ends the Third Pada (Section 3) of the Second Adhyāya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(284) CHAPTER II, SECTION 4, INTRODUCTION

In the Third Pada or Section it has been shown that ether and other elements are produced from Brahman by reconciling the apparently contradictory texts of the Śhrutis that treat of their origin. It has been shown that a conflict of the Vedic passages as to the origination of the ether, etc., does not exist. The same is now done in this Section with regard to the vital airs or Prāṇas, and senses. The texts that deal with the origin of the Prāṇas and senses are taken up for discussion.

This Section establishes that the vital airs and the senses derive their origin from Brahman.

SYNOPSIS

This Section (Pada) IV of Chapter II is devoted to the discussion of the creation of the senses, the chief Prāṇa. It establishes that they originate from Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-4) teaches that the Prāṇas (senses) originate from Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 5-6) declares that the senses are eleven in number.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 7) teaches that the senses are of minute size (Anu) and not all-pervading.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtra 8) intimates that the chief Prāṇa is also produced from Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 9-12) informs us that the chief Prāṇa is a principle distinct from air in general and from Prāṇas (senses) discussed above.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtra 13) teaches that the chief Prāṇa is minute (Anu) and not all-pervading.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 14-16) teaches that the organs are superintended and guided in their actions by special deities. The senses are connected permanently with and are subservient to the individual soul. Hence the individual soul and not the presiding deities is their master.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 17-19) informs us that organs are independent principles and not mere modes of functions of the chief Prāṇa. Prāṇa is not the resultant of the combined functions of all the eleven senses. Although Prāṇa is different from the senses and therefore not included in their number of eleven, yet it is like them, an instrument of action, as it has a specific and extraordinary function of supporting and nourishing the body, sustaining life, and supporting the senses.

Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtras 20-22) declares that the creation of names and forms (the Namarūpavyakarana) is the work not of the individual soul but of the Lord.

Flesh originates from earth. So also is the case of the two other elements (fire and water).

On account of preponderance of a particular element in them the gross elements are so named after it. As for instance, the gross water is produced from the mixture of all the five primary elements but as the

share constituted by the element water preponderates in the composition of the gross water, it is named water.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-4) The Prāṇas have their origin from Brahman

II.4.1 (270) Thus the vital airs (are produced from Brahman)
Tatha: thus, likewise, similarly, like the creation of the five primal elements as stated in the previous section; Prāṇah: the Prāṇas, the organs.

The creation of the Prāṇas or senses is now described.

The Prāṇas are divided into two classes, namely Prāṇas in a strict sense and Prāṇas in a metaphorical sense. The eleven senses, sight, hearing, etc., are called Prāṇas in a secondary meaning. The five Prāṇas, Prāṇa, Apana, Vyana, Samana and Udana are the principal Prāṇas. Among these, the author first takes up the eleven senses which are called Prāṇas in a secondary sense.

Opponent: The Prāṇas have no origin for they are eternal like the Jīvas and existed even before creation.

Siddhantin: The Prāṇas have origin.

The Opponent says: The chapters which treat of the origin of things do not record an origin of the vital airs, e.g. "It sent forth fire", etc., (Chh. Up. VI.2.3). "From that Self sprang ether", etc., (Tait. Up. II.1). It is said clearly in some places that the vital airs were not produced. "This was indeed non-existence in the beginning. They say what was that non-being? Those Rishis indeed were the non-being in the beginning. They say who are those Rishis? The Prāṇas (organs) are indeed the Rishis"

(Sat. Br. VI.1.1.1). This shows that the Prāṇas (organs) are eternal and not created.

This Sūtra refutes the above view and says that the Prāṇas are produced just like ether from Brahman. The word 'Tatha (thus or likewise)' does not refer to the preceding topic of the last section which is the plurality of souls but to the creation of ether, etc., treated in the last section. Śhruti texts directly declare their origination. "From that (Brahman) are produced the vital air, mind and all the organs" (Mun. Up. II.1.3). "As small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all vital airs come forth from that Brahman" (Bri. Up. II.1.20). "The seven vital airs also spring from Him" (Mun. Up. II.1.8). "He sent forth the vital air; from the vital air, Śhraddhā, ether, air, light, water, earth, sense, mind, food" (Pras. Up. VI.4).

Therefore, the senses are created.

If the creation of the Prāṇa is not stated in some places, that will not lessen the force of the passages about such creation.

The circumstance of a thing not being stated in some places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it in other places.

Therefore, an account of equality of scriptural statements, it is proper to maintain that the Prāṇas also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.

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II.4.2 (271) On account of the impossibility of a secondary (origin of the Prāṇas).

A plausible objection to Sūtra 1 is refuted.

The Opponent says: The Satapatha Brāhmaṇa speaks of the existence of the Prāṇas (organs) before creation. The texts which describe their creation speak in a secondary sense only.

This Sūtra refutes it. The statement as to the origin of the Prāṇas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because therefrom the abandonment of a general assertion would result. "By the knowledge of one, everything else is known." "What is that through which when it is known everything else becomes known?" (Mun. Up. I.1.3). Therefore the Prāṇas are produced from Brahman.

The creation of everything from Brahman has been reiterated in Śhruti. There is no Śhruti which contradicts it. "Yato va imani bhutani jayante - from which originate all these things" (Tait. Bhriguvalli I). In the face of the express statement in Śhrutis that all things are created from Brahman, it is absurd to suppose the Prāṇas (senses) are the sole exceptions.

The reference to the existence of the Prāṇas (organs) before creation in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa pertains to Hiranyagarbha.

Hiranyagarbha is Cosmic Prāṇa. It is not resolved in partial dissolution of the universe. Even Hiranyagarbha is resolved in complete dissolution (Mahāpralaya).

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II.4.3 (272) On account of that (word which indicates origin) being mentioned first (in connection with Prāṇas).

An argument in support of Sūtra 2 is given.

A further reason is given in this Sūtra to indicate that the Prāṇas (organs) have taken their origin from Brahman.

Further, because of the use of the word 'Jayate' (is born) in respect of Prāṇas existing prior to Ākāśha or ether, etc., it is clear that the Prāṇas (organs) have originated from Brahman.

The scriptural statement about the origin of the Prāṇas is to be taken in its literal or primary sense only. The text referred to is "From that (Brahman) are produced the Prāṇa (vital air), mind and all the organs, ether, air, water, fire and earth." (Mun. Up. II.1 .3). Here the word 'Jayate' (is born) occurs at the very beginning of the things enumerated. If the word is interpreted in its primary sense with reference to ether, etc., it must be all the more so interpreted with reference to the Prāṇas, mind and organs which are mentioned earlier.

The secondary sense is not acceptable because the Śhruti places the Prāṇas (organs) prior to Ākāśha, air, etc. The word (Jayate) occurs first, then the words signifying Prāṇa and the senses, and, last of all, come Ākāśha, air, etc. Now that the word 'Jayate' is accepted in its primary sense with respect to Ākāśha, etc., why should it be taken in a secondary sense, in connection with Prāṇas (organs) which the Śhruti has placed prior to Ākāśha, etc.? It would be absurd to decide that a word enumerated once only in one chapter and one sentence and connected with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its primary sense and others in a secondary sense, because such a decision would imply want of uniformity. The word 'Jayate' which comes in the end must be connected with the Prāṇas, etc., mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.

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II.4.4 (273) Because speech is preceded by that, (viz. fire and the other elements).

Another argument in support of Sūtra 2 is given.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares “For, truly, my child, mind consists of earth (i.e. food), Prāṇa of water, Vak of speech of fire” (VI.5.4). This text clearly indicates that the organs, etc., are products of the elements. The elements in their turn originate from Brahman.

Therefore the organs (Prāṇas) are also products of Brahman. As the Prāṇas (organs) are the products of the elements, they are not separately mentioned in the Śhruti passages which treat of the origin of things.

By the statement in the Śhruti of the direct causation of the elements it is suggested that the Prāṇas (senses) have Brahman for their immediate cause.

Moreover, the passage concludes by saying that the entire world is the creation of Brahman, and is the form of Brahman and is ensouled by Brahman.

Therefore it is an established conclusion that the Prāṇas also are effects of Brahman. The Prāṇas (organs) have an origin just like the elements ether, etc., and are not eternal.

Topic 2: (Sūtras 5-6) The number of the organs.

II.4.5 (274) The Prāṇas (organs) are seven on account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the specification (of those seven).

The number of the Prāṇas (senses) is now discussed.

The number of the organs is ascertained in this and the next Sūtra. A doubt arises here owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages. In one place seven Prāṇas are mentioned "The seven Prāṇas (organs) spring from Him" (Mun. Up. II.1.8). In another place eight Prāṇas are mentioned as being Grahas "Eight Grahas there are and eight Atigrahas" (Bri. Up. III.2.1). In another place nine "Seven are the Prāṇas of the head, two the lower ones" (Tait. Samhita V.3.2.5). Sometimes ten "Nine Prāṇas indeed are in man, the navel is the tenth" (Tait. Samhita V.3.2.3). Sometimes eleven "Ten are these Prāṇas in man, and Ātman is the eleventh" (Bri. Up. III.9.4). Sometimes twelve "All touches have their centre in the skin" (Bri. Up. II.4.11). Sometimes thirteen "The eye and what can be seen" (Prasna Up. IV.8). Thus the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the Prāṇas (organs).

This Sūtra gives the view of the Opponent.

Here the Opponent maintains that the Prāṇas are in reality seven in number, because it is stated to be so in some scriptural texts such as "The seven Prāṇas (organs) sprang from Him" (Mun. Up. II.1.8).

These seven Prāṇas are moreover specified in Tait. Samhita V.1.7.1, "Seven indeed are the Prāṇas in the head." Eight or nine organs are enumerated in some texts but these are only modifications of the inner organ. Hence there is no contradiction in the Śhruti texts if we take the number as seven.

To this argument of the Opponent the next Sūtra gives a suitable reply.

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II.4.6 (275) But (there are also in addition to the seven Prāṇas mentioned) the hands and rest. This being a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) thus (viz. that there are seven Prāṇas only).

Sūtra 5 is refuted and the actual number of the Prāṇas (senses) is ascertained.

The word 'tu' (but) refutes the view of the previous Sūtra. Sūtra 6 is the Siddhanta Sūtra.

The number seven is not correct.

In addition to the seven Prāṇas scripture mentions other Prāṇas also, such as the hands, etc. "The hand is one Graha (organ) and that is seized by work as the Atigraha; for with the hands one does work" (Bri. Up. III.2.8), and similar passages, "ten are the senses in a man and mind with these completes the number eleven" (Bri. Up. III.9.4), indicate that the hands etc., are additional organs. Therefore, four other organs viz. hands, feet, anus and the organ of generation have to be added to the seven organs already mentioned, viz. eyes, nose, ears, tongue, touch (skin), speech, and mind, the inner organ. The intellect, egoism, Chitta or memory are not separate organs. They are only modifications of the mind.

Therefore, the number of organs is in all eleven. This is the number that is fixed. They are, the five organs of knowledge (Jñāna-Indriyas), the five organs of action (Karma-Indriyas) and the inner organ, mind.

To unite all the diverse activities of the organs, it is necessary that there should be an organ which must exist as a unifying agent with the memory of the past and the present together with the anticipation of

the future, because without such an organ the activities of the organs would be unharmonised and discordant. This unifying organ is the inner organ or the Manas (mind). This one inner organ assumes four names such as mind, intellect, egoism and Chitta, according to the functions it performs (Vrittibheda).

In the passage "Nine Prāṇas indeed are in man, the navel is the tenth", the expression "ten Prāṇas" is used to denote the different openings of the human body, not the difference of nature of the Prāṇas. Because no Prāṇa is known that bears the name of navel. As the navel is one of the special abodes of the chief Prāṇa, it is here enumerated as tenth Prāṇa.

There are only eleven Prāṇas. This conclusion is confirmed by one of the scriptural passages, "Ten are these Prāṇas in man and Ātman is the eleventh." By the word Ātman we have to understand the internal organ on account of its ruling over the organs.

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Topic 3: The organs are minute in size.

II.4.7 (276) And [they are) minute.

The nature and size of senses is now ascertained.

The author now considers the question of the nature and size of the senses. Are these senses all-pervading or are they minute? The Opponent says that the senses are all-pervading, because we can hear sounds at a distance and see objects far off. The Siddhanta view however is that senses are atomic.

The word 'cha' has the force of certainty. It means that the senses are not all-pervading but atomic. This Sūtra refutes the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas who maintain that the senses are all-pervading.

The organs are minute. Minute does not mean atomic, but subtle and limited in size.

The organs must be subtle; for, if they are gross we could see them when they go out of the body at the moment of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. Had they been all-pervading like the ether, there would have been no movement possible on their part, and the texts which speak of their passing out of body and going and coming along with the soul at death and birth would be contradicted. The soul cannot have them as his essence.

It cannot be said that even if they are all-pervading they can have a particular mode or function within the body, because it is that particular mode or function which we call the sense or the instrument.

Moreover, we do not perceive through the senses what is happening throughout the world. If they were all-pervading we will certainly perceive through them what is happening throughout the world.

Therefore the senses are all subtle and finite, i.e. of limited size.

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Topic 4: The chief Prāṇa has also an origin from Brahman.

II.4.8 (277) And the best (i.e. the chief vital air or Prāṇa is also produced).

The chief Prāṇa is being characterised now.

The chief Prāṇa –‘*breath, life energy*’ has also an origin. It is an effect of Brahman.

The Opponent says: “From this (Brahman) is produced the vital force or Prāṇa” (Mun. Up. II.1.3). Again we have “By its own law the one was breathing without wind; there was nothing different from that or higher than that” (Rig Veda VIII.7.17). Here the words ‘was breathing’ which denote the proper function of breath show that breath or Prāṇa must have existed before the creation.

Therefore, it may be concluded that Prāṇa was not created. There seems to be a contradiction with reference to its origination.

This Sūtra refutes the above view and declares that even the chief Prāṇa is produced from Brahman.

The words “was breathing” are qualified by the addition “without wind” and so do not intimate that Prāṇa existed before creation.

Moreover scriptural passages such as “He is without breath, without mind, pure” (Mun. Up. II.1.2) declare clearly that Brahman is without any qualifications such as Prāṇa and so on. Therefore the words “was breathing” have merely the purpose of stating the existence of the cause. They intimate that Brahman, the cause existed before creation as is known from the texts like “Existence alone was there before this” (Chh. Up. VI.2.1).

In the Śhruti passage “Anidavatam”, the word ‘avata’ shows that what is referred to is something which is anterior to Prāṇa. Anit, therefore refers to Brahman.

The term “the best” denotes the chief vital air (Mukhya Prāṇa) according to the declaration of scripture, “Breath indeed is the oldest and the best” (Chh. Up. V.1.1). The breath is the oldest or the chief because it begins its function from the moment when the child is conceived. The senses of hearing, etc., begin to function only when their special seats, viz. the ears, etc., are formed. They are, therefore, not the oldest. It is called the oldest or the chief on account of its superior qualities and on account of the passage “We shall not be able to live without thee” (Bri. Up. VI.1.13). The chief Prāṇa is called the best, because it is the cause of the maintenance of the body.

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Topic 5: (Sūtras 9-12) The chief Prāṇa is different from air and sense functions.

II.4.9 (278) (The chief Prāṇa is) neither air nor function, on account of its being mentioned separately.

The nature of the chief Prāṇa is discussed in this Sūtra.

The Opponent maintains that there is no separate principle called Prāṇa, and that the Prāṇa is according to Śhruti nothing but air. For Śhruti says, “Breath is air”; that air assuming five forms is Prāṇa, Apana, Vyana, Udana, Samana. Or it may be considered as the combined function of all organs. Just as eleven birds shut up in one cage may move the cage by the combination of their efforts, so also the eleven Prāṇas which abide in one body functioning together produce one common function called Prāṇa. This is the view of the Saṅkhyas. The Saṅkhyas teach “The five airs, Prāṇas, etc., are the common function of

the organs (instruments)." Therefore, there is no separate principle called Prāṇa.

This Sūtra refutes these views and says that the Prāṇa is neither air nor function of organs, for it is mentioned separately from air and the sense functions. "Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman.

That foot shines and warms as the light called air" (Chh. Up. III.18.4).

Here it is distinguished from air. Each sense and its function are identical.

Again, other passages also, in which the Prāṇa is mentioned separately from air and the organs are here to be considered, e.g. "From Him is born the Prāṇa, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, etc." (Mun. Up. II.1.3). This indicates that Prāṇa is not a function of any organ because, in that case, it would not have been separated from the organs.

It is not possible that all the organs together should have one function and that that function should be the Prāṇa, because each organ has its own special function and the aggregate of them has no active power of its own. Prāṇa cannot be said to be the resultant of the joint functioning of the senses, as the functions are diverse.

The passage "Breath (Prāṇa) is air" is also correct, because the effect is only the cause in another form. The Prāṇa is only air that functions within the body. The air passing into the Adhyatma state, dividing itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialised condition is called Prāṇa.

The analogy of the birds in a cage is not to the point, because they all have the same kind of activity which is favourable to the motion of the cage. But the functioning of the senses are not of one kind but different

from one another. They are also of a distinct nature from that of Prāṇa. Prāṇa is quite dissimilar to hearing, etc. Hence, they (the organs) cannot constitute life. Therefore, Prāṇa is a separate entity.

Moreover, if the vital breath were the mere function of organs it could not be glorified as the 'best' and speech, etc., could not be represented as subordinate to Prāṇa. Hence the Prāṇa is different from air and the functions of the organs.

(294)

II.4.10 (278) But (the Prāṇa is subordinate to the soul), like eyes, etc., on account of (its) being taught with them (the eyes, etc.) and for other reasons.

The characteristics of Prāṇa are continued.

The Opponent says: The Prāṇa also must be considered to be independent in this body like the individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the best and the organs such as speech, etc., to be subordinate to it. Various powers are attributed to it in scriptural passages. It is said that when speech and the other organs are asleep the Prāṇa alone is awake; that the Prāṇa alone is not reached by death; that the Prāṇa is the absorber, it absorbs speech, etc., that the Prāṇa guards the other senses (Prāṇas) as a mother guards her sons. Hence it follows that the Prāṇa is independent like the individual soul.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that the Prāṇa is subordinate to the soul.

The words 'tu' (but) sets aside the independence of the Prāṇa. It removes the doubt.

The word 'Adi' etc., indicates that the word 'Prāṇa' is also used in the sense of sense organs. The Prāṇa is enumerated along with the senses in order to indicate that it is not independent.

The Prāṇa subserves the soul like the senses, because it is described with them. The chief Prāṇa is not independent of the Jīva, but is, like the senses, a means of his being Karta (doer) and Bhokta (enjoyer). The soul is the King. Prāṇa is his minister. The senses are his subjects. Prāṇa is described along with the senses. It abides in the body like the senses. Further, it is Achetana (non-sentient) like them.

It is composed of parts. These are the other reasons for refuting the independence of Prāṇa. Therefore it depends on the soul and serves the soul like the senses.

Prāṇa is like the eyes, etc., one of the tools or instruments of the individual soul though it stands foremost among them, because it is placed in the same category with the eye and the other senses in a mutual conversation amongst them described in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad VI.1.7-14. Things having similar attributes are always grouped and taught together, e.g. the Brihatsaman and the Rathantarasan. Hence it is subordinate to the soul.

(295)

II.4.11 (280) And on account of (its) not being an instrument the objection is not (valid); because thus (scripture) declares.

An objection against Sūtra 10 is refuted.

The Opponent says: if the Prāṇa is subordinate to the soul like the organs, then it must stand in the relation of an instrument to the soul

like the organs. We must assume another sense-object analogous to colour. But there is no twelfth sense-object. There are only eleven functions and eleven organs. There is no room for a twelfth organ when there is no twelfth sense-object.

This Sūtra refutes the above objection. Prāṇa is not an instrument. Scripture declares that the chief Prāṇa has a specific function which cannot belong to the other organs. The body and all the senses subsist by means of the chief Prāṇa. The scriptural passages say: "Then Prāṇa as the best said to the organs: Be not deceived. I alone, dividing myself five-fold, support this body and keep it" (Pras. Up. II.3). Another passage, viz. "With Prāṇa guarding the lower nest" (Bri. Up. IV.3.12), shows that the guarding of the body depends upon the Prāṇa.

Again, two other passages show that the nourishing of the body depends on Prāṇa "From whatever limb Prāṇa goes away that limb withers" (Bri. Up. I.3.19). "What we eat and drink, with it supports the other organs" (Bri. Up. 1.3.18). And another passage declares that the soul's departing and staying depends on Prāṇa. "What is it by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall stay'-the created Prāṇa" (Pras. Up. VI.3-4).

All these texts show that the function of the Prāṇa is nourishing and upkeep of the body. Prāṇa protects the body from dissolution.

The strength of the body and the senses also depends upon Prāṇa.

Prāṇa supports the body and energises it with all the senses. This is its specific function.

Prāṇa is of the greatest help to the soul by being the support of all other senses. Not only does it support the senses but it is the

organising life of the body and hence of the greatest importance to the Jīva or the individual soul.

Prāṇa has no function like the ordinary sense. Therefore it cannot be styled as Indriya or organ. Hence it is excluded from the list of eleven senses.

The chief Prāṇa is also an instrument of the soul. The senses like the eye, ear, etc., are as if officials of the Jīva and help him in his enjoyment and activity but the chief Prāṇa is his prime minister. It assists him in his highest functions and in the attainment of all his desires.

This is not the only function of Prāṇa. There are other functions also. The next Sūtra describes the other functions.

(296)

II.4.12 (281) It is taught as having a fivefold function like the mind.

The description of the characteristics of the chief Prāṇa is continued.

Prasna Upaniṣhad (II.3) declares "I alone, dividing myself fivefold, support this body and protect it." Just as the mind in relation to the five senses has five modes, even so Prāṇa has five modes, viz. Prāṇa, Apana, Vyana, Udana and Samana. Prāṇa does the function of respiration; Apana, evacuation; Samana, digestion, assimilation of food; Vyana, circulation of blood (aiding feats of strength); and Udana, deglutition. Udana helps the soul to pass out of the body at the time of death. In this respect Prāṇa resembles the inner organ which though one has a five-fold aspect as mind, intellect, ego, Chitta and memory.

Just as the mind being endowed with several functions such as desire, contemplation, faith, volition, feeling, knowing, etc., serves the individual soul, so also the chief Prāṇa does good to the individual soul being vested with the five functions.

The functions of the mind, according to Raja Yoga of Patanjali Mahārshi, are right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber and remembrance. Or the Sūtra may quote the means as an analogous instance merely with reference to the plurality and not the five-foldness of its functions.

The Prāṇa's subordinate position with regard to the soul follows from its having five functions like the mind.

(297)

Topic 6: The minuteness of the chief Prāṇa.

II.4.13 (282) And it (chief Prāṇa) is minute.

The description of the characteristics of the chief Prāṇa is continued.

The chief Prāṇa is also minute like the senses. Here also we have to understand by minuteness that the chief Prāṇa is subtle and of limited size, not that it is of atomic size, because by means of its five functions it pervades the whole body.

Prāṇa is subtle because it cannot be seen when it goes out of the body. It is limited or finite, because the scripture speaks of its passing out, going and coming. Had it been all-pervading, there could have been no movement on its part.

Therefore Prāṇa is also finite or limited.

It may be objected that it is all-pervading according to the text “He is equal to a gnat, equal to a mosquito, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe” (Bri. Up. I.3.22).

But the all-pervadingness of which this text speaks is with respect to Hiranyagarbha, the cosmic Prāṇa, the Prāṇa of the macrocosm. It is all-pervading in its universal aspect; in its individual aspect it is limited.

The statements of equality “equal to a gnat”, etc., declare the limited size of the Prāṇa which abides within every living being.

Topic 7: (Sūtras 14-16) The presiding deities of the organs.

II.4.14 (283) But there is the presiding over by Fire and others (over the organs), because of such statement in Śhruti.

Now follows a discussion on the dependence of the organs or the presiding deities.

The Opponent holds that the Prāṇas (senses) act from their own power. If we admit that the Prāṇas act only under the guidance of the presiding deities, it would follow that those guiding deities are enjoyers of the fruits of the actions and the individual soul would thus cease to be the enjoyer.

The word ‘tu’ (but) is used in order to remove the doubt. It excludes the Pūrva-paksha -‘Objection’.

The Prāṇas and senses function not because of their own potency but because of the power of the deities presiding over them.

Prāṇas, i.e. the senses, are under the guidance of the deities such as Fire and others presiding over them. Śhruti also states so.

Aitareya Aranyaka (I.2.4) declares, “Fire having become speech entered the mouth.” The senses are inert. They cannot move by themselves.

The assertion that the Prāṇas being endowed with the capability of producing their effects act from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some things which possess the capability of motion such as cars actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like.

Therefore the Prāṇas and the senses are dependent on the presiding deities.

(298)

II.4.15 (284) (The gods are not the enjoyers, but the soul, because the organs are connected) with the one (i.e. the soul) possessing them (a thing we know) from the scriptures.

From the preceding Sūtra a doubt may arise, that the gods, who guide the senses may be the enjoyers; this doubt is removed by this Sūtra.

‘Prāṇa’ here is a synonym for Indriya or sense.

The senses are connected with the soul. This is described by the Śhruti. Though the gods guide the senses, though they are the presiding deities of the organs, they cannot become Bhoktas or enjoyers.

The individual soul is the master. The senses are his servants. The senses function for subserving the interest of the soul. The individual soul is the Lord of the aggregate of the instruments of action. The Jīva alone realises that he sees, hears, etc.

The scriptures declare “Then where there is the eye, entering this opening-the cavity of the eye-it is there to serve the individual soul, the eye itself is the instrument of seeing.” “He who knows ‘Let me smell

this' he is the Self, the nose is the instrument of smelling" (Chh. Up. VIII.12.4) This clearly shows that the soul is the enjoyer but not the gods. The organs are connected with the individual soul only.

The individual soul claims and feels the eye to be his own. The eye is to serve him by presenting him with the objects of sight. Similarly the other senses also are the servants of the same master, the individual soul. Hence the individual soul and not the presiding deities is the master or Lord of the senses and the real enjoyer.

The soul is called Prāṇavat because the Prāṇas (organs) belong to it. The soul rules the senses in order to accomplish its objects of enjoyment. The gods rule the senses by merely giving their activities. The individual soul rules the senses in order to enjoy pleasurable experiences.

Moreover there are many gods in the body. A particular organ is presided over by a particular deity. The plurality of gods guiding the organs renders it impossible that they should be enjoyers in their body. There is and can be only one Bhokta or enjoyer. Otherwise remembrance or recognition of identity would be impossible.

Therefore the senses are for the enjoyment of the soul and not the gods though they are presided and directed by them.

(299)

II.4.16 (285) And on account of its (soul's) permanence (in the body it is the enjoyer, and not the gods).

An argument in support of Sūtra 15 is given.

The individual soul dwells permanently in this body as the enjoyer, as it can be affected by good and evil and can experience pleasure and pain. It is the Jīva alone who has such permanent connection with the senses in the body. Therefore, the Jīva, and not the guiding deities is their master. The body is the result of the soul's past actions. The soul only can experience or enjoy in the body which is the product of its Prarabdha Karma. Others, e.g. the gods cannot enjoy in this body.

The gods who have great glory and power cannot be enjoyers in the low human body. They have exalted status. They would treat with contempt such low enjoyments as can be experienced through the human body.

They cannot possibly enter in this wretched body into the condition of enjoyers. Scripture also says "Only what is good approaches him; verily evil does not approach the Devas" (Bri. Up. I.5.20).

The organs are permanently connected with the embodied soul only. When the soul passes out, the Prāṇas (organs) follow it. This we see from passages such as the following "When the soul passes out, the Prāṇa follows; when the Prāṇa departs, all other organs follow" (Bri. Up. IV.4.2).

The soul is the master and is therefore the enjoyer, although there are presiding gods over the organs. The gods are connected with the organs only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.

(300)

Topic 8: (Sūtras 17-19) The organs are independent principles and not functions of the chief Prāṇa,.

II.4.17 (286) They (the other Prāṇas) are senses, on account of being so designated (by the scriptures), with the exception of the best (the chief Prāṇa).

The distinction between the chief Prāṇa and other Prāṇas (the organs) is now pointed out.

Now there arises another doubt viz. whether the organs such as eyes, ears, etc., are functions or modes of the chief Prāṇa or independent entities.

The Opponent maintains that they are mere functions on account of scriptural statement. The scripture says, "This is the greatest amongst us (the organs). Well, let us all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form. Therefore they are called by this name of Prāṇa" (Bri. Up. I.5.21).

The Sūtra refutes this and says that the eleven organs are not functions or modes of the chief Prāṇa. They belong to a separate category. They are shown to be different in scriptural passages like "From Him are born Prāṇa, mind, and all organs" (Mun. Up. II.1.3). In this and other passages Prāṇa and the sense organs are mentioned separately. The text of the Brihadaranyaka must be taken in a secondary sense.

Therefore it cannot certainly be said that just as the chief Prāṇa has five modes the senses also are its modes, because the Śhruti describes the senses as separate. The senses are distinct independent principles. The senses and the mind are described as being eleven in number.

(301)

II.4.18 (287) (On account of the) scriptural statement of difference.

An argument in favour of Sūtra 17 is given.

The Prāṇa is everywhere spoken of as different from the organs. In Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (I.3.2) the organs are dealt with in one section. After concluding it, the Prāṇa is dealt with separately in the same section. This clearly indicates that they do not belong to the same category.

Other passages also referring to that difference may be quoted, as for instance, “He made mind, speech and breath for himself” (Bri. Up. I.5.3).

In the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (I.3.2) it is stated that the gods in their struggle with the Asuras, i.e. the evil forces, found that the senses such as the speech, the nose, the eye, the ear, and the mind were vitiated by the Asuras. So they took the help of the chief Prāṇa. The Asuras were not able to vitiate the chief Prāṇa. The gods became victorious over the Asuras. Here the chief Prāṇa is spoken of as different from and superior to all the senses. For reference vide, “Then, the gods appealed to the chief Prāṇa, the chief vital force which is superior to the senses” (Bri.Up. I.3.7).

Therefore the organs are independent principles, and not modes or functions of the chief Prāṇa.

II.4.19 (288) And on account of the difference of characteristics.

An argument in favour of Sūtra 17 is given.

There is, moreover, a difference of characteristics between the chief Prāṇa and the senses. The organs do not function in deep sleep, whereas the Prāṇa does. The chief Prāṇa alone is not reached by death, while the other Prāṇas are. The staying and departing of the chief Prāṇa, not that of the sense organs is the cause of the maintenance and the dissolution of the body.

The sense organs are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects, not the chief Prāṇa. The organs get tired, but not the chief Prāṇa. The loss of individual organs does not cause death, but the passing out of Prāṇa causes death of the body.

Thus there are many differences distinguishing the Prāṇa from the senses. This also indicates that the senses are different from the Prāṇa.

The Śhruti which speaks, "The senses assumed the form of Prāṇa", is to be taken in a secondary sense. The word 'Prāṇa' is applied to the sense organs in a secondary sense. It means that their functioning depends upon Prāṇa. It means that the organs follow the Prāṇa just as the servants follow their master. The chief Prāṇa is the ruler or the master or the teacher of the organs. The Śhruti describes Prāṇa as superior to the organs (Sreshtha).

Therefore the organs are independent principles and not modes of the chief Prāṇa.

(302)

Topic 9: (Sūtras 20-22) The creation of names and forms is by the Lord and not by the individual soul.

II.4.20 (289) But the creation of names and forms is by Him who does the tripartite (creation), for so the scriptures teach.

The Śhruti declares: “That Deity thought, let me now enter those three deities (fire, earth, and water) with this living self (Jīvātma) and let me then evolve names and forms; let me make each of these three tripartite” (Chh. Up. VI.3.2).

Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that evolution of names and forms is the Jīva or the individual soul or the Supreme Lord.

The Opponent maintains the former alternative on account of the glorification contained in the words “with this living self.” The word ‘tu’ (but), discards the Pūrva-paksha -‘Objection’. This Sūtra refutes it and says: The individual soul has not the power to create the gross world. The entire creation of the world can surely be the work of the Supreme Lord only who created fire, water and earth. The word ‘Jīva’ in the passage is syntactically related with ‘entrance’ and not with the creation of names and forms.

That the Supreme Lord is He who evolves the names and forms is acknowledged by all the Upaniṣhads, as we see from such passages as “He who is called ether is the evolver of all names and forms” (Chh. Up. VIII.14).

Further, the next sentence of that text, “Then that Deity said, ‘Let me make each of these three elements tripartite’ ” (Chh. Up. VI.3.3), clearly indicates that the Supreme Lord alone creates names and forms, the gross elements and this universe.

The Lord dwells in everything and directs the entire creation. He is the inner director, in the production of pots, etc., by the potter.

(303)

II.4.21 (290) Flesh, etc., originates from earth according to the scriptural statement and (so also) in the case of the other (elements, viz. fire and water).

Tripartite earth, when assimilated by man, forms flesh, etc. For the text says “Food (earth) when eaten becomes three-fold; its grossest portion becomes faeces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind” (Chh. Up. VI.5.1). So also we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other elements, viz. fire and water. Out of the consumed water, the gross portion goes out as urine, the medium portion becomes the blood and the subtle portion becomes Prāṇa. Out of the assimilated fire, the gross portion builds the bones, the medium portion becomes the marrow and the subtle portion becomes speech.

II.4.22 (291) But on account of the preponderance (of a particular element in them the gross elements) are so named (after it).

Sūtra 21 is amplified here. Here now an objection is raised. If all the gross elements contain the three fine elements, then why there is such distinction as “This is fire, this is water, this is earth?” And, again, why is it said that among the elements of the human body, flesh etc., is the effect of the food that is eaten; blood, etc., the effect of the water that is drunk; bone etc., the effect of the fire eaten? The word ‘tu’ (but), removes the objection. This Sūtra refutes the objection.

Even in each element, where the other two elements have combined, it is called so because it is the predominant portion.

Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in different places a preponderance of different elements. Heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food in earth. As the fine elements are not found in equal proportion in each of the gross elements, they are named after that fine element which preponderates in their constitution.

Thus the compound fire is called fire because of the preponderance of pure fire in it. Similarly the Devas are called fiery, because their bodies are made of substances in which fire preponderates.

The repetition 'Tadvadah'-'that special name' indicates the termination of the Chapter.

Thus ends the Fourth Pada (Section 4) of the Second Adhyāya (Chapter II) of the Brahmasutras or the Vedānta Philosophy. Here ends Chapter II

(305) CHAPTER III, SADHANA ADHYĀYA –'Practices Chapter', SECTION 1, INTRODUCTION

Now in the Third Chapter are being determined those Sadhanas or practices which are the means of attaining the highest Brahman or the infinite. In the First and Second Padas of this Chapter are being taught two things, viz. a strong yearning or burning desire (Mumukshutva) to realise Brahman or the final emancipation and an equally strong disgust (Vairagya) towards all objects other than Brahman; because these are the two fundamental things among all Sadhanas.

In order to induce Vairagya or dispassion, the Sūtras show in the first Pada the imperfections of all mundane existences and this they base on the Panchagnividya or the doctrine of five fires of the Chhandogya

Upaniṣhad in which is taught how the soul passes after death from one condition to another.

The first Pada teaches the great doctrine of reincarnation, the departure of the soul from the physical body, its journey to the Chandraloka on the third plane and its coming back to the earth. This is done in order to create Vairagya or indifference to sensual enjoyments herein and hereafter. In the Second Pada are described all the glorious attributes of the Supreme Brahman, His Omniscience, Omnipotence, Loveliness, etc., in order to attract the soul towards Him, so that He may be the sole object of quest.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-7) teaches that the soul, at the dissolution of the body, departs, accompanied by the subtle material elements (Bhuta Sukshma), as well as by the Indriyas and Prāṇas. The subtle elements serve as an abode to the Prāṇas attached to the soul.

Sūtra 7: Those who do sacrifice become in Chandraloka the food of the gods which means that they contribute to the enjoyment of the gods by their presence and service to them.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 8-11) shows that the souls after enjoying the fruits of their meritorious deeds in the Chandraloka descend to the earth with a remainder (Anusaya) of their works which determines the nature of the new body or the character of the new life.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 12-21) discusses the fate after death of those evil-doers whom their evil deeds do not entitle to pass to the Chandraloka.

Adhikaraṇas IV, V, and VI: (Sūtras 22; 23; and 24 to 27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the Chandraloka through the ether, air, etc., do not become identical with ether, air, etc, but only live there; that they descend in a short time. On entering into a corn or a plant the soul remains merely in contact with it which is already animated by another soul. The soul after having entered into a corn or a plant, gets connected with him who eats the corn or fruit of the plant and performs the act of copulation. The soul remains with him till he enters into the mothers womb with the seminal fluid injected. The soul ultimately enters the mother's womb and is brought forth as a child.

(307) CHAPTER III, SECTION 1.

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-7) The soul at the time of transmigration does take with it subtle parts of the elements.

III.1.1 (292) In order to obtain another body (the soul) goes enveloped [by subtle elements] (as appears from) the question and explanation (in the scripture, Chhandogyaj.

In the Second Chapter all objections raised against the Vedāntic view of Brahman on the ground of Śhruti and reasoning have been refuted. It has been shown also that all other views are incorrect and devoid of foundation and the alleged mutual contradictions of Vedic texts do not exist. Further it has been shown that all the entities different from the individual soul such as Prāṇa, etc., spring from Brahman for the enjoyment of the soul.

In this Chapter the manner in which the soul travels after death to the different regions with its adjuncts, the different states of the soul and the nature of Brahman, the separateness or non-separateness of the Vidyās (kinds of Upāsana); the question whether the qualities of Brahman have to be cumulated or not, the attainment of the goal by right knowledge (Samyagdarsana), the diversities of the means of right knowledge and the absence of certain rules as to Moksha which is the fruit of perfect knowledge are discussed to create dispassion.

The Jīva (individual soul) along with the Prāṇas, the mind and the senses leaves his former body and obtains a new body. He takes with himself, Avidyā, virtues and vicious actions and the impressions left by his previous births.

Here the question arises whether the soul is enveloped or not by subtle parts of the elements as the seed for the future body in his transmigration. The Opponent says-It is not so enveloped, because the subtle parts of the elements are easily available everywhere. This Sūtra refutes this view and says that the soul does take with it subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new body. How do we know this? From the question and answer that occurs in the scriptures. The question is "Do you know why in the fifth oblation water is called man?" (Chh. Up. V.3.3). The answer is given in the whole passage which, after explaining how the five oblations in the form of Sraaddha, Soma, rain, food and seed are offered in the five fires, viz. the heavenly world, Parjanya (rain God), the earth, man and woman, concludes "For this reason is water, in the fifth oblation, called man". Go through the section Panchagnividya in Chh. Up. V. parts 3-10. Hence we understand that the soul goes enveloped by water. Though the elements are available everywhere, yet the seeds for a future body cannot be easily procured anywhere. The organs, etc., which go with the soul cannot accompany it without a material body. Just as a caterpillar takes hold of another object before it leaves its hold of an object, so also the soul has the vision of the body to come before it leaves the present body. Hence the view of the Saṅkhyas that the Self and the organs are both all-pervading and when obtaining a new body only begin to function in it on account of Karma; the view of the Bauddhas that the soul alone without the organs begins to function in a new body, new senses being formed like the new body; the view of the Vaiseshikas that the mind alone goes to the new body; and the view of the Digambara Jains that the soul only flies away from the old body and alights in the new

one just as a parrot flies from one tree to another are not correct and are opposing to the Vedas. The soul goes from the body accompanied by the mind, Prāṇa, the senses and the Sukshmathutas or subtle elements.

An objection can be raised that water only accompanies the soul and not any other element. How can it be said then that the soul goes enveloped by the subtle parts of all elements. To this objection the next Sūtra gives the reply.

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III.1.2 (293) On account of water consisting of three (elements) (the soul is enveloped by all these elements and not merely water); but (water alone is mentioned in the text) on account of its preponderance (in the human body).

The water which envelops the soul is threefold. It denotes all the other elements by implication. The text specifies water, because it preponderates in the human body. In all animated bodies liquid substances such as juices, blood and the like preponderate.

The word 'tu' (but), removes the objection raised above. Water stands for all the elements because it is really a combination of water, fire and earth according to the tripartite creation of the gross elements. Therefore all the three elements accompany the soul. No body can be formed by water alone. Further liquid matter is predominant in the causal state of the body. i.e. semen and menstrual blood. Moreover fluid portion is predominant in Soma, milk, butter and the like which are necessary for Karma, which is an efficient cause for the building of the future body.

(309)

III.1.3 (294) And because of the going out of the Prāṇas (the sense organs) with the soul, the elements also accompany the soul.

A further reason is given to show that the subtle essences of the elements accompany the soul at the dissolution of the body. The Śhruti has stated that the Prāṇas and senses depart along with the individual soul at the dissolution of the body. “When he thus departs the chief Prāṇa departs after him, and when the chief Prāṇa thus departs all the other Prāṇas depart after it” (Bri. Up. IV.4.2). They cannot stay without the basis or substratum or support of the elements. Therefore it follows that the individual soul departs attended by the subtle essences of the elements at the dissolution of the body. The subtle elements form the base for the moving of Prāṇas. The going of the Prāṇas is not possible without a base. The Prāṇas cannot either move or abide anywhere without such a base. This is observed in living beings.

There can be enjoyment only when the Prāṇa goes to another body. When the soul departs the chief Prāṇa also follows. When the chief Prāṇa departs all the other Prāṇas and organs also follow. The essences of elements are the vehicle of Prāṇas. Where the elements are, there the organs and Prāṇas are. They are never separated.

III.1.4 (295) If it be said (that the Prāṇas or the organs do not follow the soul) on account of the scriptural statements as to entering into Agni, etc., (we say) not so, on account of its being so said in a secondary sense (or metaphorical nature of these statements).

The Opponent denies that at the time when a new body is obtained the Prāṇas go with the soul, because the scripture speaks of their going to Agni, etc. This Sūtra refutes this view.

The text which says that Prāṇas on death go to Agni and other gods says so in a figurative and secondary sense just as when it says that the hair goes to the trees. The text means only that the Prāṇas obtain the grace of Agni and other gods.

(310)

The entering of speech, etc., into Agni is metaphorical. Although the text says that the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the hairs of the head into the trees. It does not mean that the hairs actually fly away from the body and enter into trees and shrubs.

The scriptural texts clearly say “When the soul departs, the Prāṇa follows. When the Prāṇa departs, all the organs follow” (Bri. Up. IV.4.2.) Further the soul could not go at all if the Prāṇa could not follow it.

The soul could not enter into the new body without Prāṇa. There could be no enjoyment in the new body without the Prāṇas going to this body.

The passage metaphorically expresses that Agni and other deities who act as guides of the Prāṇas and the senses and cooperate with them, stop their cooperation at the time of death. The Prāṇas and the senses consequently lose their respective functions and are supposed to be immersed in the guiding deities. The Prāṇas and the senses remain at that time quite inoperative, waiting for accompanying the departing soul.

The entering of speech into fire, etc., means only that at the time of death, these senses and Prāṇas cease to perform their functions and not that they are absolutely lost to the soul. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Prāṇas and the senses do accompany the soul at the time of death.

III.1.5 (296) If it be objected on the ground of water not being mentioned in the first of the oblations, we say not so, because that (water) only is verily meant by the word “Śhraddhā” because that is the most appropriate meaning of the word in that passage.

The Opponent raises an objection: How can it be ascertained that ‘in the fifth oblation water is called man’ as there is no meaning of water in the first oblation? On that altar the gods offer Śhraddhā as oblation (Chh. Up. V.4.2).

The Siddhantin gives his answer: in the case of the first fire the word Śhraddhā is to be taken in the sense of ‘water’. Why? Because of appropriateness. Then only there is harmony in the beginning, middle and end of the passage and the synthetical unity of the whole passage is not disturbed. Otherwise the question and answer would not agree and so the unity of the whole passage would be destroyed.

(311)

Faith by itself cannot be physically taken out and offered as an oblation. Therefore the word Śhraddhā must be taken to mean ‘water’.

Water is called Śhraddhā in the Śhruti texts. “Śhraddhā va apaha-Śhraddhā indeed is water” (Tait. Sam. I.6.8.1). Further it is the Śhraddhā (faith) which leads to sacrifice which leads to rain.

It is the other four offerings Soma, rain, food and seed that are described to be the effects of Śhraddhā. It is Śhraddhā which modifies itself into these four. Therefore it must be a substance belonging to the same category as these four, because the cause cannot be different from its effect. An effect is only a modification of the cause. Therefore it is reasonable to interpret Śhraddhā to mean water here.

III.1.6 (297) If it be said that on account of (the soul) not being stated in the Śhruti (the soul does not depart enveloped by water, etc.) (we say) not so, because it is understood (from the scriptures) that the J ivas who perform sacrifices and other good works (alone go to heaven).

An objection is raised that in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (V.3.3) there is mention of water only but no reference to the soul (Jīva). This objection cannot stand. The passage refers to the persons performing sacrifices, i.e. the performers of Ishta (sacrifice) and Purta (digging tanks, building temples, etc.) and Dana (charity), going by the path of smoke (Dhumamarga or Dakshinayana Path to the world of moon) Chh. Up. V.10.3.

To those persons who have performed Ishtis, etc., water is supplied in the form of materials used in the Agnihotra, the Darsapurnamasa and other sacrifices, viz. sour milk, milk, curd, etc.

The materials like milk, curds, etc., that are offered as oblations in sacrifices assume a subtle form called Apurva and attach themselves to the sacrificer. The Jīvas thus go enveloped by water which is supplied by the materials that are offered as oblations in sacrifices. The water

forming the oblations assumes the subtle form of Apurva, envelops the souls and leads them to the heaven to receive their reward.

Another objection is raised now by the Opponent. He says "that is the food of the gods. The gods do eat it" (Chh. Up. V.10.4.) "Having reached the moon they become food and then the Devas feed on them there" (Bri. Up. VI.2.16). If they are eaten by gods as by tigers, how could they enjoy the fruit of their actions? The following Sūtra gives a suitable answer. The performers of sacrifices obtain the name of 'Somaraja' when they reach Chandraloka. This technical name 'Somaraja' is applied here to the soul.

(312)

III.1.7 (298) But (the souls' being the food of the gods in heaven is used) in a secondary or metaphorical sense, on account of their not knowing the Self because the Śhruti declares like that.

"The soul becomes the food of gods" has to be understood in a metaphorical or secondary sense and not literally. Otherwise the statement of scriptures such as "He who is desirous of heaven must perform sacrifice" is meaningless. If the Devas were to eat the souls why should men then exert themselves to go there and why should they perform sacrifices like Jyotistoma and the rest? Food is the cause of enjoyment. 'Eating' is the rejoicing of the gods with the performers of sacrifices. The sacrifices are objects of enjoyment to the gods just as wives, children and cattle are to men. It is not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweetmeats. The gods do not eat in the ordinary way. The scripture says "The gods do not eat or drink. They are satisfied by seeing the nectar." Those who perform sacrifices

rejoice like servants of a king, although they are subordinate to the gods. They give enjoyment to the gods and rejoice with them. Those who do not know the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods. This is known from texts like “Now, if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas” (Bri. Up. I.4.10). That means he in this life propitiates the gods by means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast and does so in the other world also, depending on them like a beast and enjoys the fruits of his works as assigned by them. They (the performers of such sacrifices) become serviceable companions to the gods. They enjoy the companionship of the gods. So they are said to be the food of the gods in the figurative or metaphorical sense. They contribute to the enjoyment of the gods by their presence and service in that world.

Therefore it is quite clear that the soul goes enveloped with the subtle essence of elements when it goes to other spheres for enjoying the fruits of his good deeds. He enjoys in the Chandraloka and returns to the earth at the end of his store of merit.

(313)

Topic 2: (Sūtras 8-11) The souls descending from heaven have a remnant of Karma which determines their birth.

III.1.8 (299) On the exhaustion of good work the soul returns to the earth with a remainder of the Karmas, as can be understood from direct statement in Śhruti and Smṛiti, by the same route through which he ascended after death and differently too.

A fresh topic is discussed here. This Adhikaraṇa teaches the mode of return from heaven. The question is raised whether the souls, after having enjoyed the fruits of all their works, return to the earth with any remnant of Karma (Karmasesha) or not. The Opponent says that there is no remnant of Karma. Why? On account of the specification "Yavat sampatam". The Śhruti says "Having dwelt there till their work is exhausted, they return again the way they went by" (Chh. Up. V.10.5). This indicates that all their Karma is completely exhausted there and there is nothing left.

This view is wrong. The right view is that the souls return to the earth by the force of some unenjoyed remnant or Anusaya of Karma.

When the totality of works which helped the souls to go to the Chandraloka for enjoyment of the fruits of good deeds is exhausted, then the body made up of water which had originated there for the sake of enjoyment is dissolved by the fire of sorrow springing from the thought that the enjoyment comes to an end, just as hailstones melt by contact with the rays of the sun, just as ghee melts by contact with the fire. Then the souls come down with a remainder yet left.

This is proved by Śhruti and Smṛiti as well. The Śhruti says "Those whose conduct, during the previous life, has been good, presently obtain good birth, such as the birth of a Brahmin, a Kshatriya or a Vaisya; those whose conduct has been bad presently obtain some evil birth such as that of a dog or a pig" (Chh. Up. V.10.7).

The Smṛiti says "The members of the different castes and of the different orders of life who are engaged in the works prescribed for them, after leaving this world and enjoying the fruits of their works in

the otherworld, are born again owing to the unenjoyed portion of their rewards, in distinguished castes and families, with special beauty, longevity, knowledge, conduct, property, comfort and intelligence".

(314)

Hence the soul is born with residual Karma.

What is such Anusaya (residual work) of Karma which leads to higher or lower birth? Of what kind is that remainder? Some say that thereby we have to understand a remainder of the works which had been performed in the previous birth to obtain heaven and whose fruits have for the greater part been enjoyed. That residue might be compared to the remainder of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled with oil even after it has been emptied or to a courtier of a king who loses his Durbar robe and therefore comes out with his shoes and umbrella alone. These analogies are obviously wrong, because when a virtuous deed leads the soul to heaven, we cannot assume that a portion of it brings him down to the earth. This would contradict the text which declares clearly that heaven alone is the fruit of meritorious acts and no residue continues to exist.

Moreover the scriptural passage distinguishes remainders of a different kind, viz. 'those whose conduct has been good; those whose conduct has been bad'. The latter cannot be a portion of the virtuous deed which leads the soul to the heaven. Therefore the Anusaya is the residue or remnant of some other store of Karmas bearing fruit. After the fruits of the meritorious acts have completely been enjoyed in heaven, the remaining other set of works (good and bad) whose fruits

are to be enjoyed in this world forms the Anusaya with which the souls come to the earth.

Another view is that after death the entire store of Karmas about to bear fruit fructifies. Therefore the souls come to the earth without any Anusaya or residue of Karma. This is wrong. This is untenable.

Some of those Karmas can be enjoyed only in one kind of birth and some in another. They cannot combine in one birth. It cannot be said that one portion ceases to bear fruit. There is no such cessation save by Prayaschitta or expiation. If all Karmas bear fruit after death, there will be no cause for rebirth after life in heaven or hell or in animal bodies, because in these there is no means of virtue or vice. Moreover some capital sins like the killing of a Brahmin involve many births.

How then can the totality of Karmas lead to one birth alone? The scripture is the sole source of virtue and vice. Similarly the Kariri Ishti, a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous of rain, causes rain.

Therefore you cannot ascribe it to the fructification of past acts after death. Therefore the view that death manifests all actions, that all events are due to the fructification of complete store of Karmas after death is entirely incorrect and baseless.

The Opponent argues that just as a lamp shows all objects, so also death exhausts all Karmas. This analogy is not correct. Because a lamp, although equally distant from a big and a very small object, may manifest only the big one and not the small object. So death excites the operation of the stronger actions only, not the weaker ones, although there is equal opportunity for both sets of works for fructification. Therefore the view that all actions are manifested by

death cannot be upheld, because it is contradicted by Śhruti, Smṛiti and reason.

(315)

You need not be afraid that if any Karmas are left in store there will be no salvation, because knowledge of Self will annihilate all Karmas. Therefore it is an established conclusion that the souls descend to the earth from heaven with a remainder of works (Anusaya).

By what way does it descend'? They return by the same way that they went by, but with some difference. From the expression "as they came" and from the fact of 'ether and smoke' it is concluded that they descend by the way they went to the heaven (Chh. Up. V.10.5). That there is some difference too is known from night, etc., not being mentioned and from the cloud, etc., being added (Chh. Up. V.10.6). He descends by the route by which he went to a certain stage and then by a different route. The word 'Ramaniyacharana' means works which are Ramaniya or good. 'Kapuyacharana' means evil acts. The word 'Yavat sampatam' does not mean the exhaustion of all Karmas, but the exhaustion of the works that took the soul to heaven and which is exhausted in heaven by enjoyment.

III.1.9 (300) If it be objected that on account of conduct (the assumption of the remnant of Karma, Anusaya is not necessary for rebirth on earth), (we say) not so (because the word 'conduct' is used) to signify indirectly (the remainder). So Karshnajini thinks.

An objection is raised with reference to the residual Karma, Anusaya, stated in the preceding Sūtra and is refuted.

The Opponent says in the text cited (Chh. Up. V.10.7.) "those whose conduct has been good", etc., get a good birth.

The quality of the new birth depends on 'Charana' or conduct, not on Anusaya or remainder of work. 'Charana' and 'Anusaya' are different things because 'Charana' is the same as Charitra, Achara, Sila-all of which mean conduct, while Anusaya means remainder of work.

Scripture also says that action and conduct are different things "According as he acts and according as he conducts himself so will he be" (Bri. Up. IV.4.5).

The objection is without force. This Sūtra refutes this and says that the term 'conduct' is meant to denote the remainder of the works (good Karmas) after enjoyment in the other world. Conduct stands for Karma which depends on good conduct. This is the opinion of the sage Karshnajini. This is secondary implication of the term.

(316)

III.1.10 (301) If it be said (by such interpretation of the word 'conduct' -good conduct would become) purposeless, (we say) not so, on account of (Karma) being dependent on that (good conduct).

A further objection with reference to the word 'Charana-conduct' is raised and refuted in this Sūtra.

The Pūrvapakshīn or the objector says that may be, but why should we give up that meaning which the word 'Charana' directly conveys viz. 'conduct' and take up the merely connotative meaning 'residue of Karma'. Then good conduct would be purposeless in man's life, as it has

no result of its own, not being a cause of the quality of new birth. Conduct which is the direct meaning of the word may have for its fruit either a good or an evil birth according as it is good or bad. Some fruit will have to be allowed to it in any case for otherwise it would be purposeless.

This Sūtra refutes this. The Sūtra denies this view on the ground that only those who are of good conduct are entitled to perform Vedic sacrifices. This objection is without force on account of the dependence on it. It cannot stand. The Smṛiti says, "Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify." He, whose conduct is not good, does not attain religious merit by mere performance of sacrifices. Conduct enhances the fruit of Karma (Atisaya). Good conduct is an aid or auxiliary to Karma. Therefore it has a purpose. When the sacrifice begins to produce its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the sacrifice will originate in the fruit some addition. It is, therefore, the view of Karshnajini that the residue of works only which is the indirect meaning of the term 'Charana' or conduct and not just conduct is the cause of the new birth. If a man is able to run by means of his feet he will certainly not creep on his knees. If a man cannot run on his legs, can he run on his knees?

(317)

III.1.11 (302) But conduct (Charana) means merely good and evil works; thus the sage Bādari thinks.

Further discussion on the meaning of the word 'Charana' is made here. The Sūtra says that there is no difference between conduct and Karma.

According to the sage Bādari the phrases ‘Ramaniyacharana’ and ‘Kapuyacharana’ mean good and evil works.

Charana means the same as Anusthana or Karma (work). The root ‘Char’ (to walk, to conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. People say in common parlance of a man who does sacrifices. “That man walks in righteousness.” The term Achara also denotes only a kind of religious duty. A sacrifice is a meritorious act (Dharma). Achara is also Dharma. When Karma and Charana are separately described it is as when you speak of Brahmins and Parivrajakas, i.e. Sannyāsis. Though Charana and Karma are one, yet they are spoken of sometimes as different on the maxim of “Kuru-Pandavas.” Though the Pandavas were also Kurus, yet in the phrase Kurus and Pandavas the word Kuru is used in a narrower sense. Thus ‘men of good conduct or character’ means those whose actions are praiseworthy; ‘men of evil conduct or evil Charana’ are those whose actions are to be censured. Conduct is used in the general sense of action. As Charana is Karma only, it is established, therefore, that those who go to heaven have remainder of Karma (Anusaya) as the cause of a new birth on earth.

Eva-only: The force of this word in this Sūtra is to indicate that this is the opinion of the author of the Sūtras.

Tu-‘but’ is used to indicate speciality, one’s own conclusion and to add emphasis.

(318)

Topic 3: (Sūtras 12-21) The fate after death of those souls whose deeds do not entitle them to pass up to Chandraloka.

III.1.12 (303) The Śhruti declares that the non-performers of sacrifices, etc., also (go to the world of moon).

The movement of persons doing evil deeds is now described.

This Sūtra is that of Opponent.

If has been said that those who do sacrifices, etc., go to the Chandraloka. The question now arises whether those persons also who do not perform sacrifices go to the sphere of moon or not.

The Opponent maintains that even they go to heaven though they do not enjoy anything there like those who perform sacrifices, because they too are in need of the fifth oblation for a new birth. Moreover the Śhruti declares: "All who depart from this world go to the sphere of moon" (Kau. Up. 1.2). The word 'all' shows that it is a universal proposition without any qualifications. Since all who perish must go to the world of moon, it follows that the sinners also go there.

Siddhantin: The sinners do not go to the sphere of moon. They go to Yamaloka or the world of punishment. This is said in the following Sūtra.

III.1.13 (304) But of others, (i.e. those who have not performed sacrifices, etc.) the ascent is to the abode of Yama and after having experienced (the results of their evil deeds) they come down to the earth; as such a course is declared by the Śhruti.

Description of the movement of persons who have done evil deeds is continued. This Sūtra refutes the view of the previous Sūtra.

This is the Siddhanta Sūtra.

Sinners suffer in Yamaloka and return to this earth. Yama says to Nachiketas: 'The way to the hereafter never rises before an ignorant person who is deluded by wealth. This is the world-he thinks-there is no other; thus he falls again and again under my sway' (Katha Up. I.2.6).

Tu (but), discards the Pūrva-paksha -'Objection'. It is not true that all persons go to Chandraloka. The ascent to the sphere of moon or Chandraloka is only for the enjoyment of the fruits of good works. It is neither without a special purpose nor for the mere purpose of subsequent descent. Hence those who have done evil actions do not go there.

Those who perform sacrifices rise to the Chandraloka not any other persons.

Aroha-avar0hau.' Ascent and descent, i.e. coming to worldly existence (ascent) and going to still nether regions (descent). This is the interpretation of Śhrī Madhvāchārya.

(319)

III.1.14 (305) The Smṛitis also declare thus.

Description of the journey of persons doing evil deeds is continued in the Sūtra.

The Smṛitis also declare the same fate of the sinners. The Smṛitis also declare that the evil doers come within the clutches of Yama. Manu, Vyāsa and others say that those who do evil deeds go to hell and suffer there. In the Bhagavata it is said "The sinners are quickly carried to the abode of Yama by the path of sinners, on which they travel with great

pains, constantly rising and falling, tired and swooning." Manu and Vyāsa declare that in the Chitisamyamana evil deeds are requited under the rule of Yama.

III.1.15 (306) Moreover there are seven (hells).

Particulars of the abode of Yama are given. Smṛiti mentions seven hells which serve as places of torture for the evil doers. The temporary hells are Raurava, Mahāraurava, Vahni, Vaitarani and Kumbhika. The two eternal hells are Tamisra (darkness) and Andhatamisra (blinding darkness).

III.1.16 (307) And on account of his (Yama's) control even there (in those hells) is no contradiction.

The same topic continues in this Sūtra. The Opponent says: According to the Śhruti the evildoers undergo punishment from the hands of Yama. How is this possible in the seven hells called Raurava, etc., which are superintended by Chitragupta and others? This Sūtra refutes the objection.

There is no contradiction as the same Yama is the chief ruler in those seven hells also. Chitragupta and others are only superintendents and lieutenants employed by Yama. They are all under Yama's government or suzerainty. Chitragupta and others are directed by Yama.

(320)

III.1.17 (308) But (the reference is to the two roads) of knowledge and work, those two being under discussion.

But the sinners never go to heaven because the topic relating to the two paths in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is confined to men of

knowledge and men of work. It has no reference to evil-doers. The different journeys of the departed souls to the other world through the two roads or paths described in the Panchagnividya of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad are the results of knowledge (meditation) and religious sacrifices according as they were practised in life; because these two are the subjects under discussion.

The Śhruti says that those who do not go by means of Vidyā along the path of Devayana to Brahmaloaka or by means of Karma along the path of Pitriyana to Chandraloka are born often in low bodies and die often. If you say that evil-doers also go to Chandraloka that world will get overfull. But you may reply that there will be souls going out from there to the earth. But then the Śhruti text clearly says that the evil-doers do not go there.

The evil-doers go to the third place and not to heaven. The Śhruti passage says "Now those who go along neither of these ways become those small creatures continually returning of whom it may be said 'Live and die'. Theirs is a third place. Therefore the world never becomes full" (Chh. Up. V.10.8).

The word 'but' in the Sūtra refutes a doubt that arises from a text from Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad. 'That all departed go to the Chandraloka'. The word 'all' has to be taken as referring only to those who are qualified, who have performed good deeds. All eligible souls only go to Chandraloka. It does not include evil doers or sinners.

The word 'but' sets aside the view propounded by the objector. If the sinners do not go to the world of moon or Chandraloka, then no new body can be produced in their case: because there is no fifth oblation

possible in their case and the fifth oblation depends on one's going to the sphere of moon. Therefore all must go to the Chandraloka in order to get a new body. This objection is answered by the next Sūtra.

(321)

III.1.18 (309) Not in (the case of) a third place, as it is thus declared in the scriptures.

The fifth oblation is not necessary in the case of those who go to the third place, because it is thus declared in the scriptures.

The rule about the five oblations does not apply in the case of evil-doers or sinners because they are born without the oblations.

The Śhruti says, "Live and die. That is the third place." That is to say these small creatures (flies, worms, etc.,) are continually being born and are dying. The sinners are called small creatures because they assume the bodies of insects, gnats etc. Their place is called the third place, because it is neither the Brahmaloaka nor the Chandraloka.

Hence the heaven world never becomes full, because these sinners never go there. Moreover, in the passage, "In the fifth oblation water is called man" the water becomes the body of a man only, not of an insect or moth etc. The word 'man' applies to the human species only.

III.1.19 (310) And (moreover the) Śrñritis have recorded also (that) in this world (there had been cases of birth without the course of five oblations).

The argument commenced in Sūtra 17 to refute the objections raised in Sūtra 12, is continued.

There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Vedas that certain persons like Drona, Dhrishtadyumna, Sita, Draupadi and others were not born in the ordinary way from mother's womb. In their cases there was wanting the fifth oblation which is made to the woman. In the case of Dhrishtadyumna and others, even two of the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one offered into man, were absent. Drona had no mother. Dhrishtadyumna had neither father nor mother. Hence in many other cases also, procreation or birth may be supposed to take place independently of oblations. The female crane conceives without a male.

The five oblations are not absolutely necessary for a future birth.

The rule about the five oblations is not universal. It applies only to those who do sacrifices. Therefore the sinners need not go to heaven.

The five oblations have nothing to do with the third way, i.e. die and be born in low bodies. They refer only to human births in the case of souls who ascend and then descend. In the case of others embodiment may take place in a manner other than through wombs.

By the particle 'Cha' (and) the Sūtra-kāra shows that the observation of the world is also one corroborated by Smṛiti.

(322)

III.1.2O (311) Also on account of observation.

The argument commenced in Sūtra 17 is continued.

It is also observed that of the four classes of organic beings, namely viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals springing from heat and moisture and beings springing from germs (plants)-the last two classes

are produced without sexual intercourse, so that in their case the number of oblations is of no consequence.

The Opponent says, "The Śhruti passage speaks only of three classes of beings: That which springs from an egg (Andaja), that which springs from a living being (Jīvaja) and that which springs from a germ (Udbhijja)" (Chh. Up. VI.3.1). How then can it be maintained that there are four classes? The following Sūtra gives a reply to his objection.

III.1.21 (312) The third term (i.e. plant life) includes that which springs from heat and moisture.

The two classes spring from earth or water, from something stable. They both germinate: one from the earth and the other from water. It makes no difference because that which springs from moisture is included in the place of plant life (Udbhijja). There is similarity between Svedaja and Udbhijja. Hence there is no contradiction. Those which are born of sweat are called Svedaja. Svedaja and Udbhijja are not born of wombs. The word Udbhijja literally means born by bursting through. The plants burst through the earth. The sweatborn burst through the water. Thus the origin of both is similar, for both are born by bursting through.

Thus the evil-doers do not go to heaven. Only those who perform sacrifices go to heaven. This is the settled conclusion.

Sabhavyapattyadhikaranam: **Topic 4:** The soul on its descent from the Chandraloka does not become identified with ether, etc., but attains a similarity of nature.

(323)

III.1.22 (313) (The soul when coming down from the sphere of moon) attains similarity of nature with them, (i.e. with ether, air, etc.,) as this only is possible.

The way of descent of the individual soul from the sphere of the moon is now discussed. The Śhruti declares, "They return again the way they went, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes mist, having become mist, he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud he rains down" (Chh. Up. V.10.5 & 6).

Now a question arises whether the soul actually becomes identical with ether, etc., or simply resembles them.

This Sūtra says that the souls do not attain identity with them, because it is impossible. It is not possible that one thing should become another in the literal sense of the word. One substance cannot become another. If the souls become identical with ether, they could no longer descend through air. The souls become only like ether, air, etc. They assume a subtle form like ether, come under the influence or power of air and get mixed with or connected with smoke etc. The attaining to the state of being smoke, etc., is but moving along with them when they are in motion, stopping while they stop, entering into them and becoming as light as they are. Therefore the passage means that the souls become similar to Ākāśha, air, etc., but not identical.

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Topic 5: It takes only a short time for the descent of the soul.

III.1.23 (314) (The soul passes through the stages of its descent) in a not very long time; on account of the special statement.

The discussion on the soul's way of descent is continued. Next arises the question, does the soul in its descent through ether down to rain, stay at each stage for a very long time, or passes through it quickly? The Opponent says: 'There being nothing to define the time of his stay, it remains indefinitely long at each stage.' This view is set aside by this Sūtra. This Sūtra says that the soul passes through them quickly. This is inferred from the circumstance of the text making a special statement.

The Śhruti says, 'Having become a cloud he rains down. Then he is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. From thence the escape is beset with many difficulties. For whoever the persons may be that eat the food, and beget offspring, he henceforth becomes like unto them' (Chh. Up. V.10.5).

The soul's journey, through the stages of the ether, the air, the vapour or smoke, the mist, the cloud and the rain, takes a shorter time than his passing through the stages of corn, semen, foetus, which takes a much longer time or hard suffering, as there is the special statement in Śhruti, that after its entrance into a corn the escape is beset with much greater difficulty and pain.

The Śhruti says "The souls enter into rice" and adds "from thence the escape is beset with more difficulty and pain." There is a hint here that the escape from the previous states or earlier stages is easy and pleasant and attained quickly.

"He who has begun to descend will enter the mothers body (womb) before a year passes since starting, though wandering through different places" (Naradiya Purana).

Topic 6: (Sūtras 24-27) When the souls enter into plants, etc., they only cling to them and do not themselves become those species.

III.1.24 (315) (The descending soul enters) into (plants) animated other (souls), as in the previous cases, on account of scriptural declaration.

The discussion on the way of descent of the individual soul is continued.

In the description of the soul's descent, it is said then they are born as rice and corn, herbs and beans. Now a doubt arises, are these souls descending with a remnant of their Karmas, themselves born as rice, corn, etc., or do they merely cling to those plants, etc.

The Opponent holds that they are born as rice, corn, etc., and enjoy their pleasures and pains on account of the remainder of works still attaching to them and do not merely cling to them. The condition of a plant may be a place of enjoyment of the fruits of actions.

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Sacrifices which entail killing of animals may lead to unpleasant results. Hence the word 'born' is to be taken literally.

This Sūtra refutes this view. The souls are merely connected with rice and plants which are already animated by other souls and do not enjoy there pleasures and pains as in previous cases. As the souls becoming air, smoke, was decided to mean only that they become connected with them, so here also their becoming rice, etc., merely means that they become connected with those plants. Because in these stages there is no reference to their Karma, just as in the earlier stages of

ether etc. They enter these plants independently of their Karma. They do not enjoy pleasure and pain while they abide there. The souls use the rice and plants as their halting station without being identified with it, as it is expressly stated in Śhruti to be a passing stage, like the previous stages of ether, air etc. They do not lose their identity. The souls are not born there for the purpose of retributive enjoyment. Where real birth takes place and experience of pleasure and pain commences, the fruits of actions begin, the text refers to the operation of Karma as in “Those whose conduct has been good will quickly attain a good birth” (Chh. Up. V.10.7).

Further if the word ‘born’ is taken in its literal sense, then the souls which have descended into the rice plants and are animating them would have to leave them when they are reaped, husked, cooked and eaten. When a body is destroyed the soul that animates it abandons it. Therefore the descending souls are merely outwardly connected with the plants animated by other souls. They abide till they attain the opportunity for a new birth.

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III.1.25 (316) If it be said that (sacrificial work is) unholy, (we say) not so, on account of scriptural authority.

An objection to Sūtra 24 is raised and refuted.

An objection may be raised that the sacrificial work, such as the Jyotistoma sacrifice and the like where animals are killed is unholy.

Therefore its result may cause the sacrificer to be actually born as a corn or a plant as penalty for his cruel action. Such objection is

groundless, because the killing of animals in sacrifices causes no demerit as it is sanctioned by the scriptures.

The sacrifices are not impure or sinful because the scriptures declare them to be meritorious. The scriptures alone can tell us what is Dharma and what is Adharma, what is holy and what is unholy. Our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of duty depends entirely on Śhastras, because these are Atindriya, i.e. beyond sense perception and there is in the case of right and wrong an entire want of binding rules as to place, time and occasion. What in one place, at one time on one occasion is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in another place, at another time, on another occasion. Therefore no one can know without a scripture, what is either right or wrong. No doubt the scripture says that one must not cause injury (Ma himsyat sarva bhutani-let not any animal be injured (killed)). That is the general rule. 'Let him offer an animal sacred to Agnistoma' is an exception. General rule and exception have different spheres of application.

They have different scopes settled by usage, and so there is no conflict between them.

Therefore we conclude that the souls become enclosed in plants when scripture says that the descending souls from the Chandraloka become plants. They are perfectly unconscious in these stages.

III.1.26 (317) Then (the soul gets) connected with him who performs the act of generation.

The discussion on the way of descent of the soul is continued.

What becomes of the soul after its clinging to the plants is now mentioned.

Chhandogya text (V.10.6.) declares “For whoever eats the food and performs the act of generation, that again he (the soul) becomes”. Here again the soul's ‘becoming’, i.e. he who performs the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense, because a man is able to procreate when he attains puberty. We have to understand that the soul gets connected with one who performs the act of generation. We again infer from this that the soul's becoming a plant merely means its entering into connection with the plant and not actual birth as such.

The soul after having entered into a corn or a plant becomes connected to him who eats the corn or the fruit and performs the act of copulation. In every stage of its passage it retains its distinctive identity from the bodies with which it may be connected. Whenever one eats the food, whenever one performs the act of coition, the descending soul becomes again that food and that semen. The soul remains in him in copulation only till he enters into the mother's womb, with the semen injected. He has a touch with the seminal fluid created by eating such grain and ultimately attains a body in wombs. The soul does not really take the form of and become identical with its procreator, because one thing cannot take the form of another thing. If it were to become literally the procreator, then there would be no possibility of the soul's getting another body.

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III.1.27 (318) From the womb at (new) body (springs).

The discussion on the nature of the descent of the soul is concluded here.

After having passed through the various preceding stages, the soul at last enters into the womb of the mother. He attains a fully developed human body in the womb of the mother which is fit for experiencing the fruits of the remainder of works. The family in which it is to be born is regulated by the nature of this remainder as mentioned in Chh. Up. V.10.7. "Of these, those whose conduct here has been good will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brāhmaṇa, or a Kshatriya or a Vaisya. But those whose conduct here has been bad will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a Chandala".

Thus it has been clearly shown that the soul becomes plant, etc., in the same sense as it becomes ether, etc.

The whole object of teaching this law of incarnation is that you should realise that the Ātman or the Absolute alone is the Highest Bliss. This Ātman alone must be your sole object of quest. You should get disgusted with this world of pain and sorrow and develop dispassion and discrimination and try earnestly to attain the Eternal Bliss of the Absolute.

O ignorant man! O foolish man! O miserable man! O deluded soul! Wake up from your long slumber of ignorance. Open your eyes.

Develop the four means of salvation and attain the goal of life, the summum bonum, right now in this very birth. Come out of this cage of flesh. You have been long imprisoned in this prison-house of body for time immemorial. You have been dwelling in the womb again and again. Cut the knot of Avidyā and soar high in the realms of Eternal Bliss.

Thus ends the First Pada (Section 1) of the Third Adhyāya (Chapter III) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(328) CHAPTER III, SECTION 2, INTRODUCTION

In the preceding Pada or Section the passage of the soul to different spheres and its return has been explained in order to create dispassion or disgust in people who perform sacrifices to obtain heaven. If they have a clear understanding of the fate of the soul they will naturally develop Vairagya and will strive to attain Moksha or the final emancipation.

This section starts with the explanation of the soul's different states, viz. waking, dream, deep sleep. The three states of the soul will be shown to be merely illusory and the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul will be established.

A knowledge of the three states, viz. waking, dreaming and deep sleep, is very necessary for the students of Vedānta. It will help them to understand the nature of the fourth state, viz. Turiya or the state of superconsciousness. For a student of Vedānta, the waking state is as much unreal as the dream state. The state of deep sleep intimates that the nature of the Supreme Soul is Bliss and that Brahman is one without a second, and that the world is unreal. Vedāntins make a study of the four states very carefully. They do not ignore dream and deep sleep states whereas the scientists draw their conclusions from the experiences of the waking state only. Hence, their knowledge is limited, partial and incorrect.

In the last section the waking state of the soul has been fully dealt with. Now its dream state is taken up for discussion.

In order to make the students understand the true significance of the Mahā-Vakya or the great sentence of the Upaniṣhad “Tat Tvam Asi- Thou art That”, this section explains the true nature of “That” and “Thou”.

SYNOPSIS

This Section starts with the explanation of the states of dream, deep sleep and so on. Then it discusses the two-fold nature of Brahman, one immanent and the other transcendent. Lastly it deals with the relation of Brahman to the individual soul as well as to the world.

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. The vision in dreams is of a wonderful character. According to Śhrī Śhaṅkara the three first Sūtras discuss the question whether the creative activity, attributed to the Jīva or the individual soul in some Śhruti texts produces objects as real as those by which the soul in the waking state is surrounded or not.

Sūtra 3 says that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere "Māyā" or illusion as they do not fully exhibit the nature or character of real objects, as they are wanting in the reality of the waking state.

Sūtra 4 intimates that dreams, although mere Māyā, yet have a prophetic quality. Some dreams are indicative of future good or bad.

Sūtras 5 and 6 say that the soul, although it is identical with the Lord, is not able to produce in dreams a real creation, because its knowledge and power are obscured by its connection with the gross body. The

rulership is hidden by ignorance in the Jīva state. It is not possible for the individual soul to dream a good or a bad dream according to his own choice as he in his present state of bondage is ignorant of the future.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 7-8) teaches that the soul abides within Brahman in the heart in the state of deep sleep.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 9) gives reasons to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep. What has been partly done by a person before going to sleep is finished after he wakes up. He has also a sense of self-identity. He has memory of past events. He has memory in the shape of 'I am the person who had gone to sleep and who have now awakened.' Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 10) explains the nature of a swoon. It intimates that swoon is half death and half deep sleep, a mixture of these two states.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 11-21) intimate the nature of Supreme Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep.

Sūtra 11 declares that Brahman is devoid of distinctive attributes (Nirviśeṣha). Brahman with attributes is only for the sake of Upāsana or pious worship of devotees. It is not its real nature.

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Sūtra 12 declares that every form due to limiting adjunct is denied of Brahman. In every passage of Śruti identity is affirmed. The Supreme Truth is Oneness. Separateness is for devotion. There is only one Infinite formless essence or Principle in reality.

Sūtra 13 says that the whole universe characterised by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed and a ruler has Brahman for its true nature.

Sūtra 14 says that the assumption of diversity or plurality is objectionable. Brahman is destitute of all forms.

Sūtra 15 says Brahman appears to have forms, as it were. This is due to its connection with its unreal limiting adjuncts, just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the thing it illumines.

Sūtra 16 says that the Śhruti (Brihadaranyaka) expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of consciousness or intelligence and has neither inside nor outside.

Sūtra 17 says the other scriptural passages and the Smṛiti also teach that Brahman is without attributes.

Sūtra 18 declares that just as the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts, so also the one Unborn Brahman.

Sūtra 19: Here the Opponent objects. There is no similarity of the two things compared as in the case of Brahman any second thing is not apprehended or experienced like water. Brahman is formless and all-pervading. It is not a material thing. Sun has a form. It is a material thing. Water is different from the sun and is at a distance from the sun. Hence the sun may be reflected in the water.

Sūtra 20: The objection raised in Sūtra 19 is refuted. The similarity is only in point of the participation in the distortion and contortion, in increase and decrease of the image reflected. Brahman participates as

it were in the attributes and states of the body and other limiting adjuncts with which it abides. Two things are compared with reference to some particular points or features only.

Sūtra 21 says the scriptures declare that the Ātman is within the Upadhis or limiting adjuncts.

Adhikaraṇa VI.' (Sūtras 22-30) teaches that the clause "neti, neti" - not this, not this" in Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad II.3.6 denies the gross and subtle forms of Brahman given in Bri. Up. II.3.1 and not Brahman itself.

Sūtras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are entirely due to the limiting adjuncts or Upadhis.

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Sūtras 27-28: express the views of the Bhedabhedavadins. They say there is difference as well as non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. The separateness and oneness is like a serpent in quiescence and motion.

Sūtra 29: This Sūtra refutes the view of the Bhedabhedavadins and establishes the final truth which has been declared in Sūtra 25 viz. that the difference is merely illusory due to fictitious limiting adjuncts and identity or non-difference is the reality.

Sūtra 30: Sūtra 29 is confirmed. The Śhruti in fact expressly denies separateness.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 31-37) explains that Brahman is one without a second and expressions which apparently imply something else as existing are only metaphorical.

Brahman is compared to a bridge or a bank or causeway not to indicate that He connects the world with something else beyond Him but to show that He is the protector of the worlds and is also like a causeway, the support of the individuals while crossing over this ocean of life.

He is conceived to be symbolised and located in a limited space for facility of meditation on the part of those who are not very intelligent.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 38-41) intimates that the fruit of actions is not as Jaimini thinks, the independent result of actions acting through Apurva, but is dispensed by the Lord. The Lord who is all-pervading is the bestower of fruits of actions. according to merits and demerits.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-6) The soul in the dream state.

III.2.1 (319) In the intermediate stage (between waking and deep sleep) there is (a real) creation; because (the Śhruti) says so.

The state of dream is now considered.

Sūtras 1 and 2 are Pūrva-paksha -'Objection' Sūtras and set out the view that what we see in dreams are true creations because of the word 'Śhrījate' (creates).

The word 'Sandhya' means dream. It is called 'Sandhya' or the intermediate state because it is midway between waking (Jagrat) and the deep sleep state (Sushupti). That place is called the intermediate state or place because it lies there where the two worlds or else the place of waking and the place of deep sleep join.

Scripture declares, “when he falls asleep, there are no chariots, in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses and roads, etc.” (Bri. Up. IV.3.9-10). Here a doubt arises whether the creation which takes place in dreams is a real one (Paramarthika) like the creation seen in the waking state or whether it is illusory (Māyā).

The Opponent holds that in the dreaming state there is a real creation.

In that intermediate state or dream the creation must be real, because scripture which is authoritative declares it to be so, “He (the individual soul) creates chariots, horses, roads,” etc. We, moreover, infer this from the concluding clause, “He indeed is the creator” (Bri. Up. IV.3.10).

Further there is no difference between the experience of the waking state and that of the dream state. Ātman in dream gets pleasure by going in a car, hearing music, seeing pleasure-sights and eating sumptuous food even as in the waking state.

Hence the creation of the dream state is real and originates from the Lord Himself, just as ether, etc., sprang from Him.

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III.2.2 (320) And some (the followers of one Sakha, namely, the Kathakas) (state that the Supreme Lord is the) Creator; sons, etc., (being the lovely things which He creates).

The Opponent gives a further argument to show that the creation even in dreams is by the Lord Himself. “He who is awake in us while we are asleep, shaping one lovely thing after another, that is Brahman” (Katha Up. II.2. 8).

‘Kāma (lovely things) in this passage means sons, etc., that are so called because they are beloved. The term ‘Kāma’ does not denote mere desires. It is used in this sense in the previous passage also, such as “Ask for all Kāmas according to thy wish” (Katha Up. I.1.25). That the word Kāma there means sons, etc., we infer from Katha Up. I.1.23, where we find these Kāmas described as sons and grandsons, etc.

Even in dreams the Lord Himself creates just as in the case of the waking state. Therefore the world of dreams is also real.

The scripture declares “This is the same as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the same he sees while asleep” (Bri. Up. IV.3.14). Hence the world of dreams is real.

To this we reply as follows.

III.2.3 (321) But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion on account of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).

The thesis adduced in Sūtras 1 and 2 is now criticised.

The word ‘tu’ (but), discards the view expressed by the two previous Sūtras. The world of dreams is not real. It is mere illusion. There is not a particle of reality in it. The nature of the dream-world does not agree entirely with that of the waking world with respect to time, place, cause and the circumstance of non-refutation. Hence the dream world is not real like the waking world.

In the first place there is in a dream no space for chariots and the like, because those objects cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of the body. If you say that the soul goes out and enjoys objects, how

can it go hundreds of miles and return within a few minutes? In a dream the soul does not leave the body; because if it did, then one who dreams of having gone to London would find himself there on waking, while he went to sleep in Bombay. But as a matter of fact, he awakes in Bombay only.

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Further while a man imagines himself in his dream going in his body to another place, the by-standers see the very same body lying on the cot.

Moreover a dreaming person does not see in his dream other places such as they really are. But if he in seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to him like the things he sees in his waking state.

Śhruti declares that the dream is within the body, "But when he moves about in dream, he moves about according to his pleasure within his own body" (Bri. Up. II.1.18).

In the second place we notice that dreams are in conflict with the conditions of time. One man who is sleeping at night dreams that it is day. Another man lives during a dream which lasts for ten minutes only, through fifty years. One man sees at night an eclipse of the sun in his dream.

In the third place, the senses which alone can bring the sensation of sight etc., are not functioning in dream. The organs are drawn inward and the dreaming person has no eyes to see chariots and other things. How can he get in the twinkling of an eye materials for making chariots and the like? In the fourth place the chariots etc., disappear on waking. The chariots etc., disappear even in the course of the dream. The

dream itself refutes what it creates, as its end contradicts its beginning. The chariot is suddenly transferred into a man, and a man into a tree.

Scripture itself clearly says that the chariots, etc., of a dream have no real existence. "There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, etc." Hence the visions in a dream are mere illusion.

The argument that the dream world is real, because it is also a creation of the Supreme Lord like this waking world is not true, because the dream world is not the creation of the Lord, but of the individual soul. The Śhruti declares "When he dreams he himself puts the physical body aside and himself creates a dream body in its place" (Bri. Up. IV.3.9.) This passage of the Śhruti clearly proves that it is the individual soul who creates the dream world and not the Lord.

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III.2.4 (322) But (though the dream world is an illusion), yet it is indicative (of the future), for (so we find) in the Śhruti, the dream-experts also declare this.

An argument in support of Sūtra 3 is given.

The word 'Tadvid' or expert means those who know how to interpret dreams such as Vyāsa, Brihaspati, and the rest.

Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not contain a particle of reality? Not so we reply: because dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For scripture says "When a man engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision" (Chh. Up. V2.8). Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams indicate speedy death,

e.g. "If he sees a black man with black teeth, that man will kill him." Those who understand the science of dreams maintain that "to dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky while it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey." "Whatever a Brahmin or a god, a bull or a king may tell a person in dream, will doubtless prove true." Sometimes one gets Mantras in dream. Lord Śhiva taught Viśhvamitra in dream the Mantra called Ramaraksha. Viśhvamitra exactly wrote it out in the morning, when he awoke from sleep.

In all these cases the thing indicated may be real. The indicating dream however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the waking state.

The doctrine that the dream itself is mere illusion thus remains uncontradicted.

The word 'creation' in dream in the first Sūtra is used in a secondary and figurative sense. The soul's good and bad deeds bring about pleasure and pain enjoyed during dream, by means of dream-experiences. In the waking state the light of the soul operates along with the light of the sun to bring about experiences. The dream state is referred to, to show the self-activity of the soul even after the senses are shut off and there is no operation of external light. It is this fact that is the primary teaching. The reference to creation in dreams is secondary.

The world of dreams is not real in the same sense as the world consisting of ether is real. We must remember that the so-called real creation with its ether, air, etc., is not absolutely real. The world of ether, etc., vanishes into nothing when the individual soul realises its identity with the Supreme Soul.

The dream-creation, however, is stultified every day. That the dream is mere illusion has therefore to be understood very clearly and decisively.

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III.2.5 (323) But by the meditation on the Supreme Lord, that which is hidden (by ignorance, vi2., the equality of the Lord and the soul becomes manifest), because from him (the Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and freedom.

The Opponent says: The individual soul is a part (Amsa) of the Supreme Soul, just as a spark is a part of the fire.

Just as fire and spark have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so also the individual soul and the Lord have in common the powers of knowledge and rulership. Therefore the individual soul may by means of his lordship create in the dreaming state chariots and the like at will (Śhaṅkalpa) like the Lord.

This Sūtra refutes it and says that the soul now is different from the Lord on account of Avidyā or ignorance. The rulership is hidden by ignorance in the Jīva state. It becomes manifest only when in the state of meditation on the Lord. This ignorance is dispelled by the knowledge, "I am Brahman", just as through the action of a strong medicine the power of sight of the blind man becomes manifest.

The Śhruti declares "when that God is known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and birth and death cease. From meditating on Him there arises on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that of universal Lordship; he who is alone is satisfied" (Svet. Up. I.11). Till the

knowledge dawns the individual soul cannot create at will anything real.

Lordship does not come to man spontaneously. It does not on its own accord reveal itself to all men. as the bondage and freedom of the individual soul come from the Lord. That means: from knowledge of Lord's true nature, i.e. from realisation of God freedom comes; from ignorance of His true nature comes bondage. Till such realisation comes, where is then any power of creation?

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III.2.6 (324) And that (viz. the concealment of the soul's rulership) also (results) from its connection with the body.

Sūtra 5 is amplified here.

Such hiding of power is due to embodiment of the soul. The state of concealment of the soul's knowledge and Lordship is due to its being joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind, intellect, sense-objects, sensations, etc., on account of ignorance. Just as fire is hidden in wood or ashes, the knowledge and power of the soul are hidden, though the Jīva is really the Supreme Lord. Hence the soul does not itself create. If it can, it will never create unpleasant dreams.

No one ever wishes for something unpleasant to himself.

The soul's knowledge and Lordship remain hidden as long as he erroneously thinks himself as the body, etc., as long as he is under the wrong notion of not being distinct from those limiting adjuncts.

Śhruti declares that the soul is non-different from the Lord. "It is True, it is the Self, Thou art That, O Svetaketu!" But its knowledge and power are obscured by its connection with the body.

Though the dream-phenomena are like waking phenomena in their having relative reality, the Śhruti itself declares that they do not really exist. As the dreams are due to Vasanas acquired during the waking state, the similarity between the dream state and the waking state is declared.

From all this it follows that dreams are mere illusion. They are false.

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Topic 2: (Sūtras 7-8) The soul in dreamless sleep.

III.2.7 (325) The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dreamless sleep) takes place in the nerves (Nāḍīs or psychic currents) and in the self, as it is known from the Śhruti or scriptural statement.

The state of dreamless deep sleep is now discussed.

The state of dream has been discussed. We are now going to enquire into the state of deep sleep (Sushupti).

Various Śhruti texts describe the soul as resting in deep sleep in nerves (Nāḍīs), in Prāṇa, in the heart, in itself, in Brahman or the Absolute.

In different Śhruti passages deep sleep is said to take place under different conditions.

"When a man is asleep reposing and at perfect rest so that he sees no dreams, then he has entered into these Nāḍīs (nerves)" (Chh. Up. VIII.6.3). In another place it is said with reference to the Nāḍīs,

“Through them he moves forth and rests in the region of the heart” (Bri. Up. II.1.19). In another place it is said “In these the person is when sleeping, he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the Prāṇa alone” (Kau. Up. IV.19). In another place it is said “That ether which is within the heart in that he reposes” (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). In Chhandogya Upaniṣhad it is said, “Then he becomes united with that which is, he is gone to his self” (Chh. Up. VI.8.1). In Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad it is said “Embraced by the highest Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within” (Bri. Up. IV.3.21). “When this being full of consciousness is asleep... lies in the ether, i.e. the real self which is in the heart” (Bri. Up. II.1.17).

Here the doubt arises whether the Nāḍīs, etc., mentioned in the above passages are independent from each other and constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep sleep or if they stand in mutual relation so as to refer to one place only.

The Opponent holds the former views on account of the various places mentioned serving one and the same purpose. Things which serve the same purpose, e.g. rice and barley do not depend on each other. As all the words which stand for the places enumerated are in the same case, viz. the locative case in the texts, they are coordinate and therefore alternatives. If mutual relation was meant then different case-endings would be used by the Śhruti.

Hence we conclude that in the state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of those places, either the Nāḍīs, or that which is, the Prāṇa, the heart, etc.

The Sūtra refutes the view of the Opponent and says that they are to be taken as standing in mutual relation indicating the same place. The view that the soul goes to one or another of these is not correct. The truth is that the soul goes through the nerves to the region of the heart and there rests in Brahman.

There is no alternative here. The assertion made above that we are compelled to allow option because the Nāḍīs, etc., serve one and the same purpose is without foundation. The authority of the Śruti is weakened if we allow option between two statements of the Śruti. If you recognise one alternative, the authority of the other alternative is denied.

Further the same case is used where things serve different purposes and have to be combined. We say, e.g. "he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on a cot." We have to combine the two locatives into one as "He sleeps on a cot in the palace." Even so the different statements have to be combined into one. "The soul goes through the Nāḍīs to the region of the heart and then rests in Brahman." Just as a man goes along the Ganga to the sea so also the soul goes through the Nāḍīs to Brahman. So he attains Svarūpa.

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Scripture mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the Nāḍīs, the pericardium and Brahman. Among these three again Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep. The Nāḍīs and the pericardium, are mere roads leading to it. The 'Puritat' or pericardium is the covering which surrounds the lotus of the heart.

In deep sleep the individual soul rests in Brahman, but there is a thin veil of ignorance between him and the Supreme Soul. Hence he has no direct knowledge of his identity with the Supreme Soul, as in Nirvikalpa Samādhī or superconscious state. The Śhruti declares "He becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own (Self)" (Chh. Up. VI.8).

In the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (IV.19) the three places are mentioned together: "In these the person is when sleeping he sees no dreams. Then he becomes one with the Prāṇa (Brahman) alone".

Therefore Brahman is the resting place of the soul in deep sleep.

III.2.8 (326) Hence the waking from that (viz. Brahman).

The mode of waking from deep sleep is now described.

Therefore waking is coming from that state of union with Brahman or Ātman.

Brahman is the place of repose of deep sleep. That is the reason why the Śhruti texts which treat of deep sleep invariably teach that in the waking state the individual soul returns to waking consciousness from Brahman. The Śhruti declares "In the same manner, my child, all these creatures when they have come back from the True do not know that they have come back from the True" (Chh. Up. VI.10.2).

This Śhruti passage clearly intimates that the Jīva or the individual soul returns from the True or Brahman to the waking state and that the Jīva rests or merges himself in Brahman and not in the Nāḍīs, Hita, etc., during deep sleep. But he does not realise his identity with Brahman in deep sleep as he is enveloped by the evil of ignorance.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad also declares “When the time comes for the answer to the question ‘whence did he come back’?” (II.1.16); the text says, “As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all Prāṇas come forth from that Self” (II.1.20).

If there were optional places, to which the soul may resort, in deep sleep, the Śhruti would teach us that it awakes sometimes from the Nāḍīs, sometimes from the pericardium (Puritat), sometimes from the Self (Brahman).

For this reason also Brahman is the place of deep sleep. The Nāḍīs are only the gateway to Brahman.

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Topic 3: The same soul returns from deep sleep.

III.2.9 (327) But the same (soul returns from Brahman after deep sleep) on account of work, remembrance, scriptural text and precept.

Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking from deep sleep is the same which entered into union with Brahman or another one.

The word ‘tu’ (but) removes the doubt.

If another self arose from sleep, the consciousness of personal identity (Ātm’anu-smarana) expressed in the words “I am the same as I was before” would not be possible.

The Opponent holds that there is no fixed rule on this point. There can be no rule that the same soul arises from Brahman. When a drop of water is poured into a big basin of water, it becomes one with the

latter. When we again take out a drop it will be difficult to manage that it should be the very same drop. It is hard to pick it out again. Even so when the individual soul has merged in Brahman in deep sleep it is difficult to say that the self-same Jīva arises from Brahman after deep sleep. Hence some other soul arises after deep sleep from Brahman.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that the same soul which in the state of deep sleep entered Brahman again arises from Brahman, after deep sleep, not any other for the following reasons.

The person who wakes from sleep must be the same because what has been partly done by a person before going to sleep is finished after he wakes up. Men finish in the morning what they had left incomplete on the day before. It is not possible that one man should proceed to complete a work half done by another man. If it were not the same soul, then the latter would find no interest in completing the work which has been partly done by another. In the case of sacrifices occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrifices.

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Hence it would be doubtful to whom the fruit of the sacrifice as promised by the Veda belongs. This would bring stultification of the sacred text. Therefore it is quite clear that it is one and the same man who finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.

He has also a sense of self-identity. He experiences identity of personality before and after sleep, for if sleep leads to liberation by union with Brahman, sleep will become the means of liberation. Then scriptural instructions would be useless to attain salvation. If the person who goes to sleep is different from the person who rises after

sleep, then the commandments of the scriptures with reference to work or knowledge would be meaningless or useless.

The person rising from sleep is the same who went to sleep. If it is not so he could not remember what he had seen, etc., on the day before, because what one man sees another cannot remember. He has memory of past events. One cannot remember what another felt.

He has memory or recollection in the shape of "I am the person who had gone to sleep and who have now awakened." The Śhruti texts declare that the same person rises again. "He hastens back again as he came to the place from which he started, to be awake" (Bri. Up. IV.3.16). "All these creatures go day after day into Brahman and yet do not discover Him" (Chh. Up. VIII.3.2). "Whatever these creatures are here whether a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again" (Chh. Up. VI.10.2). These and similar texts which appear in the chapters which deal with sleeping and waking have a proper sense only if the self-same soul rises again.

Moreover, if it is not the same soul, Karma and Avidyā will have no purpose.

Therefore from all this it follows that the person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.

The case of the drop of water is not quite analogous, because a drop of water merges in the basin of water without any adjuncts.

Therefore it is lost for ever but the individual soul merges in Brahman with its adjuncts (viz. body, mind, intellect, Prāṇa, sense). So the same

Jīva rises again from Brahman on account of the force of Karma and desire.

When the individual soul enters Brahman in deep sleep, he enters like a pot full of salt water with covered mouth plunged into the Ganga. When he awakens from sleep it is the same pot taken out of the river with the same water in it. Similarly the individual soul enveloped by his desires goes to sleep and for the time being puts off all sense-activities and goes to the resting place namely, the Supreme Brahman and again comes out of it in order to get further experiences. He does not become identical with Brahman like the person who has obtained liberation. Thus we hear that the same soul which had gone to sleep awakes again into the same body.

Hence it is an established fact that the same soul awakes from deep sleep.

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Topic 4: The nature of swoon.

III.2.10 (328) In a swoon (in him who is senseless) there is half union on account of this remaining (as the only alternative left, as the only possible hypothesis).

The state of a swoon is now discussed.

The Opponent says, "There are only three states of a soul while living in the body, viz. waking, dreaming and deep sleep. The soul's passing out of the body is the fourth state or death. The state of swoon cannot be taken as a fifth state. A fifth state is known neither from Śhruti nor Smṛiti." What is swoon then? Is it a separate state of the soul or is it

only one of these states? It cannot be waking, because he does not perceive external objects, by the senses.

May this case be similar to that of the arrow-maker? Just as the man working in the preparation of an arrow, although awake, is so absorbed in his work that he perceives nothing else, so also the man who is stunned by a blow may be awake but may not perceive anything else as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain caused by the blow of a stick.

No, we reply. The case is different owing to the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker says, "I was not conscious of anything but the arrow for such a length of time." The man who returns to consciousness from a swoon says, "I was conscious of nothing. I was shut up in blind darkness for such a length of time." A man who is waking keeps his body straight or upright but the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on the ground. Therefore a man in a swoon is not awake.

He is not dreaming, because he is totally unconscious.

It is not deep sleep because there is happiness in deep sleep whereas there is no happiness in the state of swoon.

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He is not dead also, because he continues to breathe and his body is warm. When a man has become senseless and when people are in doubt whether he is alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart in order to find out whether there is warmth in his body or not. They place their hands to his nostrils to find out whether there is breathing or not. If they do not perceive warmth or breath they come to the

conclusion that he is dead and take his body to the crematorium to burn it. If there are warmth and breathing they conclude that he is not dead. They sprinkle cold water on his face so that he may come back to consciousness.

The man who has swooned away is not dead, because he comes back to consciousness after some time.

Let us then say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep as he is unconscious and at the same time not dead. No, we reply.

This is also not possible owing to the different characteristics of the two states.

A man who has swooned does sometimes not breathe for a long time. His body shakes or trembles. His face is dreadful. His eyes are staring wide open. But a sleeping man looks calm, peaceful and happy. He draws his breath at regular intervals. His eyes are closed.

His body does not tremble. An sleeping man may be waked by a gentle stroking with the hand. He who is lying in a state of swoon cannot be wakened even by a blow with a stick. Swoon is due to external causes such as blow on the head with a stick, etc., while sleep is due to fatigue or weariness.

Swoon is only half-union. The man in the state of swoon belongs with one half to the side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the other state, i.e. death. It is only half sleep. We do not mean by this that he half enjoys Brahman. We mean that it partly resembles sleep.

It is half death, a state almost bordering upon death. In fact it is the door to death. If there is a remnant of Karma he returns to consciousness. Else, he dies.

The man in the state of swoon belongs with one half to the side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the other state, i.e. death.

Those who know Brahman say that swoon is half-union. In a swoon the person partially attains the state of deep sleep as there is no consciousness in that state and he returns to consciousness and partially the state of death as he experiences pain and misery which are expressed through distortion of face and limbs.

The objection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged is without much weight, because as that state occurs occasionally only it may not be generally known. All the same it is known from ordinary experience as well as from the science of Ayurveda. It is a separate state, though it happens occasionally. As it is a mixture of the two states, viz. deep sleep and death it is not considered as a fifth state.

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Topic 5: (Sūtras 11-21) The nature of Brahman.

III.2.11 (329) Not on account of (difference of) place also two-fold characteristics can belong to the Highest; for everywhere (scripture teaches It to be without any difference).

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to deal with the nature of Brahman.

In the scriptures we find two kinds of description about Brahman. Some texts describe it as qualified, i.e. with attributes and some as unqualified (without attributes). “From whom all activities, all desires.

all odours and all tastes proceed" (Chh. Up. III.14.2). This text speaks of attributes. Again, "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither redness nor viscid" etc. (Bri. Up. III.8.8). This text speaks of Brahman without attributes.

Are we to assume that both are true of Brahman according as it is or is not connected with limiting adjuncts or Upadhis or have we to assume only one of them as true and the other false? and if so, which is true? and why it is true? This Sūtra says that the Highest Brahman cannot by itself possess double characteristics. In the case of Brahman you cannot say that it has two aspects, viz. with form and attributes, and without form and attributes, i.e. with Upadhis (limiting adjuncts) and without Upadhis, because It is described everywhere as being Nirguna (without attributes).

Both cannot be predicated of one and the same Brahman because it is against experience. One and the same thing cannot have two contradictory natures at the same time. Brahman cannot at the same time have form and be formless.

The redness of a flower reflected in a crystal does not change the nature of the crystal which is colourless. Even so the mere connection of a thing with another does not change its nature. It is an altogether erroneous notion to impute redness to the crystal. The redness of the crystal is unreal. A thing cannot change its real nature.

Changes of its real nature means annihilation. Similarly in the case of Brahman, its connection with the limiting adjuncts like earth, etc., is due to ignorance. An Upadhi cannot affect the nature of Brahman, such Upadhi being merely due to Avidyā or nescience. The essential

character of a thing must always remain the same whatever may be the conditions imposed on it. If however it appears to be altered it is surely due to ignorance.

Therefore we have to accept that Brahman is without attributes, because all Śhruti texts whose aim is to represent the nature of Brahman such as "It is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay" (Katha Up. I.3.15) teach that It is free from all attributes.

Brahman with attributes is only for the sake of Upāsana or pious worship of devotees; it is not Its real nature.

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III.2.12 (330) If it be said that it is not so on account of difference (being taught in the scriptures), we reply that it is not so, because with reference to each (such form), the Śhruti declares the opposite of that.

An objection to the preceding Sūtra is raised and refuted.

The Opponent says, "The various Vidyās teach different forms of Brahman. It is said to have four feet (Chh. Up. III.18.2); to consist of sixteen parts or Kalas (Pras. Up. VI.1); to be characterised by dwarfishness (Katha Up. V.3); to have the three worlds for its body (Bri. Up. I.3.22); to be named Vaiśhvānara (Chh. Up. V.11.2), etc.

Hence we must admit that Brahman is also qualified." This Sūtra refutes it and declares that every such form due to limiting adjunct is denied of Brahman in texts like "This bright, immortal being who is in this earth and that bright immortal corporeal being in the body are but

the self' (Bri. Up. II.5.1). Such texts clearly indicate that the same self is present in all limiting adjuncts like earth, etc.

Therefore there is only oneness. It, therefore cannot be maintained that the conception of Brahman with various forms is taught by the Vedas.

In every passage identity is also affirmed. The Supreme Truth is oneness. Separateness is for devotion. The Śhruti declares that the form is not true and that there is only one formless essence or principle in reality.

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III.2.13 (331) Moreover some (teach) thus.

A further argument is given in support of Sūtra 11.

Some Sakhas or recensions of the Vedas directly teach that the manifoldness is not true. They pass a critical remark on those who see difference, "He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were, in it" (Katha Up. I.4.11). "By the mind alone it is to be perceived. There is no diversity in It. He who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to death" (Bri. Up. IV.4.19).

Others also "By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been declared to be three-fold and this is Brahman" (Svet. Up. I.12), say that the entire world characterised by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed and a ruler has Brahman for its true nature.

III.2.14 (332) Verily Brahman is only formless on account of that being the main purport (of all texts about Brahman).

A further argument is given in support of Sūtra 11.

We must definitely assert that Brahman is formless and so on.

Why? On account of this being the main purport of scriptures. The scriptures declare, "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long" (Bri. Up. III.8.8). "That which is without sound, without form, without decay" (Katha Up. I.3.15). "He who is called ether is the revealer of all names and forms. That within which names and forms are, that is Brahman" (Chh. Up. VIII.14.1). "That heavenly Person is without body, He is both within and without, not produced" (Mun. Up. II.1.2).

"That Brahman is without cause, and without anything inside or outside, this self is Brahman, Omnipresent and Omniscient" (Bri. Up. II.5.19).

These texts aim at teaching Brahman, describe It as formless. If Brahman be understood to have a form then the scriptural passages which describe it as formless would become meaningless. The scriptures have a purport all throughout. On the contrary, the other passages which refer to a Brahman qualified by form do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman but rather at enjoying the worship of Brahman.

Therefore Brahman is formless.

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As long as those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however, contradictions occur, the texts whose main purport is Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those of the other kind. This is the reason for our deciding that, although there are two different classes of scriptural texts, Brahman must be held to be altogether formless, not at the same

time of an opposite nature. The main Śhruti texts declare Brahman to be formless.

The colour and forms are the products of the elements and Brahman is far above the influence of and different from the elements.

Hence He is called the colourless or formless. Material colour and form cannot be found in Him when He is far above the subtle material cause as well as above its presiding deity.

III.2.15 (333) And as light (assumes forms as it were by its contact with things possessing form, so does Brahman take form in connection with Upadhis or limiting adjuncts), because (texts which ascribe form to Brahman) are not meaningless.

A further argument is given in support of Sūtra 11.

The word 'Cha' (and) is employed to remove the doubt raised above.

If Brahman is formless then all the scriptural texts which treat of Brahman with form would be meaningless, and superfluous. Then all Upāśanas of Brahman with form would be useless. How can the worship of such a false Brahman lead to Brahmaloaka? This Sūtra explains that they also have a purpose. The light of the sun has no form but it appears to be great or small according to the hole through which it enters a room and yet has the force of dispelling the darkness in the room. Similarly Brahman which is without a form appears to have a form due to limiting adjuncts like earth, body, etc. Just as the light of the sun comes in contact with a finger or some other limiting adjunct and according as the latter is straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were, so also Brahman assumes, as it were, the form of the earth, and the limiting adjuncts with which it comes into contact. The

worship of such an illusory Brahman can help one to attain Brahmaloaka which is also illusory from the view-point of the Absolute.

Therefore these texts are not meaningless. They have certainly a purport. All parts of the Veda are equally authoritative and therefore must all be assumed to have a meaning or purpose.

This, however, does not contradict the tenet maintained above, viz. that Brahman though connected with limiting adjuncts does not possess double characteristics, because what is merely due to a limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a substance. Further the limiting adjuncts are all due to ignorance.

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III.2.16 (334) And (the Śhruti) declares (that Brahman is) that (i.e. intelligence) only.

The force of the word 'Matra' in Tanmatra is to denote exclusiveness.

Scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence. "As a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of saltish taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge" (Bri. Up. IV.3.13). Pure intelligence constitutes its nature. Just as a lump of salt has neither inside nor outside but one and the same saltish taste, not any other taste, so also Brahman has neither inside nor outside any characteristic form but intelligence.

III.2.17 (335) (The scripture) also shows (this and) it is likewise stated in Srrnriti.

The argument in support of Sūtra 11 is continued.

That Brahman is without any attributes is also proved by those scriptural texts also which expressly deny that It possesses any other characteristics, e.g. "Now, therefore, the description of Brahman; not this, not this (neti, neti)" (Bri. Up. II.3.6). There is no other and more appropriate description than this "not this, not this".

Kenopanishad (I.4) declares "It is different from the known, It is also above the unknown". Taittiriya Upaniṣhad (II.9) says "From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it".

The Śhruti text which treats of the conversation between Bahva and Vashkali has a similar purport. Vashkali questioned Bahva about the nature of Brahman. Bahva explained it to Vashkali by silence.

Bahva said to Vashkali "Learn Brahman, O friend" and became silent.

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Then on a second and third question he replied "I am teaching you indeed, but you do not understand. That Brahman is Silence." If Brahman has form, there is no necessity to deny everything and say "Not this, not this." The same teaching is conveyed by those Smṛiti texts which deny of Brahman all other characteristics, e.g. "I will proclaim that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which one attains immortality; the Highest Brahman without either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to be or not to be" (Gītā XIII.12). "It is unmanifest, unthinkable, and without modification, thus It is spoken of" (Gītā II. 25).

Of a similar purpose is another Smṛiti text. Lord Hari instructed Nārada "The cause, O Nārada, of your seeing Me endowed with the qualities of

all beings is the Māyā thrown out by Me; do not cognise Me as being such in reality.”

III.2.18 (336) For this very reason (we have with respect to Brahman) comparisons like the images of the sun and the like.

The argument in support of Sūtra 11 is continued.

That Brahman is formless is further established from the similes used with respect to It. As Brahman is of the nature of intelligence, devoid of all difference, transcending speech and mind, as He is formless, homogeneous and as He is described only by denying of Him all other characteristics, the scriptures compare His forms to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning thereby that these forms are unreal being due only to limiting adjuncts. “As the one luminous sun enters into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the one unborn Brahman appears different in different bodies.”

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III.2.19 (337) But there is no similarity (of the two things compared since] (in the case of Brahman any second thing) is not apprehended or experienced like water.

Ambuvat: like water; Agrahanat: in the absence of perception, because of non-acceptance, because it cannot be accepted, not being experienced; Tu: but; Na: not, no; Tathatvam: that nature, similarity.

An objection to the preceding Sūtra is raised by the Opponent.

An objection is raised by the Opponent that the similarity spoken of in the preceding Sūtra is not appropriate or correct. In the above

illustration the sun is seen to be separate from the water. Sun has a form. It is a material thing. Water is different from the sun and is at a distance from the sun. Hence the sun may be reflected in the water. But Brahman is formless and all-pervading.

It is not a material thing. All are identical with it. There are no limiting adjuncts different from it and occupying a different place, that can catch its reflection. It is not seen to be separate from the Upadhis or limiting adjuncts.

Brahman is all-pervading. So no object can be at a distance from Him. The sun is reflected in water because of its distance from water. But there can be no such distance between Brahman and any object. Hence reflection in this connection is a meaningless term.

Therefore the instances are not parallel. The comparison is defective.

The next Sūtra removes the objection.

III.2.20 (338) As (the highest Brahman) is inside (its limiting adjuncts) It participates in their increase and decrease; owing to the appropriateness (thus resulting) of the two (things compared), it is thus, (i.e. the comparison holds good).

The objection raised in the preceding Sūtra is refuted.

The comparison with the reflection of the sun should not be taken on all fours. Whenever two things are compared they are so only with reference to some particular point or feature they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated. If it could be shown, there would be an end of that particular relation which gives

rise to the comparison. Exact similitude in all points would mean absolute identity.

The similarity is only in point of the participation in the distortion and contortion in increase and decrease of the image or reflection.

The reflected image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands; it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same.

Even so Brahman although in reality uniform and never changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which It abides. It grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were and so on. As the two things compared possess certain common features, no objection can be made to the comparison. The comparison is certainly not defective on account of the above similarity in the two cases.

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III.2.21 (339) And on account of the declaration of scripture.

A further reason is given to refute the objection raised in Sūtra 19.

The scripture moreover declares that the Supreme Brahman enters into the body and other limiting adjuncts. "He made bodies with two feet, He made bodies with four feet. That Highest Brahman first entered the bodies as a bird. He is called the Puruṣha on account of His dwelling in all bodies" (Bri. Up. II.5.18). "Having entered into them with

this luring individual self" (Chh. Up. VI.3.2). For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sūtra 18 is not defective.

Therefore it is established that Brahman is formless, homogeneous, of the nature of intelligence, and without any difference.

Scripture declares that devout meditations on Brahman with form have results of their own viz. either the warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else release by successive steps (Krama Mukti or progressive emancipation).

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Topic 6: (Sūtras 22-30) The Neti-neti text explained.

III.2.22 (340) What has been mentioned up to this is denied (by the words “not this, not this” and the Śhruti) says something more than that (afterwards).

In this group of Sūtras also the Sūtra-kāra expounds the Nirviśheṣha (formless) Brahman.

The Śhruti declares “There are two forms of Brahman, gross and subtle, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the limited and the unlimited, Sat and Tyat" (Bri. Up. II.3.1).

After describing the two forms of Brahman, the gross consisting of earth, water and fire, and the subtle, consisting of air and ether, the Śhruti declares finally “Now, therefore, the description of Brahman; not this, not this" (Bri. Up. II.3.6).

There arises a doubt whether the double denial in “not this, not this" negates both the world and Brahman, or only one of them.

The Opponent maintains that both are denied and consequently Brahman which is false, cannot be the substratum for a universe which is also false. It leads us to Śhūnya-vāda –‘*atheism*’. If one only is denied it is proper that Brahman is denied, because It is not seen and therefore Its existence is doubtful and not the universe because we experience it.

This Sūtra refutes this view of the Opponent. It is impossible that the phrase “Not so, not so” should negative both, as that would imply the doctrine of a general void. The words “Neti, Neti” cannot be said to deny Brahman as well as its having form, because that would be Śhūnya-vāda.

The Śhruti affirms Brahman. What is the good of teaching Brahman and saying that it is non-existent? Why smear yourself with mud and then wash it? So Brahman is beyond speech and mind and is eternal, pure and free. It is a mass of consciousness. Therefore the Śhruti denies that Brahman has form but not Brahman itself.

What has been described till now, viz. the two forms of Brahman: gross and subtle, is denied by the words, “not this, not this”.

Brahman cannot be denied, because that would contradict the introductory phrase of the Chapter. “Shall I tell you Brahman?” (Bri. Up. II.1.1) would show disregard of the threat conveyed in Tait. Up. II.6. “He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing,” would be opposed to definite assertions such as “He is” “He is to be apprehended” (Katha Up. II.6.13); and would certainly involve a stultification of the whole Vedānta.

The phrase that Brahman transcends all speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that Brahman does not exist, because after the Śhruti has established the existence of Brahman in such texts as "He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest", "Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman". It cannot be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. Because the common saying is "Better than bathing it is not to touch dirt at all." The Śhruti text "From whence all speech with the mind turns away unable to reach it" (Tait. Up. II.4), must therefore be viewed as intimating Brahman.

"Not so, not so" negatives the entire aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman, but not Brahman which is the basis for all fictitious superimpositions. It denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well as immaterial which in the preceding part of the chapter is described with reference to the gods as well as the body, and also the second form which is produced by the first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term Puruṣha.

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The double repetition of the negation may either serve the purpose of furnishing special denial of the material as well as the immaterial form of Brahman; or the first 'not so' may negative the aggregate of material elements, while the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that whatever can be thought is not Brahman.

The Śhruti denies that Brahman has form but not Brahman itself.

It interdicts by two negations the gross and the subtle bodies. Or it interdicts Bhutas (elements) and Vasanas. Or the repetition is for stating the denial of all similar assumptions. So the denial denies the world as superimposed on Brahman and does not deny Brahman itself.

After the negation of Neti Neti, the Śhruti goes on to describe in positive terms the further attributes of this Brahman - His name being the True of the true (Satyasya Satyam). Moreover after making such a denial, it affirms the existence of something higher-Anyat Paramasti; Satyasya Satyam-The Truth of Truth. This intimates that Brahman alone is the one reality that exists and is the substratum of the world which is illusory 'Neti Neti' denies the so-muchness of Brahman, as was described in the preceding Sūtras. It says that the material and immaterial is not the whole of Brahman. It is something more than that. The word 'Iti' refers to what has been mentioned immediately before, i.e. the two forms of Brahman, the subject matter of the discussion.

Hence it cannot refer to Brahman itself which is not the chief topic of the preceding texts.

The objection viz. Brahman is not experienced and therefore it is Brahman that is denied, has no force. It cannot stand, because the object of the Śhruti is to teach about something which is not ordinarily experienced by us. Otherwise its teaching would be superfluous.

We, therefore, decide that the clause "not so, not so", negatives not absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.

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III.2.23 (341) That (Brahman) is not manifest, for (so the scripture) says.

The character of Brahman is discussed.

This is a Pūrva-paksha -'Objection' Sūtra.

Brahman is beyond the senses, so the Śhruti declares. If Brahman exists, then why is It not apprehended by the senses or the mind? Because It is extremely subtle and is the witness of whatever is apprehended i.e. subject in the apprehension. The individual souls are enveloped by ignorance. Hence they are not able to perceive Brahman. The Śhruti declares "Brahman is not apprehended by the eye, nor by the speech, nor by the other senses, nor by penance, nor by good works" (Mun. Up. III.1). "That Self is to be described by no, no! He is incomprehensible, for He cannot be comprehended" (Bri. Up. III.9.26). "That which cannot be seen nor apprehended" (Mun. Up. I.1.6).

"When in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported" (Tait. Up. II.7). Similar statements are made in Smṛiti passages, e.g. "He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by thought, unchangeable."

III.2.24 (342) And moreover (Brahman is experienced) in devout meditation (as we know) from the Śhruti and Smṛiti.

The discussion on the characteristic of Brahman is continued.

The word 'Api' sets aside the Pūrva-paksha -'Objection'. It is used in a deprecatative sense. The above objection is not even worthy of consideration.

Brahman is exceedingly subtle. Hence He cannot be seen by the physical eyes. He is beyond the senses. But Yogis behold Him in their

purified minds. If Brahman is not manifest, then we can never know Him and therefore there will be no freedom.

This Sūtra declares that Brahman is not known only to those whose heart is not purified, but those who are endowed with a pure heart realise Brahman in the state of Samādhi when ignorance is annihilated.

This is vouched for by Śhrutis as well as Smṛitis. "The Self-existent created the senses with out-going tendencies. Therefore man beholds the external universe but not the internal Self. Some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality beholds the Self within" (Katha Up. IV.1). "When a man's mind has become purified by the serene light of knowledge, then he sees Him, meditating on Him as without parts" (Mun. Up. III.1.8).

The Smṛiti also says the same thing "He who is seen as light by the Yogins meditating on Him sleeplessly, with suspended breath, with contented minds and subdued senses, etc., reverence be to Him" and "the Yogins see Him, the august, eternal one!"

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III.2.25 (343) And as in the case of (physical) light and the like, there is no difference, so also between Brahman and Its manifestation in activity; on account of the repeated instruction [of the Śhruti to that effect].

The discussion on the character of Brahman is continued.

The identity of Jīva and Brahman is explained. Just as light, ether, the sun, etc., appear differentiated as it were, through their objects such as fingers, vessels, water, etc., which form the limiting adjuncts while in

reality they preserve their essential non-difference, so also the distinction of different selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while the unity of all selves is natural and original. Through ignorance the individual soul thinks he is different from Brahman, but in reality he is identical with Brahman.

As in the case of light, etc., the self-luminous Brahman appears diverse in meditation and other acts. This is clear from the Śhruti saying “Tat Tvam Asf’ nine times.

The Vedānta texts insist again and again on the doctrine of the non-difference of the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. The identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul is known from repeated instruction of the Śhruti in texts like “That Thou art-Tat Tvam Asf’, “I am Brahman-Aham Brahma Asmf’ which deny difference.

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III.2.26 (344) Therefore (the individual soul becomes one) with the Infinite; for thus the (scripture) indicates.

The result of realisation of Brahman is stated here.

By the realisation of Brahman the meditator becomes identical with the Infinite. Ignorance with all its limiting adjuncts vanishes when one attains Brahma Jñāna. There is indication to that effect in Śhruti, “He who knows the highest Brahman becomes Brahman Himself’ (Mun. Up. III.2.9). “Being Brahman he goes to Brahman” (Bri. Up. IV.4.6). If the difference were real, then one could not become Brahman Himself. Difference is only illusory or unreal. Jīva is only a mere shadow or reflection. He is mere appearance. Just as the reflection of the sun in the water gets absorbed in the sun itself when the water dries up, so

also the reflected Jīva gets absorbed in Brahman when ignorance is destroyed by the dawn of Knowledge of Brahman.

III.2.27 (345) But on account of both (i.e. difference and non-difference) being taught (by the Śhruti), (the relation of the highest Brahman to the individual soul has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils.

The discussion on the characteristic of Brahman is resumed.

Sūtras 27 and 28 express the views of the Bhedabheda-vadins.

Sūtra 29 gives the real view.

Having established the identity of the individual soul and Brahman the Sūtra-kāra or the author mentions a different view of the same matter. He now proceeds to enquire into the doctrine of difference and non-difference.

Some scriptural texts refer to the Supreme Soul and the individual soul as distinct entities: "Two birds of beautiful plumage, etc." (Mun. Up. III.1 .1). This text speaks of difference between the Jīva and Brahman.

In some other texts the Supreme Soul is represented as the object of approach and as the ruler of the individual soul. "Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts" (Mun. Up. III.1 .8). "He goes to the Divine Person who is greater than the great" (Mun. Up. III.2.8).

"Who rules all beings within." In other texts again the two are spoken of as non-different.

"Thou art That" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). "I am Brahman" (Bri. Up. I.4.10).

"This is thy Self who is within all" (Bri. Up. III.4.1). "He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal" (Bri. Up. III.7.15).

As thus difference and non-difference are equally vouched for by the Śhruti texts, the acceptance of absolute non-difference would render futile all those texts which speak of difference. Therefore we have to take that their relation is one of difference and non-difference, as between a serpent and its coils. As a serpent it is one non-different, but if we look at the coils, hood, erect posture, and so on, there is difference.

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Even so there is difference as well as non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. The difference between them prior to emancipation is real. The Jīva becomes identical with Brahman only when his ignorance is destroyed by the dawn of knowledge of Brahman.

Their separateness and oneness is like a serpent in quiescence and motion.

III.2.28 (346) Or like (the relation of) light and its substratum, on account of both being luminous.

The relation between Brahman and the individual soul also is discussed.

Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows. Another illustration is given to establish the theory of difference and non-difference. Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun itself, are not absolutely different, because they both consist of fire and yet are spoken of as different, so also the individual soul and the Supreme Soul (Brahman).

The light and the sun are both luminous. Hence they are non-different. They are different owing to their varying extensity. Similarly is the relation between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul one of difference and non-difference. The former is limited and the latter is all-pervading.

III.2.29 (347) Or (the relation between the two, i.e. Jīva and Brahman is) as (given) before.

Or it may be as stated in Sūtra 25. This last is the real view, because if the individual soul is another state of Brahman or a ray of Brahman, such inherent limitation will never disappear. The Śhruti affirms identity and states the feature of diversity which is due to Avidyā.

The two previous Sūtras express the view of Bhedabhedavadins who maintain the doctrine of difference and non-difference.

This Sūtra refutes the view of Bhedabhedavadins and establishes the final truth which has been declared in Sūtra 25, viz. that the difference is merely illusory, and identity or non-difference is the reality.

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If the bondage of the soul is due to Avidyā or ignorance only, final liberation is possible. But if the soul is really bound, whether the soul be regarded as a certain condition or state of the Supreme Soul or Brahman, as stated in Sūtra 27, or as a part of the Supreme Soul, as expressed in Sūtra 28-its real bondage cannot be destroyed.

Thus the scriptural doctrine of final liberation becomes purposeless and absurd.

If the difference is real it can never come to an end. All the scriptural instructions with regard to the final emancipation will be meaningless. Bondage is only the idea of separateness. If separateness is real there can be no final release at all. But if the difference is due to nescience or ignorance, then knowledge of Brahman or Brahma-Jñāna can annihilate it. Then the Supreme Reality or Brahman, the non-difference may be realised.

It cannot be said that the Śhruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. The Śhruti aims at establishing non-difference only. It merely refers to difference as something known from other sources of knowledge, viz. perception, etc.

Hence the views expressed in Sūtras 27 and 28 are not certainly correct. The view given in Sūtra 25 alone is correct.

The conclusion is that the soul is not different from the Supreme Soul or Brahman as explained in Sūtra 25.

III.2.30 (348) And on account of the denial.

Sūtra 29 is confirmed.

The Śhruti in fact expressly denies separateness.

The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intelligent being apart from Brahman or the Supreme Soul. "There is no other Seer but He-Nanyato'sti Drashta" (Bri. Up. III.7.23).

The same conclusion follows from those passages which deny the existence of a world apart from Brahman, and thus leave Brahman alone remaining, viz. "Now then the teaching-not this, not this" (Bri.

Up. II.3.6). "That Brahman is without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside" (Bri. Up. II.5.19).

It is now an established fact that there is no other entity but Brahman. Therefore there is only one Brahman without any difference at all.

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Topic 7: (Sūtras 31-37) Brahman is one without a second.

III.2.31 (349) (There is something) Superior to this (Brahman) on account of terms denoting a bank, measure, connection and difference (used with respect to It).

It may be said that there must be something higher than Brahman because Brahman is described as a bridge, or as limited or as attained by man or as different from man.

There arises now the doubt on account of the conflicting nature of various scriptural statements whether something exists beyond Brahman or not.

The Opponent holds that some entity must be admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken of as being a bank, as having size, as being connected, as being separated. As a bank it is spoken of in the passage "The Self is a bank, a boundary" (Chh. Up. VIII.4.1). The term bank intimates that there exists something apart from Brahman, just as there exists something different from an ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the words "Having passed the bank" (Chh. Up. VIII.4.2). In ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank, reaches some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest. So we must

understand that a man after having crossed, i.e. passed beyond Brahman, reaches something which is not Brahman.

As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following passages "This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight hoofs, sixteen parts" (Chh. Up. III.18.2). Now it is well known from ordinary experience that wherever an object, e.g. a coin has a definite limited size, there exists something different from that object. Therefore we must assume that there also exists something different from Brahman.

Brahman is declared to be connected in the following passages.

"Then he is united with the True" (Chh. Up. VI.8.1). "The embodied self is embraced by the Supreme Self" (Bri. Up. IV.3.21). We observe that non-measured things are connected with the things measured, e.g. men with a town. Scripture declares that the individual souls are in the state of deep sleep connected with Brahman. Therefore we conclude that beyond Brahman there is something unmeasured.

The same conclusion is confirmed by those texts which state difference. "Now that golden person who is seen within the sun." The text refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions a Lord residing in the eye distinct from the former: "Now the person who is seen within the eye." The Śhruti declares "The Ātman is to be seen" etc. There is a seer and there is the seen. There is difference.

All these indicate that Brahman is not one without a second, and that there exists something different from Brahman.

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III.2.32 (350) But (Brahman is called a bank etc.) on account of similarity.

The objection raised in the preceding Sūtra is refuted here.

The word 'tu' (but) removes the doubt. It sets aside the previously established conclusion.

There can exist nothing different from Brahman. Brahman is called the bank, etc., because He resembles it in a certain respect. He is the support of all while crossing over this ocean of the world, just as a bank is a great protection or help in crossing a canal.

There can exist nothing different from Brahman as we are not able to observe a proof for such existence. All things proceed from Brahman. The Śhruti says that by knowing Brahman everything will be known. How then can there be any other entity? Bridge or bank means like a bridge or bank.

Brahman is called a bank on account of similarity, not because there exists something beyond Him. If the mere fact of Brahman being called a bank implied the existence of something beyond Him as in the case of an ordinary bank, we should also be forced to conclude that Brahman is made of earth and stones. This would go against the scriptural doctrine that Brahman is not something produced.

Brahman is called a bank because it resembles a bank in certain respects. Just as a bank dams back the water and makes the boundary of adjacent fields, so also Brahman supports the world and its boundaries.

In the clause quoted above “Having passed that bank” the verb ‘to pass’ cannot be taken in the sense of ‘going beyond’ but must rather mean ‘to reach fully’. “Having passed the bank” means “having attained Brahman fully” and not having crossed it just as we say of a student “he has passed in the grammar” meaning thereby that he has fully mastered it.

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III.2.33 (351) (The statement as to Brahman having size) is for the sake of easy comprehension (i.e. Upāsana or devout meditation); just like (four) feet.

The statements as to the size of Brahman “Brahman has four feet,” “It has sixteen digits,” etc., are meant for the sake of Upāsana or devout meditation, because it is difficult to understand the Infinite, most subtle, all-pervading Brahman. In order to facilitate pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people four feet etc. are ascribed to Brahman.

The description of Brahman as having a limited form (Shodasakala, 16 parts) is for the sake of meditation just as Padas, i.e. speech etc., are described in respect of mind.

Just as mind conceived as the personal manifestation of Brahman is imagined to have the organ of speech, nose, eyes and ears as its four feet, so also Brahman is imagined as having size, etc., for facility of meditation but not in reality.

“Practise meditation, taking the mind as Brahman,”-this is the form of worship with the aid of the constituents of the individual soul - “This Brahman is of four feet, namely, the speech as a foot, the chief vital

energy as a foot, the eyes as a foot, and the ears as afoot" (Chh. Up. III.18.1-2).

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III.2.34 (352) (The statements concerning connection and difference with respect to Brahman) are due to special places: as in the case of light and the like.

Sūtra 33 is further confirmed.

The statements regarding connection and difference are made with a view to difference of place. The statements regarding difference are made with reference to limiting adjuncts (Buddhi, etc.) only and not to any difference in the nature of Brahman.

When the cognition of difference which is produced by Brahman's connection with different places i.e. with the Buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts, ceases owing to the cessation of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connection with the Supreme Self is metaphorically said to take place; but that is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with a view to any limitation on the part of Brahman.

This is similar to the case of light and the like. The light of the sun also is differentiated by its connection with limiting adjuncts. The light is said to be divided on account of these adjuncts. It is said to enter into connection or union when the adjuncts are removed.

We see two moons on account of an eye-disease. We see only one when the disease is removed.

Light is really one but we speak of light inside a room and light outside it. The distinction is due to limiting adjuncts. The light inside the room

may be said to be united with the light in general when the room is destroyed.

Other examples of the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether entering into connection with the eyes of needles and the like.

III.2.35 (353) And it is reasonable.

Further only such a connection as described above is possible.

Because scriptural passages such as "He is gone to his self" (Chh. Up. VI.8.1) declare that the connection of the soul with the Supreme Soul is one of essential nature. The essential nature of a thing is imperishable. Hence the connection cannot be like that of the inhabitants with the town.

The connection can only be explained with reference to an observation owing to ignorance of the true nature of the soul.

Similarly the difference referred to by scripture cannot be real but due to ignorance, because many texts declare that there exists only one Brahman.

Scripture teaches that the one ether is made manifold as it were by its connection with different places. "The ether which is outside man is the ether which is inside man, and the ether within the heart" (Chh. Up. III.12.7).

Hence connection and difference are not to be taken as real, but only metaphorically.

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III.2.36 (354) Similarly on account of the express denial of all other things (there is nothing but Brahman).

Further the Śhruti denies expressly that there is any other entity besides Brahman. (Brahmaivedam Sarvam, Ātmaivedam Sarvam).

Brahman is described as the innermost of all.

Having thus refuted the arguments of the Opponent, the author or Sūtra-kāra in conclusion strengthens his view by a further reason.

A great number of Vedic passages distinctly deny the existence of anything else besides Brahman. "He indeed is below; I am below; the Self is below" etc. (Chh. Up. VII.25.1.2). "Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was abandoned by everything" (Bri. Up. II.4.6). "Brahman alone is all this" (Mun. Up. II.2.11). "The Self is all this" (Chh. Up. VII.25.2). "In it there is no diversity" (Bri. Up. IV.4.19). "He to whom there is nothing superior, from whom there is nothing different" (Svet. Up. III.9). "This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside" (Bri. Up. II.5.19). That there is no other self within the Highest Self follows from that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within everything (Bri. Up. II.5.19).

Therefore Brahman is one without a second.

III.2.37 (355) By this the Omnipresence (of Brahman is established) in accordance with the scriptural statements regarding (Brahman's) extent.

By the rejecting of the taking of the description as bridge or bank etc., in their actual sense, it is clear that Brahman has all-pervadingness. Such Omnipresence is clear also from such words as Ayama. If you take the description as bridge etc., in their actual sense but not in the figurative sense, Brahman will become limited, and consequently not

eternal. But the Śhruti and Smṛiti describe Brahman as unlimited and all-pervasive. The word Ayama means pervasive. The all-pervadingness of Brahman follows from the very fact that it is one without a second.

That Brahman is Omnipresent follows from the texts proclaiming its extent. "As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart" (Chh. Up. VIII.1 .3). "Like the ether, he is Omnipresent and eternal." "He is greater than the sky, greater than the ether" (Sat. Br. X.6.3.2). "He is eternal, Omnipresent, firm, immovable" (Gītā. II.24).

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Topic 8: (Sūtras 38-41) The Lord is the giver of the fruits of actions.

III.2.38 (356) From Him (the Lord) are the fruits of actions, for that is reasonable.

Another characteristic of Brahman is established.

The Mīmāṃsākas hold that the Karma (work) and not the Lord gives the fruits of one's actions.

The Sūtra refutes it and declares that the fruits of one's work viz. pain, pleasure and a mixture of the two, come only from the Lord.

The Lord of all who knows all the differences of place and time alone is capable of bestowing fruits in accordance with the merit of the agents. Karma is insentient and short-lived. It ceases to exist as soon as it is done. It cannot therefore bestow the fruits of actions at a future date according to one's merit.

How can fruit which is positive result from such non-existence? You cannot say that Karma died after generating the fruit which attaches

itself to the doer in due time, because it is called fruit only when it is enjoyed.

You cannot say also that Karma generates Apurva which gives fruit. Apurva is Achetana (non-sentient). It cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. It cannot, therefore, bestow rewards and punishments. Further there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an Apurva.

Therefore the fruits of actions come to men from Īśhwara or the Lord only, who is Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, All-compassionate.

III.2.39 (357) And because the Śhruti so teaches.

The preceding Sūtra is strengthened on the support of Śhruti.

The Śhruti also declares that the fruits of actions come from the Lord. "This indeed is the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, and the giver of wealth (the fruit of one's work)" (Bri. Up. IV.4.24).

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III.2.40 (358) Jaimini thinks for the same reasons (viz. scriptural authority and reasoning, on the same ground as stated in Sūtras 38 and 39) that religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions).

An objection is raised to Sūtras 38 and 39.

The view of the Sūtras 38 and 39 is being criticised.

Jaimini says that Dharma gives fruits of actions as Śhruti and reason support such a view.

Scripture, Jaimini argues, proclaims injunctions such as the following one "He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice". It is admitted that every scriptural injunction has an object. Therefore it is reasonable to think that the scripture itself brings about the fruit or the result, i.e. the attainment of the heavenly world. If this were not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.

But it may be objected that an action cannot produce a result at a future time as it is destroyed.

Jaimini says: A deed cannot produce result at some future time, unless before passing away, it gives birth to some unseen result. We, therefore, assume that there exists some extraordinary principle called Apurva which is produced by the Karma before it is destroyed.

The result is produced at some future time on account of this Apurva.

This hypothesis removes all difficulties. But on the contrary it is impossible that the Lord should effect the fruits of Karmas. Because one uniform cause (Īśhwara) cannot cause variety of effects. He will have partiality and cruelty; and Karma will become purposeless, i.e. if the deed itself cannot bring about its own fruit, it would be useless to perform it at all.

For all these reasons the result springs from the action only, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. (This is the view of Jaimini).

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III.2.41 (359) But Bādarāyaṇa thinks the former (i.e. the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action) on account of His being declared to be the cause (of the actions themselves).

The view of Jaimini expressed in Sūtra 40 is refuted by citing a contrary one.

The word 'Tu' (but) refutes the view of Sūtra 40. It sets aside the view of the fruit being produced either by the mere action or the mere Apurva.

The sage Bādarāyaṇa holds the former, i.e. the Lord is the Dispenser of the fruit of actions. The Śhruti clearly states that all rewards whether heaven or union with the Lord come from Him, "He takes one to a purer world by virtue of one's piety - *Punyena punyam lokam nayati*'. Also Katha Upaniṣhad (I.2.23) declares "He gives Himself away to whomsoever He chooses-*Yamevaisha vrinute tena labhyah*".

Bādarāyaṇa says that the Lord bestows the fruits of deeds because Śhruti says that the Lord induces the doing of actions and gives the fruits thereof. As the Lord acts according to the variety of Karmas, he can produce and give a variety of results and has no partiality and cruelty, and Karma will not become purposeless.

The Lord is the causal agent with reference to all actions whether good or evil. Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (III.8) declares "He makes him whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed and the same makes him whom He wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed." The same is said in Bhagavad Gītā (VII.21-22), "Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and

obtains from it the benefits he desires. as ordained by Me." Moreover all Vedānta texts declare that the Lord is the only cause of all creations. The Lord creates all beings in forms and conditions corresponding to and retributive of their former Karmas. Hence the Lord is the cause of all fruits of actions. As the Lord has regard for the merit and demerit of the souls, the objections raised above that a uniform cause is incapable of producing various effects, etc., are without any foundation.

To sum up, the nature of the Supreme Brahman has been described. Brahman has been shown to be formless, self-luminous and without difference. It has been established through "Neti-Neti" "not this, not this" doctrine that Brahman is one without a second. It has been conclusively proved that the Lord is the Dispenser of the fruits of Karmas of the people.

Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the Third Adhyāya (Chapter III) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(368) CHAPTER III, SECTION 3, INTRODUCTION

In the previous Section (Pada 2) it has been shown that the Jīva (Tvam Pada of the Tat-Tvam-Asi Mahāvākya) is identical with Brahman (Tat Pada of Tat-Tvam-Asi Mahāvākya). Brahman has been shown to be Ekarasa (of homogeneous or unchanging nature). We have explained the nature of the object of cognition, i.e. Brahman.

The author of the Brahma Sūtras now sets himself to ascertain the end and aim of the Vidyās (meditations of Upāsanās) as prescribed in the Śhrutis.

The Śhrutis prescribe various kinds of Vidyās or meditations to enable the aspirant to attain the knowledge of identity. It is extremely difficult or rather impossible for the ordinary man to have a comprehensive understanding of the Infinite, which is transcendent, extremely subtle and beyond the reach of the senses and gross undisciplined intellect. Therefore the Śhrutis or the sacred scriptures prescribe easy methods of Saguna meditation for approaching the Infinite or the Absolute. They present various symbols of Brahman (Pratīkas) such as Vaiśhvānara or Virat, Sun, Ākāśha, Food, Prāṇa and mind for the neophyte or the beginner to contemplate on. These symbols are props for the mind to lean upon in the beginning. The gross mind is rendered subtle, sharp and one-pointed by such Saguna forms of meditation.

These different methods of approaching the Impersonal Absolute are known as Vidyās or Upāsanas.

This Section discusses these various Vidyās by means of which the Jīva or the individual soul attains Brahman or the Supreme Soul.

Similar Vidyās are described differently in different recensions of the Vedas. Now the question arises naturally whether these similar Vidyās are one and the same or different. whether similar Vidyās have to be combined into a single Upāsana or meditation or to be taken separately. It is decided here which Vidyās are the same and have to be combined into one and which Vidyās are different despite certain similar features.

The aim and object of all Vidyās is the attainment of Brahman or the Imperishable. Brahman alone is the only living Reality. Brahman alone is Truth. Brahman is Sat or Existence Absolute. Hence it may be

advantageous and helpful to combine the particulars of the same Vidyā mentioned in different recensions or Sakhas as they have been found highly efficacious and immensely beneficial by the followers of those Sakhas.

He who meditates on Brahman as mind as is taught in the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad, Bhrigu Valli, must collate all the attributes of the mind not only from his own particular Vedic Sakha, but from other Sakhas also where meditation on Brahman in the form of mind is taught. In meditating on Brahman as mind, he must not bring together attributes not belonging to mind such as those of food, though Brahman is taught to be meditated upon as food also. In fact only those attributes are to be supplied from other Sakhas which are taught about the particular object of meditation, and not any attribute in general.

In this Section Śhrī Vyāsa the framer of the Brahma Sūtras concludes that most of the Vidyās prescribed in the Śhrutis have for their object the knowledge of Brahman or Brahma-Jñāna. They differ only in form but not in substance. Their final goal is the attainment of everlasting peace, eternal bliss and immortality. One meditation or Upāsana or Vidyā is as good as another for attaining the final emancipation.

Śhruti teaches us to meditate on Brahman either directly or through the medium of some Pratīkas or symbols, such as the sun, Ākāśha, food, mind, Prāṇa, the Puruṣha residing in the eye, the empty space (Daharakasa) within the heart, Om or Prāṇava and the like.

You will have to search Brahman and adore Him in and through the symbols, but these symbols must not usurp His place. You must concentrate and fix the mind on these symbols and think of His

attributes such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, Omnipresence, Sat-Chit-Ānanda, purity, perfection, freedom, etc.

The Vidyās appear to be different only from the view-point of difference in the symbols but the goal everywhere is the same. Remember this point always. Bear this in mind constantly.

Some attributes of Brahman are found common in some of the Vidyās. You should not consider yourself as a distinct entity from Brahman. This is a fundamental or vital point.

In all the Vidyās three things are common. The final goal is the attainment of eternal bliss and immortality, through the realisation of Brahman with or without the aid of the symbols or Pratīkas. The attributes which are found in common in all the Vidyās such as blissfullness, purity, perfection, knowledge, immortality, Absolute Freedom or Kaivalya, Absolute Independence, eternal satisfaction and the like must be invariably associated with the conception of Brahman. The meditator must think himself identical with Brahman and must worship Brahman as his Immortal Ātman.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇas I and II: (Sūtras 1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those Vidyās which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several Vidyās or one Vidyā only. The Vidyās with identical or similar form met with in the scriptures or in different recensions of the scriptures, are one Vidyā. Particulars of identical Vidyās mentioned in different places or Sakhas are to be combined with one meditation.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 6-8) discusses the case of Vidyās which are separate on account of different subject-matter, although in other respects there are similarities. The examples selected are the Udgītha Vidyās of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (I.1.3) and the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (I.3.1). Although they indicate certain similarities such as bearing the same name and the Udgītha being in both identified with Prāṇa - yet they are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chhandogya Vidyā is not the whole Udgītha but only the sacred syllable OM while Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad represents the whole Udgītha as the object of meditation.

Adhikaraṇa IV." (Sūtra 9). In the passage. "Let one meditate on the syllable 'OM' (of) the Udgītha" (Chh. Up. I.1.1), the Omkara and the Udgītha stand in the relation of one specifying the other. The meaning is "Let one meditate on that Omkara which" etc.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtra 10) intimates that there should be no mistake in the identity of the Prāṇa Vidyā as taught in Chhandogya, Brihadaranyaka and Kaushitaki. It determines the unity of the Prāṇa-Vidyās and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the Prāṇa, which are mentioned in the different texts within one meditation.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 11-13) intimates that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman such as Bliss and knowledge are to be taken into account everywhere while those which admit of increase and decrease as for instance the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad are confined to special meditations.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 14-15) teaches that the object of Katha Upaniṣhad (III.10, 11) is one only, viz. to indicate that the Supreme Self is higher than everything, so that the passage forms one Vidyā only.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtras 16-17) intimates that the Self referred to in Aitareya Aranyaka (II.4.1.1) is not a lower form of the self (Sūtratman or Hiranyagarbha), but the Supreme Self.

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Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtra 18) discusses a minor point connected with the Prāṇa-samvada. Rinsing the mouth is not enjoined in the Prāṇa-Vidyā, but only thinking the water as the dress of Prāṇa.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtra 19) declares that the Vidyās in the same Sakha which are identical or similar have to be combined, for they are one.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtras 20-22). In Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (V.5), Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun and then as abiding within the right eye. The names "Ahar" and "Aham" of the Supreme Brahman abiding in the sun and in the right eye respectively cannot be combined, as these are two separate Vidyās.

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtra 23). Attributes of Brahman mentioned in Ranayaniya-Khila are not to be taken into consideration in other Brahma-Vidyās, e.g. the Sandilya Vidyā, as the former is an independent Vidyā owing to the difference of Brahman's abode.

Adhikaraṇa XIII: (Sūtra 24) points out that the Puruṣha-Vidyā of Chhandogya is quite different from the Puruṣha-Vidyā of Taittiriya though they pass by the same name.

Adhikaraṇa XIV: (Sūtra 25) decides that certain detached Mantras like "Pierce the whole body of the enemy" etc., and sacrifices mentioned at the beginning of certain Upaniṣhads-as for instance, a Brāhmaṇa about the Mahāvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-Aranyaka, do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the Brahma-Vidyā, not belong to the latter, as they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhikaraṇa XV: (Sūtra 26) treats of the passage stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds and affirms that a statement made in some of those passages, only to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Adhikaraṇa XVI: (Sūtras 27-28) decides that the shaking of the good and evil deeds takes place not as the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad states on the road to Brahmāloka or the world of Brahman but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body.

Adhikaraṇa XVII: (Sūtras 29-30) intimates that the knower of the Saguna Brahman alone goes by the path of the gods after death and not the knower of the Nirguna Brahman. The soul of him who knows the Nirguna Brahman becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

Adhikaraṇa XVIII: (Sūtra 31) decides that the road of the gods is followed not only by those who know the Vidyās which specially mention the going on that road but all who are acquainted with the Saguna Vidyās of Brahman.

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Adhikaraṇa XIX: (Sūtra 32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even perfected souls may be reborn for the fulfilment of some divine mission.

Adhikaraṇa XX: (Sūtra 33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some Vidyās such as its being not gross, not subtle, etc., are to be combined in all meditations on Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XXI: (Sūtra 34) determines that Kathopanishad (III.1), and Mundaka (III.1), constitute one Vidyā only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XXII: (Sūtras 35-36) maintains that the two passages (Bri. Up. III.4 and III.5), constitute one Vidyā only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the Inner Self of all.

Adhikaraṇa XXIII: (Sūtra 37) decides that the passage in Aitareya Aranyaka (II.2.4.6) constitutes not one but two meditations.

The Śhruti enjoins reciprocal meditation and not merely one way.

Adhikaraṇa XXIV: (Sūtra 38) determines that the Vidyās of the True (Satya Brahman) contained in Bri. Up. (V.4.1 and V.5.2) is one only.

Adhikaraṇa XXV: (Sūtra 39) decides that the attributes mentioned in Chh. Up. (VIII.1.1) and Bri. Up. (IV.4.32) are to be combined on account of a number of common features in both the texts.

Adhikaraṇa XXVI: (Sūtras 40-41) maintains that Prāṇagnihotra need not be observed on days of fast.

Adhikaraṇa XXVII: (Sūtra 42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain sacrifices are not parts of them and therefore not inseparably connected with them.

Adhikaraṇa XXVIII: (Sūtra 43) teaches that in a Bri. Up. passage and a similar Chh. Up. passage, meditations on Vayu and Prāṇa are to be kept separate in spite of the essential oneness of these two.

Adhikaraṇa XXIX: (Sūtras 44-52) decides that the fire-altars made of mind etc., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya of the Brihadaranyaka are not part of the sacrificial act, but constitute a separate Vidyā.

Adhikaraṇa XXX: (Sūtras 53-54) determines that the self is a separate entity distinct from the body.

Adhikaraṇa XXXI.' (Sūtras 55-56) decides that Upāsanas or meditations connected with sacrificial acts, e.g. the Udgītha Upāsana, are valid for all Sakhas.

Adhikaraṇa XXXII: (Sūtra 57) decides that the Vaiśhvānara Upāsana of Chh. Up. (V.11) is one entire Upāsana. Vaiśhvānara Agni is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.

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Adhikaraṇa XXXIII.' (Sūtra 58) decides that various Vidyās like the Sandilya-Vidyā, Dahara-Vidyā and so on, are to be kept separate and not combined into one entire Upāsana.

Adhikaraṇa IV." (Sūtra 59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit, are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.

Any one Vidyā should be selected according to one's choice.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtra 60) decides that those meditations on the other hand which refer to special desires may or may not be combined according to choice or liking.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 61-66) decides that meditations connected with members of sacrificial acts, such as the Udgītha may or may not be combined according to liking.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-4) The Vidyās having identical or the same form found in scriptures constitute one Vidyā.

III.3.1 (360) (The Vidyās or the Upāsanas) described in the various Vedānta texts [are not different, are identical] on account of the non-difference of injunction, etc., (i.e. connection, form and name).

Can Śruti declare different Upāsanas in respect of one entity? If we say that one Śruti is correct and others are incorrect, disbelief in Śruti as a whole will follow. The Śruti which declare the nature of Brahman are not commands. They only state solid facts.

The author of the Sūtras now proceeds to discuss whether the Upāsana (devotional) Śruti are divergent and separate or not. Scriptures teach that like Karma, Upāsanas have various results. Some of them have visible results, others unseen results. Some Upāsanas create true knowledge and lead to Kramamukti or gradual liberation or release by successive steps. With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise the question whether the individual Vedānta-texts teach different Upāsanas of Brahman or not.

There are many expositions of Brahman in Śhruti. In some Śhruti He is described as Vaiśhvānara, in another He is described as Prāṇa and so forth. Now a doubt may arise as to whether these expositions are different or they all aim at one and the same thing.

This Sūtra removes the doubt. The expositions in all the Śhrutis are the same. They all point to one and the same purpose of worship of Brahman, though in different forms fitted to the capacity of the meditator, because there is no difference in the injunctions about meditation. All the injunctions intimate that Brahman is to be meditated upon. Hence the object of those expositions and of meditation is one and the same.

The Upāsanas of Prāṇa are described in one way in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad and in a different way in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad. Now a doubt arises whether such Upāsanas described differently in different Sakhas of the Vedas are different or the same.

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The Opponent maintains that they are different owing to the difference in form. This Sūtra refutes it and declares that such meditations are one and the same owing to the non-difference as regards injunctions, connection, name and form of these in different Sakhas.

Thus, as the Agnihotra though described in different Sakhas is yet one, the same kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of the words "He is to offer", so the injunction met with in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (VI.1.1.). "He who knows the oldest and the best", etc., is the same as that which occurs in the text of Chhandogya "He who knows the first and the best" (Chh. Up. V.1.1).

The Prāṇa-Vidyā in all the Sakhas is one and the same. There is non-difference as regards the fruit of the Upāsana in both texts. "He who knows it to be such becomes the first and best among his people" (Bri. Up. VI.1.1). Prāṇa is the object of meditation in both texts.

The name of the meditation in both texts is Prāṇa-Vidyā. Prāṇa is described in both texts as the oldest and the greatest. Therefore the two Vidyās are not different, as there is no difference in all respects. The two Vidyās are one and the same. The same is true of Dahara-Vidyā, Panchagni-Vidyā or the knowledge of the five fires, Vaiśhvānara-Vidyā or the knowledge of the Vaiśhvānara, Sandilya-Vidyā, etc., described in various Sakhas.

III.3.2 (361) If it be said that the Vidyās are separate on account of difference (in minor points), we deny that, since even in the same Vidyās (there may be such minor differences).

An objection to the preceding Sūtra is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of two parts namely an objection and its reply. The objection is "Bhedanneti cheṭ". The reply is "Naikasyamapi".

If you say that difference exists, we say that it is not so, because such differences can exist even in the same Upāsana or Vidyā.

Doubtless the Vajasaneyins refer to a sixth Agni when referring to Panchagni Vidyā or the doctrine of five fires "The fire becomes his fire" (Bri. Up. VI.2.24), but the Chhandogyas do not. "But he who knows these five fires" (Chh. Up. V.10. 1 O). But this will not make them separate. The Chhandogyas also can add it if they like. Thus the Vidyā as stated in the two Śhrutis Brihadaranyaka and Chhandogya, is identical.

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The presence or absence of a sixth fire cannot make a difference as regards form, because the Shodasi vessel may or may not be taken in the same Atiratra sacrifice. The name "five fires" is no objection against this increase of number, because the number five is not a fundamental part of the injunction. Differences like this are found in different chapters even in the same Sakha and in the same Vidyā, and yet the Vidyā described in these different chapters is recognised by all as one.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage V.9.2 "When he has departed his friends carry him, as appointed, to the fire." Therefore it is quite clear that the Vidyās of the same class are one and not different notwithstanding these differences in different Sakhas.

The Opponent says: Then again in the conversation between the Prāṇas, the Chhandogyas mention in addition to the most important Prāṇa four other Prāṇas viz. speech, the eye, the ear and the mind, while the Vajasaneyins mention a fifth one also. "Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that becomes rich in offspring and cattle" (Bri. Up. VI.1.6).

We reply: nothing stands in the way of some additional qualification being included in the Vidyā concerning the colloquy of the Prāṇas. The addition or omission of some particular qualification is not able to create difference in the object of knowledge and thereby in the knowledge itself, because the objects of knowledge may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same time the knowing person are understood to be the same.

Therefore the Vidyā also remains the same.

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III.3.3 (362) (The rite of carrying fire on the head is connected) with the study of the Veda (of the Atharvanikas), because in the Samachara (it is mentioned) as being such. And (this also follows) from its being a qualification (for the students of the Atharva Veda) as in the case with the (seven) oblations (viz. Saurya etc).

An objection based on a statement of the Mundaka Upaniṣhad is explained and refuted.

A further objection is raised. In the Mundaka Upaniṣhad which deals with the knowledge of Brahman, the carrying of fire on the head by the student (Sirovrata) is mentioned. The Opponent maintains that the Vidyās of the Atharvanikas are different from all other Vidyās on account of this particular ceremony which is practised by the followers of the Atharva Veda.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that the rite of carrying fire on the head is an attribute not of the Vidyā, but merely of the study of the Veda on the part of the Atharvanikas. So it is described in the book Samachara which treats of Vedic observances.

At the close of the Upaniṣhad moreover we have the following sentence, "A man who has not performed the rite (carrying fire on the head) does not read this" (Mun. Up. III.2.11). This clearly intimates that it is connected with the study of the Upaniṣhad and not with the Vidyā.

The Sūtra adds another illustrative instance in the words “as in the case of the libations there is limitation of that”. The rite of carrying the fire is associated only with the study of that particular Veda and not others, like the seven oblations from the Saurya libation up to the Sataudana libation, which are not connected with the fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with those of Atharva Veda. The command is to those studying the Mundaka Upaniṣhad just as the command to perform the seven Savas is to them. The carrying of a fire-pot on their head will not make the Vidyā different.

Therefore there is unity of Vidyā in all cases. The doctrine of the unity of the Vidyās thus remains unshaken.

III.3.4 (363) (The scripture) also instructs (thus).

An argument in support of Sūtra 1 is given.

The Veda also declares the identity of the Vidyās, because all Vedānta texts represent the object of knowledge, as one, e.g. Katha Upaniṣhad (I.2.15), “That word which all the Vedas declare”; Aitareya Aranyaka (III.2.3.12) “Him only the Bahvrīchas consider in the great hymn, the Adhvaiyus in the sacrificial fire, the Chhandogyas in the Mahāvrata ceremony.” To prove the unity of the Vidyās some other instances may be quoted. Kathopanishad (I.6.2) mentions as one of the Lord's qualities that He causes fear. Now this very same quality is referred to in the Tait. Up. II.7: “For if he makes but the smallest distinction in the Self, there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him who knows a difference and does not know oneness.”

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The Impersonal Absolute is the one purport of all the Vedānta texts. Hence all Vidyās which pertain to It must also be one. The meditation on the Saguna Brahman as Vaiśhvānara, who is represented as extending from heaven to the earth in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is referred to in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, "But he who adores that Vaiśhvānara Self as extending from heaven to the earth" (Chh. Up. V.18.1). This clearly indicates that all Vaiśhvānara Vidyās are one.

Nirguna Brahman is one and not many. Saguna Brahman also is one and not many. Hence particular Vidyās which pertain to either Saguna Brahman or Nirguna Brahman are also one and not many.

This also follows from the same hymns and the like enjoined in the one place being employed in other places for the purpose of devout meditation or Upāsana.

The same rule applies to other Vidyās also besides the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā. Therefore, Vidyās are not many, though they are differently described in different Sakhas. All Vedāntic texts intimate identical devout meditations. Thus the unity of Vidyās is established.

Topic 2: Particulars of identical Vidyās mentioned in different Sakhas or places are to be combined into one meditation.

III.3.5 (364) And in the Upāsanas of the same class (mentioned in different Sakhas) a combination (of all the particulars mentioned in all Sakhas is to be made) as there is no difference in the object of meditation, just as (a combination of] all subsidiary rites of a main sacrifice (mentioned in different Sakhas is made].

A deduction is made from the four preceding Sūtras. This Sūtra states the practical outcome of the discussion carried on in the first four Sūtras.

The Vidyās described in different Sakhas will have to be combined in the Upāsana, because their object is one and the fruit also is the same, just as in the case of Vidhiseshas.

The particulars that are mentioned in other Sakhas than one's own are also efficacious. Therefore one will have to combine all these, just as one does in the case of subsidiary rites like Agnihotra connected with a main sacrifice, mentioned in several Sakhas.

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Topic 3: (Sūtras 6-8) Those Vidyās with different subject-matter are separate, even if there may be some similarities.

III.3.6 (365) If it be said (that the Udgītha Vidyā of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad and that of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad) are different on account of (difference in) texts; we deny this on the ground of their non-difference (as regards essentials).

This Sūtra represents the view of the Opponent. The Opponent tries to establish that the two Vidyās are one.

The Sūtra consists of two parts namely, a supposed objection to the objector's view and its refutation by the objector to strengthen his case. The supposed objection is “Anyathatvam sabdaditi cheḥ” and the reply is “Naviśheṣhaḥ”.

It is said in the Vajasaneyaka (I.3.1), "The Devas said, 'Well, let us defeat the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgītha' They said to speech: 'sing for us.' The speech said 'yes'." The speech and the other Prāṇas were pierced by the Asuras with evil. They were not able to do what was expected from them.

Thereupon the Devas appointed the Chief Prāṇa, and said to the breath in the mouth 'sing for us'. The breath said 'yes' and sang.

There is a similar story in Chhandogya Upaniṣhad I.2. The Devas took the Udgītha. They thought they would overcome the Asuras with it. The other Prāṇas were pierced with evil and thus vanquished by the Asuras. Thereupon the Devas went to the Chief Prāṇa. "Then comes the Chief Prāṇa. On that they meditated as Udgītha." Both these passages glorify the chief Prāṇa. Hence it follows that they both are injunctions of a meditation on the Prāṇa. A doubt arises now whether the two Vidyās are separate Vidyās or one Vidyā only.

The Opponent holds that the two Vidyās have to be considered as one. It may be objected that they cannot be one on account of the difference in texts. The Vajasaneyins represent the chief vital air as the producer of the Udgītha, "Do thou sing out for us"; while the Chhandogyas speak of it as itself being the Udgītha, "On that they meditated as Udgītha". How can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the unity of the Vidyās? But this is not acceptable because there is unity as regards a great many points. Both texts relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting; both at first glorify speech and the other Prāṇas in their relation to the Udgītha and thereupon

finding fault with them pass on to the chief Prāṇa; both tell how through the strength of the latter, the Asuras were vanquished.

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The difference pointed out, is not important enough to bring about a separation of the two Vidyās.

The text of the Vajasaneyaka also coordinates the chief Prāṇa and the Udgītha in the clause, “He is Udgītha” (Bri. Up. I.3.23). We therefore have to assume that in the Chhandogya also the chief Prāṇa has secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the Udgītha.

The two texts thus constitute one Vidyā only. There is unity of Vidyās on the grounds given in Sūtra III.3.1.

III.3.7 (366) Or rather there is no (unity of the Vidyās) owing to the difference of subject matter even as (the meditation on the Udgītha) as the highest and greatest (i.e. Brahman) (is different from the meditation on the Udgītha as abiding in the eye etc.).

The objection raised in the preceding Sūtra is refuted.

The Sūtra refutes the former view and establishes that the two Vidyās, in spite of similarity in many points, are different owing to difference in subject matter.

In the Chhandogya, Omkara is said to be a limit of Udgītha and so such Omkara has to be regarded as Prāṇa. In the other the singer of Udgītha, the Udgatri is called Prāṇa. Therefore the two Vidyās are different just as the Upāsana of Udgītha as the infinite and Supreme (Parovariya) (Chh. Up. I.9.2). “This is indeed the highest and greatest” is different

from the Upāsana of Udgītha as golden in form and as being in the eye and in the sun (Chh. Up. I.6).

In the Chhandogya only a part of the Udgītha (hymn), the syllable OM is meditated upon as Prāṇa "Let one meditate on the syllable OM of the Udgītha" (Chh. Up. I.1.1). But in the Brihadaranyaka the whole Udgītha hymn is meditated upon as Prāṇa (I.3.2). Hence the two Vidyās cannot be one owing to this difference in the object of meditation.

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The special features of different Vidyās are not to be combined even when the Vidyās belong to one and the same Sakha; much less then when they belong to different Sakhas.

III.3.8 (367) If it be said (that the Vidyās are one) on account of (the identity of) name; (we reply that) that is explained (already); moreover that (identity of name) is (found in the case of admittedly separate Vidyās).

An argument against the preceding Sūtra is refuted.

The word 'tu' (but), removes the doubt raised above.

You cannot call them identical merely because they have the same name. The subject matter differs. This has already been established in the last Sūtra. For instance Agnihotra and Darsapurnamasa are separate and yet have the same name, viz. Kathaka as they are described in the book called Kathaka. Even the Udgītha Vidyā of Chh. Up. I.6 and Chh. Up. I.9.2 are different Vidyās.

Topic 4: It is appropriate to specialise OM by the term 'Udgītha'.

III.3.9 (368) And because (OM) extends (over the whole of the Vedas), (to specialise it by the term ‘Udgītha’) is appropriate.

Sūtra 7 is elaborated here.

In the Śhruti ‘Om-ity’etad-aksharam-Udgītham-upasita’, the use of the word Udgītha as Viśheṣhana. i.e. adjective of OM is appropriate, because OM by itself is pervasive in all Śhrutis and should not be understood here in its general sense.

In the passage “Let a man meditate on the syllable OM as the Udgītha”, the two words ‘Omkara’ and ‘Udgītha’, are placed in coordination. The question then arises whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these two words stand to each other is the relation of superimposition (Adhyasa) or sublation (Apavada) or unity (Ekatva) or specification (Viśheṣhana).

The word ‘and’ stands here in place of ‘but’ and is meant to discard the three other alternatives. The fourth is to be adopted. The fourth and correct view is that the one is Viśheṣhana (an adjective) to the other as in the words Nila-Utpala (blue lotus). The passage means that Udgītha is the Viśheṣhana of Omkara. The appropriate view of the Chhandogya passage is to take the word Udgītha as specialising the term ‘Omkara’.

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Topic 5: Unity of the Prāṇa-Vidyā.

III.3.10 (369) On account of the non-difference (of the Vidyā) everywhere (i.e. in all the texts of the different Sakhas where the Prāṇa-Vidyā occurs) these qualities (mentioned in two of

them are to be inserted) in the other places (e.g. the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad).

A concrete instance on the general principle of Sūtra 5 is cited.

In the colloquy of the Prāṇas recorded by the Vajasaneyins and the Chhandogyas, the Prāṇa which is endowed with various qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as the object of meditation. Various qualities such as being the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other organs. These latter qualities are in the end attributed to the Prāṇa also. "If I am the richest thou art the richest." Now in other Sakhas also, as e.g. that of the Kaushitakins the set of qualities such as being the best and so on is attributed to the Prāṇa (Katha Up. II.14). But the set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on is not mentioned.

The question is whether they are to be inserted in the Kaushitaki also, where they are not mentioned.

This Sūtra declares that they have to be inserted, as the Vidyā is the same in all the three Upaniṣhads. Attributes belonging to one and the same Vidyā or subject have to be combined wherever that Vidyā occurs although they may not be expressly stated.

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Topic 6: (Sūtras 11-13) Attributes like Bliss, etc., of Brahman have to be combined into one meditation.

III.3.11 (370) Bliss and other attributes (which depict the true nature) of the Principal or the Supreme Self, i.e. Brahman (have to be combined from all places in the meditation on Brahman).

Brahman is described as Bliss, Knowledge, all-perVading, the Self of all, true, etc., in different texts of different Sakhas. All the attributes are not mentioned in all places.

Now the question arises whether they have to be combined in the meditation on Brahman or not. This Sūtra says that they have to be combined, as the object of meditation (Brahman) is one and the same in all Sakhas and therefore the Vidyā is one. The reason for this conclusion is the one given in Sūtra 10.

The qualities attributed to Brahman in any one place have to be combined whenever Brahman is spoken of.

III.3.12 (371) (Qualities like) joy being His head, etc., are not to be taken everywhere, (being subject to) increase and decrease (are possible only) if there is difference (and not in Brahman in which there is non-difference).

The discussion commenced in Sūtra 11 is continued, stating here as to which of the attributes are not to be culled and combined together in every form of meditation.

“More” and “less” will apply only if there is differentiation. Hence the descriptions of Priyasiras, etc., will not apply to Brahman. The description of Priyasiras (attributes like joy being His head, etc.) in the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad are not Dharmas of Brahman but the Dharmas of the Ānandamaya-kosa or the blissful sheath. The descriptions are given to turn the mind towards Brahman. Differences of higher and lower in Guṇas can come in Upāśanas of Saguna Brahman but have no application to Nirguna Brahman.

The attributes of having joy for His head and such other attributes are not acceptable in every form of meditation on Brahman because attributing limbs to Brahman would render Him liable to fluctuation.

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Attributes like joy being His head and so on mentioned in the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad are not to be taken and combined in other places where the Upāśana of Brahman is enjoined because the successive terms, “Joy is Its head”, “satisfaction is its right arm”, “great satisfaction is its left arm”, “bliss is His trunk”, “Brahman is His tail, His support” (II.5), indicate qualities which have increase and decrease with regard to each other and to other enjoyers (individual souls or Jīvas) and therefore can exist where there is difference. Now for higher and lower degrees there is room only where there is plurality or difference but Brahman is without all plurality or difference, as we know from many scriptural passages (One only, without a second). Therefore these attributes cannot constitute the nature of Brahman. They are to be confined to the texts which prescribe them and not taken to other places.

Moreover, these qualities are attributed to the Supreme Brahman merely as means of fixing one’s mind, not as themselves being objects of meditation. From this it follows that they are not valid everywhere. The attributes mentioned in any one are not valid for others.

The case is similar to that of two wives ministering to one king; one with a fan, the other with an umbrella. Here also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of ministration themselves are

distinct. They have each their own particular attributes. Similar is the case under discussion also.

Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which there is plurality, not to the Supreme Nirguna Brahman which is above all qualifications. Such attributes as having true desires (Sat-Kāma) and the like which are mentioned in some particular place have no validity for other meditations on Brahman.

III.3.13 (372) But other attributes (like Bliss, etc., are to be combined) on account of identity of purport.

The previous discussion is continued.

But attributes like Bliss, knowledge, all-pervadingness, etc., which describe the nature of Brahman, are to be combined as the object of such descriptions is the same, as they directly relate to Brahman and as they are inherent attributes of Brahman, as their purport is the one indivisible, unconditioned Brahman.

These attributes which scripture sets for the purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages which refer to Brahman, because their purport, i.e. the Brahman whose nature is to be taught is one. These attributes are mentioned with a view to knowledge of Brahman only, and not for Upāsana.

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Topic 7: (Sūtras 14-15) Katha Up. I.3.10-11 teaches merely that the Self is higher than everything else.

III.3.14 (373) (The passage in Katha Upaniṣhad 1.3.10 tells about the Self only as the highest) for the sake of pious meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of the objects being higher than the senses and so on).

We read in the Kathaka (I.3.10-11), "Higher than the senses are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind," etc., "higher than the Ātman there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest road." Here the doubt arises whether the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding one, or only that the Ātman is higher than all of them.

The Opponent holds the former alternative because the text expressly declares the objects to be higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects and so on. He maintains that these sentences are separate and not one as referring to the Ātman alone. Therefore the purpose of the text is to teach that the objects are superior to the senses and so on.

This Sūtra refutes it and declares that it is one sentence and means that the Ātman is superior to all these.

The object of the Śhruti is not to say that each later category is higher than the former, because there is no spiritual gain or any useful purpose in such a declaration. The aim is to declare that Brahman is higher than all, as such knowledge leads to Moksha.

The Ātman alone is to be known, because the Knowledge gives freedom or the final release. The scripture also says "He who has perceived that, is freed from the jaws of death" (Katha Up. I.3.15).

Further, the text intimates highest reverence for the Ātman by declaring that nothing is higher than the Ātman and that He is the highest goal and thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated only for the purpose of giving information about the Ātman. This information is given for the sake of meditation on the Ātman which results in the knowledge of it.

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III.3.15 (374) And on account of the word Ātman.

An argument in support of Sūtra 14 is given.

The above conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the subject of discussion is called the Self or Ātman. "That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect" (Katha Up. I.3.2). From this we conclude that the text wishes to represent the other things enumerated as the non-Self.

"A wise man should keep down speech and mind" (Katha Up. I.3.13). This passage enjoins pious meditation as a means of the Knowledge of the Supreme Self. It thus follows that the Śhruti indicates various excellences in the case of the Ātman only and not in that of the other things enumerated.

The text "He reaches the end of his journey and that is the highest place of Viṣṇu" suggests the question as to who is the end of the journey and we therefore conclude that the enumeration of the senses, objects, etc., has merely the purpose of teaching the highest place of

Viṣṇu and not of teaching anything about the relation of the senses, objects and so on.

But the enumeration of the senses is not altogether useless. It enables the aspirant to turn the outgoing mind towards the inner Self or the Ātman. This subtle Ātman cannot be attained without abstraction, introspection and profound meditation.

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Topic 8: (Sūtras 16-17) The Self mentioned in Ait. Up. I. 1. Is the Supreme Self and the attributes of the Self given elsewhere should be combined with this meditation.

III.3.16 (375) (In the Aitareya Upaniṣhad I. 1.) the Supreme Self is meant, as in other texts (dealing with creation) because of the subsequent qualification.

We read in the Aitareya Upaniṣhad “Verily in the beginning all this was the Self, one only; there was nothing else whatsoever” (I.1).

Here the doubt arises whether the term “Self” denotes the Supreme Self or some other being such as Hiranyagarbha.

It refers to the Supreme Self, even as the word “Self” in other texts which treat of creation refers to It, and not to Hiranyagarbha.

“From the Self ether was produced” (Tait. Up. II.1). Why? Because in the subsequent text of the Aitareya we have “It thought shall I send forth worlds? It sent forth these worlds” (Ait. Up. I.1.2). This qualification, viz. that “It thought” before creation is applied to Brahman in the primary sense in other Śruti passages. Hence we

conclude from this that the Self refers to the Supreme Self or Para Brahman and not to Hiranyagarbha, or any other Being.

III.3.17 (376) If it be said that because of the context (the Supreme Self is not meant) (we reply that) it is so (i.e. the Supreme Self is meant) on account of the definite statement (that the Atman alone existed in the beginning).

An objection to Sūtra 16 is raised and refuted.

The Sūtra consists of two parts namely an objection and its reply. The objection is 'Anvayaditi chet' the reply is 'Syad-avadharanat'.

The reference is to Para Brahman or the Highest Self. The word "Asit" shows that the reference is to Para Brahman alone, because He alone existed before all creation. The Lokasrishti or creation of the world is only after the Mahābhutasrishti or creation of the five great elements.

The Opponent says: "In the Aitareya Upaniṣhad (I.1), it is stated that Brahman created the four worlds. But it is said in the Taittiriya and other texts that Brahman created ether, air, fire, water and earth, the five elements. It is only Hiranyagarbha that creates the world with the aid of the elements created by the Highest Self. Hence the Self in the Aitareya Upaniṣhad cannot mean the Supreme Self but only Hiranyagarbha or the Karva-Brahman." This Sūtra refutes it and declares that on account of the statement "Verily, in the beginning all this was the Self, one only" (Ait. Up. I.1.) which intimates that there was one only without a second, it can only refer to the Highest Self or Para Brahman and not to Hiranyagarbha, the Karya-Brahman. The Highest Self created the four worlds after creating the elements as described in other Sakhas.

The attributes of Para Brahman or the Highest Self which are mentioned in other places are to be combined in the Aitareyaka meditation.

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Topic 9: Only thinking water to be the dress of Prāṇa is enjoined in the Prāṇa-Vidyā.

III.3.18 (377) On account of (the rinsing of the mouth with water referred to in the Prāṇa Vidyā) being a reiteration of an act (already ordained by the Smṛiti), what has not been so ordained elsewhere (is here enjoined by the Śhruti).

In regard to Prāṇa Upāsana, Achamana is ordained only as reiteration of what is stated elsewhere. What is ordained is only meditation on water as covering food. What is enjoined in Prāṇa Vidyā Upāsana of Chhandogya Upaniṣhad is not the Achamana, as such.

Achamana is enjoined by the Smṛitis and is common to all. What is ordained is Anagnatatchintana i.e. meditating that the food is covered by water.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (V.2.2) and the Brihadaranyaka (VI.1.14) there is a reference to the rinsing of the mouth with water before and after meal, thinking that thereby that Prāṇa is dressed.

These texts intimate two things, rinsing of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed. A doubt arises whether the texts enjoin both these matters or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the meditation on breath as dressed.

This Sūtra states that the act of rinsing the mouth is already ordained on every one by the Smṛiti and the act of thinking the water as the dress of Prāṇa is alone enjoined by the Śhruti. The act of rinsing the mouth is not a new one and therefor requires no Vedic injunction.

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Topic 10: Vidyās of the same Sakha which are identical should be combined, in meditation.

III.3.19 (378) In the same (Sakha also) it is thus (i.e. there is unity of Vidyā,) owing to non-difference (of the object of meditation).

A corollary to Sūtra 5 is proved.

In the Agnirahasya in the Vajasaneyi Sakha there is a Vidyā called Sandilya Vidyā, in which occurs the passage “Let him meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the Prāṇa for its body, and light for its form” (Sat. Br. Madhy. 10.6.3.2). Again, in the Brihadaranyaka (V.10.6) which belongs to the same Sakha we have “That person consisting of mind, whose being is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all-He rules all this whatsoever exists.” A doubt here presents itself whether these two passages are to be taken as one Vidyā in which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be combined or not. Are they one Vidyā or different Vidyās? This Sūtra declares that, they are one Vidyā, as the object of meditation (Upasya) is the same in both. The object of meditation in both is the Self consisting of mind. The combining of the particulars of a similar Vidyā in the same Sakha is the same as in the case of such Vidyās which occur in different Sakhas. Although the two

passages belong to one and the same Sakha, they yet constitute the Vidyā only and their particulars have to be combined into one whole. The former directs worship, by means of such Vidyā. The latter gives its Guṇas (features).

Though there is some difference in minor details, the two descriptions of the Sandilya Vidyā in the two Śhrutis are practically the same. So, a particular point mentioned in one Śhruti in connection with the Sandilya Vidyā has to be incorporated with the other, if it be not mentioned in the latter.

Therefore the Sandilya Vidyā is one.

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Topic 11: (Sūtras 20-22) The names ‘Ahar’ and ‘Aham’ of Brahman occurring in Bri. Up. V.5.1-2 cannot be combined.

III.3.20 (379) Thus in other cases also, on account of the connection (of particulars with one and the same Vidyā).

An inference on the analogy of the preceding Sūtra is drawn by way of objection.

This Sūtra is a Pūrva-paksha -‘Objection’ Sūtra. It sets forth the view of the Opponent.

We read in the Brihadaranyaka (V.5.1-2), “Satya (the truth) is Brahman. That which is Satya is that Sun-the being who is in that orb and the being who is in the right eye". This gives the abode of the Satya Brahman with respect to the gods and the body. The text teaches the two secret names of the Satya Brahman in connection with these abodes. “Its secret name is ‘Ahar’ with reference to the gods, and its

secret name is 'Aham' with reference to the body." A doubt here arises whether these two secret names are both to be applied to the Deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode, or only one name to each.

Now on the analogy of the Sandilya Vidyā, the particulars must be combined as the object of meditation, viz. the Satya Brahman is one. Therefore both the names 'Ahar' and 'Aham' have to be combined with respect to Satya Brahman.

Both the secret names equally belong to the Aditya as well as to the person within the eye.

III.3.21 (380) Rather not (so) on account of the difference (of place).

This is the Siddhanta Sūtra.

This Sūtra refutes the view of the previous Sūtra. As the solar orb and the eye-ball are too distant and distant abodes for the worship of Brahman, the two significant names 'Ahar' and 'Aham' referred to in the previous Sūtra, should not both be employed in the same form of meditation. Each name refers to a different locus of Upāsana.

Though the Vidyā is one, still on account of difference in places the object of meditation becomes different. Therefore there are different names. Hence these cannot be exchanged or combined.

The Opponent raises an objection. He says: The person within the orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only, because the text teaches that both are abodes of the one true Brahman.

True, we reply, but as each secret name is taught only with reference to the one Brahman and conditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman only in so far as it is in that state. Here is an analogy. The teacher always remains the teacher; yet those kinds of services which the pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be done when he stands and vice versa.

The comparison given by the Opponent is not well chosen as the duties of the disciple towards his teacher depend on the latter's character as teacher and that is not changed by his being either in the village or in the forest.

Therefore, the two secret names 'Ahar' and 'Aham' have to be held apart. They cannot be combined.

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III.3.22 (381) (The scripture) also declares (that).

An additional argument is given to refute Sūtra 20.

The scripture distinctly states that the attributes are not to be combined, but kept apart; because it compares the two persons, the person in the sun and the person within the eye. If it wanted the particulars to be combined, it would not make such a comparison.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the two secret names are to be kept apart.

Topic 12: Attributes of Brahman occurring in the Ranayaniya Khila constitute an independent Vidyā.

III.3.23 (382) For the same reason (as in the previous Sūtra) the supporting (of the world) and pervading the sky (attributed to

Brahman in the Ranayaniya Khila) also (are not to be included in other Vidyās or Upāsanas of Brahman).

A restriction to Sūtra 5 is made.

In a supplementary text of the Ranayaniyas we meet with a passage, "The powers, which were collected together, were preceded by Brahman; the pre-existent Brahman in the beginning pervaded the whole sky." Now these two qualities 'Sambhriti' and 'Dyuvyapti' are not to be inserted or included in the Sandilya Vidyā and other Vidyās for the same reason as is given in the last Sūtra, viz. difference of abode. In the Sandilya Vidyā, Brahman is said to have its abode in the heart "He is the Self within the heart" (Chh. Up. III.14.3). The same statement is made in the Dahara-Vidyā "There is the palace, the small lotus of the heart, and in it that small ether" (VIII.1.1). In the Upakosala-Vidyā, again, Brahman is said to abide within the eye "That person that is seen in the eye" (IV.15.1).

Further these qualities and those mentioned in other Vidyās like the Sandilya Vidyā are of such a nature as to exclude each other and are not suggestive of each other. The mere fact of certain Vidyās being connected with Brahman does not constitute their unity. It is an established fact that Brahman, although one only, is owing to the plurality of its powers meditated upon in many ways, as shown under Sūtra 7.

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The conclusion, therefore, is that the attributes of holding together its powers (Sambhriti and Dyuvyapti) are not to be inserted in the Sandilya and similar Vidyās, and that the Upāsana referred to in this Sūtra is an

independent Vidyā by itself. The Sandilya Vidyā refers to the worship of Ātman in the heart and the Upakosala-Vidyā refers to the worship of the Ātman in the eye, whereas the above attributes relate to the macrocosm.

Topic 13: The Puruṣha Vidyā in the Chhandogya and the Taittiriya are not to be combined.

III.3.24 (383) And (as the qualities) as (mentioned) in the Puruṣha-Vidyā (of the Chhandogya) are not mentioned (in that) of the others (i.e. in the Taittiriya) (the two Puruṣha-Vidyās are not one; are not to be combined).

The Puruṣha Vidyā of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad and that of the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad are now examined.

In the Rahasya-Brāhmaṇa of the Tandins and the Paingins (the Chhandogya) there is a Vidyā treating of man in which man is identified with the sacrifice, the three periods of his life with the three libations "Man is the sacrifice".

In the Taittiriya Aranyaka (X.64) also occurs a similar Vidyā "For him who knows thus the self of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, faith (Śhraddhā) is the wife of the sacrificer," etc.

The doubt here arises whether the two Vidyās are one, whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the Chhandogya are to be inserted in the Taittiriya or not.

The fundamental attribute referred to is that man is identified with sacrifice in both. This Sūtra declares that in spite of this, the two Vidyās are not one, because the details differ. The characteristics of the

Puruṣha-Yajna of the Chhandogya are not recognised in the Taittiriya text. The Taittiriya exhibits an identification of man with the sacrifice in which the wife, the sacrificer, the Veda, the Vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter, the sacrificial animal, the priest etc., are mentioned in succession. These particulars are not mentioned in the Chhandogya.

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The two texts agree in identification of the Avabhritha ceremony with death. There are greater number of dissimilarities. The Taittiriya does not represent man as the sacrifice as the Chhandogya does.

Moreover the result of the Vidyā in the Taittiriya is the attainment of the greatness of Brahman: "He obtains the greatness of Brahman".

The result of the Vidyā in Chhandogya is long life, "He who knows this lives on to a hundred and sixteen years." Therefore, the two Vidyās are separate. "The particulars cannot be combined in the two places. The particulars mentioned in the Puruṣha-Vidyā of Chhandogya, such as formulas of prayer, Mantras and so on are not to be combined with the Taittiriya text of the Vidyā.

Topic 14: Unconnected Mantras and sacrifices mentioned in certain Upaniṣhads do not belong to Brahma-Vidyā.

III.3.25 (384) Because the matter (of certain Mantras) such as piercing and so on is different (from the matter of the approximate Vidyās), (the former are not to be combined with the latter).

Certain expressions occurring at the beginning of an Upaniṣhad of the Atharva-Veda are taken up for discussion.

At the beginning of the Upaniṣhad of the Atharvanikas we have "Pierce the whole (body of the enemy), pierce his heart, crush his veins, crush his head" etc. At the beginning of the Upaniṣhad of the Tandins we have the Mantra "O God Savital produce the sacrifice". At the beginning of Kathas and the Taittiriya we have "May Mitra be propitious to us and Varuna etc." At the beginning of that of the Kaushitakins we have "Brahman indeed is the Agnistoma, Brahman is that day; through Brahman they pass into Brahman, Immortality, those reach who observe that day." The question is whether these Mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brāhmaṇas in close proximity to the Upaniṣhads are to be combined with the Vidyās prescribed by these Upaniṣhads.

The Opponent holds that they are to be combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to the Upaniṣhad-portions of the Brāhmaṇas whose chief contents are formed by the Vidyās. In the case of Mantras we can always imagine some meaning which connects them with the Vidyās. The first Mantra quoted glorifies the heart, because the heart is often represented in the Vidyās as abode of meditation. Therefore Mantras which glorify the heart may constitute subordinate members of those Vidyās.

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This Sūtra declares that they are not to be combined because their meaning is different, as they indicate acts of a sacrifice and so have no association or relationship with the Vidyās.

The Mantras might be so employed if their whole contents were glorification of the heart, but this is not the case. The Mantra first quoted clearly expresses enmity to somebody and is therefore not to be connected with the Vidyās of the Upaniṣhads, but with some ceremony meant to destroy one's enemy.

Other Mantras are subordinate to certain sacrificial actions.

They cannot, because they occur in the Upaniṣhads, be connected with the Vidyās on the ground of mere proximity.

For this reason the mentioned Mantras and acts are not on the ground of mere textual collocation to be viewed as supplementary to the Vidyās of the Upaniṣhads.

Topic 15: The statement that the good and evil deeds of a person go respectively to his friends and enemies is true for texts that mention discarding of such actions by him.

III.3.26 (385) But where only the getting rid (of the good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by others has to be added) because the statement about acceptance is supplementary (to the statement about the getting rid of) as in the case of the Kusas, metres, praise and hymns or recitations.

This (i.e. the reason for this) has been stated (by Jaimini in Pūrvamīmāṃsā).

Here is a discussion on the shaking off of virtues and vices by the released soul at death and their acceptance by his friends and enemies.

Jaimini has said that statements with respect to Kusas, metres, praises and hymns have to be completed from other texts. It is said in the

Kaushitaki Śhruti that Kusa sticks are to be collected from trees without any specification as to what sort of tree; but in the Satyayana branch it is said that the Kusas are of the Udumbara tree. This latter expression is to be accepted as complementary to the former expression of the Kaushitaki Śhruti. The first Śhruti will have to be completed in the light of the other.

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There is in a Śhruti an injunction to say a prayer composed in metre without any specification of the kind of metre, but in another place there is mention of the Deva-metre to be employed in such a case. Therefore the Deva-metre is to be understood in the previous case also.

There is instruction in one Śhruti to utter praises for the sacrificial vessel 'Shodasi' without specifying the time as to when it should be performed; but in another Śhruti it is taught to be performed when the sun has risen. Here the latter instruction is to be accepted as supplementary to the former.

As regards the hymn it is not definitely stated which of the four priests is to join in the singing of the prayer in a sacrifice; but this doubt has been cleared up by a particular text which says that the Adhvaryu will not join in the singing. Putting the two statements together, the conclusion is that all the priests except the Adhvaryu will join.

This principle is here applied to the effects of the actions of a liberated sage in connection with the Vidyās mentioned in the Upaniṣhads. In the text of the Tandins we find "shakes off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the

mouth of Rahu, I obtain the uncreated world of Brahman" (Chh. Up. VIII.13). Again in Mundaka Upaniṣhad (III.1.3) we read "Then knowing shaking of good and evil, he reaches the highest oneness, free from passion." These Śhrutis are silent on the point as to who accepts his good and evil deeds.

In the Satyayana branch of Śhruti it is said "His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he has done." In the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (I.4) we find "He shakes off his good and his bad deeds. His beloved relations obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done." This Sūtra declares that the obtaining of the good and evil by his friends and enemies has to be inserted or necessarily added in the Chhandogya text and Mundaka text according to Jaimini's principle explained above.

The Opponent raises another objection. He argues that the verb 'Dhu' in the text of the Chhandogya and Kaushitaki may be interpreted as 'trembling' and not as 'getting rid of'. It would mean therefore that good and evil still cling to a person who attains Knowledge, although their effects are retarded on account of the Knowledge.

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This Sūtra declares that such a meaning is incorrect, because the subsequent portion of the text indicates that others obtain the good and evil. This is certainly not possible unless the person who attains Knowledge abandons them.

Good and evil deeds cannot be said to 'tremble' in the literal sense of the word like flags in the wind, as they are not of a substantial nature. Though 'Dhu' in 'Vidhuya' may be said to signify 'shaking' and not

‘casting off’, yet as others are described as taking the liberated sage's merits and sins, it means ‘casting off’.

Topic 16: (Sūtras 27-28) The shaking off of good and evil by the man of Knowledge occurs only at the time of his death.

III.3.27 (386) (He who attains knowledge gets rid of his good and evil deeds) at the time of death, there being nothing to be attained (by him on the way to Brahmaloka through those works); for thus others (declare in their sacred texts).

This Sūtra decides when the individual soul shakes off his good and evil deeds.

The question now arises as to when the individual soul gets rid of his good and evil deeds. In the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad (I.4) we find “He comes to the river Viraja and crosses it by the mind alone, and there he shakes off good and evil.” On the strength of this text the Opponent maintains that the good and evil deeds are discarded on his way to Brahmaloka and not at the time of departing from the body.

This Sūtra refutes it and declares that the liberated sage frees himself from the effects of good and evil works at the time of death through the strength of his knowledge.

Though the Kaushitaki Śhruti refers to the discarding of good and evil on the Devayana way or the way to Brahmaloka, after crossing the Viraja river, the good and evil deeds are cast off at death, because there is nothing to be attained through them after death, there remaining nothing to be enjoyed by him through his good and evil works. The good and evil works are no longer of any use to him and not fit to be retained by him thereafter.

The Sanchita Karma or accumulated works are destroyed as soon as one attains knowledge of Brahman. Prarabdha is destroyed at death. So he is freed from the effects of all his merits and sins at the time of death.

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As the results of his good and evil deeds are contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by the power of the latter. The moment of their destruction is that moment in which he sets out towards the fruit of his knowledge, i.e. the world of Brahman.

Moreover it is not possible to cast off the effects of good and evil deeds on the way to Brahmaloaka because the soul has no gross body and so it cannot take recourse to any practice that can destroy them.

Further one cannot cross the river Viraja unless he is freed from all good and evil.

The Śhruti declares “shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hairs” (Chh. Up. VIII.13.1).

Therefore the settled conclusion is that all good and evil works are cast off at the time of death.

III.3.28 (387) (The interpretation that the individual soul practising Yama-Niyama) according to his liking (discards good and evil works while living is reasonable) on account of there being harmony in that case between the two (viz. cause and effect, as well as between the Chhandogya and another Śhruti).

The view is correct because voluntary performance of Yama, Niyama, etc., to get rid of Karma is possible only before death, and because it is

opposed to all texts. The above view is in agreement or unison with all Śhrutis.

If the soul frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way after having departed from the body and having entered on the way of the gods (Devayana), we land ourselves in impossibilities, because after the body has been left behind, he cannot practise according to his liking self-restraint and pursuit of knowledge which can effect destruction of his good and evil deeds. Therefore there cannot be annihilation of his good and evil works.

It does not certainly stand to reason that the effect is delayed till some time after death when the cause is there already. When there is a body it is not possible to attain Brahmaloaka. There is no difficulty in discarding good and evil.

(397)

Topic 17: (Sūtras 29-30) The knower of Saguna Brahman alone goes along Devayana, and not the knower of Nirguna Brahman.

III.3.29 (388) (The soul's) journey (along the path of the gods, Devayana) is applicable in a two-fold manner, otherwise there would be contradiction (of scripture).

Here is a side issue of Sūtra 27.

In some scriptural texts the dead man's going on the path of the gods is mentioned in connection with his freeing himself from good and evil. In other texts it is not mentioned. The doubt now arises whether the two things go together in all cases or only in certain cases.

The Opponent holds that the two are to be connected in all cases, just as the man's freeing himself from his good and evil works is always followed by their passing over to his friends and enemies.

This Sūtra declares that the worshipper of Saguna Brahman only takes journey after death along the Devayana. The going on that path has a sense in the case of Saguna Upāsana only and not in worshippers of Nirguna Brahman. Brahmaloka is located elsewhere in space. The Saguna Upasaka has to move and attain that abode.

There is actual going through which another place is reached. Therefore, the journey has a meaning in his case only. The Prāṇa of Nirguna Upasaka is absorbed in Brahman. He is one with the Infinite or the Absolute. Where will he move? The liberated sage who is free from all desires and egoism does not go to another place. He does not move. The Supreme Brahman is not to be reached by the liberated sage. He need not transport himself to another locality. There is no meaning at all in journey for such a sage who is absorbed in Nirguna Brahman. His ignorance is destroyed by the dawn of knowledge of Brahman. He becomes identical with the Supreme Self. If there is journey for him also, then it would contradict Śhruti texts like "Shaking off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the Highest Self, or Para-Brahman" (Mun. Up. III.1.3).

How can the liberated sage who has become one with the Supreme Brahman who is secondless, who is all-pervading, who is Infinite, who is without motion, go to another place by Devayana? He has already attained his goal or union with Brahman. The journey along the Devayana is meaningless for him.

Therefore, he who has realised the Saguna Brahman, he who worships Saguna Brahman alone goes by the Devayana.

(398)

III.3.3O (389) (The two-fold view taken above) is justified because we observe a purpose characterised thereby (i.e. a purpose of the going) as in ordinary life.

The previous discussion is continued.

The meditations on Saguna or qualified Brahman, such as the Paryankavidya of the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad, there is a reason for the man's proceeding on the path of the gods (Devayana); because the text mentions certain results which can be attained only by the man going to different places, such as his mounting a couch, his holding conversation with Brahman seated on a couch, his experiencing various odours and so on.

On the contrary going on the path of the gods has nothing to do with perfect knowledge. No purpose is served by such a journey in the case of a liberated sage or Nirguna Upasaka in whom ignorance has been destroyed by the dawn of knowledge of Brahman or the Imperishable. He has attained oneness or unity with the Supreme Self. All his desires have been fulfilled. All his Karmas have been destroyed.

He is only waiting for the dissolution of the body.

The destruction is similar to what is observed in ordinary life. If we wish to reach some village we have to proceed on a path leading there, but no moving on a path is needed when we want to attain freedom from a disease.

(399)

Topic 18: The passage of the soul by Devayana applies equally to all Vidyās of Saguna Brahman.

III.3.31 (390) There is no restriction (as to the going on the path of the gods for any Vidyā). There is no contradiction as is seen from the Śhruti and Smṛiti.

The journey of the soul who knows Brahman is continued.

We have shown that the going on the path of the gods is valid only for the Vidyās of Saguna Brahman, not for the knowledge of Nirguna Brahman which is devoid of all qualities.

Now we observe that the going on the path of the gods to Brahmaloaka is mentioned only in some of the qualified Vidyās such as the Paiyanka Vidyā, the Panchagni Vidyā, the Upakosala Vidyā, the Dahara Vidyā, but it is not mentioned or expressly stated in others such as the Madhu Vidyā, the Sandilya Vidyā, the Shodasakala Vidyā, the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā.

The doubt now arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to be connected with those Vidyās in which it is actually mentioned or generally with all Vidyās of that kind.

This Sūtra declares that all worshippers of the Saguna Brahman, whatever their Vidyās may be, go after death by this path. This is seen from the Śhruti and Smṛiti. “Those who meditate thus through Panchagni Vidyā and also those who understand other Vidyās and also those who meditate in the forest with faith and austerities, on Saguna

Brahman through any other Vidyā proceed on the path of the gods” (Chh. Up. V.10.1.); (Bri. Up. VI.2.15).

Bhagavad Gītā also declares, “Light and darkness, these are thought to be the world’s everlasting paths; by the one he goes who does not return, by the other he returns again” (VIII.26).

The term “The True” in the passage “Those who in the forest, with faith, worship the True”, i.e. Brahman, is often employed to denote Brahman.

Thus it is quite clear that the going on the path of gods is not confined to those Vidyās in which it is actually mentioned or expressly stated.

(400)

Topic 19: Perfected souls may take a corporeal existence for divine mission.

III.3.32 (391) Of those who have a mission to fulfil (there is corporeal) existence, so long as the mission is not fulfilled.

A plausible objection to Sūtra 31 is refuted.

The Opponent says: Rishi Apantaratamas, a teacher of the Vedas was by the order of Viṣṇu, born on this earth as Vyāsa or Kṛiṣṇa Dvaipayana. Similarly Vasishtha, the son of Brahma’s mind having parted from former body in consequence of the curse of Nimi, was on the order of Brahma, again procreated by Mitra and Varuna.

Bhrigu and other sons of Brahma’s mind were again born at the sacrifice of Varuna. Sanatkumāra also, who likewise was a son of Brahma’s mind, was in consequence of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda. Daksha, Nārada and other Rishis were born

again. It is stated that some assumed a new body after the old body had perished, some assumed through their supernatural powers various new bodies while the old body remained intact all the while.

Now these Rishis had knowledge of Brahman or the Absolute and yet they had to be reborn. If this is the case what is the use of such knowledge of Brahman? The knowledge of Brahman may either be or not be the cause of final emancipation or freedom.

The Sūtra refutes it and declares that ordinarily a person is not reborn after attaining knowledge of the Absolute. But the case of those who have a divine mission to fulfil is different. They may have one or more births till their mission is fulfilled, after which they are not born again. They are entrusted with the offices conducive to the subsistence of the world such as the promulgation of the Vedas and the like. They assume new bodies of their own free will and not as the result of Karma. They pass from one body to another, as if from one house into another in order to accomplish the duties of their offices.

They preserve all the true memory of their identity. They create for themselves, through their power over the material of the body and the sense organs, new bodies and occupy them either all at once or in succession.

Smṛiti tells us that Sulabha, a woman who had knowledge of Brahman, wanted to enter into discussion with Janaka. She left her own body, entered into that of Janaka, carried on a discussion with him and again returned into her own body.

“Tat Tvam Asi’ (That thou art) does not mean “Tat Tvam Mrito Bhavishyasi’ (they will become That after death). It cannot be

interpreted to mean "Thou wilt be that after thou hast dead." Another text declares that the fruit of Knowledge viz. union with Brahman springs up at the moment when the complete knowledge of Brahman is attained. The Rishi Vamadeva saw and understood it singing, "I was Manu, I was the sun." But they never come under the sway of Avidyā or nescience even though they may be born. The case is similar to that of a liberated sage. A Jīvanmukta continues his physical existence even after attaining Brahma Jñāna or Knowledge of the Absolute as long as the Prarabdha Karma lasts. The divine mission of these Rishis like Śhrī Vyāsa, Vasishtha, Apantaratamas, can be compared to the Prarabdha Karma of Jīvanmuktas.

For all these reasons it is established that those who are endowed with true and perfect knowledge attain in all cases final emancipation.

(401)

Topic 20: The negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in various texts are to be combined in all meditations on Brahman.

III.3.33 (392) But the conceptions of the (negative) attributes of the Imperishable (Brahman) are to be combined (from different texts where the Imperishable Brahman is dealt with, as they form one Vidyā), because of the similarity (of defining the Imperishable Brahman through denials) and the object (the Imperishable Brahman) being the same, as in the case of the Upasad (offerings). This has been explained (by Jaimini in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā).

The negative attributes of the Imperishable are now examined, as the positive attributes were examined in Sūtra 11 of this Section.

We read in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad, "O Gargi! The Brāhmaṇas or the knowers of Brahman call this Akshara or the Imperishable. It is neither gross nor subtle, neither short nor long" (Bri. Up. III.8.8). Again the Mundaka says, "The Supreme Knowledge is that by which the Imperishable (Akshara) is attained." "That which is imperceivable, ungraspable, which has no family and no caste" etc.

(Mun. Up. I.1.5-6). In other places also the highest Brahman, under the name of Akshara is described as that of which all qualities are to be denied.

A doubt arises now as to whether the negative qualities in the above two texts are to be combined so as to form one Vidyā or they are to be treated as two separate Vidyās.

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The Opponent maintains that each denial is valid only for that passage in which the text actually exhibits it, and not for other places. These negative attributes do not directly indicate or specify the nature of Brahman like the positive attributes, Bliss, Peace, Knowledge, Truth, Purity, Perfection, Eternity, etc. Hence the principle stated in Sūtra III.3.11 does not apply here, because no purpose is really served or gained by such a combination.

This Sūtra refutes this and declares that such denials are to be combined because the method of teaching Brahman through denial is the same and the object of instruction is also the same, viz. the Imperishable Brahman (Akshara). The rule of Sūtra III.3.11 applies here also. In Sūtra III.3.11 positive attributes of Brahman were discussed.

Here we are concerned with negative attributes which teach Brahman by an indirect method. The case is similar to the Upasad offerings. The Mantras for giving these offerings are found only in the Sama Veda. But the priests of the Yajur Veda use this Mantra given in the other Veda. The hymns which occur in the Sama Veda are recited by the Adhvaryu after the time of the Yajur Veda. This principle has been established by Jaimini in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā (III.3. 9).

Similarly the negative attributes have to be combined here also in the meditation on the Imperishable Brahman (Akshara).

The conception of the negative attributes of the Indestructible (Akshara) as stated in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad is to be retained in the meditations on the indestructible everywhere (i.e. in every Akshara Vidyā) because the same Akshara is recognised in every Akshara Vidyā and also because those negative attributes are presupposed to be included among His essential attributes.

Topic 21: Mundaka III.1.1 and Katha I.3.1 constitute one Vidyā.

III.3.34 (393) Because (the same thing) is described as such and such.

We read in the Mundaka Upaniṣhad “Two birds of beautiful plumage, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet and bitter fruits there of, the other looks on without eating” (Mun. Up. III.1.1). The same Mantra is found in the text of Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad (IV.6).

Again we have, “There are the two enjoying the fruits of their good deeds, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit.

(403)

Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinachiketa sacrifice" (Katha Up. I.3.1).

The doubt here arises, do we have in these two texts two different Vidyās or one only? The Opponent maintains that these are two Vidyās, because there are different objects of meditation. The Mundaka text declares that only one eats the fruit, while the other does not. Katha text says that both of them enjoy the fruits of their good actions. So the object of meditation is not the same. As the objects of knowledge differ in character, the Vidyās themselves must be looked upon as separate.

This Sūtra refutes it and declares that they form one Vidyā, because both describe the same Lord as existing thus and thus, i.e. In the form of the individual soul. The purpose or aim of the two Śhruti passages is to teach about the Highest Self or Para Brahman and show the identity of the Jīva and Para Brahman.

As the word Dvau, i.e. two is used in the two Śhrutis we must realise that they refer to the same Vidyā. Though the Mundaka text says that one bird (the individual soul) eats the fruits of actions and the other bird looks on without eating and though the latter passage refers to the two as eating fruits, the Vidyās are the same as they refer to the same entity. Just as when in a group one carries an umbrella we say umbrella-holders go, even so the Para Brahman also is described as eating fruits. The context refers clearly to the eternal and Supreme Brahman (Aksharam brahma yat param).

The Katha Upaniṣhad text intimates the same highest Brahman which is above all desires. As it is mentioned together with the enjoying

individual soul, it is itself metaphorically spoken of as enjoying, just as we speak of the 'men with the umbrella' although only one out of several carries an umbrella. All this has been explained at length under I.2.11.

Therefore, the Vidyās are one only, as the object of meditation or Knowledge is one.

(404)

Topic 22: (Sūtras 35-36) Brihadaranyaka III.4.1 and III.5.1 constitute one Vidyā.

III.3.35 (394) As the Self is within all, as in the case of the aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of Vidyā).

Two passages from the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad are taken up for discussion to show that they relate to the same Vidyā.

In the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad Ushasta questions Yajnavalkya, "Explain to me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not hidden- this Ātman or Self which is within all" (Bri. Up. III.4.1).

Yajnavalkya replies, "That which breathes through Prāṇa is your self, that is within all." In the same Upaniṣhad Yajnavalkya gives an answer to the same question put by Kahola, "That which transcends hunger and thirst, grief and delusion, decay and death, knowing this very self" etc. (Bri. Up. III.5.1).

The Opponent maintains that these two are separate Vidyās, because the replies given being different, the objects referred to must also be different.

This Sūtra refutes this and declares that the object is one. the Highest Self or Para Brahman, because it is impossible to conceive two selves being simultaneously innermost of all in the same body.

Ātman alone is taught in the two texts as being ultimately immanent just as Ātman is also taught as being immanent in the elements.

The two passages refer only to one Vidyā, because there could be only one Ātman, who is Sarvantara, i.e. ultimately immanent. Among the elements water is immanent in earth, fire in water and so on. But none has ultimate immanency. Even so there is only one ultimate immanent entity.

Relatively one element can be inside the other. But none of the five elements which constitute this physical body can be truly the innermost of all. Similarly two selves cannot be simultaneously the innermost of all in the same body. Even so one self alone can be the innermost of all.

Therefore, the same self is taught in both the replies of Yajnavalkya.

In both the cases the subject-matter of the question and the answer is Brahman. This is emphasised by the sage Yajnavalkya himself, when he repeats "That soul of thine is the innermost soul of individuals." The different expositions of Yajnavalkya refer to the one and the same object of worship, viz. Brahman.

As both texts equally declare the self to be within all, they must be taken as constituting one Vidyā only. In both passages question and answer equally refer to a Self which is within everything. For in one body, there cannot be two selves, each of which is inside everything

else. One Self only may be within everything. We read in the Svetasvatara Upaniṣhad "He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings." As this Mantra records that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings, the same holds good with regard to the two passages of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad.

As the object of Knowledge or the object of worship is one, the Vidyā also is one only.

(405)

III.3.36 (395) If it be said (that the two Viclyas are separate, for) otherwise the repetition cannot be accounted for, we reply not so; (it is) like (the repetition) in another instruction (in the Chhandogya).

The Opponent says that unless the separateness of the two Vidyās be admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be accounted for. He remarks that unless the two texts refer to two different selves the repetition of the same subject would be meaningless.

This Sūtra says that it is not so. The repetition has a definite purpose or aim. It helps the aspirant to comprehend the subjects more clearly and deeply from different view points. The repetition does not justify us to take that two different selves are taught here. In Chhandogya Upaniṣhad the instruction conveyed in the words "That is the Self, Thou art That (Tat Tvam Asi), O Svetaketu", is repeated nine times, and yet the one Vidyā is not thereby split into many. Similarly is this case also.

The introductory and concluding clauses indicate that all those passages have the same sense. There also the Upakrama (beginning) is the same. So is the conclusion (Upasamhara). Itsays, "Everything else is

perishable. Everything else is of evil." In the earlier Brāhmaṇa, Ātman is taught as being separate from the body and the senses. In the later Brāhmaṇa, Ātman is taught as not having hunger, etc. But the Vidyā is the same.

The former section declares the existence of the Supreme Self which is neither cause nor effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends all the relative attributes of the Samsāra state, such as hunger, thirst and so on. The second answer tells something special about the Self.

The two sections, therefore, form one Vidyā only.

(406)

Topic 23: The Śhruti prescribes reciprocal meditation in Ait. Ar. II. 2. 4.6.

III.3.37 (396) There is exchange (of meditation), because the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases.

The Aitareya Aranyaka says with reference to the person in the sun, "What I am, that He is; what He is, that am I" (Ait. Ar. II.2.4.6).

A doubt arises here whether the meditation is to be of a reciprocal nature, a double one by means of exchange, i.e. identifying the worshipper with the being in the sun, and then inversely, identifying the being in the sun with the worshipper; or only in the former manner.

The Opponent maintains that the meditation is to be practised in the former manner only and not in the reverse way also. He argues that the soul would be exalted by the former meditation and the Lord be

lowered by the latter one! There is a meaning in the first kind of meditation but the second kind of meditation is meaningless.

The present Sūtra refutes this view and declares that the meditation is to be practised in both ways because such a statement would be purportless. Exchange, or reverse meditation is expressly recorded in the Śhruti for the purpose of meditation, just as other qualities of the Self such as its being the self of all, Satyasankalpa, etc., are recorded for the same purpose. For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation "I am Thou" and "Thou an I." Now the double enunciation has a sense only if a two-fold meditation is to be based upon it; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning; since one statement would be all that is needed.

This will not in any way lower Brahman. Even in that way, only the unity of the Self is meditated upon. Brahman who is bodiless can be adored or meditated even as having a form. The double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness of the Self. It gives force or emphasis to the identity.

Therefore, a two-fold meditation has to be admitted, not a single one. This confirms the unity of the Self. The double relation enounced in the Śhruti text has to be meditated upon, and is to be transformed to other Vidyās also which treat of the same subject.

(407)

Topic 24: Brihadaranyaka V4.1 and V.5.3 treat of one Vidyā about Satya Brahman.

III.3.38 (397) The same (Satya Vidyā is taught in both places), because (attributes like) Satya etc., (are seen in both places).

We read in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad "He who knows this great, glorious, first born (Being) as the Satya Brahman, conquers these worlds" (V.4.1). Again we read "That which is Satya is that Sun the being who is in that orb and the being who is in the right eye... he destroys evils" (V.5.3).

Now a doubt arises whether these two Satya Vidyās are one or different.

The Opponent holds that the Vidyās are two; because the text declares two different results, one in the earlier passage "He conquers these worlds"(V.4.1), the other one later on "He destroys evil and leaves it" (V.5.3).

The Sūtra declares that they are one, because the second text refers to the Satya of the earlier text, "That which is Satya," etc.

In reality there is only one result in both cases. The statement of a second result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new instruction given about Satya or the True, viz. that its secret names are 'Ahar' and 'Aham'.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the text records only one Vidyā of the True (Satyam), distinguished by such and such details and that hence all the qualities mentioned such as Truth and so on are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.

Some commentators think that the above Sūtra refers not to the question whether Bri. Up. V.4, 1 and V.5.3 form one Vidyā or one meditation but to the question whether the Brihadaranyaka text about the persons in the sun and in the eye and the similar Chhandogya text

(I.6.6), “Now that golden person who is seen within the sun” etc. constitute one Vidyā or not.

They come to the conclusion that they constitute one Vidyā and that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in the Brihadaranyaka are to be combined with the Chhandogya text also.

But this interpretation of the Sūtra is objectionable, because the Chhandogya Vidyā refers to the Udgītha and is thus connected with sacrificial rites. The marks of this association are seen in the beginning, the middle and the end of the Vidyā. We read at the beginning, “The Rik is the earth, the Saman is fire”, in the middle, “Rik and Saman are his joints, and therefore he is the Udgītha,” and in the end, “He who knows this sings as a Saman” (Chh. Up. I.6.1).

In the Brihadaranyaka, on the contrary, there is verily, nothing to connect the Vidyā with the sacrificial rites. As the subject matter is different, the Vidyās are separate and the details of the two Vidyās are to be held separate.

(408)

Topic 25: Attributes mentioned in Chh. Up. VIII.7.1 and Br/I Up. IV.4.22 are to be combined on account of several common features in both texts.

III.3.39 (398) (Qualities like true) desire etc., (mentioned in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad are to be inserted) in the other (i.e. in the Brihadaranyaka) and (those mentioned) in the other (i.e. in the Brihadaranyaka are also to be inserted in the Chhandogya) on account of the abode, etc., (being the same in both).

Dahara Vidyā of the Chhandogya and the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhads is now discussed.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (VIII.1.1) we read, "There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the small lotus and in it the small ether; that is the Self." We read in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (IV.4.22) "That great unborn self who consists of Knowledge, who is surrounded by the Prāṇas lies in the ether that is within the heart." A doubt here arises whether the two constitute one Vidyā and therefore the particulars are to be combined or not.

The present Sūtra declares that they form one Vidyā and the qualities mentioned in each are to be combined in the other, because many points are common in both.

"Wishes and so on," i.e. "The quality of having true wishes and so on." The word 'Kāma' stands for 'Satyakāma' just as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhama for Satyabhama. This quality and the other qualities which the Chhandogya attributes to the ether within the heart, have to be combined with the Brihadaranyaka passage, and vice versa, i.e. the qualities mentioned in the Brihadaranyaka such as being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self free from sin, described in the Chhandogya.

The reason for this is that the two passages exhibit a number of common features. Common to both is the heart regarded as abode.

Common again is the Lord as object of knowledge or meditation.

Common also is the Lord being regarded as a bank preventing these worlds from being confounded. And there are several other points also.

But an objection is raised. There are also differences. In the Chhandogya the attributes are ascribed to the ether within the heart, while in the Brihadaranyaka they are attributed to Brahman abiding in the ether. This objection has no force. It cannot certainly stand. We have shown under I.3.14 that the term ether in the Chhandogya designates Brahman.

(409)

There is, however, one difference between the two texts. The Chhandogya treats of Saguna Brahman while the Brihadaranyaka treats of Nirguna Brahman or the Supreme Brahman destitute of all qualities. Yajnavalkya says to Janaka “For that person is not attached to anything. That Self is to be described by No, No-neti, net!” (Bri. Up. IV.3.14).

But as the qualified Brahman is fundamentally one with the unqualified Brahman we must conclude that the Sūtra teaches the combination of the qualities for glorifying Brahman and not for the purpose of devout meditation or Upāsana.

Topic 26: (Sūtras 40-41) Prāṇagnihotra need not be observed on days of fast.

III.3.40 (399) On account of the respect shown (to the Prāṇagnihotra by the Śhruti) there can be no omission (of this act) (even when the eating of food is omitted).

This Sūtra gives the view of the Opponent.

Because there is loving emphasis on Prāṇagnihotra in Jabala Śhruti, such Prāṇagnihotra should not be omitted.

In the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, the worshipper is asked first before he takes his meals to offer food to each of the Prāṇas, saying “To Prāṇa I offer this”. The Śhruti attaches much importance to this Prāṇagnihotra. The Śhruti enjoins that food must be offered to the Prāṇas even before entertaining guests.

Now the question is whether the Prāṇagnihotra is to be observed even on days of fasting.

The Sūtra declares that there should be no omission of it even on days of fasting, as the Śhruti attaches much importance to it. The Jabala Śhruti says it must be observed even on days of fasting by sipping at least a few drops of water.

To this Pūrva-paksha -‘Objection’ the next Sūtra gives a reply.

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III.3.41 (400) When eating is taking place (the Prāṇagnihotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food first eaten), for so [the Śhruti] declares.

This Sūtra refutes the view expressed in the last Sūtra, and declares that Prāṇagnihotra, need not be performed on fasting days, because the Śhruti expressly declares, “Therefore the first food which comes is meant for Homa. And he who offers that first oblation should offer it to Prāṇa, saying Svaha" (Chh. Up. 19.1).

The first portion of the food should be offered to the Prāṇas on those days when it is taken. The Śhruti gives importance to this only and not that it should be observed even on days of fasting.

Topic 27: Upāsanas mentioned in connection with sacrifices are not their parts, but separate.

III.3.42 (401) There is no rule about the inviolability of that (i.e. Upāsanas connected with certain sacrifices) that is seen (from the Śhruti itself); for a separate fruit (belongs to the Upāsanas), viz. non-obstruction (of the results of the sacrifice).

This Sūtra states that a meditation or Upāsana prescribed in connection with a ceremonial rite is not compulsory.

We have the direction to make a certain Upāsana as an Anga (element or limit) of Karma (Karmangavabaddhopasti). Is it an indispensable element? No. If it is performed there will be greater fruit.

Even if it is not done the Karma will be complete. This is clear from the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad.

We now enter into an enquiry whether certain Upāsanas mentioned with some sacrifices are part of those sacrifices and therefore inseparable and permanently connected with them.

The present Sūtra declares that Upāsanas do not constitute a part of the sacrifice, because there is no rule as to their inseparability.

The Śhruti expressly declares that the sacrifice can be done with or without the Upāsanas. “The ignorant man, as well as the wise man may both engage in the Udgītha worship; both perform the sacrifice” (Chh. Up. I.1.10). This shows that the Udgītha worship may be performed, the meditation or Upāsana part being left out. That which is performed with meditation, faith and knowledge becomes all the more effective.

(411)

There is no fixed rule for compulsory performance of Udgītha meditation and the like in ceremonials, because performance of the meditation on 'OM' is left optional to the performer and also because the fruit in each case is quite distinct, if the performance of the rite is not in any way obstructed, because it is clear that the meditation is sure to produce its own effect independently of the rite but the rite is liable to interruption and obstruction. If, however, the meditation and the rite be conjoined, fruit becomes doubly effective.

The Chhandogya Śhruti (I.1.10) indicates that the rite can be done even without meditation or Upāsana and that to perform the rite with meditation is to make it more effective. Hence the Udgītha meditation and all others performed in connection with ceremonial rite (Karmanga Upāsana), are not compulsory and are to be done by those only who wish to attain greater fruits.

The original sacrifice brings its own rewards but the Upāsana increases its results. Therefore, the Upāsana does not constitute a part of the sacrifice. Therefore, it may or may not be done according to the sweet will of the sacrificer.

The Upāsana prevents any obstruction to the results of the sacrifice. This does not make it a part of the ceremonial rite. The rewards of the sacrifice may be delayed on account of the intervention of an evil Karma of the sacrificer. The Upāsana annihilates the effect of this evil deed and hastens the attainment of the fruits of the sacrifice. That is all. The sacrifice does not rely upon the Upāsana for its rewards.

Therefore, the Upāsana does not form a part of the sacrifice and is, therefore, optional.

(412)

Topic 28: Meditations on Vayu and Prāṇa are to be kept separate notwithstanding the essential oneness of these two.

III.3.43 (402) As in the case of the offerings (Vayu and Prāṇa must be held apart). This has been explained (in the Pūrvamirnarnsa Sūtra).

The section of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad which begins “Voice held, I shall speak” (Bri. Up. I.5.21) determines Prāṇa to be the best among the organs of the body and Vayu to be the best among the Devas.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad Vayu is said to be the general absorber of the Devas, “Vayu indeed is the absorber” (IV.3.1); Prāṇa is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body, “Breath indeed is the absorber” (IV.3.3).

In the Samvarga Vidyā of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad, meditation on Prāṇa with reference to the body and on Vayu with reference to the gods is prescribed.

Many Śruti texts say that Prāṇa and Vayu are one in essence.

Therefore, the Opponent maintains that the two meditations can be combined and that Vayu and Prāṇa are non-separate because in their true nature they do not differ. And as their true nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon separately. In some places we have even a direct identification of the two, “What Prāṇa is that is Vayu-Yah pranah sa vayuh.” The present Sūtra refutes the above view and declares that they are to be kept apart despite the non-difference in nature of Prāṇa and Vayu, because their functions on account of their

different abodes are different. Although there may be non-difference of true nature, yet there may be difference of condition giving rise to difference of instruction, and through the latter to difference of meditation.

The Sūtra compares the case under discussion to a parallel one from the Karmakāṇḍa by means of the clause “as in the case of the offerings”.

As an illustration we may take Pradhāna where Purodasa (oblations) is given separately to Raja Indra (the Ruler), Adhiraja Indra (the monarch or the over-ruler), and Svaraja Indra (the sovereign or the self-ruler) according to his different capacities, though Indra is essentially one, though he is one god.

Hence, though the Vidyā is one from the Adhyatmic point of view, there is separateness from the Adhidaivata point of view. So the meditations on Prāṇa and Vayu have to be kept apart. This principle is established by Jaimini, in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā (Śhaṅkarsha alias Devata Kāṇḍa).

(413)

Topic 29: (Sūtras 44-52) The fires in Agnirahasya of the Brihadaranyaka are not part of the sacrificial act, but form an independent Vidyā.

III.3.44 (403) On account of the majority of indicatory marks (the fires of the mind, speech, etc., in the Agnirahasya of the Vajasaneyins do not form part of the sacrifice), for it (the indicatory mark) is stronger (than the context or the general subject matter). This also (has been explained in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras by Jaimini).

In the Agnirahasya of the Vajasaneyins (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa) certain fires named after mind, speech, eyes, etc., are mentioned.

A doubt arises whether these form part of the sacrifice mentioned therein or form an independent Vidyā.

The present Sūtra declares that in spite of the prima facie view which arises from the context, these form a separate Vidyā because there are many indicatory marks to show that these fires form an independent Vidyā.

The indicatory marks are of greater force than the context or the leading subject matter (Prakarana). This has been explained in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā (III.3.14).

The reference in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad takes a man's age to be one hundred years, i.e. 36,000 days and describes each day's mentality as an Agnichayana or fire sacrifice. The passage occurs in a portion relating to Karma or ceremonial action. If you say that such a meditation is an Anga or element in the ceremonial because it occurs in a passage relating to Karma, we say that the majority of indicatory marks is otherwise, e.g. the Śhruti says that such Chayana goes on even in sleep. A specific reason given in a passage has a greater weight or force than mere context.

III.3.45 (404) (The fires spoken of in the previous Sūtra are) alternative forms of the one mentioned first, (i.e. the actual sacrificial fire) on account of the context; (they) ought to be part of the sacrifice like the imaginary drink or the Manasa-cup.

An objection is raised to the preceding Sūtra.

The Opponent raises a fresh objection. On the tenth day of the Soma sacrifice a Soma drink is offered to Prajāpati wherein the earth is regarded as the cup and the sea as the Soma. This is a mental act only, and yet it forms a part of the sacrifice.

The same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made of mind and so on though these fires are mental, i.e. imaginary, yet they form part of the sacrifice and not an independent Vidyā, because of the context. They are an alternate form of the actual fire mentioned first.

You may say that it is only Arthavada and that a mere Arthavada cannot override the context and that such meditation is part of the Karma as is the case in the Dasaratra Karma.

(414)

III.3.46 (405) And on account of the extension (of the attributes of the actual fire to these imaginary fires).

Atidesat: on account of the extension (of the attributes of the first to these fires); Cha: and.

Objection to Sūtra 44 is continued by presenting another argument in support of Sūtra 45.

The Opponent gives another reason to support his view.

The Śhruti in that passage ascribes all the attributes of the actual fire to these imaginary fires. Therefore, they are part of the sacrifice.

III.3.47 (406) But (the fires) rather constitute the Vidyā, because (the Śhruti) asserts it.

Objections raised in Sūtras 45 and 46 are now refuted.

The word 'Tu' (but) sets aside the Pūrva-paksha -'Objection'. It refutes the Opponent.

The present Sūtra declares that the fires form an independent Vidyā, because the text asserts that "They are built of knowledge (Vidyā) only", and that "By knowledge they are built for him who thus knows".

III.3.48 (407) And because (in the text indicative marks of that are) seen.

The indicative marks are those referred to in Sūtra 44. In fact the internal indications show that it is a Vidyā and not a Karmanga.

(415)

III.3.49 (408) (The view that the Agnis or fires constitute an independent Vidyā) cannot be refuted, owing to the greater force of the Śhruti etc.

Objections raised in Sūtras 45 and 46 are further refuted.

There is no negation of this view on the basis of the context, because of the greater strength of Śhruti, etc.

Our Opponent has no right to determine on the ground of Prakarana that the Agnis are subordinate to the sacrificial action and so to set aside our view according to which they are independent. For we know from the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā that direct enunciation (Śhruti), indicative mark (Linga) and syntactical connection (Vakya) are of greater force than leading subject matter (Prakarana) and all those three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the Agnis being independent.

Mere context is of no force against express Śhruti, Linga, etc. The Śhruti used the word 'Eva' where there is an imperative tense, etc., used, a

mere Upadesa can be treated as an Arthavada, because there is also an express command. Where there is no such indication, an Upadesa must be treated as a Vidhi. Therefore what we have here is an independent Vidyā and not a Karmanga.

The Śhruti directly says, "All these fires are kindled with knowledge alone. The indicatory mark is this." All beings kindle these fires for him, even when he is asleep. This continuity of the fire shows that they are mental ones. An actual sacrifice is not continued during sleep. The syntactical connections "Through meditation alone these fires of the worshipper are kindled." These three are more forcible than mere context.

(416)

III.3.50 (409) On account of the connection and so on (the fires built of mind, etc., form an independent Vidyā), in the same way as other Vidyās (like Sandilya Vidyā) are separate; and it is seen (that in spite of the context a sacrifice is treated as independent). This has been explained (in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras by Jaimini).

The argument in refutation of Sūtras 45 and 46 is continued.

This Sūtra gives additional reasons in support of the view set forth in Sūtra 47.

Independence has, against the general subject matter, to be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, because the text connects the constituent members of the sacrificial action with activities of the mind. The text connects for the purpose of Sampad Upāsana (meditations based on resemblance) parts of a sacrifice with mental

activities, e.g. "These fires are started mentally, the altars are set up mentally, the cups are taken mentally, the Udgatris are praised mentally, the Hotris are recited mentally, everything connected with this sacrifice is done mentally." This is possible only if there is a sharp difference between things which resemble each other.

The Śhruti mentions in regard to such mental worship all the greatness of a Karmanga. Therefore Atidesa (similarity) applies even on the footing of the context referring to an independent Vidyā which is separate from a Karmanga.

The fires constitute an independent Vidyā, just as the Sandilya Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā, form separate Vidyās, although mentioned along with sacrificial acts.

A similar thing is seen in Aveshti being done as an independent ceremony in the Rajasuya sacrifice. It is observed in the sacrificial portion of the Vedas, that though the sacrifice Aveshti is mentioned along with the Rajasuya sacrifice, it is yet considered as an independent sacrifice by Jaimini in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras.

(417)

III.3.51 (410) In spite of the resemblance (of the fires to the imaginary drink, they do) not (constitute part of the sacrificial act) because it is seen (from the reasons given, and on the ground of Śhruti that they form an independent Vidyā) as in the case of death; for the world does not become (fire, because it resembles fire in some points).

The argument in refutation of Sūtras 45 and 46 is continued.

Though being a mental act, there is an element of similarity, it is not a Karmanga because it is stated to have a separate fruit. This is clear from the illustrations relating to Mrityu and describing the earth as fire.

The resemblance cited by the Opponent has no force. It cannot certainly stand because on account of the reasons already given, viz. the Śhruti, indicatory mark, etc., the fires in question subserve the purpose of man only, and not the purpose of some sacrificial action.

Mere resemblance can hardly justify the contrary view. Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or other; but in spite of that there remains the individual dissimilarity of each thing from all other things.

The case is analogous to that of 'death'. The resemblance cited is like the common epithet 'death' applied to fire and the being in the sun. "The being in that orb is death indeed" (Sat. Br. X.5.2.3). "Fire indeed is death" (Tait. Samh. V.1 .10.3). This resemblance cannot make fire and the being in the same one.

Again we have "This world is a fire indeed, O Gautama, the sun is its fuel" etc., (Chh. Up. V.4.1). Here it does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that the world does not actually become fire.

Thus also in our case. Hence from the fact that the Manaschita Agni (fire) is a mental act like the Manasagraha which is a Karmanga, you cannot on that ground of such similarity alone argue that it also is a Karmanga.

III.3.52 (411) And from the subsequent (Brāhmaṇa) the fact of the text (under discussion) being such (i.e. enjoining an independent Vidyā) (is known). But the connection (of the

fanciful Agnis or imaginary fires with the actual fire is) on account of the abundance (of the attributes of the latter that are imagined in these fires).

In a subsequent Brāhmaṇa we have "By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in words do not go there, nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance". This verse depreciates mere works and praises Vidyā or knowledge. A former Brāhmaṇa also viz. the one beginning "Where that orb leads" (Sat. Br. X.5.2.23) concludes with a statement of the fruit of knowledge "Immortal becomes he whose self is death" and thereby shows that works are not the chief thing. Hence we conclude that the injunction of the Śhruti is that the fires constitute an independent Vidyā.

The connection of the fires with the actual fire is not because they constitute part of the sacrifice but because many of the attributes of the real fire are imagined in the fires of the Vidyā, in the Agnis built of mind. The statement of the fires built of mind along with the ordinary sacrificial fire is due to an abundance of common matters with the latter.

All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars built of mind and so on constitute an independent Vidyā.

(418)

Topic 30: (Sūtras 53-54) Ātman is an entity distinct from the body.

III.3.53 (412) Some (maintain the non-existence) of a separate self (besides the body) on account of the existence (of the self) where a body is (only).

In this topic the existence of an Ātman apart from the body is taken up for discussion. Unless there is a soul apart from the body there is no use of the scripture teaching liberation. Nor can there be any scope for ethical commands which are the means of attainment of heaven or for the teaching that the soul is Brahman.

There must be a soul apart from the body who can enjoy the fruits of the Upāsana or Vidyās, otherwise of what avail is Upāsana? If there is no soul all Upāsanas become useless.

At present we will prove the existence of a soul different from the body in order to establish thereby the qualification of the self for bondage and release. For if there were no selves different from the body, there would be no room for injunction that have the other world for their result, nor could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self.

This Sūtra gives the view of the Charvakas or Lokayatikas (materialists) who deny the existence of an Ātman different from the body.

They say that consciousness is a mere material product and that the body is the soul. They declare that consciousness is seen to exist only when there is a body and that it is nowhere experienced independent of the body. Therefore consciousness is only an attribute or quality of the body. There is no separate self or soul in this body.

They say man is only a body. Consciousness is the quality of the body. Consciousness is like the intoxicating quality which arises when certain materials are mixed in certain proportions. No single material has the intoxicating effect.

Although consciousness is not observed in earth, and the other external elements, either single or combined, yet it may appear in

them when transformed into the shape of a body. Consciousness springs from them. No soul is found after the body dies and that hence as both are present or absent together, consciousness is only an attribute of the body just as light and heat are attributes of fire.

As life, movements, consciousness, remembrances and so on, which are regarded as qualities of the Ātman by those who maintain that there is an independent Ātman apart from the body, are observed only within the bodies and not outside the bodies, and as an abode of those attributes different from the body cannot be proved, it follows that they must be attributes of the body only.

Therefore, the Self is not different from the body.

The next Sūtra gives a reply to this conclusion of the Charvakas or Lokayatikas (materialists).

(419)

III.3.54 (413) But not (so); a self or soul separate (from the body does exist), because (Consciousness) does not exist even when there is the body (after death), as in the case of cognition or perceptive consciousness.

The statement in the preceding Sūtra is refuted.

The soul is separate because even when the body exists the soul goes away. They are separate just as subject and object are separate.

The view expressed by the Opponent in the previous Sūtra is certainly wrong, because the Ātma-Dharma such as Chaitanya (consciousness), etc., are not found after death, though the body exists.

Consciousness cannot be an attribute of the body, because we do not find consciousness in a body after a person dies.

This consciousness is an attribute of something which is different from the body and which abides in the body.

The subject and the object cannot possibly be identical. Fire cannot burn itself. The acrobat cannot stand upon his own shoulder.

Can form sense form? Can sound hear sound? No. Consciousness is eternal, as it is of the same identical quality always. Can you say that consciousness is a quality of the light, because light is necessary to see forms? Even so consciousness is not a quality of the body. Moreover consciousness functions in dreams even without the aid of the body.

The Charvakas accept that the cogniser is different from the thing cognised. So the experiencer of this body, he who cognises this body must be different from the body. He who cognises this body is the Self.

(420)

Therefore, consciousness is an attribute of this Self, rather its very essence of nature.

As consciousness constitutes the character of the Self, the Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is permanent follows from the uniformity of its character and we, therefore, may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent also. That consciousness is the nature of the Self, that it is permanent, follows from the fact that the Self, although connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious agent a recognition expressed in judgments such as "I saw this" and from the fact of remembrance and so on being possible.

Therefore, the view that the Self is something separate from the body is free from all objections.

Topic 31: (Sūtras 55-56) Upāsanas connected with sacrificial acts, i.e. Udgītha Upāsana are valid for all schools.

III.3.55 (414) But [the Upāsanas or meditations connected with parts) (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular) Sakhas, according to the Veda (to which they belong), (but to all its Sakhas because the same Upāsana is described in all).

There is no rule that the Angavabaddha (Karmanga) Upāsana in each Śhruti Sakha is separate and should be confined to it alone.

The above said intervening or occasional discussion is over.

Now we pursue the main theme. In Udgītha, etc., various Karmanga Upāsanas are taught. From this you could not say that each Upāsana in each Śhruti Sakha is different, on account of the proximity of text and the difference in Svaras or sounds. All such Upāsanas may be taken together, because the Udgītha Śhruti is more powerful than mere proximity of context or diversity of Svara.

There are certain Upāsanas mentioned in connection with sacrificial acts, as for example the meditation on 'OM' which is connected with the Udgītha as Prāṇa, or the meditation on the Udgītha as the earth and so on. "Let a man meditate on the syllable 'OM' as the Udgītha" (Chh. Up. I.1.1). "Let a man meditate on the five-fold Saman as the five worlds" (Chh. Up. II.2.1).

(421)

A doubt here arises whether the meditations or Vidyās are enjoined with reference to the Udgītha and so on as belonging to a certain Sakha only or as belonging to all Sakhas. The doubt arises because the Udgītha and so on are chanted differently in different Sakhas, because the accents, etc., differ. Therefore, they may be considered different.

Here the Opponent holds that the Vidyās are enjoined only with reference to the Udgītha and so on which belong to the particular Sakha to which the Vidyā belongs. Why? Because of proximity.

The present Sūtra refutes the view that they are so restricted, because the text speaks of these Upāsanās in general and so they are all one in all the branches.

The word ‘tu’ (but) discards the prima facie view or the view of the Opponent. The Upāsanās are not restricted to their own Sakhas according to the Veda to which they belong but are valid for all Sakhas, because the direct statements of the text about the Udgītha and so on enounce no specification. Direct statement has greater force or weight than proximity.

There is no reason why the Vidyā should not be of general reference. We, therefore, conclude that, although the Sakhas differ as to accents and the like, the Vidyās mentioned refer to the Udgītha and so on belonging to all Sakhas, because the text speaks only of the Udgītha and so on in general.

III.3.56 (415) Or else, there is no contradiction (here), as in the case of Mantras and the like.

The discussion commenced in Sūtra 33 is continued.

Just as Mantras, etc., mentioned in only one Sakha, are used in another Sakha, with respect to that particular rite, so also the Upāsanas connected with particular rites in one Sakha of the Veda can be applied to the other Sakhas.

As for example the Mantra “Kutarurasi” (thou art the grinding stone), prescribed in one Branch of the Vedas fortaking stone to grind rice, is acceptable in that rite everywhere; even so the Upāsana (meditation) prescribed in one Branch of the Vedas may be transferred or applied to other Sakhas or Branches without apprehending any impropriety.

We find that Mantra and Guṇa and Karma in one Sakha are taken into another Sakha, just as the members of sacrificial actions on which certain Vidyās rest are valid everywhere, so the Vidyās themselves also which rest on those members are valid for all Sakhas and Vedas.

(422)

Topic 32: Vaiśhvānara Upāsana is one entire Upāsana.

III.3.57 (416) Importance (is given to the meditation) on the entire form (of Vaiśhvānara) as in the case of sacrifice; for thus (the Śhruti) shows.

The Vaiśhvānara Vidyā is discussed here.

In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (V.11.8) there is the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā, the meditation on the cosmic form of the Lord. The meditator should think that His head is the heaven, His eye the sun and so on.

Different fruits are mentioned for each part of the Upāsana. For example, the fruit of meditating on His head as the heaven is “He eats

food, beholds his beloved ones and has Vedic glory in his house" (Chh. Up. V.12.2).

Now a doubt arises whether the Śhruti here speaks of one Upāsana on the entire cosmic form or Upāsana of each part of Vaiśhvānara.

The present Sūtra says that the Śhruti speaks of one Upāsana on the whole form of Vaiśhvānara or the cosmic form of the Lord.

The Śhruti gives superiority to the meditation on Vaiśhvānara as a whole, as in the case of Kratu or sacrifice. Though the Śhruti declares fruits for Upāsana or worship of each part of Vaiśhvānara, yet it emphasises the worship of the entire Vaiśhvānara with the universe as His body, just as in sacrifices like Darsa-Purnamasa all the Angas have to be combined.

The separate fruits mentioned for meditation on parts of Vaiśhvānara must be combined into one whole with meditation.

The text informs us that six Rishis, Prakināsala, Uddalaka, etc., being unable to reach a firm foundation in the Knowledge of Vaiśhvānara, went to the King Asvapati Kaikeya; goes on to mention the object of each Rishi's meditation, viz. the sky and so on; determines that the sky and so on are only the head and so on of Vaiśhvānara. Asvapati said "That is but the head of the self," and rejects all meditations on Vaiśhvānara in his partial form. He said "Your head would have fallen if you had not come to me" (Chh. Up. V.12.2).

As this text discourages partial worship of Vaiśhvānara, it is quite clear that it recommends the entire Upāsana on the whole Vaiśhvānara.

Moreover the section begins thus: “which is our own self, which is Brahman” (Chh. Up. V.11.1). This indicates that the entire Brahman is the object of meditation. It ends thus “of that Vaiśhvānara Self Sutejas is the head” etc. (Chh. Up. V.18.2). This clearly intimates that only the entire Upāsana is intended.

For all these reasons, the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation on the entire Vaiśhvānara only is correct.

(423)

Topic 33: Various Vidyās like the Sandilya Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā and so on are to be kept separate and not combined into one entire Upāsana.

III.3.58 (417) (The Vidyās are) separate, on account of the difference of words and the like.

In the previous Sūtra we have arrived at the conclusion that a meditation on Vaiśhvānara as a whole is the pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special fruits are stated for meditations on parts such as Sutejas and so on.

The Opponent follows this line of argument and says that we must combine all the different Vidyās like Sandilya Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā, Satya Vidyā, and so on into one composite meditation or more general meditation on the Lord, as the object of meditation is the one Lord.

The present Sūtra refutes this and declares that the Vidyās are separate, although the object of meditation is on the one Lord, on account of the difference of words and the like. For the text exhibits a difference of words such as “He knows.” “Let him meditate”, “Let him form the idea” (Chh. Up. III.14.1).

This difference of terms is acknowledged as a reason or test of difference of acts, according to Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras, II.2.1.

“And the like” or “etc.” refers to other reasons like the difference in qualities.

The Lord indeed is the only object of meditation, but according to its general purport each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord. Although one and the same Prāṇa is the object of meditation in the other series of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated upon in one place and another in another place. From difference of connection there thus follows difference of injunction and from the latter we apprehend the separateness of the Vidyās.

Though the object of meditation is the one Lord, yet He is different on account of the difference in qualities that are imagined in different Upāsanas. Further it is not possible at all to combine all the various Vidyās into one.

(424)

Therefore, the different Vidyās are to be kept separate and not combined into one composite or general meditation.

Though the Vidyā (what is to be known) is one, each Upāsana which is described by such words as Upasita, etc., is different. In each Upāsana certain special attributes of the Lord and certain special results are stated.

The forms of meditation such as the Sandilya Vidyā, the Satya Vidyā, the Dahara Vidyā, the Vaiśhvānara Vidyā, are different owing to difference of names and processes, the directory words and the

attributes, yet, each of them teaches the worship of the same Lord; but under a particular aspect meditations have been prescribed in various names and forms so as to suit different meditators.

The Sūtra, therefore, rightly declares the separateness of the Vidyās.

Topic 34: Any one of the Vidyās should be selected according to one's own option or choice.

III.3.59 (418) There is option (with respect to the several Vidyās), because the result (of all the Vidyās) is the same.

The most important Vidyās are: Sandilya Vidyā, Bhūma Vidyā, Sat Vidyā, Dahara Vidyā, Upakosala Vidyā, Vaiśhvānara Vidyā, Udgītha Vidyā, Ānandamaya Vidyā, Akshara Vidyā.

One may follow any Vidyā according to his option, and stick to it till he reaches the goal, as the result of all Vidyās or the goal is the same, namely the realisation of Self or Brahman. If we adopt many, the mind will get distracted and the spiritual progress will be retarded.

When the Brahman is realised through one meditation, a second meditation would be purposeless.

Therefore, one must select one particular Vidyā and stick to it and remain intent on it till the fruit of the Vidyā is attained through the intuition of the object of meditation.

(425)

Topic 35: Vidyās yielding particular desires may or may not be combined according to one's liking.

III.3.60 (419) But Vidyās for particular desires may be combined or not according to one's desires on account of the absence of the previous reason (mentioned in the previous Sūtra).

This Sūtra shows an exception to the previous Sūtra that more Vidyās than one may be combined where the object is other than the realisation of Brahman.

In the previous Sūtra it was stated that any one of the Vidyās about Brahman should be taken up, and that more than one at a time should not be taken up, because each Vidyā was quite sufficient to take to the goal or Self-realisation and more than one Vidyā would produce distraction of the mind.

We have on the other hand, Vidyās connected with particular desires, e.g. "He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions never weeps for his sons" (Chh. Up. III.15.2). "He who meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as name reaches" (Chh. Up. VII.1.5).

The question arises whether one is to restrict oneself to only one of these Vidyās or can take up more than one at a time.

The present Sūtra declares that one can practise more than one Vidyā or not according to one's liking, as the results are different unlike that of the Brahma-Vidyās. He may practise more than one Vidyā or not, on account of the absence of the former reason, i.e. because there is not the reason for option which was stated in the preceding Sūtra.

(426)

Topic 36: (Sūtras 61-66) Meditations connected with members of sacrificial acts may or may not be combined according to one's liking.

III.3.61 (420) With regard (to meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts) it is as with (the members) with which they are connected.

Of the six Sūtras which are contained in this Adhikaraṇa, the first four Sūtras are Pūrva-paksha -'Objection' Sūtras and the last two Sūtras are Siddhanta Sūtras.

Different instructions connected with a sacrifice are stated in the different Vedas. The scriptures say that all these members mentioned in the different Vedas are to be combined for the due performance of the principal one.

The question now is, which is the rule to be followed with regard to the meditations or Upāsanas connected with these members.

The present Sūtra declares that the same rule which applies to the members applies also to the Upāsanas connected with them. It is according to the abodes. As the abiding places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on are combined for the performance of the sacrifice, so those meditations or Upāsanas also; for a meditation is subject to what it rests on. All these Upāsanas are to be combined.

Just as the Stotras, etc., are combined when performing Karmas, so also the Upāsanas which are Angas of Karma (Angavabaddha Upāsana) should be combined.

III.3.62 (421) And from the injunction of the Śhruti.

An argument in support of the objection raised in Sūtra 61 is adduced. That is because the Upāsanas depend on the Stotras.

As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in the three Vedas, so also are the meditations resting on them. Just as the members are scattered in the different Vedas, so also are the meditations connected with them. There is no difference as regards the injunction of the Śhruti with reference to these meditations.

There is no difference between the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations referring to them.

III.3.63 (422) On account of the rectification.

A further reason is given by the Opponent. Another argument in support of Sūtra 61 is adduced.

There is also indication in the Śhruti about such combination.

Such combination is seen when the Udgatri performs the Hautra Karma described in another Veda for removing the effects of error in the discharge of his function.

(427)

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares "What is Udgītha is OM or Prāṇava and what is OM is Udgītha. This meditation on the oneness of the Udgītha and OM mends the Udgītha defiled by any mistake committed even on the part of the Hotri, the hymn-reciting priest in recitation of the Udgītha" (Chh. Up. I.5.5).

Here it is said that the mistakes committed by the Udgatri or chanting priest of the Sama Veda are rectified by the recitation of the Hotri or invoking priest of the Rigveda. This indicates that though the meditations are given in the different Vedas they are yet interlinked.

Hence all of them have to be observed.

The passage "From the seat of the Hotri, he sets right any mistake committed in the Udgītha" (Chh. Up. I.5.5), declares that owing to the force of the meditation on the unity of Prāṇava and Udgītha, the Hotri rectifies any mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work of the Hotri.

Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is connected with what is mentioned in another Veda, in the same manner as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations on members of sacrificial acts, in whatever Veda they may be mentioned-have to be combined.

A thing belonging to the Rigveda, viz. Prāṇava is, according to the Chhandogya text, connected with the Sama Veda meditation on the Udgītha. Hence meditations also which belong to different Vedas may be combined; because there is no difference between them and things as far as connection is concerned.

III.3.64 (423) And from the Śhruti declaring 'OM' which is a common feature (of the Udgītha Vidyā) to be common to all the Vedas.

Another argument in support of Sūtra 61 is adduced.

Further Prāṇava (Omkaara) is common to all the Upāsanās and links them up.

It is found in Śhruti that OM is the common property of all the Vedas. Therefore, it is an inseparable concomitant of the sacrificial rites, prescribed in the Vedas. Hence the Vidyās also, being dependent on

OM, are concomitants of the sacrificial rites. Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares "Through this ('OM') the Vedic Vidyā proceeds.

With OM the Adhvaryu gives orders, with OM the Hotri recites, with OM the Udgatrisings" (Chh. Up. I.1.9). This is stated with reference to OM, which is common to all the Vedas and all the Upāsanas in them.

This indicates that as the abode of all Vidyās, viz. OM, is common, so the Vidyās that rest in it are common also. Therefore, all of them are to be observed.

(428)

III.3.65 (424) (The meditations connected with members of the sacrificial acts are) rather not (to be combined) as the Śhruti does not state their going together.

This Sūtra refutes the contention raised in Sūtras 61-64.

This and the following Sūtra give the conclusion.

There is no Śhruti commanding such combination of the Karmanga Upāsanas. No Śhruti refers to such compulsory combination of the Upāsanas. So they can be done singly or in combination as we like.

There is no binding rule that the Vidyās, depending on the Prāṇava or on any part of a sacrificial rite, is a necessary concomitant of the sacrifice. It may be dispensed with or retained at the option of the performer. But there is this difference. If Vidyās be associated with the rites greater good will accrue.

Though the utterance of the Prāṇava or the Udgītha hymn has been enjoined by the Śhruti to be necessary for the sacrificial performance, yet Śhruti does not insist that the Vidyā (meditation) portion of the

performance is a necessary adjunct to the mind. It is not absolutely necessary for the fulfilment of external sacrifices. A sacrifice may be performed even without the Vidyā (meditation) merely by utterance of Mantras, singing of the Udgītha hymns, pouring of the clarified butter into the sacred fire and the like external rites, in order to attain particular desired objects, but the Vidyā or meditation on Brahman leads to realisation of Brahman.

The rule for combining the instructions regarding sacrifices that are scattered in all the Vedas cannot be applied with regard to the meditations (Upāsanas) connected with them. If the instructions regarding the sacrifices are not combined, the sacrifice will itself fail. But it is not the case if the Upāsanas are not practised, because Upāsanas only increase the fruits of the sacrifice (Vide III.3.42).

Upāsanas are not inseparable from the sacrifice.

Therefore, Upāsanas (Vidyās, meditations) may or may not be practised.

(429)

III.3.66 (425) And because the Śhruti (scripture) says so (shows it).

This Sūtra is adduced in support of Sūtra 65.

This may also be inferred from Sruti.

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares “The Brāhmaṇa (superintending chief priest) who possesses such knowledge saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer and all the priests, just as the horse saves the horseman" (Chh. Up. IV.17.10).

This shows that the scriptures do not intend that all the meditations should go together. For, if all meditations were to be combined, all priests would know them all and the text could not specially announce that the Brāhmaṇa, chief superintending priest, possessing a certain knowledge thereby saves the others.

The meditations, therefore, according to one's liking may or may not be combined.

Thus ends the Third Paola (Section 3) of the Third Adhyāya (Chapter III) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(430) CHAPTER III, SECTION 4, INTRODUCTION

In the last Section the Vidyās or Upāsanās (meditations) which are the means to the knowledge of Brahman were discussed.

In this Section the Sūtra-kāra enters into an enquiry whether the knowledge of Brahman is connected with ritualistic work through one who is entitled to perform the works or is an independent means to accomplish the purpose of man.

Śhrī Bādarāyaṇa, the Sūtra-kāra, begins by stating the final view in the first Sūtra, “Thence” etc. He is of opinion that through the independent Knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the Vedānta-texts the purpose of man is effected.

In the present Section it will be shown that Knowledge of Brahman is independent of Karma and that is not subordinate to sacrificial acts.

Bādarāyaṇa establishes that the attainment of the final emancipation is the direct result of Brahma Vidyā of knowledge of Brahman, that works or sacrifices are only indirect aids to contemplating by purifying the heart, that Karma does not directly lead to the final beatitude, that the seeker of Brahman may even do away with Karma and may attain freedom solely by contemplation on Brahman and that even in that case he should not abandon the duties enjoined by the scriptures.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not Krativartha, i.e. subordinate to action (sacrificial acts) but independent.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtras 18-20) confirms this conclusion that Sannyāsa is prescribed by the scriptures, that the state of the Pravrajins is enjoined by the sacred law and that for them Brahma Vidyā only is prescribed, and not action.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 21-22) determines that certain clauses forming part of Vidyās are not mere glorificatory passages (Śhrutis or Arthavadas) but themselves enjoin the meditation.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 23-24) The stories recorded in the Upaniṣhads are not to be used as subordinate members of acts. They do not serve the purpose of Pariplavas and do not form part of the ritualistic acts. They are meant to glorify the Vidyā taught in them. They have the purpose of glorifying as Arthavadas the injunctions with which they are connected.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtra 25) For all these reasons the Sannyāsin need not observe ritualistic acts as knowledge serves their purpose.

They require no actions but only knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 26-27) Nevertheless the actions enjoined by scripture such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, etc., are useful as they are indirect means of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 28-31) Certain relaxations allowed by scripture of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need. Restrictions as regards food may be abandoned only when life is in danger.

Adhikaraṇa VIII.' (Sūtras 32-35) The duties of the Āśhramas are to be performed by even one who does not strive after liberation or who is not desirous of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtras 36-39) Those who stand midway between two Āśhramas are also entitled to knowledge. Those also who owing to poverty and so on, are AnĀśhramins, have claims to Vidyā.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtra 40) A Sannyāsi who has taken the vow of life-long celibacy cannot revoke his vow. He cannot revert back to his former stages of life.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtras 41-42) Expiation of the fall of an Urdhvareta, of one who transgresses the vow of life-long celibacy.

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtra 43) Exclusion of the fallen Urdhvaretas or life-long celibate. He must be shunned by Society.

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Adhikaraṇa XIII: (Sūtras 44-46) Those meditations which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice are the business of the priest, not of the Yajamana or sacrificer.

Adhikaraṇa XIV: (Sūtras 47-49) Bri. Up. III.5.1 enjoins Mauna or meditation as a third in addition to Balya (child-like state) and Panditya (scholarship or erudition).

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtra 50) By Balya or child-like state is to be understood a child-like innocent state of mind, being free from passion, anger, etc.

Adhikaraṇa XVI: (Sūtra 51) intimates that the fruition of knowledge may take place even in this life if there be no obstruction to it (the means adopted).

Adhikaraṇa XVII: (Sūtra 52) declares that there is no difference in liberation, i.e. in the realisation of Brahman. It is of one kind in all cases.

(433)

Topic 1: (Sūtra 1-17) Knowledge of Brahman is independent of sacrificial acts.

III.4.1 (426) From this (Brahma Vidyā or Brahma Jñāna results) the purpose or the chief object of pursuit of man, because the scriptures state so; thus (holds) the sage Bādarāyaṇa.

The result or fruit of Brahma Vidyā is stated.

The Sūtra-kāra Śhrī Vyāsa now proceeds to show that Brahma Jñāna leads not to Karma, but to the attainment of the highest Puruṣhartha, i.e. Moksha or the final emancipation. That is Bādarāyaṇa's teaching.

The four Puruṣharthas are: Dharma (discharge of religious duty), Artha (acquisition of wealth, worldly prosperity), Kāma (enjoyment), and Moksha (salvation). Knowledge of Brahman is not merely connected with sacrificial acts by affording to the agent a certain qualification. It definitely paves the way for the attainment of the final release or freedom from births and deaths.

Whence is this known? From the scripture.

Bādarāyaṇa bases his arguments on the Śhruti texts, such as "The knower of Ātman goes beyond grief- Tarati śhokam-ātmavit" (Chh. Up.

III.4.1). "He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman-Brahma-vit-brahm'aiva bhavati' (Mun. Up. III.2.9).

"He who knows Brahman attains the Highest - Brahma-vid-apnoti Param" (Tait. Up. II.1).

"For him who has a teacher there is delay only so long as he is not delivered; then he will be perfect" (Chh. Up. VI.14.2). "He who has searched out and understood the Self which is free from sin, etc., obtains all worlds and all desires" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). "The Ātman is to be seen" etc., up to "Thus far goes immortality" (Bri. Up. IV.5.6-15).

These and similar texts emphatically declare that Knowledge of Brahman effects the highest purpose of man or Supreme Puruṣhartha.

Against this the Opponent raises his objection as follows.

Here Jaimini comes forward with his following objections.

(434)

III.4.2 (427) Because [the self] is supplementary (to sacrificial acts), (the fruits of the Knowledge of the Self) are mere praise of the agent, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.

Sūtras 2 to 7 are Pūrva-paksha -'Objection' Sūtras and Sūtras 8 to 17 are Siddhanta Sūtras.

Jaimini thinks that the Śhruti texts merely praise the doer of Karma and that Brahmajñana is only an accessory of Karma (Karmanga).

He is of the opinion that the Vedas merely prescribe works to attain certain purposes including emancipation. He holds that the knowledge of Brahman has no independent fruit of its own because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is meditated by

the Self, the object of knowledge. which is the agent in all works and, therefore, itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. The agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death by knowing that his self will survive the body.

A man undertakes a sacrificial act only when he is conscious that he is different from the body and that after death he will go to heaven when he will enjoy the fruits of his sacrifice.

The qualification the self thus acquires is similar to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water; because they become fit to be used in the sacrifice, only through this latter act of ceremonial purification.

As the knowledge of the Self has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own. Therefore the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as injunctions of fruits, but merely as Arthavadas (or gloriflcatory passages), like other Arthavadas relating to the substance (Dravya) or to the purification of the substance (Samskara) or to subordinate acts themselves (Karma), making some additional statement about the fruits of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliaw.

Jaimini maintains that the statement that the reward of Brahma Jñāna is the highest good does not mean that such knowledge of the Self by itself yields any real fruit but the statement is only an exhortation to the performance of the sacrifices. He says that the knowledge of the self is useful only so far as it produces in the performer a belief in his extra-mundane existence to enable him to enjoy the rewards of his sacrifices. The statement that it yields any fruit by itself is only an

exhortation to purification of the sacrificer. The purification of the sacrificer is a necessary concomitant factor like other material requisites of a sacrifice; because without this purification he would not be assured of his surviving the body and enjoying the fruit of his sacrifices in a higher world after death.

(435)

III.4.3 (428) Because we find (from the scriptures such) conduct (of men of realisation).

The objection raised in Sūtra 2 is strengthened.

Janaka the king of the Videhas performed a sacrifice in which gifts were freely distributed (Bri. Up. III.1.1). "Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice" (Chh. Up. V.11.5). These and similar passages indicate that those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial action.

Janaka and Asvapati were knowers of Brahman. If they had attained the final emancipation by knowledge of Brahman there was no necessity for them to perform sacrifices. If mere knowledge could effect the purpose of man, why should they perform sacrifices troublesome in many respects? If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should he go to the forest? But the two texts intimate that they did perform sacrifices.

This proves that one attains the final emancipation through sacrifices or works alone and not through the knowledge of Brahman, as the Vedāntins maintain.

III.4.4 (429) Because scripture directly declares that (viz. that knowledge of Brahman stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial acts.)

The Śhruti also says that Vidyā is an Anga of Karma.

If one does Karma with knowledge there will be greater efficiency. "What a man does with knowledge, faith and meditation is more powerful" (Chh. Up. I.1.10). This text clearly indicates that knowledge is a part of the sacrificial act. This passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to work and from this it follows that mere knowledge cannot effect the purpose of man.

(436)

III.4.5 (430) Because the two (knowledge and work) go together (with the departing soul to give fruits of actions).

The objection begun in Sūtra 2 is continued.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad (IV.4.2) says "The departing soul is followed by knowledge and work." This passage indicates that knowledge and work go together with the soul and begin together to manifest their fruits. Therefore, it follows that knowledge is not independent. It is not able to produce any such effect independently.

It is concluded that knowledge is not independent of works or sacrificial acts.

III.4.6 (431) Because (the scriptures) enjoin (works) for such (only who understand the purport of the Vedas).

The objection, begun in the Sūtra 2, is continued.

Further Karma is enjoined for one who recites and studies the Vedas. “He who has learnt i.e.. read the Vedas from a family of teachers, according to the sacred injunction in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru; who after having received his discharge has settled in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred spot” (Chh. Up. VIII.15.7). Such passages also indicate that those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified for sacrificial acts and that hence knowledge does not independently produce any result.

(437)

III.4.7 (432) And on account of prescribed rules.

The argument begun in Sūtra 2 is concluded here.

Doing Karma is a Niyama or life-long commandment. “Performing works here (i.e. in this life), let a man wish to live a hundred years” (Isa. Up. 2). “Agnihotra is a sacrifice lasting up to old age and death; for through old age one is freed from it or through death” (Sat. Br. XII.4.1.1). From such definite rules also it follows that Knowledge is merely supplementary to works, or stands in a subordinate relation to work.

The Sūtra-kāra (Śhrī Vyāsa) upholds his view in the following Sūtra against all those objections.

III.4.8 (433) But because (the scriptures) teach (the Supreme Self to be) other (than the agent), Bādarāyaṇa’s view is correct (or valid) for that is seen thus (in scriptural passages).

Objections raised in Sūtras 2 to 7 are now being refuted one by one. This Sūtra refutes Sūtra 2.

Sūtras 2-7 give the view of the Mīmāṃsākas which is refuted in Sūtras 8-17.

The Śhruti declares Īśhwara as higher than the individual soul. So Bādarāyaṇas doctrine as stated in Sūtra 1 is correct. The Śhruti shows this. The real nature of the soul is divinity.

The word 'tu' (but) discards the Pūrva-paksha -'Objection'. The Vedānta texts do not teach the limited self which is the agent. What the Vedānta texts really teach as the object of Knowledge is something different from the embodied self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is free from all attributes of transmigrating existence such as agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin and so on, the Supreme Self.

The knowledge of such a self does not only not promote action but rather puts an end to all actions. Hence the view of the revered Bādarāyaṇa which was stated in Sūtra 1 remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning about the subordination of knowledge to action and the like.

That the Vedānta texts teach the Supreme Self is clear from such texts as the following: "He who perceives all and knows all" (Mun. Up. I.1.9). "From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises" (Tait. Up. II.8). "It is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt" (Katha Up. II.6.2). "By the command of that Imperishable one, O Gargi" (Bri. Up. III.8.9). "It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire" (Chh. VI.2.3).

(438)

III.4.9 (434) But the declarations of the Śhruti equally support both views.

This Sūtra refutes the view expressed in Sūtra 3. It is a reply to the third Sūtra.

There are equal Śhrutis which show that Vidyā is not Karmanga.

The Śhruti shows that Vidyā is not Karmanga.

The word 'tu' (but) is used in order to remove the idea that Vidyā is subordinate to Karma. There is equal authority in the scriptures from the proposition that Vidyā is not subordinate to Karma, that for one who has attained knowledge there is no work. Thus there are scriptural passages such as: knowing this the Rishis descended from Kavasa said: "For what purpose should we study the Vedas, for what purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra", and "when Brāhmaṇas know that self and have risen above the desire for sons, wealth and worlds, they wander about as mendicants" (Bri. Up. III.5).

Thus the sages called Kavaseyas did not care for Karma, nor did Yajnavalkya, who abandoning all Karmas went to forest. "This much indeed is the means of Immortality, my dear. saying this Yajnavalkya left home" (Bri. Up. IV.5.15). Thus we find examples of eminent men devoted to Vidyā, renouncing all ceremonial actions.

Therefore, scriptural texts are not all one-sided, in favour of Karmas, but there are passages to the contrary also. The examples of persons like Janaka and others indicate that these men followed Karma as an

example to mankind, so that the social order may be preserved. Their work was characterised by non-attachment and therefore it was practically no work at all. Hence the argument of the Mīmāṃsākas is weak.

There are indeed found in Śhrutis instances of sacrifices being performed by enlightened souls like Janaka, but there are also declarations of equal weight to the effect that performance of sacrifices is quite useless and redundant for the enlightened, i.e. those who have known Brahman.

So it cannot be asserted on the strength of the instances of Janaka and others like him, that knowledge is to be considered as secondary to the sacrifice.

With reference to the indicatory sign as to the dependence of knowledge to work, which is implied in the passage “Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice” we say, that it belongs to a section which treats of Vaiśhvānara.

Now the texts may declare that a Vidyā of Brahman as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works; but all the same the Vidyā does not stand in a subordinate relation to works as the leading subject matter and the other means of proof are absent.

The author or Sūtra-kāra (Bādarāyaṇa) next answers the objection raised in the Sūtra 4.

(439)

III.4.10 (435) (The scriptural declaration referred to in Sūtra 4) is not of universal application.

The refutation of the objections is continued. This Sūtra specially refutes Sūtra 4.

The statement of the Śhruti referred to in Sūtra 4 to the effect that the combination of meditation and sacrifice makes the sacrifice effective is not applicable everywhere. The above-mentioned statement of the Śhruti does not refer to meditations in general, but only to the Udgītha Vidyā which forms the subject matter of the discourse concerned.

The declaration of the Śhruti that Knowledge increases the fruit of the sacrifice does not refer to all knowledge (all Vidyās), as it is connected only with the Udgītha (Udgītha Vidyā) which is the topic of the section "Let a man meditate on the syllable OM as the Udgītha." The text says that if this Udgītha Vidyā is recited by a person with knowledge, then it is more fruitful than if it is recited without such Vidyā.

Therefore, Vidyā is not an auxiliary to work in every instance.

The author next answers the objection raised in III.4.5.

III.4.11 (436) There is division of knowledge and work as in the case of a hundred (divided between two persons).

This Sūtra specially refutes Sūtra 5.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares "The departing soul is followed by Vidyā (Knowledge) and Karma (work) and past experiences" (IV.4.2). Here we have to take knowledge and work in a distributive sense. It means the knowledge follows one and work another. Just as when we say, "Give Rs. 100 to Rama and Kṛiṣṇa" it means "Give Rs. 50 to Rama and Rs. 50 to Kṛiṣṇa", the above passage means that the Vidyā relates

to the souls seeking emancipation and Karma to other souls. There is no combination of the two.

The text quoted refers only to knowledge and work which concern the soul that transmigrates but not the soul which is about to obtain final release. Because the passage, "Thus does the man who desires to transmigrate" (Bri. Up. IV.4.6) indicates that the previous text refers to the soul that transmigrates. The Śhruti declares of the soul who is about to be released, "But the man who never desires never transmigrates" (Bri. Up. IV.4.6).

The next Sūtra refutes the Sūtra 6.

(440)

III.4.12 (437) (The scriptures enjoin work) on those who have merely read the Vedas.

This Sūtra specially refutes Sūtra 6.

He who has read the Vedas and known about the sacrifices is entitled to do sacrifice. But no work is prescribed for one who has knowledge of Brahman (Brahma Jñāna).

III.4.13 (438) There being no specification (the rule does) not (specially apply to him who knows, i.e. a Jñāni).

This Sūtra specially refutes Sūtra 7.

The Śhruti "Kurkanneveha" "performing works here let a man live" etc., of the Isavasya Upaniṣhad does not specially apply to a Brahma Jñāni. It is general in its terms. There is no special mention in it that it is applicable to a Jñāni also. It is not binding on a Jñāni when there is no specification.

The Śhruti of the Isavasya does not lay down any such restrictive rule that even the illumined sage must perform Karma throughout his life. Why so? Aviśheṣhat. Because there is no specification. All that it says is “Let one perform Karmas throughout his life”. There is nothing to show to which class of people, that particular rule is addressed. On the other hand there are express texts of the Śhrutis which show that immortality is not to be obtained by Karmas, but by knowledge alone.

Mahānārāyana Upaniṣhad of the Tait. Ar. X.5 declares “Not by Karmas (sacrifices), not by progeny, nor by wealth can one obtain immortality. It is by renunciation alone that some great souled beings have obtained immortality.” The apparent conflict in the two Śhruti texts is to be reconciled by giving them different scopes. One is addressed to Karma-nishtha devotees, the other to the Jñāna-nishtha devotees.

(441)

III.4.14 (439) Or rather the permission (to do work) is for the glorification (of knowledge).

This Sūtra also refutes Sūtra 7.

The passage “performing works here” may be treated in another way also. The injunction to do work for the knowers of Brahman or the illumined sages is for eulogising this knowledge. A Brahma Jñāni or knower of the Self may work all his life but he will not be bound by its effects, on account of the power of knowledge. Knowledge nullifies the effect of Karma. “No work clings to the man.” This clearly glorifies Knowledge.

III.4.15 (440) And some according to their own liking (have abandoned all works).

The argument in refutation of Jaimini's views is continued.

In Sūtra 3 it was stated that Janaka and others performed sacrifices even after attaining knowledge of Brahman. This Sūtra says that some have abandoned all works according to their own liking. Some may like to work to set an example to others after attaining knowledge, while others may abandon all works. There is no compulsion on the knowers of Brahman or liberated sages as regards work.

A scriptural text of the Vajasaneyins runs as follows: "Knowing this the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this self and this world" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). From this it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to action and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.

(442)

III.4.16 (441) And (scripture teaches that the) destruction (of all qualifications for work results from knowledge).

The previous argument is continued.

Further, such knowledge brings the realisation that everything is Ātman or Brahman. How then can the knower act? Again, far from being a part of work, knowledge puts an end to all works, all obligatory duties. Mundaka Upaniṣhad declares, "Brahman in both His superior and inferior aspects being realised, the knot of the heart (egoism, etc.) is cut down, all doubts are dispelled and works are destroyed" (Mun. Up. II.2.9).

Knowledge of Brahman annihilates all ignorance and its effects like agent, deed and fruit, "But when to the Knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one see and through what?" (Bri. Up. IV.5.15). The knowledge of Brahman is antagonistic to all actions. Hence it cannot be subsidiary to work. It is independent.

III.4.17 (442) And (knowledge belongs) to those who observe perpetual celibacy, because in scripture [that stage of life is mentioned].

The previous argument is continued.

Further the Śhruti declares Jñāna in relation to Sannyāsins.

Knowledge is said to be in Sannyāsins. They have not to do any Karmas. Such Sannyāsa can be taken even without going through the householder's life.

Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for the stages of life for which perpetual celibacy is prescribed. Now in their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work, because work is absent, because the works prescribed by Vedas such as the Agnihotra are not performed by men who have reached those stages. To a Sannyāsin there is no work prescribed except enquiry of Brahman and meditation on the Supreme Self. So how can knowledge be subordinate to work? We find from the Śhruti texts that there is a stage of life called Sannyāsa. "There are three branches of duty" (Chh. Up. II.23.1).

"Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity" (Chh. Up. V.10.1).

"Those who practise penance and faith in the forest" (Mun. Up. I.10.11). "Wishing for that world only, mendicants renounce their homes and wander forth" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). "Let him wander forth at

once from the state of studentship." "All these attain to the worlds of the virtuous; but only one who is finally established in Brahman, attains immortality." (Chh. Up. II.23.1-2).

Everyone can take to this life, without being a householder etc.

This indicates the independence of knowledge.

Thus, the theory of Jaimini that Knowledge is subordinate to Karma has no legs to stand upon, and has been refuted.

(443)

Topic 2: (Sūtras 18-20) Sannyāsa is prescribed by the scriptures.

III.4.18 (443) Jaimini (considers that scriptural texts mentioning those stages of life in which celibacy is obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages; they are not injunctions; because other (scriptural texts) condemn (those stages)).

An objection to Sūtra 17 is raised.

Jaimini says that in the text quoted in the last Sūtra (Chh. Up. II.23.1), there is no word indicating that Sannyāsa is enjoined on man.

It is a mere reference only but not an injunction.

The Brihadaranyaka text quoted in the last Sūtra declares that some persons do like Sannyāsa. Śhruti here makes a statement of fact. It does not enjoin Sannyāsa.

Thus there is no direct Śhruti for Sannyāsa though there are Smṛitis and Achara (usage). But if we say that there is no Śhruti for the householder's life, he (Jaimini) would reply that Karmas like Agnihotra are enjoined by Śhruti.

Further, the text here glorifies steadfastness in Brahman. "But only one who is firmly established in Brahman attains Immortality." Sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, studentship and life-long continence bestow the fruit of obtaining heaven. But Immortality is attained only by one who is firmly established in Brahman.

Moreover, there are other Śhruti passages which condemn Sannyāsa. "Having brought to your teacher his proper reward, do not cut off the line of children" (Tait. Up. I.11.1). "To him who is without a son this world does not belong; all beasts even know that" (Tait. Br. VII.13.12).

(444)

III.4.19 (444) Bādarāyaṇa (holds that Sannyāsa) also must be gone through, because the scriptural text (quoted) refers equally to all the four Āśhramas or stages of life.

Anushttheyam: should be practised; Bādarāyaṇah: Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Sūtras; Samyasruteh: for the scriptural text refers equally to all the four Āśhramas.

The objection raised in Sūtra 18 is refuted.

In the text quoted sacrifice refers to the householder's life, austerity to Vanaprastha, studentship to Brahmāchārya, and one who is firmly established in Brahman to Sannyāsa. So the text refers equally to all the four stages of life. The text that relates to the first three stages refers to what is enjoined elsewhere. So also does the text that relates to Sannyāsa.

Therefore, Sannyāsa also is enjoined and must be gone through by all.

Bādarāyaṇa holds that Sannyāsa is an appropriate Āśhrama like Gṛihastha Āśhrama (householder's life), because both are referred to in Śhruti. The word Tapas refers to a different Āśhrama in which the predominant factor is Tapas.

III.4.20 (445) Or rather (there is an) injunction (in this text) as in the case of carrying (of the sacrificial wood).

The argument commenced in Sūtra 19 to refute the objection raised in Sūtra 18 is continued.

This Sūtra now tries to establish that there is an injunction about Sannyāsa in the Chhandogya text quoted. The passage is rather to be understood as containing an injunction, not a mere reference.

The case is analogous to that of 'carrying'. There is a scriptural text relating to the Agnihotra which forms part of the Mahāpitriyajna which is performed for the manes. "Let him approach carrying the sacrificial wood below the ladle holding the offering; for above he carries it to the gods." Jaimini interprets the last clause as an injunction although there is no word in it to that effect, for such an injunction is nowhere else to be found in the scriptures. Following this argument, this Sūtra declares that there is an injunction as regards Sannyāsa and not a mere reference in Chh. Up. II.23.1, as it is not enjoined anywhere else.

(445)

Even if in the Śhruti there is only Anuvada (declaration) of other Āśhramas, the Pūrvamimamsika rules show that we must infer a Vidhi (injunction) of Sannyāsa from the portion: "Brahma-samsthāmrītatvam'eti", because there is no other separate injunction just as there is no command that the Samit should be kept on the

upper portion of the Sruk -'havan ladle' and yet the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā says that such command should be inferred.

In the present case also the same rule of construction should be applied. Further, even if there is only a declaration and not an injunction as regards the other Āśhramas, we must infer an injunction about Sannyāsa as it has been specially glorified.

Further there are Śhruti passages which directly enjoin Sannyāsa, "Or else he may wander forth from the students life, or from the house, or from the forest" (Jabala Upaniṣhad 4). Hence the existence of Sannyāsa Āśhrama is undeniable.

The word Tapas in the Śhruti refers to Vanaprastha whereas the speciality of Sannyāsa is control of the senses (Indriya Samyama). The Śhruti differentiates Sannyāsa and says that those belonging to the other three Āśhramas go to the Punya Lokas whereas the Sannyāsin attains Amritatva (Immortality).

Jaimini himself says that even glorification must be in a complimentary relation to an injunction. In the text, steadfast devotion to Brahma is employed. Hence it has an injunctive value. "Brahma Samstha" means meditating always on Brahman. It is a state of being grounded in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activities. In the case of other Āśhramas: that is not possible as they have their own Karmas. But it is possible to Sannyāsins as they have abandoned Karmas. Their Sama (serenity) and Dama (self-restraint) help them towards it and are not obstacles.

Sannyāsa is not prescribed only for those who are blind, lame, etc., and who are, therefore, not fit for performing rituals. Sannyāsa is a means

for the realisation of Brahman. It must be taken in a regular prescribed manner. The Śhruti declares, "The wandering mendicant, with orange-coloured robe, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on alms, accepting no gifts, qualifies himself for the realisation of Brahman" (Jabali Śhruti).

Therefore, Sannyāsa is prescribed by the scriptures. As knowledge is enjoined on Sannyāsins, it is independent of works.

Topic 3: (Sūtras 21-22) Scriptural texts as in Chh. Up. I. 1.3. which refer to Vidyās are not mere praises but themselves enjoin the meditations.

(446)

III.4.21 (446) If it be said that (texts such as the one about the Udgītha are) mere glorifications on account of their reference (to parts of sacrifices), (we say) not so, on account of the newness (of what they teach, if viewed as injunctions).

"That Udgītha (OM) is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the highest place, the eighth" (Chh. Up. I.1.3). "This earth is the Rik, the fire is Saman" (Chh. Up. I.6.1). "This world in truth is that piled up fire-altar" (Sat. Br. X.1.2.2). "That hymn is truly that earth" (Ait. Ar. II.1.2.1).

A doubt arises whether these passages are meant to glorify the Udgītha or to enjoin devout meditations.

The Opponent maintains that these are mere praise and no injunction to meditate on 'OM' and so on. These passages are analogous to passages such as "This earth is the ladle". "The sun is the tortoise."

“The heavenly world is the Ahavaniya” which simply glorify the ladle and so on.

The latter half of the present Sūtra refutes the view of the Opponent.

In the Śhruti passage “That Udgītha (OM) is the best essence of the essences” etc., the description is not mere praise but is a Vidhi, and it tells us something which is new.

The analogy is incorrect. Glorificatory passages are of use in so far as entering into a complimentary relation to injunctive passages, but the passages under discussion are not capable of entering into such a relation to the Udgītha and so on which are enjoined in altogether different places of the Vedas and would be purposeless as far as the glorification is concerned. Passages such as “This earth is the ladle” are not analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive passages, and so they can be taken as praise.

Therefore, the texts such as those under discussion have an injunctive purpose. On account of the newness, these are not mere praise but an injunction.

(447)

III.4.22 (447) And there being words expressive of injunction.

The argument commenced in Sūtra 21 is concluded.

“Let one meditate on OM or the Udgītha” (Chh. Up. I.1.1). We have a very clear injunction to meditate on OM in this passage. On the face of this we cannot interpret the text quoted in the last Sūtra as mere praise of OM. The expression “This is the best of all the essences” in

the passage cited under the preceding Sūtra is not a mere glorificatory expression, but it amounts to an injunction for the Udgītha meditation.

Topic 4: (Sūtras 23-24) The stories mentioned in the Upaniṣhads do not serve the purpose of Pariplavas and so do not form part of the ritualistic acts. They are meant to eulogise the Vidyā taught in them.

III.4.23 (448) If it be said (that the stories told in the Upaniṣhads) are for the purpose of Pariplava (only, we say) not so, because (certain stories above) are specified (by the Śhruti for this purpose).

The purpose of narration of stories in the Upaniṣhads is stated in this Sūtra and in the next one.

This Sūtra consists of two parts namely, an objection and its reply. The objection portion is 'Pariplavartha iti chet'. And the reply is: 'Na viśheṣhitatvat'.

In the Asvamedha sacrifice the priest recites stories to the king who performs the Asvamedha sacrifice, and his relatives at intervals during the performance of the sacrifice. These are known as Pariplavas and form part of the ritualistic acts.

The question is whether the stories of the Upaniṣhads such as those relating to Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi (Bri. Up. IV.5.1), Pratardana (Kau. Up. III.1), Janasruti (Chh. Up. IV.1.1), and so on also serve this purpose in which case they become part of the rites, and the whole of Jñāna Kāṇḍa becomes subordinate to Karma Kāṇḍa.

The Opponent holds that those stories of the Upaniṣhads serve the purpose of Pariplava, because they are stories like others and because

the telling of stories is enjoined for the Pariplava. From this it follows that the Upaniṣhadic stories and Vedānta texts do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like Mantras they stand in a complimentary relation to sacrificial acts.

(448)

III.4.24 (449) And so (they are meant to illustrate the nearest Vidyās), being connected as one coherent whole.

The discussion commenced in Sūtra 23 is concluded here.

Therefore, it is for the purpose of praise of Vidyā because only then there would be unity of idea in the context. Only such a view will lead to harmony of the context.

The stories of the Upaniṣhads are to be regarded as essential parts of Brahma Vidyā. They are introduced only to facilitate an intelligent grouping of the subject. The stories are intended to introduce the Vidyās. The story form creates more attention and interest on the part of the aspirant. Their object is to make it clear to our understanding in a concrete form, the Vidyās taught in other portions of the Upaniṣhads in the abstract.

Why do we say so? Ekavakyatopabandhat. Because of their syntactical connection with the Vidyās taught in the succeeding passages.

Thus in the story beginning with "Yajnavalkya had two wives", etc., we find immediately following in that very section, the Vidyā taught about the Ātman in these words "The Ātman is verily to be seen, to be heard of, to be meditated upon." As these stories are immediately preceded or succeeded by instructions about Brahman, we infer that they are

meant to glorify the Vidyās and are not Pariplava stories. The stories are told in order to facilitate the understanding of these abstruse subjects and they are eminently fitted to subserve that purpose.

(449)

Topic 5: Sannyāsins need not observe ritualistic acts, as Brahma Vidyā or knowledge serves their purpose.

III.4.25 (450) And, therefore, there is no necessity of the lighting of the fire and so on.

This Sūtra states that the seeker of Brahman may dispense with sacrificial rites.

Brahma Vidyā has no need for fire, fire-wood, etc. It is by itself the cause of emancipation.

In Sūtra III.4.1 it was stated that the knowledge of Brahman results in the attainment of the highest Puruṣhartha or goal of life. The expression "Ata Eva" (for this reason alone) must be viewed as taking up Sūtra III.4.1 because thus a satisfactory sense is established. For this very same reason, i.e. because knowledge serves the purpose of Sannyāsins, the lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are enjoined on the householders, etc., need not be observed by them.

Thus the Sūtra-kāra sums up the result of this first Adhikaraṇa, intending to make some further remarks.

As a Sannyāsin, devoted to the meditation on Brahman is stated in Śhruti to attain immortality and not any of the rewards arising from sacrificial rites, he is not required to have recourse to sacrificial works to be performed with fire, fire-wood and so on. Chhandogya Upaniṣhad

declares, "Brahmasamstho'amritatvameti-One devoted to Brahman attains Immortality" (Chh. Up. II.23.1).

The theory or doctrine that knowledge and work must be combined in order to produce Mukti or salvation is hereby set aside.

Brahma Vidyā or Knowledge of Brahman is sufficient for that purpose.

(450)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 26-27) Works prescribed by the scriptures are means to the attainment of knowledge.

III.4.26 (451) And there is the necessity of all works because the scriptures prescribe sacrifices, etc., (as means to the attainment of knowledge) even as the horse (is used to draw a chariot, and not for ploughing).

The Sūtra says that sacrificial works and the like are necessary for origination of knowledge of Brahman.

We may conclude from the previous Sūtra that works are altogether useless.

This Sūtra says that all these works are useful for origination of knowledge. Even the scriptures prescribe them as they serve an indirect means to the attainment of knowledge. Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares, "Brāhmaṇas seek to know Brahman by the study of the Vedas, by scriptures, gifts, penance and renunciation" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). Similarly the passage, "what people call sacrifice that is really Brahmacharya" (Chh. Up. VIII.5.1), by connecting sacrifices and so on with Brahmāchārya which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices, etc., also are means of knowledge. Again the passage "That

word which all the Vedas record, which all penances proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students, that word I tell thee briefly, it is OM" (Katha Up. I.2.15), likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the Āśhramas are means of knowledge.

When knowledge once is attained requires no help from external works for the production of this result namely, Liberation. The case is analogous to a horse, whose help is required until the place of destination is reached but it may be dispensed with after the journey has been accomplished.

When Ātma-Jñāna is attained it does not need any other accessory to bring about salvation, but Karma is needed for Ātma-Jñāna.

Just as a horse is not used to drag a plough but is used to drag a car, so the Āśhrama Karmas are not needed for the fruition of Jñāna but are needed for Jñāna.

The final emancipation results only from knowledge of Brahman and not from work. Work purifies the mind and knowledge dawns in a pure mind.

Hence works are useful as they are an indirect means to knowledge.

If knowledge be originated by sacrifices, gifts, penance and fasting, what is the necessity of other qualifications like Sama (serenity) and Dama (self-restraint)? To this the author replies in the next Sūtra.

(451)

III.4.27 (452) But all the same (even though there is no injunction to do sacrificial acts to attain knowledge in the Brihadaranyaka text) one must possess serenity, self-control

and the like, as these are enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge and therefore have necessarily to be practised.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares, “The Brāhmaṇas seek to know Brahman through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity," etc. (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). In this passage there is no word to indicate that sacrifice is enjoined on one who wants to know Brahman.

So the Opponent maintains that there is no necessity at all for work for one who aspires after knowledge.

This present Sūtra says that even should this be so. The seeker for knowledge must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses and so on; because all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge in the following scriptural passage, “There he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected sees Self in Self’ (Bri. Up. IV.4.23).

What is enjoined must necessarily be carried out. The introductory word ‘therefore’ (Tasmat) which expresses the praise of the subject under discussion makes us understand that the passage has an injunctive character, because if there were no injunction, the praise would be meaningless.

Further the Madhyandina Śhruti uses the word “pasyet” let him see and not ‘he sees’. Hence calmness of mind, etc., are required even if sacrifices, etc., should not be required.

As these qualities are enjoined, they are necessarily to be practised. Sama, Dama etc., are proximate or direct means of knowledge (Antaranga-Sadhana). Yajnas or sacrifices, etc., are remote or indirect means of knowledge (Bahiranga-Sadhana).

The word 'Adi' (and the rest) mentioned in the Sūtra, indicates that the aspirant after Brahma Vidyā must possess all these qualifications of truthfulness, generosity, asceticism, celibacy, indifference to worldly objects, tolerance, endurance, faith, equilibrium, compassion etc.

Topic 7: (Sūtras 28-31) Food-restrictions may be given up only when life is in danger.

III.4.28 (453) Only when life is in danger (there is) permission to take all food (i.e. take food indiscriminately) because the Śhruti declares that.

This and the subsequent three Sūtras indicate what kind of food is to be taken.

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares, "For one who knows this, there is nothing that is not food" (Chh. Up. V.2.1). The question is if such Sarvannanumati (description of all as his food) is a Vidhi or Vidhyanga or a Śhruti (praise).

(452)

The Opponent maintains that it is enjoined on one who meditates on Prāṇa on account of the newness of the statement. It has an injunctive value, as such statement is not found anywhere else.

The Sūtra refutes it and declares that it is not an injunction, but only a statement of fact. We are not justified in assuming an injunction, where the idea of an injunction does not arise. It is not Vidhi or injunction as no mandatory words are found. Can a man eat and digest all things? No. Prohibited food may be eaten only when life is in danger, when one is dying of hunger as was done by the sage

Chakrayana (Ushasti) when he was dying for want of food. Śhruti declares this.

Sage Ushasti was dying of hunger on account of famine. He ate the beans half-eaten by a keeper of elephants but refused to drink what had been offered by the latter on the ground of its being a mere leaving. The sage justified his conduct by saying, "I would not have lived, if I had not eaten the beans, but water I can do without at present. I can drink water wherever I like." From this it follows, that the passage "For one who knows this" etc., is an Arthavada.

III.4.29 (454) And because (thus) (the scriptural statements with respect to food) are not contradicted.

The topic commenced in Sūtra 28 is continued.

And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish lawful and unlawful food such as "When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure" (Chh. Up. VII.26.2) are non-sublated. The statement of the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad will not be contradicted only if the explanation given is taken, and not otherwise.

Only then other Śhrutis will have unhindered applications. Only in this view will the Śhruti "When the food is pure the mind becomes pure" have application.

Clean food should generally be taken as there is no contrary statement anywhere in Śhruti to the purifying effect of clean food.

There is nowhere any passage in Śhruti, contradicting the passage of the Chhandogya Śhruti which declares that clean food makes our nature pure.

Unlawful food as a general rule clogs the understanding and obstructs the clear works of the intellect. But in the case of the sage, whose heart is always pure and intellect keen, the taking of such food does not obstruct the working of his brain, and his knowledge remains as pure as ever.

(453)

III.4.30 (455) And moreover the Smṛitis say so.

The previous topic is continued.

Smṛiti also states that when life is in danger both he who has knowledge and he who has not can take any food. "He who eats food procured from anywhere when life is in danger, is not tainted by sin, as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water." On the contrary many passages teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. "The Brāhmaṇa must permanently forego intoxicating liquor". "Let them pour boiling spirits down the throat of a Brāhmaṇa who drinks spirits". "Spirit-drinking worms grow in the mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what is unlawful." From this it is inferred that generally clean food is to be taken except in the case of extreme starvation or in times of distress only.

When the Upaniṣhad says that the sage may eat all kinds of food, it must be interpreted as meaning that he may eat all kinds of food, in times of distress only. The text of the Upaniṣhad should not be construed as an injunction in favour of eating unlawful food.

III.4.31 (456) And hence the scripture prohibiting license.

The previous topic is discussed and concluded here.

There are scriptural passages which prohibit one from doing everything just as he pleases, which forbid man to take undue liberty in the matter of food and drink. "Therefore a Brāhmaṇa must not drink liquor" (Kathaka Sam.). Perfect spiritual discipline is absolutely necessary for controlling the mind and the senses and attaining knowledge or Self-realisation. Such Śhruti texts are meant for this discipline.

Therefore, it is established that the Śhruti does not enjoin on one who meditates on Prāṇa to take all kinds of food indiscriminately.

As there is Śhruti which forbids license in food and drink, the Śhruti referred to above in Sūtra 28 is an Arthavada.

The permission to take all kinds of food is confined to times of distress only when one's life is in danger. One must strictly observe the injunctions of the scriptures in ordinary times.

(454)

Topic 8: (Sūtras 32-35) The duties of Āśhrama are to be performed by even one who is not desirous of salvation.

III.4.32 (457) And the duties of the Āśhramas (are to be performed also by him who does not desire emancipation) because they are enjoined (on him by the scriptures).

This and the subsequent three Sūtras show who are required to perform sacrifices and do other prescribed duties.

Under Sūtra 26 it has been proved that the works enjoined on the Āśhramas are means to knowledge. The question arises now, why should one who does not desire knowledge or final release do these works? The present Sūtra declares that since these duties are enjoined

on all who are in these Aramas or orders of life, viz. student-life, householders life, and hermit life, one should observe them.

In the case of a man who keeps to the Āśhramas but does not seek liberation, the Nityakarmas or the permanent obligatory duties are indispensable. The Śhruti says “Yavajjivam agnihotram juhōti-as long as his life lasts, one is to offer the Agnihotra.”

III.4.33 (458) And (the duties are to be performed also) as a means to knowledge.

The topic commenced in Sūtra 32 is continued.

The duties or works are helpful in producing knowledge but not its fruit, viz. emancipation. In the former case the connection between Karma and fruit is inseparable (Nitya-Samyoga), but in the latter case it is separable (Anitya-Samyoga). Salvation or Moksha is attainable only through knowledge of Brahman or Brahma-Jñāna.

Works (Karmas) are an aid to Vidyā or knowledge of Self. Those who are desirous of emancipation should also perform religious rites as a help to enlightenment. Brahma Vidyā is independent in producing its results. Karma is merely the handmaid and cooperator of Vidyā. Works are means for the origination of knowledge.

(455)

III.4.34 (459) In all cases the same duties (have to be performed), because of the two-fold indicative marks.

The previous topic is continued.

The question arises whether the works performed as enjoined on the Āśhramas, and those done as auxiliaries to knowledge are of two different kinds.

The present Sūtra declares that in either case, whether viewed as duties incumbent on the Āśhramas or as cooperating with knowledge, the very same Agnihotra and other duties have to be performed, as is seen from the Śhruti and the Smṛiti texts.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares, “Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices etc.” (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). This text indicates that sacrifices etc., enjoined in Karmakanda for different purposes are to be performed as means to knowledge also.

The Smṛiti also says the same thing, “He who performs obligatory works without aiming at the fruit of work” etc. (Gītā VI.1). Those very obligatory duties subserve the origination of knowledge also.

Moreover the Smṛiti passage “He who is qualified by that forty-eight purifications” etc., refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has undergone these purifications.

In every respect, whether viewed as duties incumbent on a householder or as practices auxiliary to knowledge or illumination, the sacrificial works, prescribed to be performed, are recognised to be the same and not different, because they are indispensable requisites for both orders of life, as permanent duties for a householder and as auxiliary aids to meditation for a Sannyāsi.

The Sūtra-kāra, therefore, rightly emphasises the non-difference of the works.

(456)

III.4.35 (460) And the scripture also declares (that he who is endowed with Brahmāchārya) is not overpowered (by passion, anger, etc.).

The previous topic is concluded here.

This Sūtra points out a further indicatory mark strengthening the conclusion that works cooperate towards knowledge. Scripture also declares that he who is endowed with such means as Brahmāchārya, etc.. Is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion, anger and the like. "For that Self does not perish which one attains by Brahmāchārya" (Chh. Up. VIII.5.3). This passage indicates that like work, Brahmāchārya, etc., are also means to knowledge. He who is endowed with celibacy is not overcome by anger, passion, jealousy, hatred. His mind is ever peaceful. As his mind is not agitated, he is able to practise deep and constant meditation which leads to the attainment of knowledge.

It is thus a settled conclusion that works are obligatory on the Āśhramas and are also means to knowledge.

(457)

Topic 9: (Sūtras 36-39) Those who stand midway between two Āśhramas also are (qualified for knowledge)

III.4.36 (461) And (persons standing) in between (two Āśhramas) are also (qualified for knowledge), for that is seen (in scripture).

Widowers who have not married again, persons who are too poor to marry and those who are forced by circumstances not to enter into

wedlock and have not renounced the world come under the purview of Sūtras 36-39.

The word 'tu' is employed in order to refute the Pūrva-paksha - 'Objection' that Karma is necessary for the origination of knowledge of Brahman.

The force of the word 'cha' is to show certainty.

A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not possess means, etc., and, therefore, are not able to enter into one or the other of the Āśhramas, or who stand midway between two Āśhramas as for example, a widower, are qualified for knowledge or not.

The Opponent maintains that they are not qualified, as they cannot perform the works of any Āśhrama which are means to knowledge.

The present Sūtra declares that they are entitled, because such cases are seen from the scriptures. Scriptural passages declare that persons of that class such as Raikva and Gargi, the daughter of Vachaknavi had the knowledge of Brahman (Chh. Up. IV.1 and Bri. Up. III.6.8).

Vidura, a man who had no wife, did not adopt the Vanaprastha Āśhrama, and who had no Āśhrama, was expert in Brahma Vidyā. He had knowledge of Brahman.

Antara (who stand outside) are those persons who do not belong to any order or Āśhrama and consequently do not perform the duties of any Āśhrama. They are born in this life with discrimination and dispassion owing to the performance of such duties in their previous birth. Their minds have been purified by truth, penance, prayers, etc., performed in their past lives. If a man has duly discharged the duties of

his Āśhrama in previous birth, but owing to some obstacles or Pratibandhas Brahma-Jñāna did not arise in him in that life, and he dies before the dawn of knowledge, then he is born in the present life ripe for knowledge. Brahma-Jñāna manifests in him in all its glory by mere contact with a sage. Therefore such a man does not perform any Karmas or rather does not stand in any need of performing any duties of Āśhramas.

III.4.37 (462) This is stated in Smṛiti also.

The previous topic is continued.

Moreover, it is stated also in Smṛiti that persons, not belonging to any one of the four prescribed orders of life, acquire Brahma-Jñāna.

It is recorded in the Itihāsas (Mahābhārata) also how Samvarta and others who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the Āśhramas went naked and afterwards became great Yogins or saints.

The great Bhishma is also an instance in point.

Manu Samhita declares "There is no doubt that a Brāhmaṇa attains final success only by practice of continuously repeating the Japa. It matters little whether he performs other prescribed duties or not. One who is friendly to all, is really a Brāhmaṇa" (II.87).

But the instances quoted from scripture and Smṛiti furnish merely indicative marks. What then is the final conclusion? That conclusion is stated in the next Sūtra.

(458)

III.4.38 (463) And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed on them) through special acts.

The previous topic is continued.

Moreover knowledge of Brahman may be attained by the special grace of the gods due to Japa, fasting and worship of gods. Or it may be that Āśhrama Karmas might have been done in previous births.

A widower who is not a householder in the proper sense of the term, can attain knowledge of Brahman through special acts like Japa, fasting, prayer, which are not opposed to the condition of those who do not belong to any Āśhrama.

The Smṛiti says “By mere prayer no doubt the Brāhmaṇa perfects himself. May he perform other works or not, the kind-hearted one is called Brāhmaṇa” (Manu Samhita II.87).

This passage indicates that where the works of the Āśhramas are not possible, prayer qualifies for knowledge.

Smṛiti also declares “Perfected by many births he finally goes to the highest state” (Bhagavad Gītā VI.45). This passage intimates that the aggregate of the different meritorious works performed in previous births promotes knowledge.

Therefore, there is no contradiction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the part of widowers and the like.

(459)

III.4.39 (464) Better than this is the other (state of belonging to an Āśhrama) on account of the indicatory marks (in the Śhruti and the Smṛiti).

The previous topic is concluded here.

The word ‘tu’ (but) is employed in order to remove the doubt.

The word 'cha' (and) is used in the sense of exclusion.

Though it is possible for one who stands between two Āśhramas to attain knowledge, yet it is a better means to knowledge to belong to some Āśhrama. He who belongs to an Āśhrama has better means of attaining knowledge of the Self or Brahman, because the facilities are greater in the latter condition.

This is confirmed by the Śhruti and Smṛiti "The Brāhmaṇas seek to know Brahman through sacrifices" etc. (Bri. Up. IV.4.22). "On that path goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy works as prescribed for the Āśhramas and obtained splendour" (Bri. Up. IV.4.9).

Smṛiti declares, "Let not a Brāhmaṇa stay for a day outside the Āśhrama; having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin."

Topic 10: He who has taken Sannyāsa cannot revert back to his former stages of life.

III.4.40 (465) But for one who has become that (i.e. entered the highest Āśhrama, i.e. Sannyāsa) there is no reverting (to the preceding ones) on account of restrictions prohibiting such reversion or descending to a lower order. Jaimini also (is of this opinion).

The question whether one who has taken Sannyāsa can go back to the previous Āśhrama is now considered.

The present Sūtra declares that he cannot go back to the previous Āśhrama. This is the opinion of Jaimini also.

There are no words in the Śhruti allowing such a descent. The Śhruti expressly forbids it, “He is to go to the forest, he is not to return from there”.

It is also against approved custom or usage.

The Upaniṣhad declares “Having been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the four Āśhramas according to rule, up to release from the body” (Chh. Up. II.23.1). There are texts which teach of the ascent to higher Āśhramas. “Having completed the Brahmāchārya state he is to become a householder. He may wander forth from the Brahmāchārya state,” but there are no texts which treat of the descent to lower Āśhramas.

Dharma is what is enjoined for each and not what each is capable of doing.

Scripture declares, “Once returning to the forest, one should never return to household life.” A Sannyāsi should not stir up the household fire again after having once renounced it.” Therefore, one cannot go back from Sannyāsa.

(460)

Topic 11: (Sūtras 41-42) Expiation for one who has broken the vow of Sannyāsa.

III.4.41 (466) And there is no fitness for expiation in the case of a Naishthika Brahmacharin (who is immoral), because a fall (in his case) is inferred from the Smṛiti and because of the inefficacy (in his case) of the expiatory ceremony.

The previous discussion is continued.

The present Sūtra expresses the view of the Opponent.

The Opponent maintains that there is no expiation for such transgression in the case of a Naishthika Brahmacharin who has taken the vow of life-long celibacy, because no such expiatory ceremony is mentioned with respect to him. The expiatory ceremony which is mentioned in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā VI.8.22, refers to ordinary Brahmacharins and not to Naishthika Brahmacharins.

Smṛiti declares that such sins cannot be expiated by him any more than a head once cut off can again be fixed to the body, “He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika again lapses from them, for him a slayer of the Self, I see no expiation which might make him clean again” (Agnēya XVI.5.23).

Further the expiatory ceremony referred to in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is not efficacious in his case, because he will have to light sacrificial fire and therefore have to marry. In that case he will cease to be a Naishthika Brahmacharin thereafter.

But the Upakurvana (i.e. who is a Brahmacharin for a certain period only, not for life, one who is a Brahmacharin till marriage) about whose sin Smṛiti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself by the ceremony mentioned. If he is immoral there is expiation.

(461)

III.4.42 (467) But some (consider the sin) a minor one (and therefore claim) the existence (of expiation for the Naishthika Brahmacharin also); as in the case of eating (of unlawful food). This has been explained (in the Pūrvaniimanlsa).

The previous discussion is continued.

Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the transgression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of a Naishthika is a minor sin, not a major one excepting cases where the wife of the teacher is concerned and so can be expiated by proper ceremonies just as ordinary Brahmacharins who take prohibited food such as honey, wine, flesh, are again purified by expiatory ceremonies. They plead that that sin is not anywhere enumerated among the deadly ones (Mahāpātaka) such as violating a teacher's bed and so on. They claim the expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naishthika as well as the Upakurvana.

Both are Brahmacharins and have committed the same offence.

It is only sexual intercourse with the wife of the Guru or spiritual preceptor that is a Mahāpātaka (major sin). That Upapātaka, a minor sin is an expiable sin has been explained in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaimini in Chap. I.3.8.

The Smṛiti passage which declares that there is no expiation for the Naishthika must be explained as aiming at the origination of serious effort on the part of Naishthika Brahmacharins. It puts him in mind of the serious responsibility on his part so that he may be ever alert and vigilant and struggle hard in maintaining strict unbroken Brahmāchārya and thus achieving the goal or summum bonum of life, i.e. Self-realisation.

Similarly in the case of the hermit and the Sannyāsin. The Smṛiti does prescribe the purificatory ceremony for both the hermit (Vanaprastha) and the mendicant (Sannyāsi). When the hermit has broken his vows, undergoes the Kricchra-penance for twelve nights and then cultivates a

place which is full of trees and grass. The Sannyāsi also proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of cultivating the Soma plant, and undergoes the purifications prescribed for his state.

(462)

Topic 12: The life-long celibate who fails to keep up his vow must be excluded by society.

III.4.43 (468) But (they are to be kept) outside the society in either case, on account of the Smṛiti and custom.

The previous discussion is concluded here.

Whether the lapses be regarded as major sins or minor sins, in either case good people (Sishtas) must shun such transgressors, because the Smṛiti and good custom both condemn them.

Smṛiti declares, "he who touches a Brāhmaṇa who has broken his vow and fallen from his order, must undergo the Chandrayana penance." Approved custom also condemns them, because good men do not sacrifice, study, or attend weddings with such persons.

Topic 13: (Sūtras 44-46) The meditations connected with the subordinate members of sacrificial acts (Yajñangas) should be observed by the priest and not by the sacrificer.

III.4.44 (469) To the sacrificer (belongs the agentship in meditations) because the Śhruti declares a fruit (for it): thus Atreya (holds).

This is the view of the Opponent.

A doubt arises as to who is to observe the meditations connected with the subordinate members of sacrificial acts (Yajnangas), whether it is the sacrificer (Yajamana) or the priest (Ritvik).

The Opponent, represented by the Sage Atreya, maintains that it is to be observed by the sacrificer, as the Śhruti declares a special fruit for these meditations.

“There is rain for him and he brings rain for others who thus knowing meditates on the five-fold Saman as rain” (Chh. Up. II.3.2).

Hence the sacrificer only is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit. This is the opinion of the teacher Atreya.

(463)

III.4.45 (470) (They are) the duty of the Ritvik (priest), this is the view of Audulomi, because he is paid for that (i.e. the performance of the entire sacrifice).

The previous topic is continued.

The assertion that the meditations on subordinate members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer (Yajamana) is unfounded.

But Audulomi says that they are to be done by the priest (Ritvik), because he is engaged (literally bought) for the sake of the Karma. As the priest is paid for all his acts, the fruit of all his acts, is as it were, purchased by the Yajamana (sacrificer). Therefore the meditations also fall within the performance of the work, as they belong to the sphere of that to which the sacrificer is entitled. They have to be observed by the priest and not the sacrificer.

This is the view of the sage Audulomi.

III.4.46 (471) And because the Śhruti (so) declares.

The previous topic is concluded here.

The Ritvik is to make the Anga Upāsana. But the fruit goes to the Yajamana.

“Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray for the good of the sacrificer” (Sat. Br. I.3., I.26). “Therefore an Udgatri who knows this may say: what wish shall I obtain for you by my singing” (Chh. Up. I.7.8). The scriptural passages also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest is the agent, goes to the sacrificer.

All this establishes the conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of the sacrifice are the work of the priest.

Therefore, Audulomi's view is correct, being supported by the Śhruti texts.

(464)

Topic 14: (Sūtras 47-49) In Bri. Up. III.5.1 meditation is enjoined besides the child-like state and scholarship.

III.4.47 (472) There is the injunction of something else, i.e. meditation, cooperation (towards knowledge) (which is) a third thing (with regard to Balya or state of a child and Panditya or scholarship), (which injunction is given) for the case (of perfect knowledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such (i.e. the Sannyāsin possessing knowledge); as in the case of injunctions, and the like.

This Sūtra examines a passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad and concludes that continuous meditation is also to be considered as enjoined by Śhruti for the realisation of Brahman. This and the following two Sūtras show that the scripture enjoins the four orders of life.

Mauna (Nididhyasa or meditation) is enjoined as an aid. The third, i.e. Mauna is enjoined for a Sannyāsi in case his sense of cosmic diversity is persistent, just as Yajnas are enjoined for one desirous of heaven.

“Therefore, a knower of Brahman, having done with scholarship, should remain like a child (free from passion, anger, etc.); and after having finished with this state and with erudition he becomes meditative (Muni)” (Bri. Up. III.5.1).

A doubt arises now whether the meditative state is enjoined or not.

The Opponent maintains that it is not enjoined, as there is no word indicating an injunction. Though the imperative mood occurs in regard to Balya or child-like state, there is no such indication in regard to the Muni. The text merely says that he becomes a Muni or meditative whereas it expressly enjoins “One should remain” etc., with respect to the state of child and scholarship.

Further scholarship refers to knowledge. Therefore, it includes Muniship which also refers to knowledge. As there is no newness (Apurva) with respect to Muniship in the text it has no injunctive value.

(465)

This Sūtra refutes this view and declares that Muniship or meditateness is enjoined in the text as a third requisite besides child-like state and scholarship.

“Muni” means a person who constantly meditates on Brahman.

So constant meditation is the third auxiliary observance for one who is already possessed of Panditya (erudition) and Balya (child-like state); and as such constant meditation is enjoined to be observed like the injunctions about sacrifice and control of the senses and so on.

This Sūtra refers to a passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad, where in reply to a question by one Kahola, the sage Yajnavalkya enjoins first, scholarly attainments, the child-like simplicity, and then thirdly, continuous meditation cooperating with the two previous conditions, with a view to realisation of Brahman. Though there is no verb of imperative or injunctive force in the case of this third state, there is to be inferred an injunction to be understood like the injunctions in the other cases.

Muniship is continuous contemplation on Brahman. Therefore, it is different from scholarship. It is a new thing (Apurva). It has not been referred to before. Hence the text has injunctive value. Incessant meditation is highly beneficial for a Sannyāsin who has not yet attained oneness or unity of Self and who experiences plurality on account of past expressions or the prevailing force of the erroneous idea of multiplicity.

Munihood is enjoined as something helpful to knowledge.

III.4.48 (473) On account of his being all, however, there is winding up with the householder.

The Śhruti winds up with the householder as he has all the duties.

He has to do difficult sacrifices and has also to observe Ahimsa, self-control, etc. As the householder's life includes duties of all the other stages of life, the Chapter ends with the enumeration of the duties of the householder.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad concludes with the householder's stage, because of the fact that this stage includes all the others. "He, the householder, conducting his life in this way, concentrating all his senses upon the self, and abstaining from injury to any living being throughout his life, attains the world of Brahma and has not to return again to this world" (Chh. Up. VIII.15.1).

(466)

The word 'tu' is meant to lay stress on the householder being everything. He has to do many duties belonging to his own Āśhrama which involve a great trouble. At the same time the duties of the other Āśhramas such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint of the senses and study of scriptures, and so on are incumbent on him also as far as circumstances allow. Therefore, there is nothing contradictory in the Chhandogya winding up with the householder.

The householder's life is very important. GṛihasthĀśhrama includes more or less the duties of all Āśhramas. The Śhruti enumerates the duties of the Brahmacharin and then those of the householder and there it ends without referring to Sannyāsa in order to lay stress on the life of the householder, to show its importance, and not because it is not one of the prescribed Āśhramas.

III.4.49 (474) Because the scripture enjoins the other (stages of life, viz. Brahmāchārya and Vanaprastha), just as it enjoins the state of a Muni (Sannyāsi).

This Sūtra states that the scripture enjoins the observance of the duties of all the orders of life.

Just as the Śhruti enjoins Sannyāsa and householder's life, so also it enjoins the life of a Vanaprastha (hermit) and that of a student (Brahmacharin). For we have already pointed above to passages such as "Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the house of a teacher is the third." As thus the four Āśhramas are equally taught by the scripture, they are to be gone through in sequence or alternately.

That the Sūtra uses a plural form (of the 'others') when speaking of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to the different sub-classes of those two or to their difficult duties.

(467)

Topic 15: Child-like state means the state of innocence, being free from egoism, lust, anger, etc.

III.4.50 (475) (The child-like state means) without manifesting himself, according to the context.

This Sūtra says that the perversity of a child is not meant by the word 'Balyena' (by the child-like state), in the passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad quoted under Sūtra 47.

In the passage of the Brihadaranyaka quoted in the Sūtra 47, the child-like state is enjoined on an aspirant after knowledge. "Therefore, a Brāhmaṇa after he has done with learning should remain like a child."

What is exactly meant by this? Does it mean to be like a child without any idea of purity and impurity, freely attending to the calls of nature without any respect of place, etc., behaving, talking and eating, according to one's liking and doing whatever one likes, or does it mean inward purity, i.e. absence of cunningness, arrogance, sense of egoism, force of the sensual passions and so on as in the case of a child? The present Sūtra says it is the latter and not the former, because that is detrimental to knowledge. It means that one should be free from guile, pride, egoism, etc. He should not manifest the undesirable evil traits. He should not manifest by a display of knowledge, learning and virtuousness. Just as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed themselves does not attempt to make a display of himself before others, he must not publish and proclaim his learning, wisdom and goodness. Such meaning only is appropriate to the context, purity and innocence being helpful to knowledge.

Then only the passage has a connection with the entire chapter on the ground of cooperating towards the principal matter, namely, the realisation of Brahman. Being free from ostentation is necessary, because only then there will be Anvaya or concordance of doctrine.

The Smṛiti writers have said, "He whom nobody knows either as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well as well-conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brāhmaṇa. Quietly devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life unknown, let him step on this earth as if he were blind, unconscious, deaf." Another Smṛiti passage is "With hidden nature, hidden conduct," and so on.

(468)

Topic 16: The time of the origination of knowledge when Brahma Vidyā is practised.

III.4.51 (476) In this life (the origination of knowledge takes place) if there be no obstruction to it (the means adopted), because it is so seen from the scriptures.

Aihikam: in this life; Api: even; Aprastutapratibandhe: in the absence of an obstruction to it (the means adopted); Taddarsanat: as it is seen in Śhruti. (Aprastuta: not being present; Pratibandhe: obstruction; Tat: that; Darśhanat: being declared by the scriptures.) This Sūtra states whether the consequence of Brahma Vidyā, which is the realisation of Brahman, is possible in this life or will wait till death.

Beginning from Sūtra 26 of the present Pada (Section) we have discussed the various means of knowledge.

The question now is whether knowledge that results from these means comes in this life or in the life to come.

The present Sūtra declares that knowledge may come in this life only if there is no obstruction to its manifestation from extraneous causes. When the fruition of knowledge is about to take place, it is hindered by the fruit of some other powerful work (Karma), which is also about to mature. When such an obstruction takes place, then knowledge comes in the next life.

That is the reason why the scripture also declares that it is difficult to know the Self, "He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom many even when they hear of him do not comprehend; wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him; wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an able teacher" (Katha Up. L27).

The Gītā also says, “There he recovers the characteristics belonging to his former body, and with that he again strives for perfection, O Joy of the Kurus” (VI.43). “The Yogin striving with assiduity, purified from sin, gradually gaining perfection, through manifold births, then reaches the Supreme Goal” (VI.45).

Further scripture relates that Vamadeva already became Brahman in his mother’s womb and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in a later form of existence through means procured in a former one; because a child in a womb cannot possibly procure such means in its present state.

It, therefore, is an established conclusion that knowledge originates either in the present or in a future life, in dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.

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Topic 17: Liberation is a state without difference. It is only one.

III.4.52 (477) No such definite rule exists with respect to emancipation, the fruit (of knowledge), because the Śhruti asserts that state (to be immutable).

In the previous Sūtra it was seen that knowledge may result in this life or the next according to the absence or presence of obstructions and the intensity of the means adopted.

Similarly a doubt may arise that there may be some rule with respect to the final emancipation also, which is the fruit of knowledge. A doubt may arise whether salvation can be delayed after knowledge, and whether there are degrees of knowledge according to the qualification

of the aspirant, whether there exists a similar definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification of the persons knowing.

This Sūtra declares that no such rule exists with regard to release. Because all Vedānta texts assert the state of final release to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but Brahman and Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only.

“The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman.” There can be no variety in it, as Brahman is without qualities.

There is no such divergence in the fruit of Mukti, because of the affirmation of its identical nature. There may be differences in the potency of the Sadhana leading to knowledge or Brahma Vidyā. Brahma Vidyā itself is of the same nature, though it may come early or late owing to the power of the Sadhana. There is no difference in the nature of Mukti (liberation) which is attained by Brahma Vidyā. There would be difference of results in Karmas and Upāsanās (Saguna Vidyās) but Nirguna Vidyā is but one and its result viz. Mukti is identical in all cases.

Difference is possible only when there are qualities as in the case of the Saguna Brahman. There may be difference in the experiences according to difference in Vidyās but with regard to Nirguna Brahman it can be one only and not many.

The means of knowledge may, perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart a higher or lower degree to their result, viz. knowledge, but not to the result of knowledge, viz. Liberation. Because

liberation is not something which is to be brought about, but something whose nature is permanently established, and is reached through knowledge.

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Knowledge cannot admit of lower or higher degree because it is in its own nature high only and would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although knowledge may differ in so far as it originates after a long or short time, it is impossible that liberation should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. From the absence of difference of knowledge also there follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the result of knowledge, viz. Liberation.

There cannot be any delay in the attainment of emancipation after knowledge has dawned, because knowledge of Brahman itself is emancipation.

The repetition of the clause, "Tadavasthavadhriteh" "because the Śhruti asserts that state" indicates that the Chapter ends here.

Thus ends the Fourth Pada (Section 4) of the Third Adhyāya (Chapter III) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy. Here ends Chapter III.

(471) CHAPTER IV, PHALA-ADHYĀYA –‘rewards chapter’, SECTION 1, INTRODUCTION

In the Third Chapter, the Sadhanas or the means of knowledge relating to Para Vidyā (higher knowledge) and Apara Vidyā (lower knowledge) were discussed. The Fourth Chapter treats of Phala or the Supreme Bliss of attainment of Brahman. Other topics also are dealt with in it. In the beginning, however, a separate discussion concerned with the means of knowledge is dealt with in a few Adhikaraṇas. The remainder of the previous discussion about Sadhanas is continued in the beginning. As the main topic of this Chapter is that of the results or fruits of Brahma Vidyā, it is called Phala Adhyāya.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I.' (Sūtras 1-2) The meditation on the Ātman enjoined by scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again till knowledge is attained.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtra 3) The meditator engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view or comprehend It as identical with his own self.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 4) in Pratikopasanas where symbols of Brahman are used for meditation as for instance “Mano Brahmetyupasita”, the meditator is not to consider the Pratīka or symbol as identical with him.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtra 5) in the Pratikopasanas, the Pratīkas or symbols are to be viewed as Brahman and not in the reverse way.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtra 6) In meditations on the members of sacrificial acts, the idea of divinity is to be superimposed on the members and

not vice versa. In the example quoted for instance the Udgītha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the Udgītha.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 7-10) One is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture. Śhrī Śhaṅkara maintains that the rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is Samyag-darsana but the Sūtra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtra 11) The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, if favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtra 12) The meditations are to be continued until death. Śhrī Śhaṅkara again holds that those meditations which lead to Samyag-darsana are excepted.

Adhikaraṇa IX: (Sūtra 13) Knowledge of Brahman frees one from the effects of all past and future evil deeds.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtra 14) Good deeds likewise cease to affect the knower of Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtra 15) Works which have not begun to yield results (Anarabdhakarya) are alone destroyed by knowledge and not those which have already begun to yield fruits (Arabdhakarya).

Adhikaraṇa XII: (Sūtras 16-17) From the rule enunciated in Adhikaraṇa X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (Nitya, obligatory works), as for instance the Agnihotra, because they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa XIII: (Sūtra 18) Sacrificial works not combined with knowledge or meditations also help in the origination of knowledge.

Adhikaraṇa XIV: (Sūtra 19) On the exhaustion of Prarabdha work through enjoyment, the knower of Brahman attains oneness with It. The Bhoga or enjoyment of the Sūtra is, according to Śhaṅkara, restricted to the present existence of the seeker, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the ignorance which otherwise would lead to future embodiments.

(474)

Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-2) Meditation on Brahman should be continued till knowledge is attained.

IV.1.1 (478) The repetition (of hearing, reflection and meditation on Brahman is necessary) on account of the repeated instruction by the scriptures.

This Sūtra states that constant practice of meditation is necessary.

Frequent practice of meditation on Brahman is necessary as there is instruction to that effect in the Śhruti.

“Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be reflected upon, and meditated upon” (Bri. Up. II.4.5). “The intelligent aspirant knowing about Brahman should attain Brahma-Sākshātkara or direct Self-realisation” (Bri. Up. IV.4.21). “That is what we must search out, that is what we must try to understand” (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1).

A doubt arises whether the mental action (reflection and meditation) referred to in them is to be preformed once only or repeatedly.

The Opponent maintains that it is to be observed once only as in the case of Prayaja offerings and the like.

"Let us then repeat exactly as the scripture says, i.e. let us hear the self once, let us reflect on it once, let us meditate on it once and nothing more".

The present Sūtra refutes this view and says that hearing, etc., must be repeated till one attains knowledge of Brahman or direct Self-realisation, just as paddy is husked till we get rice. There is the necessity of repetition till there is dawn of knowledge of Brahman.

The repetition of mental acts of reflection and meditation eventually leads to direct Self-realisation. Repetition is to be performed because scripture gives repeated instruction.

Thus in the Chh. Up. VI.8.7 the teacher repeats nine times the saying, "Tat Satyam Sa Ātma Tat-Tvam-Asi Svetaketo-That Truth, That Ātman, That thou art, O Svetaketu!" Here Svetaketu is taught the mystery about Brahman nine times before he understood it.

(475)

The analogy of the Prayaja is faulty. It is not to the point at all because there is the Adṛiṣṭa which is the result gives fruit at some particular future time in the next world. But here the result is directly realised. Direct intuition of the Self is a visible result to be gained in this very life. Therefore, if the result is not there, the process must be repeated, till the result is realised. Such acts must be repeated, because they subserve a seen purpose.

When we speak of the Upāsana of the Guru or the king or of the wife thinking about her absent husband, we do not mean a single act of service or thought but a continuous series of acts and thoughts. We say in ordinary life that a person is devoted to a teacher or a king if he

follows him with a mind steadily set on him, and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say that she thinks of him only if she steadily remembers him with longing.

In Vedānta, Vid (knowing) and Upasati (meditating) are used as identical. That 'knowing' implies repetition follows from the fact that in the Vedānta texts the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used one in the place of the other. In some passages the term 'knowing' is used in the beginning and the term 'meditating' in the end: thus, e.g. "He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me" and "teach me sir, the deity which you meditate on" (Chh. Up. IV.1.4; 2.2).

In other places the text at first speaks of 'meditating' and later on of 'knowing'; thus e.g. "Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman" and "He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame and glory of countenance" (Chh. Up. III.18.1, 6).

Meditation and reflection imply a repetition of the mental act.

When we say "He meditates on it" the continuity of the act of remembrance of the object is implied. Similar is the case with reflection also.

From this it follows that repetition has to be practised there also, where the text gives instruction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.

When the scripture speaking about the rice for the sacrifice says, "The rice should be beaten" the sacrificer understands that the injunction means "The rice should be beaten over and over again, till it is free from husk" for no sacrifice can be performed with the rice with its husk

on. So when the scripture says, “The Self must be seen through hearing, reflection and meditation” it means the repetition of these mental processes, so long as the Self is not seen or realised.

(476)

IV.1.2 (479) And on account of the indicatory mark.

The same topic is continued.

An indicatory mark also shows that repetition is required. In the Śhruti there is a teaching of repeated meditation. It says that one son will be born if there is a single act of meditation whereas many sons will be born if there are many and repeated acts of meditation. “Re flect upon the rays and you will have many sons” (Chh. Up. I.5.2). In the Section treating of meditation on the Udgītha the text repeats the meditation on the Udgītha viewed as the sun, because its result is one son only and the clause “Reflect upon his rays” enjoins a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the possession of many sons. This indicates that the repetition of meditation is something well known.

What holds good in this case holds good for other meditations also.

In the case of first class type of aspirant with intense purity, dispassion, discrimination and extremely subtle and sharp intellect, a single hearing of that great sentence “Tat-Tvam-As!” Mahāvākya will be quite sufficient. Repetition would indeed be useless for him who is able to realise the true nature of Brahman even if the Mahāvākya “Tat-Tvam-As!” is enounced once only. But such advanced souls are very rare. Ordinary people who are deeply attached to the body and objects cannot attain realisation of Truth by a single enunciation of it.

For such persons repetition is of use. The erroneous notion "I am the body" can be destroyed only through constant meditation or repeated practice. Knowledge can dawn only when there is incessant and frequent meditation. Repetition has the power of annihilating this erroneous idea gradually. Meditation should be continued till the last trace of body idea is destroyed. When the body consciousness is totally annihilated, Brahman shines itself in all its pristine glory and purity. The meditator and the meditated become one. Individuality vanishes in toto.

If repetition is not necessary, the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad would not have taught the truth of the great sentence "Thou art That" repeatedly. In the Taittiriya Upaniṣhad III.2 we find that Bhrigu goes several times to his father Varuna and asks him again and again, to be taught the nature of Brahman.

Bhrigu Varuni went to his father Varuna saying, "Sir, teach me Brahman." He told him this, viz. food, breath, the eye, the ear, mind and speech. Then he said again to him "That from whence these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman." This injunction about repetition is meant for those only who lack in purity and subtle understanding and in whom a single enunciation is not sufficient to give them the direct cognition of Brahman.

The individual soul is taught step by step to be subtler than the body, etc., till it is realised as pure Chaitanya. When we have the knowledge of the object only, we can have full knowledge of the affirmation about it. In the case of those who have ignorance or doubt or wrong

knowledge, the affirmation (Tat-Tvam-Asi) cannot bring on immediate realisation but to those who have no such obstruction there will be realisation. Hence reiteration with reasoning is only for leading us to full Vachyārtha Jñāna.

(477)

We observe that men by repeating again and again a sentence which they, on the first hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full understanding of the true sense.

All this establishes the conclusion that, in the case of cognition of the Supreme Brahman, the instruction leading to such realisation may be repeated.

Topic 2: He who meditates on the Supreme Brahman must comprehend It as identical with himself.

IV.1.3 (480) But (the Śhruti texts) acknowledge (Brahman) as the Self (of the meditator) and also teach other (to realise It as such).

This Sūtra prescribes the process of meditation.

A doubt arises whether Brahman is to be comprehended by the Jīva or the individual soul as identical with it or separate from it.

The Opponent maintains that Brahman is to be comprehended as different from the individual soul owing to their essential difference, because the individual soul is subject to pain, sorrow and misery, while the other is not.

The present Sūtra refutes the view that Brahman is to be comprehended as identical with one's self. The individual is essentially Brahman only. The Jīvahood is due to the limiting adjunct, the internal organ or Antahkarana. The Jīvahood is illusory. The Jīva is in reality an embodiment of bliss. It experiences pain and misery on account of the limiting adjunct, Antahkarana.

The Jabalas acknowledge it "I am indeed Thou, O Lord, and Thou art indeed myself." Other scriptural texts also say the same thing, "I am Brahman: Aham Brahma Asmf' (Bri. Up. I.4.10). "Thy self is this which is within all" (Bri. Up. III.4.1). "He is thy self, the ruler within, the immortal" (Bri. Up. III.7.3). "That is the True, that is the Self, That thou art" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). The texts are to be taken in their primary and not secondary sense as in "The mind is Brahman" (Chh. Up. III.1 8.1), where the text presents the mind as a symbol for meditation.

Therefore we have to meditate on Brahman as the Self.

You cannot say that these mean only a feeling or emotion of oneness, just as we regard an idol as Viṣṇu.

In the latter case we have only a single statement. But in the Jabala Śhruti we have a double affirmation, i.e.. the identity of Brahman with the individual soul with Brahman. The seeming difference between Jīva and Brahman is unreal. There is Jīvahood or Samsāritva for the individual soul till realisation is attained.

Hence we must fix our minds on Brahman as being the Self.

(478)

Topic 3: The symbols of Brahman should not be meditated upon as identical with the meditator.

IV.1.4 (481) (The meditator is) not (to see the Self) in the symbol, because he is not (that).

This and the following two Sūtras examine the value of a Pratīka or symbol in worship.

Pratīkas, symbols, would not be regarded as one with us. The meditator cannot regard them as being one with him, as they are separate from him.

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad III.18.1 declares “The mind is Brahman”.

A doubt arises whether in such meditations where the mind is taken as a symbol of Brahman, the meditator is to identify himself with the mind, as in the case of the meditation: “I am Brahman-Aham Brahma Asmi”.

The Opponent maintains that he should, because the mind is a product of Brahman and as such it is one with It. So the meditator, the individual soul, is one with Brahman. Therefore, it follows that the meditator also is one with the mind, and hence he should see his Self in the mind in this meditation also.

The present Sūtra refutes this. We must not attach to symbols the idea of Brahman. Because the meditator cannot comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the nature of the Self.

We must not regard Pratīkas (symbols or images) as being ourselves. They are different from ourselves and cannot be regarded as being identical with ourselves. Nor can we say that they being derivatives of

Brahman and Brahman being one with Ātman, they are also to be treated as one with the Ātman. They can be one with Brahman only if they go above name and form and when they go above name and form, they will not be Pratīkas.

(479)

Ātman is Brahman only when freed from Kartritva (doership).

Two gold ornaments cannot be identical but both can be one with gold.

If the symbol mind is realised as identical with Brahman, then it is no longer a symbol, just as when we realise an ornament as gold, it ceases to be an ornament. If the meditating person realises his identity with Brahman, then he is no longer the Jīva or the individual soul, the meditator. The distinctions of meditator, meditation and the meditated exist in the beginning when oneness has not been realised.

Whenever there is the distinction between the meditator and the meditated there is the process of meditation. Where there is consciousness of difference, diversity or plurality, the meditator is quite distinct from the symbol.

For these reasons the self is not meditated in symbols. The meditator is not to see his self in the symbol.

Topic 4: When meditating on a symbol, the symbol should be considered as Brahman and not Brahman as the symbol.

IV.1.5 (482) (The symbol) is to be viewed as Brahman (and not in the reverse way), on account of the exaltation (of the symbol thereby).

The same discussion is continued.

In meditations on symbols as in “The mind is Brahman”, “The sun is Brahman”, the question is whether the symbol is to be considered as Brahman, or Brahman as the symbol.

This Sūtra declares that the symbols, the mind, the sun, etc., are to be regarded as Brahman and not in the reverse way. Because you can attain elevation or progress by looking upon an inferior thing as a superior thing and not in the reverse way. As you have to behold Brahman in everything and free yourself from the idea of differentiation and diversity, you have to contemplate on these symbols as Brahman.

To view the symbol as Brahman is quite proper, but by reversing the order to view Brahman in the light of the symbol is not justifiable, because of super-eminence of Brahman over the symbol.

It would not serve any purpose to think of Brahman in the light of a limited thing; because it would be only to degrade the Infinite Lord to the status of a finite thing. The symbol should be raised higher in thought to the level of Brahman but Brahman should not be brought down to the level of the symbol.

(480)

Topic 5: In meditation on the members of sacrificial acts the idea of divinity is to be superimposed on the members and not in the reverse way.

IV.1.6 (483) And the ideas of the sun, etc., are to be superimposed) on the subordinate members (of sacrificial acts), because (in that way alone the statement of the scriptures would be) consistent.

A particular instance is cited to confirm the preceding Sūtra.

“He who burns up these (sun), let a man meditate upon that which shines yonder as the Udgītha” (Chh. Up. I.3.1). “One ought to meditate upon the Saman as fivefold” (Chh. Up. II.2.1). “Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman in speech” (Chh. Up. II.8.1). “This earth is the Rik, fire is Saman” (Chh. Up. I.6.1).

In meditations connected with sacrificial acts as given in the texts quoted, how is the meditation to be performed? Is the sun to be viewed as the Udgītha or the Udgītha as the sun? Between the Udgītha and the sun there is nothing to indicate which is superior, as in the previous Sūtra, where Brahman being pre-eminent, the symbol was viewed as Brahman.

The present Sūtra declares that the members of sacrificial acts as the Udgītha are to be viewed as the sun and so on, for the fruit of the sacrificial act is increased by so doing. The sacrificial work becomes successful. As scriptural passage, viz. Chh. Up. I.1.10 “Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith and Upaniṣhad is more powerful” expressly declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial work.

If we view the Udgītha as the sun, it undergoes a certain ceremonial purification and thereby contributes to the Apurva or Adṛiṣṭa, the invisible fruit of the whole sacrifice, which leads to Karma Samriddhi (the fullness of the Karma). If the sun is viewed as Udgītha in the reverse way the purification of the sun by this meditation will not contribute to the Apurva. as the sun is not a member of the sacrificial act.

The members of the sacrificial acts are to be viewed as the sun, etc., if the declaration of the scriptures that the meditations increase the result of the sacrifice is to come true.

The sun, etc., are higher (Utkarsha) than Udgītha because the sun, etc., are the fruits attained by Karma. Therefore, the rule of Utkarsha-buddhi referred to above needs that we must regard and worship Udgītha, etc., as the sun, etc.

If you say that if we regard the sun, etc., as the Udgītha, the former being of the nature of Karma will give the fruit, that would be wrong because Upāsana itself is a Karma and will give the fruit.

The Udgītha should be raised higher in thought to the level of the sun, but not the sun brought down to that of the Udgītha.

In this way a meditator should raise himself to the level of Brahman by thinking himself as Brahman, but should not bring Brahman down to the level of the individual soul.

(481)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 7-10) One is to meditate sitting.

IV.1.7 (484) Sitting (a man is to meditate) on account of the possibility.

The posture of the meditator while engaged in meditation is now discussed.

In Karmanga Upāsanas there is no question as to whether they should be done sitting or standing as they depend on the particular Karma. In pure realisation or perfect intuition there could be no such question as

it depends on the object of realisation. In other Upāsanās sitting is necessary for meditation.

The Opponent here maintains that as the meditation is something mental there can be no restriction as to the attitude of the body.

This Sūtra says that one has to meditate sitting, because it is not possible to meditate while standing or lying down. Sitting is necessary for meditation because Upāśana is the continuity of mental state and such continuity will not exist when one walks or runs because then the mind will attend to the body and cannot concentrate, or when one lies down because then he will be soon overpowered by sleep.

In Upāśana one has to concentrate one's mind on a single object. This is not possible if one is standing or lying. The mind of a standing man is directed on maintaining the body in an erect position and therefore incapable of reflection on any subtle matter.

A sitting person may easily avoid these several occurrences and is, therefore, in a position to carry on his meditation. The sitting posture contributes that composure of mind which is the sine qua non of meditation. Meditation is to be practised in a sitting posture, as in that case only meditation is practicable.

(482)

IV.1.8 (485) And on account of meditation.

An argument in support of Sūtra 7 is adduced.

Further, such continuity of thought is Dhyana or meditation. It can come only when the limbs are not active and the mind is calm.

Upāsana (worship) being mainly of the nature of concentration, should be practised in a sitting posture, which is conducive to concentration. Concentration being an uninterrupted and unintermittent current of thought sent towards a particular object, the sitting posture becomes indispensable.

The word 'Upāsana' also denotes exactly what meditation means, that is concentrating on a single object with a fixed look, and without any movement of the limbs. This is possible only in a sitting posture.

Meditation denotes a lengthened carrying of the same train of ideas. We ascribe thoughtfulness to those whose mind is concentrated on one and the same object while their look is fixed and their limbs do not move. We say that Śhrī Ramakrishna is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness is easy for those who sit. The wife sits and thinks deeply over her husband gone on a distant journey.

Dhyana or meditation is thinking on one subject continuously, without the inrush of ideas incongruous with the subject of thought.

Such meditation is possible in a sitting posture only and not while lying down or standing etc. Therefore, a sitting posture should be adopted both for prayers as well as for meditation.

The distraction of mind is minimised when one meditates in a sitting posture.

We, therefore, conclude herefrom also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting person.

(483)

IV.1.9 (486) And with reference to immobility (the scriptures ascribe meditateness to the earth).

The argument in support of Sūtra 7 is continued.

The word 'cha' has the force of 'indeed'. In the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad the root 'Dhyana' or meditation is employed in the sense of motionlessness.

With reference to the immobility of the earth in ordinary eye, the scripture fancies the earth as being engaged in concentration, as if it remains fixed in space in the act of pious meditation. It suggests that such a steady application of the mind can be attained by meditating only in a sitting posture.

if the body is at rest, there is rest for the mind also; if the body is in motion, i.e. restless, the mind too becomes restless.

In the passage, "The earth meditates as it were", meditateness is attributed to earth on account of its immobility or steadiness.

This also helps us to infer that meditation is possible in one when he is sitting and not while standing or walking.

Steadiness accompanies meditation. Steadiness of body and mind is possible only while sitting and not while standing or walking.

IV.1.10 (487) The Smṛiti passages also say (the same thing).

The argument in support of Sūtra 7 is concluded.

Authoritative authors also teach in their Smṛitis that a sitting posture subserve the act of meditation, e.g. "Having made a firm seat for one's self on a pure spot" (Bhagavad Gītā VI.11).

For the same reason the Yoga-Śhastra teaches different postures, viz. Padmasana, Siddhasana, etc.

(484)

Topic 7: There is no restriction of place with regard to meditation.

IV.1.11 (488) Wherever concentration of mind (is attained), there (it is to be practised), there being no specification (as to place).

There are no specific rules about the time or place of meditation.

Whenever and wherever the mind attains concentration, we should meditate. The Śhruti says “Mano’nukule”-where the mind feels favourable.

Any place is good if concentration is attained in that place. The scriptures say, “Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage to concentrate his mind.” But places that are clean, free from pebbles, fire, dust, noises, standing water, and the like are desirable, as such places are congenial to meditation.

But there are no fixed rules to place, time and direction.

Topic 8: Meditations should be continued till death.

IV.1.12 (489) Till death (till one attains Moksha) (meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in scripture.

This Sūtra says Upāsana (meditation, worship) is to be observed till death.

Worship is to be continued till death, till one gets Mukti, because it is found in Śhruti, that the worshipper, continuing so till death, attains the world of Brahman after death.

The first topic of the present Chapter has established that the meditation on the Ātman or Brahman enjoined by the scriptures is to be repeated till knowledge dawns.

The question is now taken up about other meditations which are practised for attaining certain results.

The Opponent maintains that such meditations can be stopped after a certain time. They should still give fruits like sacrifices performed only once.

The present Sūtra declares that they are to be continued up to death, because the Śhruti and Smṛiti say so. "With whatever thought he passes away from this world" (Sat. Br. X.6.3.1). "Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he even passes, assimilated its being" (Bhagavad Gītā VIII.6).

"At the time of death with unmoved mind" (Bhagavad Gītā VIII.10).

"Let a man at the time of death, take refuge with this triad" (Chh. Up. III.17.6). "Whatever his thought at the time of death with that he goes into Prāṇa and the Prāṇa united with light, together with the individual self, leads on to the world as conceived at the moment of death" (Pras. Up. IV.2.10). This also follows from the comparison to the caterpillar (Bri. Up. IV.4.3) or leech. The leech takes hold of another object before it leaves an object.

One cannot entertain such a thought at the time of departure of Prāṇa from this body without practice for the whole life.

Therefore, meditations must be practised up to death.

(485)

Topic 9: Knowledge of Brahman frees one from all past and future sins.

IV.1.13 (490) On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there takes place) the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; because it is so declared by the scriptures.

The result of knowledge of Brahman or the state of Jīvanmukti is now discussed.

The supplement to the Third Chapter is finished herewith. With the last Adhikaraṇa the topics connected with the Third Chapter have come to an end. From this Adhikaraṇa the Fourth Chapter proper begins. The Fourth Chapter is the Phaladhyaya, i.e. the Chapter relating to the fruits of Brahma Vidyā.

The Opponent maintains that emancipation is attained in spite of knowledge, only after one has experienced effects of one's sins committed before enlightenment because the Smṛitis declare "Karma is not destroyed before it has yielded its effects." The law of Karma is unrelenting.

This Sūtra says that when a person attains knowledge all his past sins are destroyed and future sins do not cling to him.

Karma has doubtless its power of bringing its effects but that power can be nullified and overcome by knowledge of Brahman.

Prayaschittas (expiatory acts) have the power of cleansing sin.

Saguna-Brahma-Vidyā cleanses all sins. Nirguna-Brahma-Vidyā puts an end to agency or doership and destroys all sins. Hence no future doership can come to him and the effects of the entire past doership vanish when knowledge dawns. Otherwise there will be no liberation as Karma is Anādi (beginningless). If it is said that emancipation is caused like the fruits of Karma, it will be transient and not eternal.

Further, the results of Jñāna must be direct and immediate. So all sins vanish when one attains knowledge of Brahman or Self-realisation.

(486)

The scripture declares that future sins which might be presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him who knows. “As water does not cling to lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this” (Chh. Up. IV.14.3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction of previous accumulated evil deeds. “As the fibres of the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all sins are burnt” (Chh. Up. V.24.3). The extinction of works the following passage also declares: “The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works are destroyed when He who is high and low is seen” (Mun. Up. II.2.8).

As regards the verses which say that no Karma is destroyed, but by producing its effects, that holds good in the case of ordinary men who are in ignorance and who have no knowledge of Brahman. It does not hold good in the case of those enlightened sages who have knowledge of Brahman.

The knower of Brahman feels and realises thus: “That Brahman whose nature it is to be at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is

thus opposed in being to the soul's previously established state of agency and enjoyment that Brahman am I; hence I neither was an agent, nor an enjoyer at any previous time, nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such at any future time." In this way only the final emancipation is possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which has been running on from eternity could not be cut short, liberation could never take place. Emancipation cannot depend on locality, time and special causes, as the fruit of works is; because therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is non-permanent.

Therefore, it is an established conclusion that there results the extinction of all sins on attaining Brahman.

(487)

Topic 10: Similarly good work do not affect the knower of Brahman.

IV.1.14 (491) Thus in the same way, there is non-clinging of the other (i.e. Punya or virtue, good works) also; but at death (liberation, i.e. Videha-Mukti is certain).

Discussion on the consequence of Brahma Jñāna (the knowledge of Brahman) is continued.

As in the case of sin, so merit or virtue cannot attach to the knower of Brahman. Otherwise such merit will be an obstruction to liberation. When doership goes, merit must go like sin. The result of merit is below that of Jñāna. Merit and sin have to be left behind.

When both are transcended, liberation is sure at death.

A knower of Brahman has no idea of agency. He is not touched by good works also. He goes beyond virtue and vice. "He overcomes both" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22).

Even there where the text mentions evil deeds only, we must consider good deeds also to be implied therein, because the results of the latter also are inferior to the results of knowledge.

Merit also is a cause of bondage and stands in the way of liberation. For a knower of Brahman all his accumulated merits and demerits are destroyed. Thus his merits and sins being totally inoperative, his salvation necessarily follows at death.

Topic 11: Works which have not begun to yield results are alone destroyed by knowledge and not those which have already begun to bear fruits.

IV.1.15 (492) But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge; because the scripture states) that (i.e. the death of the body) to be the term.

Discussion on the consequence of Brahma Jñāna is continued.

In the last two Adhikaraṇas (topics) it has been stated that all the past works of a knower of Brahman are destroyed. Past works are of two kinds, viz. Sanchita (accumulated works) those which have not yet begun to yield results and Prarabdha, i.e. those works whose effects have already begun to operate and have produced the body through which the aspirant has attained Brahma Jñāna or knowledge of Brahman.

The Opponent maintains that both these are destroyed, because the Mundaka Upaniṣhad says that all his works are destroyed.

“He thereby overcomes both”. This refers to all works without any distinction, all works whatever must be regarded to undergo destruction.

Further the sage who has attained Self-realisation is a non-doer. He has no idea or feeling of agency. His idea of non-doership is the same with reference to Sanchita or Prarabdha.

Hence both these works are destroyed when one attains knowledge of Brahman or the Supreme Self.

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This Sūtra refutes this view and declares that only Sanchita Karmas or accumulated works whose fruits have not yet begun to operate are destroyed by knowledge but not the Prarabdha. Prarabdha Karmas are destroyed only by being worked out. Those works whose effects have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed, i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises and not destroyed by that knowledge. This view is founded on the scriptural passage “For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered from this body, and then he is one with Brahman” (Chh. Up. VI.14.2), which fixes the death of the body as the term of the statement of the attainment of final release.

If it were not so, then there would be no teachers of knowledge.

Therefore, the Prarabdha Karmas are not destroyed by knowledge.

If it is said that fire must destroy all seeds, the reply is that what has begun to operate, like a potter's wheel, must have its operation.

Mithya Jñāna (the erroneous knowledge of multiplicity) though negated by Jñāna, will persist for a while (Badhitanuvritti).

Each man's inner realisation cannot be denied or disputed by another. This truth is declared by the description of the Sthitaprajna in the Bhagavad Gītā.

The Knowledge of Brahman in a knower or a sage cannot check the Prarabdha Karma, just as an archer has no control over the arrows already discharged, which comes to rest only when its momentum is exhausted. The liberated sage must keep up this body as long as the momentum of Prarabdha Karmas lasts. When the Prarabdha Karmas are worked out or exhausted the body falls off and he attains Videha-Mukti or disembodied salvation.

The final discussion, therefore, is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works only whether good or evil, whose effects have not yet begun to operate.

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Topic 12: (Sūtras 16-17) Permanent obligatory works enjoined by the Vedas for different Āśhramas are not to be given up.

IV.1.16 (493) But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards the same effect, knowledge (liberation), because that is seen from the scriptures.

Works of permanent obligation (Nitya Karmas) enjoined by the Vedas such as Agnihotra tend towards the same effect, i.e. have the same

effect as knowledge. Because this is declared by the texts such as the following, "Brāhmaṇas seek to know him by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifices, by gifts" (Bri. Up. IV.4.22).

But an objection is raised as knowledge and works have different effects, it is not possible that they should have one and the same effect.

It is observed, we reply, that curd and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of the body, if the curd is mixed with sugar and the poison taken while certain Mantras are recited. Even so works ifjoined with knowledge may effect final emancipation.

The Opponent maintains that even obligatory works (Nitya Karmas) such as Agnihotra which do not give any fruits but which are enjoined by the scriptures as a sort of discipline are destroyed by the dawn of knowledge, just as other works done with desires, because the idea of non-agency of the knower of Brahman is the same with respect to both.

This Sūtra refutes this view and declares that the regular obligatory works are not destroyed.

Obligatory duties exercise a purifying influence on the heart and are helpful to the origination of knowledge. They contribute indirectly to knowledge i.e. liberation. They subserve final emancipation immediately. Therefore, their results persist till death.

IV.1.17 (494) For (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this, according to some. (There is agreement) of both

(teachers, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa) (as to the fate of those works).

There is also a class of good works different from works of permanent obligation (Nitya Karmas like the daily Agnihotra and the like) which are performed with a view to a fruit. The following statement of some Sakhas is made with reference to these: “His friends get his good works and enemies his evil actions.” Both teachers, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, are of the opinion that works performed for the fulfilment of some special desire do not contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.

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Topic 13: Sacrificial works not combined with knowledge or meditation also help in the origination of knowledge.

IV.1.18 (495) Because the text “whatever he does with knowledge” intimates this.

Nitya Karmas (regular obligatory works) which help the origination of knowledge are of two kinds, viz. those combined with meditations and those unaccompanied by knowledge or meditations.

The Opponent maintains that work combined with meditations helps the origination of knowledge as it is superior to work done without meditation.

The present Sūtra refutes it and says that in the statement “That alone which is performed with knowledge becomes more powerful” (Chh. Up. I.1.10) the comparative degree indicates that works done without

knowledge, not combined with meditations are not altogether useless, though the other class is more powerful.

Even ordinary Agnihotra has Virya (power) but Agnihotra confirmed by Vidyā (Upāsana) is more potent (Viryavattara). Agnihotra if accompanied by knowledge possesses a greater capability of originating knowledge and, therefore, is of superior causal efficiency with regard to the realisation of the self, while the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such superiority.

Topic 14: After enjoying the fruits of Prarabdha Karma the knower becomes one with Brahman.

IV.1.19 (496) But having exhausted by enjoyment the other two works (viz. good and evil works, that have begun to yield fruits), he becomes one with Brahman.

This Sūtra concludes with the answer to the question "What becomes of the Prarabdha portion of the illumined soul's work, which has brought his present life into existence." It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose effects have not yet begun are destroyed by the power of knowledge of Brahman. "The two others on the other hand, i.e. those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, and then he becomes one with Brahman." This appears from scriptural passages such as "for him there is delay so long as he is not delivered from the body, then he will become one with Brahman" (Chh. Up. VI.14.2), and "Being Brahman he goes to Brahman" (Bri. Up. IV.4.6).

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The Opponent argues that the knower of Brahman will continue to see diversity even after death, just as he sees plurality while living; analogously to the visual appearance of a double moon which may continue even after it has been cognised as false. He does not attain oneness with Brahman even after death.

This Sūtra refutes it and declares that the Prarabdha works are destroyed through enjoyment. Though the knower of Brahman has to remain in this world as a liberated sage or Jīvanmukta, yet he attains oneness with Brahman at death.

When the Prarabdha Karmas are exhausted by being worked out, he no longer beholds any plurality on account of the absence of any cause like the Prarabdha. He certainly becomes one with Brahman as all works including Prarabdha are destroyed at death.

Thus Brahma Jñāna destroys Karmas (Sanchita) which have not begun to bear fruit. Those which have begun to bear fruit (Prarabdha) must be worked out by enjoyment. There is no escape even on the part of the enlightened soul from the operation of the law of Prarabdha.

The Opponent again argues that a new aggregate of works will originate a new fruition. Not so, we reply; the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. What on the death of the body, could originate a new period of fruition, is only a new set of works and works depend on false knowledge. But such false knowledge is totally destroyed by perfect knowledge of Brahman.

When, therefore, the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the liberated sage who knows Brahman necessarily enters into the state of perfected isolation or Absolute Kaivalya.

Thus ends the First Pada (Section 1) of the Fourth Chapter (Adhyāya IV) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(492) CHAPTER IV, SECTION 2, INTRODUCTION

In the previous Section it was shown that one attains Jīvan-mukti when the Sanchita Karmas or the accumulated works which have not as yet begun to bear fruits are destroyed, and Videha-mukti –*‘liberation from the body’* at death when the Prarabdha Karma –*‘work undertaken’* is destroyed.

This Section is devoted to the mode of departure of the enlightened and the unenlightened souls at the time of leaving the body. The path of the gods, the Devayana, by which the knower of the Saguna Brahman travels after death, is described. The Sūtra-kāra begins by explaining on the basis of scriptural statements the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body at death. The departure of the soul is the same in the case of him who possesses the lower knowledge and of him who is destitute of all knowledge.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-2) At the time of death of the knower of Saguna Brahman, the functions of the organs get merged in mind.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtra 3) At the time of death of the knower of Saguna Brahman, the function of the mind is merged in the Prāṇa.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 4-6) At the time of death of the knower of Saguna Brahman, the function of Prāṇa is merged in the individual soul or Jīva.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 7) The mode of departure from the body up to the way is common to both a knower of Saguna Brahman and an

ordinary man. Both pass through the same stages up to the entrance of the soul together with the subtle elements and so on into the Nāḍīs.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 8-11) The merging of fire, etc., of death in the Highest Deity is not absolute merging. A complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is attained.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 12-14) The Prāṇas of a knower of the Nirguna Brahman do not depart from the body at death.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtra 15) The organs of the knower of the Nirguna Brahman get merged in It at death.

Adhikaraṇa VIII: (Sūtra 16) The Kalas of the knower of the Nirguna Brahman attain absolute non-distinction with Brahman at death.

Adhikaraṇa IX' (Sūtra 17) The soul of the knower of the Saguna Brahman comes to the heart at the time of death and thence goes out through the Suṣumnā. The soul of the ignorant man goes out by means of some other Nāḍī.

Adhikaraṇa X: (Sūtras 18-19) The departing soul of a knower of the Saguna Brahman follows the rays of the sun after death which exist at night as well as during day, and goes to Brahmaloḥa.

Adhikaraṇa XI: (Sūtras 20-21) The soul of the knower of the Saguna Brahman goes to Brahmaloḥa even if he dies during the southern course of the sun (Dakshinayana).

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-2) At the time of death the functions of the organs are merged in the mind.

IV.2.1 (497) Speech is merged in mind, because it is so seen, and there are scriptural statements (to that effect).

This Sūtra says that speech merges in the mind at death.

Till now Jīvanmukti or liberation while living is described. Now the attainment of Brahmaloaka by going along the path of gods (Devayana) after death is going to be described.

About the process of dying we have the following passage, "When a man departs from here his speech merges in his mind, his mind in Prāṇa, Prāṇa in fire and fire in the Highest Deity" (Chh. Up. VI.6.1).

Now a doubt here arises whether the organ of speech as such gets merged in the mind or only its function.

The Opponent maintains that the organ itself is merged in the mind as there is no mention in the text about the function of speech getting merged.

The present Sūtra refutes this view and decides that only the function of the organ of speech is merged in the mind.

The merging is always of the effect in the cause. Speech is not an effect of the mind. Therefore, the organ of speech cannot merge in the mind. But Vrittis (functional manifestations) can merge in something which is not its cause. For instance, heat which is the function of fire originates from fuel and extinguished in water.

We see the manifestation of speech ceasing in a dying man, though his mind is still functioning. None sees the organ of speech being merged in the mind.

So experience also teaches that the function of speech and not the organ itself gets merged in mind.

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IV.2.2 (498) And for the SHIHC reason all (sense-organs) follow (mind, i.e. get their functions merged in it).

This Sūtra intimates that the functions of all the organs merge in the mind at the time of death.

For the same reasons (general experience and corroborative statement of Śhruti) as stated in Sūtra 1, the functions of all the other sense-organs follow, i.e. get merged in the mind. "The fire is verily the Udana, for he whose light has gone out comes to a new birth with his senses merged in the mind" (Pras. Up. III.9).

Like the speech it is observed that the eye and other senses discontinue their functions, while the mind continues to act. Because the organs themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text admits of that interpretation we conclude that the different organs follow after, i.e. are merged in the mind only as far as their functions are concerned.

Topic 2: The function of mind is merged in Prāṇa.

IV.2.3 (499) That mind (is merged) in Prāṇa (as is seen) from the subsequent clause (of the Śhruti cited).

It has been shown that the passage "speech is merged in mind" means a merging of the function only. A doubt here arises whether the subsequent clause "mind is breath" also means to intimate a merging of the function only or of that to which the function belongs.

The Opponent maintains that here it is mind itself and not its function that gets merged in Prāṇa, as Prāṇa can be said to be the material cause of mind. In support of his statement he quotes the following text: “Mind consists of food, Prāṇa of water” (Chh. Up. VI.6.5); “Water sent forth earth” (VI.2.4). When mind, therefore, is merged in Prāṇa, it is the same thing as earth being merged in water, for mind is food or earth, and Prāṇa is water, causal substance and effect being non-different. Hence the Śhruti here speaks not of the function of the mind, but of mind itself getting merged in Prāṇa.

This Sūtra refutes this view. For the same reason it is the mental Vrittis (functions) that get merged in Prāṇa, because in deep sleep and in approaching death, we see the mental functions stopping while the Prāṇa (breath) is active. The mind is not derived from Prāṇa, and hence cannot merge in it. Breath or Prāṇa is not the causal substance of mind. The relation of causality by an indirect process does not suffice to show that mind is really merged in Prāṇa. Were it so, then mind would also be merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor is there on the alternative contemplated any proof of mind having originated from that water which has passed over into breath.

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Therefore, mind cannot itself be merged in Prāṇa. The function of the mind only is merged in Prāṇa.

Topic 3: (Sūtras 4-6) The function of Prāṇa is merged in the Jīva.

IV.2.4 (500) That (Prāṇa) is merged in the ruler (individual soul or Jīva) on account of the (statements as to the Prāṇas) coming to it and so on.

“Prāṇa is merged in fire” (Chh. Up. VI.8.6). A doubt arises now whether according to the word of the scripture. The function of Prāṇa is merged in fire or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the body and senses.

According to the Opponent we must conclude that Prāṇa is merged in fire only.

The present Sūtra justifies its view because statements about Prāṇas coming to the Jīva, etc., are found in scriptural passages.

“All the Prāṇas approach the departing man at the time of death” (Bri. Up. IV.3.38). Another passage again specially declares that the Prāṇa with its five functions follows the individual soul. After him thus departing the Prāṇa departs, and that the other Prāṇas follow that Prāṇa. “And after the Prāṇa thus departing all the other Prāṇas depart” (Bri. Up. IV.4.2).

The text cited in Sūtra 1. “When the man departs from here, his speech merges in mind, mind in Prāṇa, Prāṇa in fire and fire in the Highest Deity” (Chh. Up. VI.8.6), does not, however, contradict this view, as the following Sūtra indicates.

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IV.2.5 (501) In the (subtle) elements (is merged) (the Jīva with the Prāṇas) as it is seen from the Śhruti.

This Sūtra amplifies the previous one.

The soul along with Prāṇa rests in the subtle elements (Bhuta-sukshma). This is clear from the Śhruti “Prāṇastejas/”.

The soul united with the Prāṇa takes up its abode within the subtle elements which accompany fire and forms the seed of the future gross body. This we conclude from the clause, "Prāṇa in heat". But this passage intimates that the Prāṇa takes up its abode and not that the soul together with the Prāṇa takes up its abode.

We reply, it does not matter. The preceding Sūtra intercalates the soul in the interval between Prāṇa and fire. We may say shortly of a man who first travels from Haridwar to Ayodhya and then from Ayodhya to Benares that he travels from Haridwar to Benares. The passage under discussion, therefore, means that the soul together with the Prāṇa abides in the elements associated with fire. The Prāṇa is first merged in the individual soul and then the soul with the Prāṇa takes its abode in the fine essence of the gross elements, fire etc., the seed of the future body.

But how are you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the text only speaks of that? To this question the next Sūtra gives an answer.

The Prāṇa joining the soul, merged not only in Tejas but at the same time in other elements too. This can be understood from Śhruti. It is said to merge only in Tejas, because Tejas (fire), is the predominating factor there. "That soul is united with the essence of the earth, of the water, of the air, of the Ākāśha, of the fire" (Bri. Up. IV.4.5).

IV.2.6 (502) (The soul with Prāṇa is merged) not in one element only, for both (the Śhruti and Smṛiti) declare this (or declare so).

When the soul leaves one body at the time of death and goes in from another, it together with the subtle body abides in the subtle essence of all the gross elements and not in fire only, because all the elements are needed for a future body. The new body consists of various elements. This matter is declared in the question and answer about the waters called man (Chh. Up. V.3.3). Vide III.1.2.

When the soul attains another body he does not rest in Prāṇa alone, but goes with the subtle portions of all the elements. The question and answer in the Śhruti show this.

A passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares that the soul's embodiment is due to Karma, for the abode consisting of Graha (Indriyas or senses) and Atigraha (Vishayas or objects) is the effect of Karma. Here the subtle elements are called the abode because they are the stuff of which the new body is made. These two views or passages do not contradict each other.

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Topic 4: The mode of departure from the body up to the way is common to both the knower of the Saguna Brahman and an ordinary man.

IV.2.7 (503) And common (is the mode of departure at the time of death for both the knower of the Saguna Brahman and the ignorant) up to the beginning of their ways; and the immortality (of the knower of the Saguna Brahman is only relative) without having burnt (ignorance).

There is no departure for the knower of Nirguna Brahman. His Prāṇas are absorbed in Brahman.

The Opponent maintains that the mode of departure from the body for the knower of Saguna Brahman and the ignorant or the ordinary man ought to be different, because they attain different abodes after death. The knower of Saguna Brahman goes to Brahmaloaka while the ordinary man is reborn in this world.

The present Sūtra says that the knower of the Saguna Brahman enters the Suṣumnā Nāḍī at death and then goes out of the body and then enters the Devayana or the path of the gods while the ordinary ignorant man enters some other Nāḍī and goes by another way to have rebirth.

But the mode of departure at death is common to both till they enter on their respective ways.

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII.6.6 and Kathopanishad II.3.16 declare "There are a hundred and more Nāḍīs in the interior of the heart, of which only one leads from the heart to the head; by that, progressing upwards, the departing soul attains immortality, i.e. emancipation; all the other Nāḍīs are for the egress of the ordinary people for undergoing bondage of frequent births and deaths."

(499)

Topic 5: (Sūtras 8-11) The dissolution of fire etc., at the time of death in the Supreme Deity is only relative.

IV.2.8 (504) That (fine body lasts) up to the attainment of Brahman (through knowledge), because (the scriptures) declare the state of relative existence (till then).

In the text cited in Sūtra 1, we have “And fire is merged in the Highest Deity”. The meaning is that the fire of the dying man together with the individual soul, the Prāṇa, the aggregate of the organs and the other elements is merged in Brahman.

We now have to consider of what kind that merging is.

The Opponent holds that it is an absolute absorption of things merged, as it is proved that those things have the Highest Deity for their causal matter. For it has been established that the Deity is the causal substance of all things, that have an origin. Therefore that passing into the state of non-separation is an absolute one. This is the final dissolution. Everyone attains the final emancipation at death.

This Sūtra says that this merging is not absolute merging. Although Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they are at the time of death, as in the case of deep sleep and a Pralaya of the world, merged in it only in such a way as to continue to exist in a seminal condition or seed state. Only the functions of these elements are merged and not the elements themselves.

Those subtle elements, fire and so on, which form the abode of hearing and the other organs persist up to final release from the Samsāra, which is caused by perfect knowledge, because the scriptures declare that till then the Jīva or the individual soul is subject to relative existence. “Some souls enter the womb for embodied existence as organic beings; others go into inorganic matter, according to their work and according to their knowledge” (Katha Up. II.5.7).

Otherwise the limiting adjuncts of every soul would at the time of death be absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union with

Brahman. Every dying person will reach Brahman. This would render all scriptural injunction and scriptural doctrine equally useless.

Bondage which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be dissolved but through perfect knowledge (Samyag Jñāna). If the merging at death were absolute, then there could be no rebirth.

(500)

IV.2.9 (505) (This fine body) is subtle (by nature) and size, because it is so observed.

The elementary matter of fire and the other elements which form the substratum of the soul, when passing out of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it passes out by the Nāḍīs and so on.

Its thinness renders it capable of passing out through the thin and subtle Nāḍī and its transparency is the cause of its not being stopped or obstructed by any gross substance, and not being seen by the bystanders when it passes out at death.

IV.2.10 (506) Therefore, (this subtle body is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body).

On account of this great subtlety the subtle body is not destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning and the like.

IV.2.11 (507) And to this (subtle body) alone does this (bodily) heat belong, because this (only) is possible.

To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we perceive in the living body, by means of touch. That bodily heat is not felt in the body

after death, while such qualities as form, colour and so on, continue to be perceived. The bodily heat is felt as long as there is life.

It follows from this that the heat resides in something different from the body, as ordinarily known. The subtle body imparts its own heat to the gross body and keeps it warm as long as it remains alive. Scripture also says, "He is warm if going to live; cold if going to die."

(501)

Topic 6: (Sūtras 12-14) The Prāṇas of the knower of Brahman do not depart at the time of death.

IV.2.12 (508) If it be said (that the Prāṇas of one who knows Brahman do not depart) on account of the denial made by the Śhruti, (we say) not so, (because the scripture denies the departure of the Prāṇas) from the individual soul (and not from the body).

This Sūtra consists of two parts, viz. an objection and its reply.

The objection portion is 'Pratishedhaditi chet'. The reply portion is 'Na sarirat; Spashto hyekesham'.

This Sūtra gives the view of the Opponent while the thirteenth and fourteenth Sūtras state the Siddhanta or correct doctrine.

Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad declares, "But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, of him, the vital airs (Prāṇas) do not depart" (Bri. Up. IV.4.6). From this express denial, forming part of the higher knowledge, it follows that the Prāṇas do not pass out of the body of him who knows Brahman. This Śhruti passage refers to one who knows

the Nirguna Brahman. It declares that his Prāṇas do not depart at death.

The Opponent maintains that the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the Prāṇas from the body but from the individual soul. If the Prāṇas do not depart from the body there will be no death at all. This is made clear from the Madhyandina recension which says "From him the vital spirits do not depart." Therefore, the soul of a knower of Brahman passes out of the body with the Prāṇas.

The next Sūtra refutes this view.

IV.2.13 (509) For (the denial of the soul's departure) is clear (in the texts) of some schools.

The Prāṇas do not depart from the body in the case of a liberated sage. This is made clear from the Śruti texts like: "Yajnavalkya" said Artabhaga, "when the liberated man dies, do his Prāṇas go up from him or do they not?" "No" replied Yajnavalkya, "they merge in him only" (Bri. Up. III.2.11).

If the Prāṇas depart with the soul from the body, then the soul will surely take a rebirth. Hence there will be no emancipation.

Therefore, the Prāṇas do not depart from the body in the case of one who knows Brahman.

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IV.2.14 (510) And Smṛiti also says that.

In the Mahābhārata also it is said that those who know Brahman do not go or depart. "He who has become the Self of all beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the gods themselves are perplexed,

seeking for the path of him who has no path" (Mahābhārata: XII.270.22).

Topic 7: The Prāṇas (organs) and elements of the knower of the Nirguna Brahman get merged in It at death.

IV.2.15 (511) Those (Prāṇas, elements) (are merged) in the Supreme Brahman, for thus the (scripture) says.

Those, i.e. sense-organs denoted by the term 'Prāṇa' and the elements of him who knows the Supreme Brahman are merged when he dies in the same Supreme Brahman. Why? Because scripture declares that "Thus these sixteen parts of this witness, the Puruṣha, having their goal in Him are dissolved on reaching Him in Him" (Pras. Up. VI.5).

But another text which refers to him who knows teaches that the parts also are merged in something different from the Highest Self.

"The fifteen parts enter into their elements" (Mun. Up. III.2.7). No, we reply. This latter passage is concerned with the ordinary view of the matter. It intimates the end from a relative stand-point, according to which the whole aggregate of the parts of him who knows the Supreme Brahman is merged in Brahman only, just as the illusory snake is merged in the rope.

There is thus no contradiction.

Though ordinarily the senses and the elements merge in their causal substances, yet in the case of the Jñāni they merge in Brahman.

(503)

Topic 8: The Kalas of the knower of the Nirguna Brahman attain absolute non-distinction with Brahman at death.

IV.2.16 (512) (Absolute) non-distinction (with Brahman of the parts merged takes place) according to the statement (of the scriptures).

“Thus these sixteen constituents or Kalas, viz. eleven senses and five subtle elements, belonging to the seer, i.e. the liberated sage who attains the Supreme Brahman loses his distinction and disappears in Him. There names and forms are destroyed; and people speak of the Puruṣha only. Then he becomes partless and deathless" (Pras. Up. VI.5).

The Kalas in the case of the knower of Brahman get absolutely merged in the Highest Brahman. In the case of an ordinary person it is not so. They exist in a fine potential state, the cause of future birth.

When parts or Kalas that are the effects of ignorance are dissolved through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder be left.

The parts, therefore, get merged absolutely in Brahman. There is no chance for them for cropping up again.

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Topic 9: The soul of the knower of the Saguna Brahman comes to the heart at the time of death and then goes out through the Suṣumnā Nāḍī.

IV.2.17 (513) When the soul of a knower of the Saguna Brahman is about to depart from the body, there takes place) a lighting up of the front of its (soul's) abode (viz. the heart); the door (of its egress) being illumined thereby; owing to the power of knowledge and the application of meditation to the way which is part of that (knowledge); the soul favoured by Hirn in the

heart (viz. Brahman) (passes upward) by the one that exceeds a hundred (i.e. the hundred and first Nāḍī).

The discussion about the Para Vidyā (Higher Knowledge) is over. The Sūtra-kāra now pursues the discussion of the Apra Vidyā, i.e. Upāsana (lower knowledge).

It has been already stated in Sūtra 7 that up to the beginning of the way the departure of a knower of the Saguna Brahman and an ignorant man is the same. The present Sūtra now describes the soul's entering on the way. The Brihadaranyaka text describes the death of a person "He taking with him those elements of light descends into the heart" (Bri. Up. IV.4.1). Then again it says, "The point of his heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the self departs, either through the eye or through the skull or through other places of the body" (Bri. Up. IV.4.2). The soul together with the organs comes to the heart at the time of death.

The question arises whether the departure is the same for a knower of Saguna Brahman and an ordinary man.

The exit of the ordinary man is different from that of the knower of Saguna Brahman. The former goes out from any part of the body at death (eye, ear, nose, anus, etc.). But the latter goes out only through the Suṣumnā Nāḍī and out of the Brahmarandhra in the head. If he goes out by any other way he cannot attain the Supreme Abode.

By virtue of knowledge and owing to the application of constant thought of Brahman the point of the heart which is the abode of the departing soul is illumined and through the grace of the supreme soul resident therein, the door of egress, the mouth of the Nāḍī leading

from the heart to the head as stated in Sūtra 7 is thrown open. The soul passes into the Nāḍī numbered one hundred and one. This Nāḍī is the gateway of the release. The other one hundred Nāḍīs lead to bondage.

The scripture says in a chapter treating of the knower of Brahman dwelling in the heart: "There are a hundred and one Nāḍīs of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; going up along that one attains Immortality; the others serve for departure in different directions)" (Chh. Up. VIII.6.5).

Although equality for him who does know and him who does not know, the point of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull only, while the others depart from other places. Why so? On account of the power of knowledge. If also he who knows departs like all others, from any place of the body, he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere and then all knowledge would be meaningless.

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"And on account of the application of meditation on the way forming a part of that." In different Vidyās there is enjoined meditation on the soul's travelling on the way connected with the Nāḍī that passes through the skull, which way forms part of those Vidyās. Now it is proper to conclude that he who meditates on that way should after death proceed on it.

Therefore, he who knows being favoured by Brahman dwelling in the heart, on which he had meditated and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the Nāḍī which passes through the skull which is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass out by other Nāḍīs.

Topic 10: (Sūtras 18-19) The soul of one who knows Saguna Brahman follows the rays of the sun after death and goes to Brahmaloaka.

IV.2.18 (514) (The soul of a knower of the Saguna Brahman when he dies) follows the rays (of the sun).

The description of the progress of the released soul is continued.

Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares “When he thus departs from this body, then he departs upwards by those very rays. By that moving upwards he reaches immortality” (Chh. Up. VIII.6.5).

From this we understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and first Nāḍī (Suṣhumnā) follows the rays of the sun.

A doubt here arises as to whether the soul of one who dies by night as well as of him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the latter only.

As scripture mentions no difference, the Sūtra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases.

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IV.2.19 (515) If it be said (that the soul does) not (follow the rays) in the night, we say (not so) because the connection (of Nāḍīs and rays) continues as long as the body lasts; the Śhruti also declares (this).

An objection to Sūtra 17 is raised and refuted.

It might perhaps be said that the Nāḍīs and rays are connected during the day, and so the soul of a person who dies during the day may follow those rays but not the soul of one who dies by night, when the connection of the Nāḍīs and the rays is broken.

But this is an erroneous notion, for the connection of rays and Nāḍīs lasts as long as the body exists. Hence it is immaterial whether the soul passes out by day or by night.

Further we observe that the rays of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer season, because we feel their warmth and other effects. During the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive, because then few only continue to exist, just as during the cloudy days of the cold season. The Śhruti also declares, "Even by night the sun sheds his rays." We cannot predetermine the movement of death. If such departure to the supreme abode is denied to the person dying in the night, no one will take to Upāsana. The result of knowledge cannot be made to depend on the accident of death by day or night.

If again a man dying at night should wait for the dawn to mount upwards, it might happen that, owing to the action of the funeral fire etc., his body would at the time of day-break, not be capable of entering into connection with the rays. The scripture moreover expressly declares that he does not wait. "As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to the sun" (Chh. Up. VIII.6.5).

For all these reasons the soul follows the rays by night as well as by day.

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Topic 11: (Sūtras 20-21) Even if the knower of the Saguna Brahman dies in Dakshinayana, he still goes to Brahmaloka.

IV.2.20 (516) And for the same reason (the departed soul follows the rays) also during the sun's southern course.

This Sūtra is a corollary drawn from the preceding Sūtra.

The Opponent raises an objection and maintains that the soul of the knower of Brahman who passes away during Dakshinayana or the southern course of the sun does not follow the rays to Brahmaloka. The Śhruti and the Smṛiti declare that only one who dies during Uttarayana or the northern course of the sun goes to Brahmaloka.

Further it is also written that Bhishma waited for the northern course of the sun to leave the body.

This Sūtra says that for the same reason as mentioned in the previous Sūtra, i.e. the unreasonableness of making the result of knowledge depend on the accident of death happening at a particular time, the knower of Saguna Brahman goes to Brahmaloka even if he dies during the southern course of the sun.

For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible, and because the fruit of knowledge is not merely eventual one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also he who has true knowledge, and who dies during the southern course of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge.

In the text "Those who know thus go by light, from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, and from that to the six months of the northern course of the sun" (Chh. Up. V.10.1), the points in the northern course of the sun do not refer to any division of time but to deities as will be shown under IV.3.4.

The Devayana path can be trodden by those who die in the Dakshinayana.

Bhishma waited for the Uttarayana, because he wanted to uphold an approved custom and to show that he could die at will owing to his father's boon.

IV.2.21 (517) And (these times or details) are recorded by Smṛiti with reference to the Yogins and these two (Yoga and Saṅkhya) and classed as Smṛitis (only).

The argument in the two preceding Sūtras is strengthened here by further exposition.

The Opponent says: We have the following Smṛiti text, “That time wherein going Yogins return not, and also that wherein going forth they return, that time shall I declare to thee, O Prince of the Bharatas” (Gītā VIII. 23-24). This determines specially that to die by day and so on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who dies by night or during the sun’s southern course depart not to return? The decision of the previous Sūtra cannot be correct.

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This Sūtra refutes the objection and says that these details as to time mentioned in the Gītā apply only to Yogis who practise Sadhana according to Yoga and Saṅkhya systems. These two are Smṛitis, not Śhrutis. Therefore, the limitations as to the time mentioned in them do not apply to those who meditate on the Saguna Brahman according to the Śhruti texts.

Yoga and Saṅkhya are mere Smṛitis. They are not of spiritual character. As it has a different sphere of application, and is based on a special kind of authority, the Smṛiti rule as to the time of dying has no influence on knowledge based on scripture.

But an objection is raised. We have such passages as “Fire, light, the day, the bright half of the month, the six months of the northern path, smoke, night, the dark half of the month, the six months of the southern path” (Gītā VIII. 24-25), in which though belonging to Smṛiti we recognise the path of the fathers as determined by scripture.

Our refutation, we reply, of the claims of Smṛiti applies only to the contradiction which may arise from the teaching of Smṛiti regarding the legitimate time of dying, “I will tell you the time,” etc. In so far as Smṛiti also mentions Agni and the other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no contradiction whatsoever.

What appears to refer to time in the above passage refers only to the deities presiding over the day-time and the bright half of the month and the Uttarayana and over the night time, and the dark half of the month and the Dakshinayana.

Thus ends the Second Pada (Section 2) of the Fourth Chapter (Adhyāya IV) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(509) CHAPTER IV, SECTION 3, INTRODUCTION

In the previous Section the departure of a knower of the Saguna Brahman by the path of the gods (Devayana) has been described.

Now the present Section treats of the path itself. It describes the journey of the released soul on the way to Brahman and takes up the thread of the story at the point where it was left in the preceding Section.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtra 1) The path connected with deities beginning with that of light is the only path to Brahmaloka.

Adhikaraṇa II: (Sūtra 2) The departing soul reaches the deity of the year and then the deity of the air.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtra 3) After reaching the deity identified with lightning the soul reaches the world of Varuna.

Adhikaraṇas I, II, III (Sūtras 1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upaniṣhads as to the stations on the way which leads the Upasaka to Saguna Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 4-6) Light, etc., referred to in the text describing the path of the gods mean deities identified with the light, etc., which lead the soul stage after stage till Brahmaloka is reached.

Adhikaraṇa V.' (Sūtras 7-14) The Brahman to which the departed souls go by the path of the gods is the Saguna Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sūtras 7-11 by Bādarāyaṇa. In Sūtras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view according to which the soul of the Upasaka goes to the Highest Brahman, not to the Karya Brahman (Saguna Brahman). Jaimini's view is a mere Pūrva-paksha -'Objection', while Bādari's opinion represents the Siddhanta.

Adhikaraṇa VI." (Sūtras 15-1 6) Only those who have worshipped the Saguna Brahman without a symbol attain Brahmaloka.

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Topic 1: The path connected with the deities beginning with that of light is the only path that leads to Brahmaloka.

IV.3.1 (518) On the path connected with light (the departed soul of the knower of Saguna Brahman travels to Brahmaloka after death], that being well-known (from the Śhruti).

It has been explained that up to the beginning of the way the departure is the same. In the last section it was stated that the knower of the Saguna Brahman travels to Devayana or the path of the gods to Brahmaloka. But different texts make different declarations about the way itself.

One passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the Nāḍīs and rays: "Then he mounts upwards by just those rays" (Chh.

Up. VIII.6.5). Another passage describes it as beginning with light.

"They go to the light, from light to day" (Chh. Up. V.10.1). Another way is described in Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad I.3: "Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to the world of Agni." Another way is described in Bri. Up. V.10.1: "When the person goes away from this world he comes to the wind." Another way is described in Mun. Up. I.2.11: "Free from passion they depart through the gate of the sun." A doubt here arises whether these ways are different from each other or whether there is only one path, the path of the gods of which the different texts mention different particulars, or give different descriptions.

The Opponent maintains that these texts refer to different paths to Brahmaloka.

The present Sūtra refutes this view and declares that all the texts refer to one path only and give only different particulars of the same path, the path connected with deities beginning with that identified with

light. Why so'? On account of its being widely known, from the Śhruti texts that this is the path for all knowers of Brahman.

The text "Those who know this (Panchagni Vidyā) and those who in the forest meditate with faith and austerity reach the deity identified with light" (Chh. Up. V.10.1), expressly states that the path connected with deities beginning with that of the flame belongs to all knowers of Brahman whatever be the Vidyā by which they have attained that knowledge.

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The goal, viz. Brahmaloka, is the same in all cases. Some part of the path is recognised in all texts. All the following passages declare one and the same result, viz. the attainment of the world of Brahman. "In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever" (Bri. Up. VI.2.15). "There he dwells eternal years" (Bri. Up. V.10.1).

"Whatever victory, whatever greatness belongs to Brahman, that victory he gains, that greatness he reaches" (Kau. Up. I.2). There is no justification to regard the path as different on account of its being dealt with in different chapters.

Hence we have to conclude that all the texts refer to the same path but give different particulars which have all to be combined for a full description of the path.

Though various Śhrutis refer to the path by such words as Archis (light), Surya (sun), Vayu (wind), etc., yet they all refer only to different portions of one and the same way, viz. Archiradi-marga or Devayana which leads to Brahmaloka. Each Śhruti gives us something indicative of the path and we have to combine the diverse particulars.

Topic 2: The departing soul reaches the deity of the year and then the deity of the air.

IV.3.2 (519) (The departed soul) (of a knower of the Saguna Brahman goes) from the deity of the year to the deity of the air on account of the absence and presence of specification.

The description of the path of the gods is continued.

The Sūtra fixes the order of the stages. The Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad describes the path as follows: “The Upasaka or the worshipper, having reached the path of the gods comes to the world of Agni (fire), to the world of Vayu (air), to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajāpati, and then to the world of Brahma" (Kau. Up. L3).

Now the world of Agni means the same as light, as both terms denote burning, and we, therefore, need not with regard to them search for the order in which they are to be combined.

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Again the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad (V.10.1) describes the path as follows: “They reach the deity identified with the light, from him to the deity of the day, from him to the deity of the bright half of the month, from him to the deities identified with six months of the north ern path of the sun, from them to the deity of the year, from him to the deity of the sun, from him to the deity of the moon, from him to the deity of the lightning”. Here Vayu is not mentioned in the path beginning with light. There is absence of specification.

In the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣhad Vayu is mentioned before Aditya. “When the person goes away from this world he comes to Vayu. Then

Vayu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel, and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Aditya." On account of this specification which shows Vayu to come before Aditya, Vayu must be inserted between the year and Aditya. We should conclude that the soul goes to Vayuloka before going to the sun.

The Brihadaranyaka text (V.10.1) fixes that air comes immediately before the sun, because there is regular order of succession.

But as regards air coming after the deity of fire there is no specification but simply a statement "Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of Vayu." The Vajasaneyins in their text record "From the deities identified with the six months in which the sun travels northwards he reaches the deity identified with the world of the gods" (Bri. Up. VI.2.15). Here in order to maintain the immediate succession of the deity identified with Vayu (air) and that identified with the sun (Aditya) we must understand that the soul passes from the deity of the world of the gods to the deity of air.

Again in the texts of the Chhandogya and the Brihadaranyaka the deity of the world of the gods is not mentioned in the former and the deity of the year in the latter. Both texts are authoritative. Both have to be included in the full description of the path. As the year is connected with the months, the deity of the year precedes the deity of the world of the gods.

Hence the sequence is Archis (rays), Ahas (day), Suklapaksha (bright half of the month), six months when the sun travels to the north, year, the world of the gods, the world of Vayu, the sun, the moon, the

lightning, the world of Varuna, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati and the world of Brahma.

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Topic 3: After reaching the deity identified with lightning, the soul reaches the world of Varuna.

IV.3.3 (520) After (reaching) the deity of lightning (the soul reaches) Varuna, on account of the connection (between the two).

The enumeration of the stations of the journey is continued.

In the Chhandogya text we find, "From the sun to the moon, from moon to lightning." In the Kaushitaki Upaniṣhad we find, "From Vayu (wind) to Varuna." Combining the two texts we have to place Varuna after lightning, on account of the connection between the two (lightning and Varuna). The broad lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the sound of deep thunder and then water falls down. "It lightens, it thunders, it will rain" (Chh. Up. VII.11.1).

Varuna is the god of rain and lightning precedes rain. So after lightning comes Varuna.

After Varuna come Indra and Prajāpati for there is no other place for them. The Kaushitaki text also puts them there.

The complete enumeration of the stages of the path of the gods is as follows: first the deity of fire, then the deity of the day, the deity of the bright half of the month, the deities of the six months when the sun travels to the north, the deity of the year, the deity of the world of gods, the deity of the air, the sun, the moon, the deity of lightning, the

world of Varuna, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati, and finally Brahmaloka.

Topic 4: (Sūtras 4-6) Light, etc., referred to in the text describing the path of the gods mean deities identified with light, etc., who conduct the soul stage after stage till Brahmaioka is reached.

IV.3.4 (521) (These are) deities conducting the soul (on the path of the gods), on account of indicatory marks to that effect.

The description of the path of the gods is continued.

With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment, or conductors of the travelling souls.

The Opponent says: Light and so on are marks of the road, because the instruction has that character. In ordinary life a man who wishes to go to a village or a town is told "GO from here to that hill, from there to a banyan tree, from that tree to a river, from that to a village, after that you will reach the town." So here also the text says, "From light to day, from day to the waxing half of the month," etc.

Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoyment.

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Because the text connects Agni and so on with the "world" "He comes to the world of Agni." Now the term "world" denotes places of enjoyment of living beings, as when we say "the world of men", "the world of fathers", "the world of gods".

Therefore, light and the rest are not conductors. Further they cannot be conductors as they are without intelligence. In ordinary life,

intelligent men only are appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult roads.

The present Sūtra refutes this. They must be the conductors.

They receive the departed souls and conduct them on their way to Brahmaloka. That conductors are meant here and not marks or places of enjoyment is indicated by the text of the Chhandogya which ends thus, "From the moon to the lightning. Then a being who is not a man leads them to Brahman" (Chh. Up. IV.15.5; V.10.1). This text shows that unlike the previous guides or conductors who were more or less human, this particular guide or conductor is not a human in nature - "Amanava".

IV.3.5 (522) [That deities or divine guides are meant in these texts, they are personal conductors] is established, because both (i.e. the path and the traveller) become unconscious.

This Sūtra is an argument in support of Sūtra 4.

The departed souls are not capable of guiding themselves as their organs are withdrawn in the mind. The light, etc., are without intelligence. Hence they are equally incapable and cannot guide the souls. Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities identified with the light, etc., guide the souls to Brahmaloka. In ordinary life also drunken or senseless people follow a road as commanded by others.

Again light and the rest cannot be taken for marks of the path or road, because they are not always present.

Further the departed souls cannot enjoy as their organs are withdrawn into the mind. Hence light and the rest cannot be worlds where they enjoy.

Although the wanderers or the departed souls do not enjoy anything, the word “world” may be explained on the ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other beings dwelling there.

The conclusion, therefore, is that he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni and he who has reached the world ruled by Vayu is led by Vayu.

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IV.3.6 (523) From thence (the souls are led or guided) by the very same (superhuman) person who comes to lightning, that being known from the Śhruti.

The discussion on the journey is continued.

“From thence, i.e. after they have come to the lightning they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the worlds of Varuna and the rest by the person, not a man (Amanava-purusha) who follows immediately after the lightning. When they have reached the place of lightning, a person, not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman" (Bri. Up. VI.2.15).

Varuna and the rest only favour the souls either by not obstructing or helping them in some way.

Therefore, it is well established that light and so on are the gods who act as conductors or guards.

Topic 5: (Sūtras 7-14) The departed souls go by the path of gods to Saguna Brahman.

IV.3.7 (524) To the Katya Brahman or Hiranyagarbha or Saguna Brahman (the departed souls are led); (thus opines) the sage Bādari on account of the possibility of its being the goal (of their journey).

A discussion is now taken up whether the soul is conducted to the Nirguna Brahman or the Saguna Brahman.

In the previous Sūtra the way was discussed.

Now from this Sūtra onwards the discussion is about the goal reached.

The Chhandogya text declares, "Then a being who is not a man (Amanava Puruṣha) leads them to Brahman" (Chh. Up. V.10.1).

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A doubt arises whether the Brahman is the Saguna Brahman or the Supreme Nirguna Brahman. The opinion of the teacher Bādari is that the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower qualified, effected Brahman (Saguna or Karya Brahman); because it is possible to go to that. Because Saguna Brahman which occupies a definite place, which has a special abode and which is finite can be the goal of a journey. But it is not possible with respect to the Nirguna Brahman which is Infinite and all-pervading. With the Highest Nirguna Brahman on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas of one who goes, or object of going or act of going; because that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self of all.

IV.3.8 (525) And on account of the qualification (with respect to this Brahman in another text).

An argument in support of Sūtra 7 is adduced.

Because the word Brahman is qualified by the word 'lokam'.

“He leads them to the worlds of Brahman; in these worlds of Brahman they live for ever and ever” (Bri. Up. VI.2.15). The plural number is not possible with respect to the Supreme Infinite Brahman which may abide in different conditions.

IV.3.9 (526) But on account of the nearness (of the Saguna Brahman to the Supreme Brahman it is) designated as that (Supreme Brahman).

The argument in support of Sūtra 7 is continued.

The word 'tu' (but) sets aside any doubt that may arise on account of the word 'Brahma' being used for the Saguna Brahman in the Chhandogya text.

This Sūtra says that this designation is on account of the proximity of the Saguna Brahman to the supreme Brahman or the Absolute.

The manifested Brahman also can be called Brahman as it is in the closest proximity to the Unmanifested Para Brahman. The Para Brahman assumes absolutely pure limiting adjuncts such as mind, etc.; to become an object of devotion and meditation, i.e. the lower Brahman or Kaiya Brahman or Saguna Brahman.

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IV.3.10 (527) On the dissolution of the Brahmaloaka (the souls attain) along with the ruler of that world what is higher than

that (i.e. the Supreme Brahman) on account of the declaration of the Śhruti.

The individual soul's final absorption in the Para Brahman or the Absolute is now stated.

The Opponent says: If the souls who go by the path of the gods reach the Saguna Brahman, then how can statements like, "They who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man" (Chh.

Up. IV.15.6); "For them there is no return here" (Bri. Up. VI.2.15); "Moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality" (Chh. Up. VIII.6.5), be made with respect to them, as there is no permanency anywhere apart from the Highest Brahman? The Sūtra declares that at the dissolution of Brahmaloaka the souls, which by that time have attained knowledge, along with the Saguna Brahman attain what is higher than the Saguna Brahman, i.e. Para Brahman or the pure highest place of Viṣṇu. This is called Kramamukti or successive (progressive) liberation or release by successive steps. So the Śhruti texts declare.

IV.3.11 (528) And on account of the Smṛiti (texts supporting this view).

An argument in support of Sūtra 10 is adduced.

The view expressed in the preceding Sūtra is corroborated by Smṛiti also, "When the Pralaya has come and when the first person (Hiranyagarbha) comes to His end, then they all, together with Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place." The above are the Siddhanta Sūtras. The final conclusion (Siddhanta), therefore is that the going of the souls of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the Karya Brahman or Saguna Brahman.

The Pūrva-paksha -'Objection' is stated in Sūtras 12-14.

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IV.3.12 (529) To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led); Jaimini opines, on account of that being the primary meaning (of the word 'Brahman').

Sūtras 12-14 give a pr/ma facie view of the matter. An objection to Sūtra 7 is adduced by presenting an opposite view.

Jaimini is of opinion that the word 'Brahman' in the Chhandogya text "He leads them to Brahman" refers to the Highest Brahman, as that is the primary meaning of the word.

IV.3.13 (530) And because the Śhruti declares that.

An argument in support of Jaimini is adduced.

The text "Going upwards by that he reaches immortality" (Chh.

Up. VIII.6.6) (Katha Up. II.6.16) declares that immortality is attained by going. But immortality is possible only in the Supreme Brahman, not in the Saguna Brahman, because the latter is transitoiy. So scripture says, "Where one sees something else, that is little, that is mortal" (Chh. Up. VIII.24.1).

According to the text of the Kathopanishad also the going of the soul is towards the supreme Brahman. The soul which passes out of the body by the Suṣumnā Nāḍī reaches immortality. This can be attained only in the Supreme Brahman.

IV.3.14 (531) And the desire to attain Brahman cannot be with respect to the Saguna Brahman.

The argument in support of Sūtra 12 is continued.

"I enter the hall of Prajāpati, the house" (Chh. Up. VIII.14.1), cannot have the lower or Saguna Brahman for its object. This desire to enter the 'hall' or the 'house' cannot be with respect to the Saguna Brahman. It is appropriate with regard to the Highest Brahman (Para Brahman). Because the immediately preceding passage intimates "And that within which these (names and forms) are contained is Brahman." The passage "I am the glory of the Brāhmaṇas" represents "the soul as the self of all". 'Glory' is the name of the supreme Brahman. "There is no likeness of him whose name is great glory" (Vajasaneya Samhita: .II.3). Here the Supreme Brahman is referred to.

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Sūtras 12-14 give the view of the Opponent against what has been said in Sūtras 7-11. The arguments of Sūtras 12-14 are refuted thus: The Brahman attained by those who go by the path of the gods (Devayāna) cannot be the Supreme Brahman (Nirguṇa Brahman).

They attain only the Saguṇa Brahman. Para Brahman is all-pervading. He is the Inner Self of all. He cannot be attained as He is the Innermost Self of everyone.

We do not go to what is already reached. Ordinary experience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him.

Journey or attainment is possible only where there is difference, where the attainer is different from the attained.

The Supreme Brahman cannot be assumed to possess any differences depending on time, or space or anything else and cannot, therefore, become the object of going.

In the realisation of the Supreme Brahman the veil of ignorance is removed and the seeker knows his essential divine nature. He realises his identity with the Supreme Brahman. When the ignorance is removed Brahman manifests itself. That is all. There is no going or attaining in such a realisation.

But the attainment of Brahman spoken of in the texts connected with the path of the gods is not merely the removal of ignorance but actual.

The passage "I enter the hall of Prajāpati, the house", can be separated from what precedes and be connected with the Saguna Brahman.

The fact that Chh. Up. VIII.14.1 says "I am the glory of the Brāhmaṇas, of the kings" cannot make it refer to the Nirguṇa Brahman, because the Saguna Brahman can also be said to be the self of all, as we find in texts like "He, to whom all works, all desires belong" (Chh. Up. III.14.2).

The reference to the journey to Brahman which belongs to the realm of relative or qualified knowledge in a chapter which deals with the Highest Knowledge is only by way of glorification of the latter.

For all these reasons the view of Bādari as set forth in Sūtras 7-11 is the correct one.

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Topic 6: (Sūtras 15-16) Only those who have taken recourse to the worship of Brahman without a symbol attain Brahmaloka.

IV.3.15 (532) Bādarāyaṇa holds that (the superhuman being) leads (to Brahmaloḥa only) those who do not take recourse to a symbol of Brahman in their meditation; there being no fault in the two-fold relation (resulting from this opinion) and (it being construed on the doctrine) as is the meditation on that (i.e. Brahman) so does one become.

The discussion commenced is Sūtra 6, whether the soul is taken to the Supreme Brahman or the Saguna Brahman is concluded in this and the following Sūtra.

A doubt here arises whether all worshippers of the Saguna Brahman go to Brahmaloḥa being led by the superhuman being mentioned in Chh. Up. IV.15.5 or only some of them? The Opponent maintains that all go to Brahmaloḥa whatever may be their Upāsana.

This Sūtra declares that only those worshippers of the Saguna Brahman who do not take recourse to any symbol in their meditation on Brahman go there. This is the opinion of the teacher Bādarāyaṇa.

This, however, does not contradict what is said in III.3.31 if we understand that by 'all' is meant all those worshippers who do not take recourse to any symbol in their meditation on Brahman.

Only Brahma Upasakas are taken by the Amanava Puruṣha to the Brahmaloḥa. The form of meditation governs the result. In the case of symbols like the Salagrama stone, there is no feeling that it itself is Brahman. No doubt in the case of Panchagni-Vidyā, the Śhruti says that the worshipper is led to Brahmaloḥa. But we cannot extend the result to the worshippers of external symbols where there is no direct

scriptural statement, we have to understand that only those who meditate on Brahman go to Brahmaloaka, not others.

He whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches Brahmaloaka.

This view is supported by Śhruti and Smṛiti. "In whatever form they meditate on Him, that they become themselves." In the case of symbols on the other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the symbol being the chief element in the meditation. Hence the worshipper does not attain Brahmaloaka.

(522)

IV.3.16 (533) And the scripture declares a difference (in the case of meditation on symbols).

An argument in support of the conclusion arrived at by Bādarāyaṇa, is adduced here.

With reference to meditations on symbols such as name and so on, that occur in Chhandogya Upaniṣhadic texts, the Śhruti speaks of different results according to difference in the symbols. "One who meditates upon name as Brahman becomes independent so far as name reaches" (Chh. Up. VII.1.5). "One who meditates upon speech as Brahman becomes independent so far as speech reaches" (Chh. Up. VII.2.2).

Now the distinction of rewards is possible because the meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no such difference in results, if they depend on the one non-different Brahman.

Hence it is quite clear that those who use symbols for their meditation cannot have the same reward as others. They cannot go to Brahmaloaka like those who meditate on the Saguna Brahman.

Thus ends the Third Pada (Section 3) of the Fourth Chapter (Adhyāya IV) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy.

(523) CHAPTER IV, SECTION 4, INTRODUCTION

The attainment of Brahmaloaka by the worshippers of the Saguna Brahman has been treated in the last Section. This Section deals with the realisation of the Highest Brahman by its worshippers.

SYNOPSIS

Adhikaraṇa I: (Sūtras 1-3) the released soul does not acquire anything new but merely manifests itself in its true nature.

Adhikaraṇa II." (Sūtra 4) determines that relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of Avibhaga, non-separation.

Adhikaraṇa III: (Sūtras 5-7) discuss the characteristics of the soul that has attained the Nirguna Brahman. According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses the attributes which in Chh. Up. VIII.7.1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as Apahatapapmatva (freedom from sin), Satyasankalpatva (true volition) and Aisvarya (Omniscience) etc.

According to Audulomi the only characteristics of the released soul is Chaitanya or pure intelligence.

According to Bādarāyaṇa the two views can be combined. The two views describe the released soul from two different standpoints, viz. relative and transcendental and so there is no contradiction between the two.

Adhikaraṇa IV: (Sūtras 8-9) The soul which has attained the Saguna Brahman effects its desires by mere will.

Adhikaraṇa V: (Sūtras 10-14) A released soul which has attained Brahmaloḥa can exist with or without a body according to its liking.

Adhikaraṇa VI: (Sūtras 15-16) The released soul which has attained the Saguna Brahman can animate several bodies at the same time.

Adhikaraṇa VII: (Sūtras 17-22) The released soul which has attained Brahmaloḥa has all the lordly powers except the power of creation, etc. There is no return to this world for these released souls.

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Topic 1: (Sūtras 1-3) The liberated soul does not acquire anything new but only manifests its essential or true nature.

IV.4.1 (534) (When the Jīva or the individual soul) has attained (the highest light) there is manifestation (of its own real nature) as we infer from the word ‘own’.

The Chhandogya text says “Now this serene and happy being, after having risen out of this body and having attained the highest light, manifests itself by its own nature” (Chh. Up. VII.12.3).

The Opponent holds that the Jīva or the individual soul which has freed itself from identification with the three bodies attains emancipation after realising Brahman. Release also is a fruit like other fruits, e.g.

Svarga or heaven. Manifestation means as much as origination. Liberation was not a pre-existent thing. It is something that is newly acquired like heaven, as the word 'reaches' in the text clearly indicates. Therefore emancipation is something new that is acquired by the individual soul. If the manifestation took place only through the self's own nature, it would already appear in the self's former states, because a thing's own nature is never absent in it.

The present Sūtra refutes this view and says that the word 'own' indicates that emancipation was a pre-existent thing. The individual soul manifests its own, essential divine nature which was so long covered by ignorance (Avidyā). This is his attainment of the final beatitude or release. It is certainly nothing that is newly acquired.

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IV.4.2 (535) (The self whose true nature has manifested itself is) released; according to the promise (made by scripture).

The previous Sūtra is further elucidated.

Emancipation is a cessation of all bondage and not the accession of something new, just as health is merely the removal of illness and not a new acquisition.

If release is nothing new that is acquired by the individual soul, then what is its difference from bondage? The Jīva was stained in the state of bondage by the three states, i.e. the state of waking, dream ing and dreamless sleep. According to Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII. 9-11, "It is blind" "It weeps as it were" "It goes to utter annihilation". It imagines itself to be finite. It identifies itself with the illusory vehicles or Upadhis and experiences pleasure, pain, joy and sorrow. After Self-realisation it

realises its true nature which is absolute bliss. It is freed from all erroneous notions and misconceptions. It is freed from Avidyā or ignorance and its effects. It is perfect, free, independent.

This is the difference.

Annihilation of ignorance is salvation. Eradication of all erroneous notions or misconceptions is liberation. Destruction of the veil of ignorance, that separates the individual soul from the Supreme Soul, is emancipation or the final beatitude.

But how is it known that in its present condition the soul is released'? On account of the promise made in the scriptures, says the Sūtra.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣhad says, "I will explain It to you further" (Chh. Up. VIII.9.3; VIII.10.4; VIII.11.3). Here the Śhruti proposes to expound that Self which is free from all imperfections. It begins thus, "The Self which is free from sin" (Chh. Up. VIII.7.1). "It being without the body, is not touched by pleasure and pain" (Chh. Up. VIII.12.1), and concludes "By his own nature he manifests himself.

That is the highest person. The serene being rises above its body, reaches the highest light and appears in its own true nature" (Chh. Up. VIII.12.3).

IV.4.3 (536) (The light into which the individual soul enters is) the Supreme Self; owing to the subject matter of the chapter.

This Sūtra says that the individual soul recovers his own Self (the Supreme Self) as stated in Sūtra 1.

The Opponent holds: How can the soul be called "liberated" considering that the clause "(having entered into) the highest light"

speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect? Because the word 'light' in common parlance denotes physical light. No one who has not transcended beyond the sphere of effects can be liberated, as whatever is an effect is tainted with evil.

We reply: this objection is without force. It cannot stand; for in the passage referred to in the Chh. Up. VIII.3.4 the word 'light' denotes the Self Supreme, in accordance with the subject matter of the Chapter and not any physical light.

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The word 'Jyotih' (light) in the passage refers to the Ātman which is described as sinless, undecaying and deathless (Ya Alma apahatapapma vijaro vimrityuh-Chh. Up. VIII.7.1).

We, therefore, may not all at once pass over to physical light incurring thereby the fault of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing a new one.

The word 'light' is also used to denote the Self in the texts like "The gods meditate on the immortal Light of all lights as longevity" (Bri. Up. IV.4.16). We have discussed this in detail under I.3.40.

Topic 2: The released soul remains inseparable from the Supreme Soul.

IV.4.4 (537) (The Jīva in the state of release exists) as inseparable (from Brahman), because it is so seen from the scriptures.

A doubt arises whether the individual soul in the state of emancipation exists as different from Brahman or as one with and inseparable from It.

The present Sūtra declares that it exists as inseparable from Brahman, because the Śhruti texts declare so. "Thou art That, Tat Tvam Asi" (Chh. Up. VI.8.7). "Aham Brahma Asmi, I am Brahman" (Bri. Up. I.4.10). "Where he sees nothing else" (Chh. Up. VII.24.1).

"Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman" (Bri. Up. IV.4.6). All these Śhruti passages declare that the emancipated soul is identical with Brahman.

Such passages as "Just as pure water poured into pure water remains the same, thus O Gautama, is the self of a thinker who knows" (Katha Up. II.4.15), whose object is to describe the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non-separation only. The same follows from the comparison of the soul entering Brahman to rivers falling into the sea.

Passages which speak of difference have to be explained in a secondary sense, expressing non-separation or unity.

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Topic 3: (Sūtras 5-7) Characteristics of the soul that has attained the Nirguna Brahman.

IV.4.5 (538) (The released soul exists) as possessed of (the attributes of) Brahman; (thus) Jaimini (opines) on account of the reference etc.

The view of the sage Jaimini is stated in this connection.

It has been stated that the released soul attains Brahman. Brahman has two aspects, viz. one the unconditioned aspect as pure consciousness and the other as described in the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad VIII.7.1: "The Ātman which is free from evil, undecaying, undying, free from sorrow, hunger and thirst, with true desires (Satyakāma) and true volitions (Satyasankalpa)." A doubt arises now, which aspect does the released soul attain? Jaimini maintains that the liberated soul attains the conditioned aspect. Why? Because this is known from reference to the nature of the self as being such in the text cited. The qualities of Omniscience and Omnipotence are mentioned. Hence Jaimini opines that the released soul attains the conditioned aspect of Brahman.

IV.4.6 (539) (The released soul exists) solely as pure consciousness or Intelligence, that being its true nature or essence; thus Audulomi (thinks).

The view of sage Audulomi is stated in this connection.

This Sūtra gives another view about the state of emancipation.

This is the view of the sage Audulomi. Audulomi says that it is the realisation of the soul's essential nature as pure Chaitanya (knowledge, consciousness or intelligence). The soul is solely of the nature of Pure Consciousness. It exists as such in the state of release.

This conclusion will also agree with other scriptural texts such as Bri. Up. IV.5.13: "Thus this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge".

Although the text enumerates different qualities such as freedom from sin, etc., these qualities rest only on fanciful conceptions due to

difference of words; because what the text intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as sin and the rest.

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IV.4.7 (540) Thus also, on account of the existence of the former qualities admitted owing to reference and so on, there is no contradiction (between the two); (so thinks) Bādarāyaṇa.

The author's own view is now stated.

Bādarāyaṇa reconciles both and says that the affirmation of the divine attributes of Omniscience and Omnipotence is from the point of view of God's nature when the soul is bound, while the affirmation of the soul's nature as pure knowledge is from the point of view of its released state.

Although it is admitted that intelligence constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former nature, i.e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is intimated by reference and the rest is with a view to the world of appearances not rejected. Hence there is no contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher Bādarāyaṇa.

Topic 4: (Sūtras 8-9) The soul which has attained the Saguna Brahman effects its desire by mere will.

IV.4.8 (541) But by mere will (the liberated souls attain their purpose), because scriptures say so.

The powers and privileges which a liberated soul acquires are stated here.

In the meditation on Brahman within the heart we read as follows: “If he desires the world of the fathers (Pitriloka) by his mere will they come to him” (Chh. Up. VIII.2.1).

A doubt here arises whether the will alone is the cause to get the result, or the will combined with some other operative cause.

The Opponent holds that although scripture says “by his mere will” some other cause must be supposed to cooperate as in ordinary life. Because, as in ordinary experience the meeting with one’s father is caused by one’s will, and in addition by the act of going and so on, so it will be with the case of the liberated soul also.

This Sūtra says that by mere will the result comes, because the Śhruti so declares. If any other cause were required, the direct scriptural statements “by his will only” would thereby be contradicted.

The will of the liberated soul is different from the will of ordinary men. It has the power of producing results without any operative cause.

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IV.4.9 (542) And for this very same reason (the released soul is) without another Lord.

The previous topic is continued.

For the very same reason, i.e. owing to the tact of the will of the released person being all-powerful, he who knows has no other Lord over himself. Because not even an ordinary person when forming wishes, will, if he can help it, wish himself to be subject to another master. Even in this world no one could willingly have master to lord

over him. Scripture also declares that a released soul is master of himself. "For them there is freedom from all worlds" (Chh. Up. VIII.1.6).

Topic 5: (Sūtras 10-14) A liberated soul who has attained Brahmaloṇa can exist with or without a body according to his liking.

IV.4.10 (543) There is absence (of body and organs, in the case of the liberated souls) (asserts) Bādari, for thus scripture says.

There follows a discussion whether the liberated soul possesses a body or not.

The passage "By his mere will the fathers rise" shows that the liberated soul possesses a mind, whereby he wills. A doubt arises whether he possesses a body and the organs.

The teacher Bādari says that he does not, because the scripture declares so, "And it is by means of the mind that he sees the desires and rejoices" (Chh. Up. VIII.12.5). This clearly indicates that he possesses only the mind and not the organs, etc. There are neither body nor sense-organs in the state of emancipation.

(531)

IV.4.11 (544) Jaimini (asserts that the liberated soul) possesses (a body and the organs) because the scriptures declare (the capacity on the part of such a soul to assume) various forms.

A contrary view to Sūtra 10 is adduced.

The teacher Jaimini is of the opinion that the liberated soul possesses a body and organs as well as a mind. the Chhandogya Upaniṣhad declares "He being one becomes three, five, seven, nine" (Chh. Up. VII.26.2). This text says that a liberated soul can assume more than one form.

This indicates that the released soul possesses besides the mind, a body and the organs.

IV.4.12 (545) For this reason Bādarāyaṇa opines that the released person is of both kinds as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice.

A decision is given on the conflicting views noted above.

Bādarāyaṇa affirms from the two-fold declarations of the two scriptures that a liberated soul who has attained Brahmaloḥa can exist both ways, with or without a body, according to his liking. It is like the twelve days' sacrifice, which is called a Satra as well as an Ahina sacrifice.

IV.4.13 (546) In the absence of a body (the fulfilment of desires is possible) as in dreams, as this is reasonable.

An inference is drawn from the conclusion arrived at in Sūtra 12.

When there is no body or sense-organs, the wished for objects are experienced by the liberated souls just as embodied persons experience joy in dreams.

(532)

IV.4.14 (547) When the body exists (the fulfilment of desires is) as in the waking state.

When there are the body and sense-organs, the wished for objects are experienced by the liberated souls, just as embodied persons experience joys in the waking state.

Topic 6: (Sūtras 15-16) The liberated soul which has attained the Saguna Brahman can animate several bodies at the same time.

IV.4.15 (548) The entering (of the released soul into several bodies) like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp because thus the scripture declares.

This Sūtra shows the possibility of the liberated soul of simultaneously possessing several bodies other than his own.

In Sūtra 11 it has been shown that a released soul can assume many bodies at the same time for enjoyment.

A doubt arises whether the bodies which the released create for themselves when rendering themselves threefold and so on are soulless like wooden figures or animated by souls like the bodies of men.

The Opponent maintains that as neither the soul nor the mind can be divided, they are joined with one body only, while other bodies are soulless. Other bodies are lifeless puppets. Enjoyment is possible only in that body in which the soul and mind exist.

This Sūtra refutes this view and says, "Like the flame of a lamp in their entering" i.e. just as the one flame of a lamp can enter into different wicks lighted from it, the released soul, although one only, multiplies itself through its lordly power and enters into all these bodies. It creates bodies with internal organs corresponding to the original internal organs and being limited by these divides itself as many. Therefore, all the created bodies have a soul which renders enjoyment through all of these bodies possible. Scripture declares that in this way one may become many. "He is onefold, he is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold" (Chh. Up. VII.6.2).

The Yoga Śhastras also make the same affirmation.

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IV.4.16 (549) (The declaration of absence of all cognition is made) having in view either of the two states, viz.; deep sleep and absolute union (with Brahman), for this is made clear (by the scriptures).

The range of knowledge of the liberated soul is now discussed.

The Opponent holds: How can lordly power, enabling the released soul to enter into several bodies and enjoy be admitted if we consider the different scriptural texts which declare that the soul in that state has not any specific cognition? e.g. “What should one know and through what?” (Bri. Up. II.4.14). “But there is not the second thing separate from it which it can know” (Bri. Up. IV.3.30). “It becomes like water, one, witness and without a second” (Bri. Up. IV.3.32).

This Sūtra says that these texts refer either to the state of deep sleep or to that of final release in which the soul attains absolute union with the Nirguna Brahman.

Those passages on the other hand, which describe lordly power refer to an altogether different condition which like the heavenly world, is an abode where knowledge of Saguna Brahman produces its results.

We have been discussing in the previous Sūtras about one who has not attained absolute union with Nirguna Brahman but only Brahmaloka. There is cognition in Brahmaloka. There is enjoyment also in heaven. The difference between heaven and Brahmaloka is that one does not return to this world from Brahmaloka whereas one returns to this universe from heaven when the results of his virtuous deeds have been exhausted.

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Topic 7: (Sūtras 17-22) The liberated soul which has attained Brahmaloaka has all the lordly powers except the power of creation.

IV.4.17 (550) (The liberated soul attains all lordly powers) except the power of creation, etc., on account of (the Lord being) the subject matter (of all texts where creation, etc., are referred to) and (the liberated souls) not being mentioned (in that connection).

A doubt here presents itself whether those who through meditation on the Saguna Brahman enter Brahmaloaka possess unlimited lordly power or power limited to some extent.

The Opponent maintains that their powers must be unlimited, because we meet with texts such as "They can roam at will in all the worlds" (Chh. Up. VII.25.2; VIII.1.6). "He obtains self-lordship" (Tait. Sam. I.6.2). "To him all the gods offer worship" (Tait. Sam. I.5.3).

"For him there is freedom in all worlds" (Chh. Up. VIII.1.6).

This Sūtra says that the liberated souls attain all lordly powers such as Anima, rendering oneself to atomic size, etc., except the power of creation, etc. Creation, preservation and destruction, on the other hand can belong to the everlastingly perfect Lord only. Why so? Because the Lord is the subject matter of all the texts dealing with creation, etc., while the released souls are not mentioned at all in this connection.

Further, this would lead to many Īśhwaras. If they have the power of creation of the universe they may not be of one mind. There may be

conflict of wills with respect to creation, etc. One may desire to create, and another to destroy. Such conflicts can only be avoided by assuming that the wishes of one should conform to those of another and from this it follows that all other souls depend on the Highest Lord.

Hence the powers of the released souls are not absolute but limited and are dependent on the will of the Lord.

(535)

IV.4.18 (551) If it be said that the liberated soul attains absolute powers on account of direct teaching of the scriptures, we say no; because the scriptures declare that the liberated soul attains Him who entrusts the sun, etc., with their offices and abides in those spheres.

An objection to Sūtra 17 is raised and refuted.

“He becomes the Lord of himself- Apnoti svarājyam” (Tait. Up. I.6). From the direct teaching of the Śhruti the Opponent maintains that the limited soul attains absolute powers.

This present Sūtra refutes this and says that his powers depend on the Lord, because the text cited further on says, “He attains the Lord of the mind, the Lord who dwells in spheres like the sun, etc., and entrusts the sun, etc., with offices.” Therefore, it is quite clear from this latter part of the text that the liberated soul obtains its powers from the Lord and depends on Him.

Hence its powers are not unlimited. He attains powers as the gift of the Supreme Lord who is in the sun, etc., and who bestows the function of controlling the orb of the sun, on the sun-god.

IV.4.19 (552) And (there is a form of the Supreme Lord) which is beyond all created things (because, so the scripture declares) (His) existence (in a two-fold form unmanifest and manifest).

The description of the status of the liberated soul is continued.

According to scripture, there is also an internal form of the Supreme Lord, which does not abide in effects. He is not only the ruling soul of the spheres of the sun and so on which lie within the sphere of what is effected.

The text declares this abiding in a two-fold form as follows: "Such is the greatness of it; greater than that is the Puruṣha; one foot of Him is all beings; His other three feet are what is immortal in heaven" (Chh. Up. III.12.6).

This text intimates that the Highest Lord abides in two forms, the transcendental and the relative.

He who meditates on the Lord in His relative aspect does not attain the transcendental aspect. He who worships the Lord as having form cannot attain the formless Brahman, because of the law of proportion of fruit to desire. The Śhruti declares "As one meditates upon That, so he becomes." As the meditator on the relative aspects of the Lord is unable to comprehend it fully, he attains only limited powers and not unlimited powers like the Lord Himself.

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IV.4.20 (553) And thus perception and inference show.

This Sūtra declares that the transcendental aspect of the Lord is established by both the Śhruti and Smṛiti. Śhruti and Smṛiti both

declare that the highest light does not abide within effected thing, "The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings and much less this fire" (Mun. Up. II.2.10). "The sun does not illumine it, nor the moon, nor fire" (Bhagavad Gītā, XV.6).

IV.4.21 (554) And because of the indications (in the scriptures) of equality (of the liberated soul with the Lord) only with respect to enjoyment.

That the powers of the liberated soul are not unlimited is also known from the indication in the Śhruti that the equality of these souls with the Lord is only with regard to enjoyment and not with respect to creation, etc.

"As all beings honour that Deity, so do all beings honour him who knows that" (Bri. Up. I.5.20). "Through it he attains identity with the Deity, or lives in the same world with it" (Bri. Up. I.5.23).

All these texts describe equality only with regard to enjoyment.

They do not mention anything with reference to creation, etc.

(537)

IV.4.22 (555) (There is) no return (for these liberated souls), on account of the scriptural statement (to that effect).

The discussion on the privileges of the liberated soul is concluded here.

The Opponent maintains: If the powers of the liberated souls are limited, then they too will come to an end like all limited mortal beings. Therefore, the liberated souls will have to return to this world from Brahmaloaka.

This Sūtra refutes this and says that those who go to Brahmaloḥa by the path of the gods do not return from there. Because scriptural passages teach that they do not so return. "Going up by that way, one reaches immortality" (Chh. Up. VIII.6.6). "Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man" (Chh. Up. IV.15.6).

"He reaches the world of Brahman and does not return" (Chh. Up. VII.15.1). "They no more return to this world" (Bri. Up. VI.2.15).

The repetition of the words "No return", etc., indicates that the book is finished.

Thus ends the Fourth Pada (Section 4) of the Fourth Chapter (Adhyāya IV) of the Brahma Sūtras or the Vedānta Philosophy of Śhrī Bādarāyaṇa or Śhrī Veda-Vyāsa or Śhrī Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipayana, the Avatara of Lord Śhrī Hari. May His blessings be upon you all.

HARI OM TAT SAT

Śhrī Sadguru Paramātmāne namaḥ –*'Salutations to the Guru, the Supreme Spirit'*

Om Śhrī Vedavyāsāya namaḥ –*'Salutations to Shri Ved Vyās' (the author)*

Om Purnam-adah Purnam-idam Purnāt Purnam-udachyate, Purnasya Purnam-ādaya Purnam-eva-vasishyate.

'That is complete, this is complete, from completeness, complete is come forth, from completeness is complete taken, yet it remains ever complete.'

Om Śhantiḥ Śhantiḥ Śhantiḥ

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Glossary of Sanskrit and other Philosophical terms used in the Brahma Sutra commentary.

Adhikaraṇa	Subject, topic
Adhyāya	Chapter
Ākāśha	Ether, space, sky. One of the five elements. Also called Vyoman, Nabhas, Viyat.
Akshaya	‘Undecaying, eternal’. Name of Brahman.
Akshara	‘Immutable, imperishable’ name of God. Also: letter, sound, Om.
Antaḥkaraṇa	Inner faculties, mind, thought, ego, soul, conscience.
Āśhrama	Hermitage. The four stages of life – Brahmachārya –‘celibate student’, Gṛihastha –‘householder’, Vānaprastha –‘forest dwelling’, Sannyāsa –‘renunciation’.
Ativādin	Having the Highest knowledge, best teacher.
Ātman	Individual Spirit, consciousness, Self.
Avidyā	Ignorance, false knowledge
Bhūmi	Earth. One of the five elements
Brahman (Brahma)	Formless All-pervading Consciousness, Supreme Spirit, God. Brahman has two forms, Nirguṇa –‘without attributes’ and Saguṇa –‘with attributes’ ie. the manifested Universe. The name of Shrī Brahmā, the Creator, is the same except that it is masculine, but the All-pervading Brahman is neuter.
Brāhmaṇa (Brahmin)	Highest of four castes. Spiritual souls, priests. Also spiritual texts commenting on the Vedas.
Caste	Belief in position by birth being divinely ordained. Four castes - Brāhmaṇa –‘priests’, Kshatriya –‘warriors’, Vaiśhyas –‘merchants’, Śhūdras –‘manual labourers’. First three are ‘twice-born’, given sacred thread and allowed to worship God.
Darśhana	Philosophy, viewpoint, teaching.
Dharma	Righteousness, duty, religion. From Dhṛ -‘to support’

Guṇa	Attribute, quality, mood. The three Guṇas are Tamas – ‘darkness, inertia’, Rajas – ‘passion, movement’ and Sattva – ‘Truth, existence’
Itihāsa	‘History’, the Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata epics.
Jīva	Individual soul, living person.
Jīvan-mukti	One who has attained liberation while alive.
Jyoti	Light, fire. One of the five elements.
Kośha	The five sheaths encapsulating the Ātmā – ‘Spirit’. They are Anna-maya Kośha – ‘sheath of food’ (physical body), Prāṇa-maya – ‘Sheath of breath’, Mano-maya – ‘heart/mind’, Vijñāna-maya – ‘intellect’, Ānanda-maya – ‘Sheath of Bliss’.
Kshatriya	Warrior/royal caste. Second of four castes.
Mahāsamādhi	‘Final absorption’, death
Monism	Non-duality, God and the Creation are one
Nirguṇa	Attribute-less, without manifestation or qualities.
Pada	Section, part
Pradhāna	Primary cause, primordial nature
Prajña (Pragñya)	Wisdom, intelligence, soul in deep sleep state.
Prakṛiti	Nature, primordial matter
Pralaya	Dissolution of the Creation at the end of time.
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā	Sacred text about the mantra portion of the Vedas.
Pūrva-pakṣha	First Objection. Pūrva – ‘first’, paksha – ‘objection, alternative view’. The Opponent or Devil’s Advocate.
Rajas	Passion, sky, movement. Guṇa – ‘mood’ of the Right Side.
Rāmānuja	11 th c. Tamil saint, influenced Vaishnavism – ‘worship of Vishnu’ and the Bhakti movement (Kabir, etc.)
Ṛishi	Sage, seer, saint
Saguṇa	Having attributes, manifested, experienced with the senses
Samādhi	Deep contemplation, absorbed in meditation

Samsāra	Worldly illusion, material existence
Saṅkhya (Samkhya)	Philosophy proposing Creation is a product of Pradhāna with 25 Tattwas –‘principles’
Sannyāsa	Complete Renunciation. The fourth stage of life (see Āśhrama)
Sattva	Truth, reality, goodness, peace. Guṇa –‘quality’ of the Centre Channel
Śhaṅkara	Śhri Ādi Śhaṅkarāchārya (c.500-800 CE) (‘beneficent’, name of Shiva)
Śhruti	‘Listened to’, orally transmitted sacred texts, eg. Vedas, Upanishads.
Smṛiti	‘Remembered’ texts such as Purānas, epics, poems, etc.
Śhūdra	Lowest of four castes. Not ‘twice-born’ ie. Initiated into Hinduism. (see ‘Caste’)
Śhraddhā	Faith, purity, belief.
Sūtra	Thread, string (of ...), aphorism. Sūtra-kāra –‘author’.
Swāmī	Lord, owner, sage
Tamas	Darkness, inertia, ignorance. Guṇa –‘attribute’ of Left Side.
Tanmātra	Subtle elements – smell, sight, taste, touch, sound.
Udgītha	‘The Chant’, Om, chanting the Vedas.
Upanayana	Sacred thread ceremony. Investiture into Hinduism.
Upāsana	Service, worship
Vedānta	‘Final knowledge’ (Veda –‘knowledge’, anta –‘end’) Hindu philosophy
Vidyā	Knowledge, learning, mantra lore.
Viśheṣha	Attribute, modification.
Viṣṇu	Supreme Being who takes incarnation to establish Dharma. (Rāma, Kṛiṣṇa, Jesus, etc.)